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Abstract 
In 1925, American internationalists launched an unofficial multinational 
conference in Honolulu, with participation of people from major Pacific 
rim countries including Japan, Australia and the USA. As a result, a 
permanent organization, the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), was 
founded. Through an examination of this institute, the thesis explore:: 
ideas of the 'international order' held by Wilsonian internationalists in 
the Asia-Pacific context in the inter-war period. 
The IPR reflected the new dynamism in internationill politics in the 1920s, 
resulting from the influence of Wilsonian internationalism and the ideas 
of a "Pacific Age". This "Pacific Age" in the IPR context was an American 
construct, and reflected American confidence in the Asia-Pacific. Inspired 
by Wilsonian internationalism and the concept of the new era, the IPR 
advocated 'unofficial diplomacy', new attitudes to the Orient and a Pacific-
centred perspective. It achieved certain success in these respects during 
the 1920s, but soon this new dynamism was lost. Although the IPR 
pioneered a regional-centred perspective and an idea of a regional 
community, it did not lead to the establishment of any regional 
an-angement. Instead key figures tried to make the IPR a more 'official' 
and world-oriented organization. As a result, the loss of the Pacific-
centred perspective and American centrality became increasingly evident 
within the IPR. 
This origi.nal IPR experiment was unsuccessful not because those who 
were involved in it unrealistically ignored the elements of the nation-
state system and power politics, but rather because they took these 
elements for granted. Soon within the IPR, certain assumptions became 
evident. These concerned the moral justice of the 'international order', 
the coherence of the nation-state and existence of the colonial system, and 
they became increasingly evident in the operations of the IPR during the 
1930s. While the nation-state assumption was not problematized among 
internationalists at the IPR in general, it was different for members of the 
Japanese Council of the IPR. Japanese military action after 1931 was seen 
as a challenge to the 'international order', and the dual loyalty of Japanese 
internationalists both to the nation-state and the 'international 
community', which existed from the beginning of the internationalist 
movement in Japan, became problematic. The same dual loye.lty, 
however, existed among other members of the IPR. 
Despite the historicity of these assumptions, the moral justice of the 
'international order' and the national coherence was not generally 
challenf;ed in the discourse of international politics even after WWII. 
vi 
The tre:ids which emerged within the IPR in the 1930s and 1940s, the loss 
of Pacific-centrality and American dominance, remained dominant in the 
discourse after WWII. A re-examination of the experiment of the IPR i!l 
the inter-war period can, therefore, clarify the historicity and limit?tions 
of these notions, and open the path for the possibility in ?. new age of the 
Asia-Pacific in this post-Cold 'i'lar period. 
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A Note ott Conventions 
Japanese personal names throughout the thesis are presented in Japanese 
form-that is, with the surname followed by the given name. Exceptions 
to this convention are made onlv in the case of Japanese scholars Jong 
resident outside Japan, whose names are conventionally presented in the 
English literature in the form in which the given names is followed by the 
surname. Macron marks have been used where relevant in all cases 
except where the word in question appears so commonly in English 
without macrons that such usage has relatively become standard. I 
applied the latter convention to names of Japanese cities such as Tokyo 
and Kyoto, names of the period such as Taisho and Showa, and names of 
regions in Japan such as KaP.!R and Chugoku. These names, therefore, 
appear without Macron marks in this thesis. 
-AA 
ACIPR 
ACTU 
AIIA 
AUH 
AUM 
BIIA 
BL 
BLCU 
CFR 
CH 
FLUS 
GC 
GS 
HI 
IPR 
ISIPR 
JARC 
JCIPR 
LCH 
LESU 
LHU 
LL SEP 
LSRM 
ML 
NLA 
oc 
PWW 
RFmA 
RFnA 
RIIA 
SEDS 
TMCK 
TYB 
Abbreviation 
: Australian Archi,1es 
: American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations 
: American Centre of Tokyo University 
: Australian Institute of International Affairs 
: Archives ot l'niversity of Hawaii at Manoa 
: Archives of University of Melbourne 
: British Institute of International Affairs 
: Bodleian Library 
: Butler Library of Columbia University 
: Council on F:ireign Relations 
: Chatham House 
: Fisher Library of the University of Sydney 
: Glavor Cottcge 
: Gaiko shir . )kan 
: Hoover · ·" ; mt.~ 
: InstitoJ.tt! 01 Pacitlc Relations 
: Internatimrnl Secretariat of the IPR 
: Japanese American Relations Committee 
: Japan?.se Council of the lPR 
: Library of Chatham House 
: Library of English Speaking Union 
: Library of Hitotsubashi University 
: Library of Lcindon School of Econorn~cs and Politics 
: Laura Spelman RockefeJler Memorial Collections 
: MitcheJI Librn.ry 
: National Lib1;1ry of Australia 
: Okubo CoJlr.ction 
: Paper of Woodrow Wilson 
: RockefeJler Family Archives 
: Rockefelle:r Foundation Arch:.ves 
: Royal Institute of International Affairs 
: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryo 
: Taiheiyo mondai chosakai kankei ikken 
: Takagi Yasaka bunko 
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Introduction 
In 1927, Herbert Croly, Editor of New Republic, who had been involved in 
the formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 192:3, 
participated the second IPR conference, and described it as an innovative 
experiment in terms of perception and practice in international politics. 
[The IPR's] function is really novel and l~.ore radical than these 
delegates seemed to realize. It is an experiment in the use of the 
understanding in elucidating and integrating political 
relationship. If it carries on its work with any success, it may 
eventually exercise an important influence on the world of affairs 
in the Pacific .. .1 
The IPR was experimental because it pioneered research on current affairs 
in the Asia-Pacific region, promoted the new concepts of the "Pacific Age" 
and the "Pacific community", and advocated 'unofficial diplomacy' and 
new attitudes to the 'Orient'. 
The aims of this thesis are twofold. First, it describes the intellectual and 
institutional emergence of the IPR as one of the first International Non-
Governmental Org;mizations (INGO) in the Asia-Pacific region i.n the 
inter-war period. Second, it examines the nature of the 'internati·:malism' 
held by IPR members by focusing on the Institute' s role as an ad,.'ocate of 
'unofficial diplomacy' and of new attitudes to the Orient. The main aim 
of the thesis, therefore, is not to assess the political influence of the IPR in 
foreign policy-making, but rather to illuminate the intellectual framework 
which shaped the Institute's creation and influenced its inter-war 
activities. 
The term INGO is a post-WWII invention. It was first defined by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations in 1948 to mean 'any 
international organization which is not established by intergovernmental 
I H. Croly, 'Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' in J.B. Condliffe ed., Problems of the 
Pacific, 1927 (Chicago: Unive1. 'ty of Chicago Press, 1928), p. 578. 
agreement'. 2 In the inter-war period, the term 'private international 
organization' was used. L. C. White's pioneering work on these 
organizations, published in 1933, defined the IPR as une of the 'private 
international organizations',3 and pointed out that the IPR was the only 
organization of this kind which had the headquarters in the Pacific 
region.4 White defines 'private' in terms of the nature of membership in 
1933 rather than in terms of the way an organization was established.5 
However, because he uses the term 'private' in opposition to 'public', 
'official' or 'governmental',6 I use the term !NGO for the inter-war period 
in this thesis.7 
2 
Because of its experimental and pioneering role, the IPR in the inter-war 
period provides a fascinating story, which had been largely neglected. 
After the first conference in 1925,B i;i·•ulving the influential people 
mainly from the Pacific rim countries, the IPR was established ()5 a 
permanent institution with its headquarters: the International Secretariat 
0f fr,c IPR (ISIPR): in Honolulu. After the first conference, National 
Councils of the IPR were founded independently in Australia, Britain, 
Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, the USA and 
later in France, Holland and the USSR. The executive body of the 
Jnstitute, the Pacific Council, consisted of representatives from these 
National Councils. The ISIPR organized conferences every few years 
(every two years in 1925-1933, and every three years in 1933-1945), which 
were attended by members and non-me1nbers of these National Councils. 
The participants met and discussed the major issues of the day, formed 
2 'Arrangements of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations for Consultation 
with Non-Governmental Organizations, Guide for Consultations,' 30 April, 19-18. 
3 Layman Cromwell While, The Structure of Private 111ter11atio11al Orga11izatio11s 
(Philadelphia, Penn: George S. Ferguson Company, 1933), p.130-131. 
4 As Chapter One, Section Four clarifies, there were 'private international organiz<:>Lions' 
w i, .. headquarters localed in New York, Washington D. C. and Chicago in ~his 
period, but these places were not regarded as within the rei,<ion. Sec Chaylc» One, 
Section Four, for the details. 
5 L. C. White_. Private /11ter11atio11a1 Orga11izatio11s, p.14 
6 Ibid., pp.13-14. 
7 In the sat71E .nMncr, White's work of 1951 uses the term INGO for the organizations 
which he defined 'private international organizations' in 1933. L. C. White, 
l11ter11atio11al No11-Gover11111e11tal orga11izatio11s: Their Purpose, Metliods, a11d 
Accomplis/1111e11ts (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1?51), p.ix. 
8 For the details of the conference, sec Appendix A. 
networks, and came home and publicized their experiences at the 
conferences. 
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The academic neglect of the IPR in the inter-war period has mainly been 
caused by the dominant image of the IPR after ; ·142 and especially in the 
1950s. In this period, it was portrayed as a communist front organization. 
and was believed by some to be responsible for the American "loss of 
China". Many studies of the IPR, therefore, have regarded it as an 
American organization, and the main concern of these works has been the 
IPR's influence on American foreign policies towards China in the 1940s-
1960s.9 
In the inter-war period, however, the IPR was seen in a totally different 
way. It was regarded as 'a prestigious study and discussion group' on Asia 
and the Pacific.IO The IPR was significant for several reasons. One reason 
was its pioneering role in 'contemporary' regional ~·:udies, especially on 
Asia.11 These works by and in association with the IPR must have 
influenced the way in which scholars constructed knowledge of the 
region: knowledge which was distributed through IPR channels and 
9 ). N. Thomas, T/Je Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Sclwlars and American Politics 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); G. H. Davis, T/Je Dissolution of t/Je 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944-1961, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of 
Chicago, I966); T. E. Carpenter III, T/Je Institute of Pacific Relations and American 
Foreign Policy, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, I968); 
and B. L. Martin, Interpretations of United States Policy toward t/Je Chinese 
Communists, 1944-1968, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy, I 968). The tendency to focus on political influence was also seen in studies of 
IPR related organizations in Britain and Australia. C. Thorn, 'Chatham House, 
Whitehall. and Far Eastern ifsues, 1941-1945,' International Affairs, Vol.54, No.I 
(January, 1978), and W. D. Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the Australian 
Institute of International Affairs: Some Personal Recollections,' Australian Outlook, 
Vol.28, No.I (April, I978). 
JO R. Newman, Owen Lattimore and t/Je "Loss" of C/Jina (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, I 992), p.22. 
11 For the pioneering role of the IPR in Asian studies in the USA, Austraiia and Japan, sec 
j. Thomas, The Institute of Pacific Relations, H. Borton, Saito M. trans., 'Nihon kcnkyil 
no kaitakushatachi,' in Hosoya C. and Saito M. eds., Was/Jin ton taisei to nicl1ibei 
kankei (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), Nick Brown,' Australian intellectuals and 
the image of Asia, 1920-1960,' Australian Cultural History, No.9 (I990), and I-Iara 
Kakuten, Gendai Ajia kenkya seiritsus/Jiron (Kciso shobO, I984). The IPR promoted 
regional studies on the Asia-Pacific region not only in English speaking countries, but 
also in France and Holland. 
contributed to images in academia, press and governmental circles. 
Furthermore the knowledge constructed through the IPR not only 
reflected the intellectual paradigm of the time, but also inf! uenced later 
works in area studies and International Relations because it defined the 
initial framework of these fields in their formative period.12 
4 
Besides this knowledge, the experience which the IPR provided in the 
inter-war period was important. Its conference was one of the ver~· few 
occasions where 'unofficial' but influential figures from within and 
outside Asia exchanged their ideas. John Fairbank describes IPR 
conferences in the 1920s and 1930s as 'important events, peopled with 
leading personalities and charged with excitement'. He further states that 
'foreign offices, corporations, and the press took them seriously, and 
participants were often profoundly influenced by the experience'.13 
The IPR's entire operatiol''> were new and experimental. The Institute 
promoted the concept of the "Pacific Age" and the "Pacific community", 
and attracted many in various countries, who saw a new opportunity in 
the Pacific. In other words, the IPR was an organ in initiating and 
diss<:>mir.ating ideas through the conferences. At a time when there was no 
model to follow in the region, its members tried to transform their 
visions into reality through the institutions of the ISIPR, National 
Councils and the various other activities of the IPR such as research 
programs. 
Fairbank argues that 'the IPR in its day stood almost alone as the 
protagonist of international integration in the Pacific area' .1 4 By 
'international integration', Fairbank means the extension of 'international 
stability and justice' into the region, and he empha5izes the :.ignificance of 
12 Regarding the influence of British members of the IPR in the International Relations in 
Britain, sec Roger Morgan, 'The Study of International Politics,' in R. Murgan ed., The 
Study of International Affairs: Essays in Honour of Kenneth Younger (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), p.277, and Richard Higgott and Dian Stone, 'The Limits of 
Influence: Foreign Policy Think Tanks in Britain and the USA,' Review of International 
Studies, Vol.21 (1994),pp.1-20. 
13 John Fairbanl< 'William L. Holland and the IPR in Historical Perspective,' Pacific 
Affairs, Vol.52, No.4 (Winter.1979-1980), p.589. 
14 Ibid., p.587. 
·~~~------------............ ... 
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the IPR in 'the advancement of the int€gration of the international 
society'.15 Recent studies on the IPR have begun to recognize this aspect, 
and to see the IPR not as an American organization, bu.t an INGO, and its 
role in the regional in<egration.16 As the result of this shift of the 
perspective, scholars started to see the IPR beyond American context, and a 
few works have exan:ined the IPR in the Japanese context in the inter-war 
period.1 7 Nakami's work concludes that the immediate influence of the 
IPR on governmental policies and public opinion-making was 
insignificant in Japan in the inter-war period.18 
The crucial question which has remained t.:i be asked, however, concerns 
the nature of this 'international society' or 'international community', 
which the IPR was perceived to have promoted. In other words, what was 
the nature of the internationalism which IPR members advocated in the 
inter-war period? How was their internationalism implemented in the 
institutions of the IPR, and how was their internationalism seen in 
various countries? In this thesis, I take the nature of internationalism as a 
central theme, and examine it by analysing how IPR members 
accommodated concepts such as the nation-state, unofficialness, the 
Orient and the Pacific in their visions of the 'international community'. 
In this way, I hope to illuminate the possibilities and limitations of the 
experiment of the IPR as well as of the 'international community' they 
imagined. 
An e;:amination of perceptions of the 'international community' or the 
'intc!:»ational order' in this period is important because it can contribute 
l5 Ibid. 
!6 Lawrence Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Relations (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 
Yamaoka Michio, Ajia Tai11eiyo jidai ni mukete: Sano zenshi to shite no taiheiyo 
monc.ai chi5saka i to taihe iyo ka igi (Hokuju shuppan, 1991) and Pekka Korhonen, 'The 
Concept of the Pacific Age in History,' a paper presented al the Seventh International 
Conference of the European Association of Japanese Studies, Copenhagen, 22-26, Augus~ 
1994. 
17 Nakami Mari, 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' Slliso, No. 728 
(February, 1985), and Katagiri Nobuo, 'Senkanki laiheiyi5 jidai no anzen hoshi5 imeji,' 
.'Cokusai seiji, No. 102 (February, 1993). 
18 Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai rhosakai,' p.116-117. 
to a re-evaluation of Wilsonian internationalism. Those who were 
involved in the IPR in various countries were n-.ainly Wilsonian 
internationalists. Their experiment at the IPR, therefore, presents a rare 
case study to examine the nature of Wilsonian internationalism in the 
non European context. 
6 
The term 'internationalism' in this thesis refers to visions of the 
'international community' and activities to promote these visions. 
Internationalists tried to transform these visions into institutions. While 
peace was one important goal of these visions, this did not mean that war 
was rejected as a means of achieving peace. Internationalism was, 
therefore, a part of the peace movement, but not identical to pacifism.19 
Internationalism in the inter-war period was ba:;ed on inter-state 
activities. It included both 'non-governmental' and 'gover · ital' 
activities, but the distinction between them was ambiguL· . 11 ... 
ambiguity originated from the perceptio'l cf the state as a monolithic 
entity, and the strong tendency of internationalists to identify with the 
nation-state. The historicity of the assumption of a unified nation-state 
and of the 'internationalism' based on this assumption has been clarified 
by recent works on transnationalism.2° These works define 
'internationalism' as inter-state or inter-governmental activities,21 and 
transnational relations as' sets of direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that are not controlled or closely guided by the 
19 I take Ccadel's definition of 'pacifism'. According lo him, pacifism denies war as 
always wrong. For the position which secs war is sometimes necessary to achieve peace, 
he uses the term 'pacificism'. M. Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining of 
a Faith (Oxford: Oarendon Press, 1980), p.3. 
20 These works intend to fill a gap in stale-centred discourse by emphasizing non-
governmental relations. Joseph S. Nye Jr and Rohen 0. Keohane, 'Transnational 
Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,' in R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye Jr eds., 
Transnational Relations and World Poli:ic~ (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1972), pp.ix-x. 
21 Some dismiss internationalism as inherently inefficicttt and insignificant. Samuel P. 
Huntington, 'Transnational art-:. 1izations in world politics,' in Richard Little and 
Michael Smith eds., Perspectives 011 World Politics (New York: RouLlcdgc, 1991. second 
edition), pp.214-215. But others such as Keohane and Nye acknowledge a more positive 
side to .t. Keohane and Nye, 'Transgovcmmental relations and international 
organizations,' in Lillie and Smith eds., Perspectives on World Politics, pp.230-231 and 
2'l8. 
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policies of the cabinets or chief ,·xecutives of those governments'.2~ While 
the nation-state still remains dominant in the discourse of Inte;1 ational 
Relations today,23 the emergence cf the concept of transnationaltsm 
reflects changing perceptions of the state in the recent decades. The crucial 
point of Keohane and Nye on transnationalism, for example, is that the 
state is not seen as monolithic, but as a composite of sub-units. Just as 
transnationalism is an historical phenomenon, internationalism came 
into being at the specific moment when the state was seen as the ultimate 
entity. 
An historical re-evaluation of Wilsonian internationalism is important. 
Current criticism or re-appraisal of Wilsonian internationalism seems to 
be carried out with little regard to the historical context, and without 
questioning the historicity of certain concepts. There is a tendency either 
to applaud it too readily,24 or dismiss it without adequate examination. 
The dismissal of Wilsonianism is related to a tendency for theorists of 
International Relations to neglect the importance of the inter-war 
period.25 The inter-war period was, however, a ~i;_;nificant period in the 
formation not only of the discipline of Internalh.mal Relations, but also of 
the discourse of international politics in the twentieth century, and 
Wilsonians played a significant role in this formation.26 
22 Ibid., p.232. 
23 J. George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)J11trod11ction to Intcmational 
Relations (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p.72. 
24 Arthur Schlesinger Jr asserts, 'We are all, more or less, Wilsonians today'. A. 
Schlesinger Jr,' A Living Thing is Horn: Woodrow Wilson's Fight for the Federation of 
the World,' Times Literary Supplement, May 21, 1993, p.3. Francis Fukuyama's work 
seems to be a declaration of the triumph of Wilsonianism. F. Fukuyama, T/1e End of 
History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
25 Even the works whicl1 question the dominant assumptions of international politics lend 
to focus on the beginning of the nation-stale system in the sixteenth century. Michael 
Banks, 'The Evolution of International Relations Theory,' in M. Banks ed., Conflict in 
World Society: A New Perspective on International Relations (Brighton, Whcatsheaf 
Books, 1984), p.8, Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics, pp. 74-83, and Robert 
Walker, 'The Prince and "The Pauper": Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the Theory 
of International Relations,' in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro eds., 
lntemational/lntertextlial Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics (London: 
Lexington Books, 1989), p.29. 
26 The new book by R. Steel, Temptations of a Superpower, which is pu!ilished too late lo 
put into this thesis, seems to suggest the need to examine the nature of 'Nilsonian . 
internationalism in order to put th~ present Americ~ foreign policy int~~ persreclive. 
The book reflects the loss of the confidence of Amencan global leadership, and tls 
------___________ BE_:·;~-.:~~:·,; 
Wilsonian internationalism constituted the core ideal of the IPR 
founders, and it was the main form of internationalism in this period. 
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IPR members were inspired by Woodrow Wilson's vision for the 
'international community', based on his principles for the conduct of 
internatiunal affairs, such as anti-imperialism, open diplomacy and self-
detf:rmination. \'\Tilson' s visions attracted the minds of many for several 
reasons. He represented the American vision of itselr as a leader in the 
world, and his visions reflected ilis belief in social reforms. These ideas 
gave hope for the new era, without destroying existing frameworks. 
Because his vision was central to the foundation of the League of Nations, 
I use the term "Wilsonians" or "Wilsonian internationalists" to refer to 
supporters not only of the Wilsouian vision, but also of the Leagur~ of 
Nations. 
One of the ideas promoted by Wilsonian internati.on< !i ,m was crucial in 
the setting of the IPR. This was the recognition of non-governmental 
forces in international relations. The idei1 originated in the principle of 
New Diplomacy, which meant ditJlomacy open to public scrutiny, as 
opposed to the 'ol:" diplomacy cf secret treaties between politicians. 
White in his 1933 study argues the significance of non-governmental 
forces in the 1920s: 
[Private international organizations] are more important than 
many of t!ie public international organizations and exert a greater 
influence Jn international affairs. [They] come into direct contact 
with ma1..i more individuals .... The effect of this in promoting 
international friendship and understanding ... is undoubtedly of 
great importance.27 
:entral argument seems lo be that the USA should improve the domestic conditions 
oefore it commit lo the welfare d the rest of the world. The review article, however, 
seems to be too clear about the division between Democrat's and Republican foreign 
policies. Peter W. Rodman, 'Superpower Survives,' Times Literary Supplement, 9 June, 
1995, p.6. 
27 L. C. White, Private International Organizations, p.12. 
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Similarly in 1930, Alfred Zimmern (1879-1957), a British Professor of 
Internationai Politics2B and ardent League supporter,29 summarized the 
work of the League of Nations in the 1920s as follows: '(T]he most striking 
achievements in international policy in the last decade have not beer. due 
to the deciswu;; of statesmen but to the 'recommendations' of expens'.3~ 
He was aware of the limitation of experts in tr~.nscending national pride 
or personal motives, and of the possibility that their recommendations for 
'practical policies' would be dismissed as 'utopian' not. because they were 
invalid, but becaus~ political interests were at stake.31 Like Zimmern, 
inany Wilsr:inians were non-official' experts' in international politics, and 
had similar views of their owr. significance. It was in this specific 
context that the IPR came into being in 1925. It aimed to become an 
'expert' body in regional affairs, and as demonstrated in the following 
chapters, this goal became increasingly clear as time went on. 
The growing recognition of the role of non-govermn,;;ntal expert bodies in 
international politics prompted E. H. Carr to criticize influential 
Wilsonians at the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s. While his 
criticism led many to mistakenly think of Wilsonians as 'utopian 
cosmopolitans', as Chapter One clt.monstrates, they in fact operated on a 
firm basis of the nation-state system and power politics. For Carr (1892-
1982), a cliplomat until his mid-forties,32 however, the true experts un 
foreign affairs were diplomats and soldiers, not ir.tellectuals 'divorced 
from reality' .33 'Practice, not theory, bureaucratic training, not intellectual 
brilliance, is the school of political wisdom'.34 While equally dismissive 
about 'theorist' and 'utopian' elements,35 Wilsonians strongly advocated 
28 1-1° was Professor of International Politics al Aberystwyth in 1919-1920 and at Oxford in 
1930-1944. 
29 A. Zimmern, 'Democracy and the Expert,' Political Quarterly, Vo!.1 (1930), pp.13-14. 
30 Ibid., p.15. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Norman Stone, 'Grim Eminence,' umdon Review of Books, 20 Jmrnary-3 February, 1983, 
p.3. 
33 E. H. Carr, Tlie Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: '' l Introduction to tlie Study of 
lnterna!ional Relations (London: Papermac, 1993, first published in 1939, second edition 
appeared in 1946), p.1. 
34 Ibid., p.16. 
35 Zimmern criticized World Court as an academic dr~am. He argued the importance of 
immediate need rather than principle. A. Zimmern, T/Je Prospects of Democracy: And 
ot/Jer Essays (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), pp.195 and 213. 
the role of non-officials in international politics. The issue between 
Wilsonians and Carr was, therefore, over the role of non-governmental 
actors in international politics and the meaning of nation-state for these 
actors. 
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Carr's criticism influenced not only later scholars' evaluation of 
'\!Vilsonian internationalism, but also their interpretation of the political 
events of the inter-war period. His Twenty Years' Crisis appeared in 1939: 
on the eve of WWII and at a time when the 'failure' of the League of 
Nations, and the Wilsonian internationalism on which it was based, was 
widely accepted. As the subtitle of The Twenty Years' Crisis, An 
lntroduction to the Study of International Relations, shows, it is the dassic 
of the discipline of International Relations, and its influence still remains 
significant. In this respect, Carr's work helped to obscure the complexity of 
Wilsonianism, and to construct a simplistic: dichotomy between pre-war 
and post-war. 
Carr, however, pointed out the nature of the 'international order' which 
Wilsonians and the founders of the IPR accepted without question. He 
argued that the international order was determined by the dominant 
powers at a specific time, and peace meant the defence of the status quo of 
the powerful at the expense of the powerless.36 While his other criticisms 
of Wilsonians have been widely accepted, this criticism of the nature of 
the 'international order' has been largely ignored not only by Wilsonians 
in the inter-war period, but also by later scholars. This question is crucial 
in understanding the Wilsonians and their reaction to Japanese '- :ilitary 
intervention in Manchuria, an incident which inevitably affected the IPR. 
Carr's insight on this point is important to this thesis which examines 
Wilsonians at the IPR headquarters and the Japanese Council of the IPR, 
and their relations in the 1930s. 
Despite Carr's insight, some later scholars remain unchallenging about the 
nature of the 'international order' of the time. A recent study on Japanese 
internationalists, for example, defined inte!"nationalists ::.n Japan as: 
36 E. H. Carr, Tlze Twenty Years' Crisis, pp.78~0. 
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those who were ideologically committed to international 
institutions; those who felt Japan could not stand up against the 
world and were inclined to consult, and seek agreement with, 
foreign powers; and those who felt that Japan, who no longer had 
a foreign ally, should act circumspectly on the international 
scene.37 
In this definition, the absolute position of the international 
institutions/ scene, which is used identically with the international order, 
is assumed. It existed and Japanese internationalists were expected to 
cooperate in it. A majority of . i1'Jse who participated in the discourse of 
international politics, including Wilsonians, not only thought that the 
internat:onal order existed 'out there', but also argued thc\t it was 
inherently 'right' and had to be preserved. This assumption is crucial to 
an understanding of Wilsonians who seldom questioned the 
fundamental justice of the international order. The adjective 'idealist' as a 
descriptior. of Wilsonians is, therefore, misleading. 
Christopher Thorne saw the same assumption at work in the judgement 
given at the Tokyo Tribunal, which convicted those who plotted a 
challenge to the international order. He quotes Justice Pal, an Indian 
judge at the Tribunal: 
[W]hen Japan came on the field there had already been the Anglo-
American economic world order leaving no space for expansion to 
any new power .... Even peaceful pursuit on the part of a new 
aspirant would thus involve some apprehension from their 
privileged participants, especially when their whole conception of 
the evolution of human affairs from a distant past towards a 
distant future was that the future belong to them only, and that 
others had fulfilled their destined function in history by 
ministering to the divinely appointed advancement of ~hem~ 
This illustrates the 'historicity' of the international order which Carr 
pointed out. Pal's opinion, however, belonged to a minority at that time. 
37 Ian Nish, ].~pan's Struggle with lntemationalisrn: Japan, China and the League of 
Nations, 1931-1933 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p.8. 
38 lMTFE, Judgement, Vols, pp.157-158 and 732-731, cited in Christopher Thorn~Tlze 
Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931-33 
(New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), p.418. 
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The 'justice' of the international order which was assumed by Wilsonians 
has continued to be accepted by a majority of people, including many who 
are dismissive of Wilsonians. This assumption has led to a simplistic, but 
popular perception of the dichotomy between good 'internationalists' and 
bad 'nationalists' in the 1930s. According to this framework, 
internationalists were' out-manoeuvred'39 and suppressed by nationJlists. 
Thb dichotomy was, however, false. Wi!.;onian internationalists did not 
deny the nation-state system, nor loyalty to one's own nation, as Chapter 
One demonstrates. A dual loyalty to the nation-state and the 
international community always existed. They were not utopian 
cosmopolitans or believers in laissez-faire. They saw state intervention as 
a moral good, while acknowledging the contradiction between the state's 
role as provider of social welfare and suppressor of individual rights. 
They tried to promote ?.n international order based upon reformist 
principle~ .,imilar to those they advocated for domestic politics. The basis 
of the order for them was the nation-state, and they knew that in times of 
crisis the nation would take priority over their commitment to the 
international order. 
Questioning the historicity of the international order does not imply a 
justification of the actions resulting from the ideological challenge to that 
order, which took the form of Japanese military aggression in Asia during 
WWII, and the domestic suppression of human rights in Japan. Rather, 
the question should open up various issues which were marginalized and 
ignored by the accepted assumptions. In this way, Wilsonian 
internationalism can be understood not in simplistic opposition to 
'nationalism', but in the context of the power strur.ture of international 
politics and the nation_al mobilization of domestic politics during the 
inter-war period. 
The significance of the IPR increases because of its original and pioneering 
position in the Pacific. The thesis sees the IPR as one of the first attempts 
not only to advocate regional integration, but also to see the Orient as an 
39 I. Nish, Japan's Struggle with Internationalism, p.243. 
emerging power. While internationalist movements and their 
organizations were centred mostly in Europe, the original regional 
emphasis and location of the IPR inevitably brought out certain issues 
which would not have been considered by other organizations. These 
issues were: the positions of the Orient (race/ culture/ country) and the 
Pacific (region) in the 'international community'. 
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In this thesis, I define the 'Orient' and the 'Pacific' in the sense which was 
used by contemporaries at the IPR. The 'Orient' is not a neutral term, but 
has political implications which result from its construction by the 
European and American powers. With this in mind, I nevertheless use 
the term without quotation marks. I follow the usage common in the IPR 
in the inter-war period. In this context, the Orient was equated with East 
Asia, especially Japan and China, and referred to the 
races/ cultures/ people/ countries/ region of East Asia. In a similar manner, 
I use the term the Pacific as contemporaries used it. The Pacific meant 
what is now called the "Asia-P,:.cific", although in the IPR context, the 
emphasis on the Pacific rim was far greater than on the Pacific islands. 
For most Wilsonian internationalists in Europe, the Pacific and the Orient 
remained insignificant and on the periphery. Their imagined 
international community emerged in a specific context. The context was 
urban, bourgeois and Western European. But as soon as this imagination 
was institutionalized, it had to tr'•nscend its original context, and the 
relationship of this centre with the 'other' became a problem. Wilsonians 
were not crude imperialists. They were not military chauvinists who 
supported colonial exploitation or territorial expansion by military action 
as a desirable means. They did advocate paternalistic guidance in dealing 
with their colonies, and to this extent their approach was based rm the 
assumption of the dominance of 'West' over 'East'. 
This centrality and dominance of Western Europe in international politic.; 
which Carr and Wilsonians assumed was not questioned vocally among 
scholars in Europe and North America until after WWII. One of the most 
influential works in this aspect was that of Edward Said in the late 1970s. 
He argued the neglect of the race I culture dimension in the field of 
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international politics.4° His challenge was to the dominance not only of 
Western Europe, but also of the USA which had been the major power 
after WWII. His perspective partially reflected the development of racial 
equality in domestic poiitics, such as the advancement of the civil rights 
movements in the USA. C:ur and Wilsonians did not even contemplate 
questioning the dominant paradigm of the day. 
While Carr, Wilsonians and even Said assumed certain relations between 
'East' and 'West', Japan did not exactly fit into the power relationship of a 
strong 'West' and weak 'East'. It was non Euro-American, but with power. 
In this sense, the disc0urse which Said terms Orientalism, and which, he 
argues, promotes 'Western' domination over the 'East', !of _sits relevance 
in dealing with Japan.41 The 'Orient' as the' other' to the dominant Euro-
American powers did not, therefore, provide::. united analytical identity 
in international politics. The form of the discourse between non Euro-
American 'power' and the 'other' was more complex than one-way 
imposition and needs further examination.42 
The IPR was one of the first attempts to seek a new style of discourse with 
the 'Orient with power'. Significantly, it was initiated by Americans, not 
Europeans, with enthusiastic support from Japan and China. Unlike 
other INGOs of the time, the IPR focused on Asia, or what was called the 
Orient. Because the initial main concern at the IPR was 'race relations in 
the Pacific', its documents shed a new light on the racial/cultural 
dimension of Wilsonianism as well as the complex nature of the 
discourse. The source materials not only in the USA, but also in Japan 
and Australia, have enabled the thesis to avoid falling into a simplistic 
one-way portrayal of the discourse between 'West' and 'East'. 
40 Edward Said, Orienta/ism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin Books, 
1991, first published in 1978). 
41 Even in the 1970s, Said sees it as one-way imposition of a dominant 'West' on a subdued 
'East'. E. Said, Orienta/ism, p.3. Although he emphasizes interactive aspects in his 
recent work, Culture and Imperialism, interaction only takes the form of resb!;!Ilce. E. 
Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), especially Chapter 
Three 
42 Kan Sanjun and Murai Osamu, 'Ranhansha suru Orientarizumu,' Gendai shiso, Vol.21, 
No.5 (May 1993), p.186. On the complexity of the Orient in Japan as its national 
identification tool, sec Stephan Tanaka, Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p.18. 
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ihe central argument of the thesis is that the IPR reflected the new 
dynamism of international politics in the 1920s, and pioneered 'unofficial 
diplomacy', new attitudes to the Orient and a Pacific-centred perspective, 
but that by the early 1930s this nEw dynamism was lost and key figures 
were pushing the IPR in a more 'dficial' and world-oriented (as opposed 
to regional-oriented) direction. This 'failure' of the initial experiment 
arose not from the 'unrealistic' nature of IPR members, but from the very 
perceptions implicit in the original setting of the IPR. These perceptions 
were a belief in the moral justice of the 'international order', an 
assumption of the coherence of the nation-state, and the colonial system. 
Except in the case of t!:~ Japanese Council of the IPR, these perceptions did 
not cause problems for IPR members in general, and their hold on the 
imaginations of key IPR figures strengthened during the l930s. In this 
process, American centrality became increasingly evid~nt within the 
ISIPR, IPR conferences and its projects. 
In this thesis, a coherent internationalism within the IPR is not assumed. 
The Institute was an organization with a central secretariat and national 
councils, and it organized conferences every two or three years, which 
members and non-n1embers attended. The 'IPR', therefore, implied 
various levels of organization as well as the whole: individual 
participants and members, National Councils, the ISIPR, the executive 
body (the Pacific Council) and the conferences. 
To examine internationalism at the IPR and its implementation by the 
IPR, the thesis focuses on the ISIPR which was located in the USA, on the 
National Councils in Japan and Australia, and on the conferences. The 
ISIPR and conferences were the essential parts of the IPR's institutional 
structure. Because of the nature of the relationship between the ISIPR and 
the American Council, and because of the American initiative in creating 
the IPR, the American context is examined. The Japanese Council 
GCIPR)43 was chosen because of the position of Japan in international 
43 Although there were some variations in the translation, the Japanese name of the JCIPR 
was Taiheiyomondai cl1osakai, and the IPR was translated in Japanese as Taiheiyo 
kaigi. Nakami and Wilson use the term the Japan Council of the IPR, not the Japanes" 
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politics as the first non Euro-American great power.44 Japan's peculiar 
position led members of the JCIPR to question some of the assumptions 
about the absolute nature of the international order. The Australian 
Council was chosen as Australia was, in contrast to Japan, a small Pacific 
power with a dominant European population. Australia was also 
significant because of its connection with Britain, a European power 
which certainly differed in its understanding of politics in the Pacific. The 
thesis uses the British sources which have not been used in the previous 
studies on the IPR, and w,1ich put the IPR in a new perspective. While 
acknowledging the importance of other councils such as the Chinese 
Council, and IPR organs such as Pacific Affairs, Far Eastern Survey and 
other research projects, this thesis does not directly address their roles. 
Covering three countries requires extensive reading in the diplomatic and 
intellectual history of these countries. The thesis does not claim to have 
exhausted the literature, but it is one of the first attempts to put forward 
such a synthesis. Documents were collected in Australia, Japan, the USA 
and Britain. They include governmental papers, but reflecting my major 
interest in the intellectual and institutional paradigm of the IPR, the bulk 
of the materials comprise administrative papers of the IPR, !'rivate papers, 
correspondence, biographical documents and conference proceedings. 
Detailed analysis of National Councils in the domestic contexts of 
Australia and Japan is provided in Chapter Three, and previous works 
concerning internationalism and the IPR in these countries are surveyed 
in that chapter. The chapter contains, therefore, not only material from 
primary documents, but also my interpretations of secondary sources on 
intellectual history and diplomatic history of two countries. 
Council of the IPR. Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chOsakai to Nihon no chishikijin,' 
and S. Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: The Japan 
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' Modem Asia11 Studies, Nol.26, No.3 (1992). 
Both terms appear in the documents. Because the latter appeared more frequently in the 
documents, and also it correspr"lds to the names of other National Councils, I use the 
term the Japanese Council of the IPR in this thesis. 
44 Japan's entrance into the international system is often discussed in terms of treaties, and 
focused on the late nineteenth century. For example, see Suganami Hidemi, 'Japan's 
Entry into International Society,' Hedley Bull and Adam Watson eds., Tli• Expa11sio11 of 
/11tematio11al Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), and Gerlt W. Gong, T.1e Sta11dard 
of 'Civilization' in /11tematio11a/ Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), Chapter Six. 
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IPR conferences presented a rare interaction between the Orient and non-
Orient, and between greater powers and smaller powers. The Institute 
held conferences every two or three years from 1925 in the region. By 
focusing on participants from Japan, the Oriental great power, and 
Australia, the non-Oriental small power, the thesis tries to describe the 
complexity of these interactions. It explains the shared experience and 
intellectual paradigm of those who gathered at the IPR conferences, <-:id 
sugg.:: 'cS the implications ci its paradigm for the domestic politics of each 
country. 
For the documentation of the ISIPR, although acknowledging 
contradictory USA official reports on the IPR in the 1950s,45 I have used 
only documents from the inter-war period to illustrate the issues and 
mental paradigms as contemporaries ~3.W them. I have tried to construct 
the history of the IPR mainly based on correspondence of key figures 
exchanged in the 1920s and '! 930s. They included Merle Davis (General 
Secretary of the ISIPR in 1926-1929), Jerome Greene (Chairman of the 
American Council in 1929-1932), Lionel Curtis (British Representative at 
the Pacific Council in 1927-1929) and Edward Carter (Secretary of the 
American Council in 1926-1933, General Secretary of the ISIPR in 1933-
1946). 
While the documents of the IPR at Columbia University had been used, I 
have also looked at those at the University of Hawaii as well as the 
documents related to the IPR at the Rockefeller Archives, Bodleian 
Library, Oxford and Chatham House. These documents add new 
dimensions to the image of the IPR in previous studies. They also further 
clarify various aspects of this experimental enterprise. One might expect 
these administrative papers to be dry documents, but they reflect the 
pioneering nature ; .f the IPR. They are sources rich with excitement and 
ideas. In additio11 to these documents, I have looked at the editorials of 
45 US, Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Report No.2050, 82d Cong., 2nd sess., 1952 (McCarran Report) and US, 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee Pursuant to S. 
Resolution 23, Hearings on the Stale Department E'.llployee Loyalty Investigation, 3 
vols., 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950 (fydings Hearings). 
the journals published by the IPR, and IPR publications on the 
organization as source materials to indicate the visions and directions of 
key figures. 
18 
I also used memoirs and diaries written by and on key figures. These 
memoirs were crucial not only in documenting the intellectual and 
institutional paradigm at the IPR, but also in det;: iling the lives of those 
who worked for the IPR as an experimental enter .irise, which itself was an 
important context to influence their ideas and actions. Publishe.! accounts 
of IPR conferences by Japanese such as Tsurumi Yu.suke (1885-1973) and 
Hoshino Aiko were valuable. Similarly, the finding of diaries on IPR 
conferences by two Australians, Hessel Duncan-Hall (1891-1976) and 
Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954) at the National Library of Australia was 
crucial for portraying the complex nature of the discourse at the 
conferences 
Careful handling of memoirs was necessary especially because of the 
tormented experience during the postwar attack on the IPR or personal 
conflicts within the IPR. The latter was particularly true for tl-:e memoir 
of John Condliffe, on which Thomas's work relies for the description 
of the IPR in the early period. Condliffe, Research Secretary of the IPR in 
1927-1937, had a personal clash with Edward Carter, then the Secretary of 
the American Council of the IPR (1926-1933). Since the scope of the IPR 
was rather diverse and wide, impressions recorded by office holders at 
times contradicted the evidence of the administrative docu.nents. The 
contradictions themselves are revealing. 
I have used biographies of some JC IPR members, such as Tsurumi Yasuke, 
Maeda Tamon (1884-1962) and Iwanaga Yi.ikichi (1883-1939) and others 
who were often regarded as minor figures in terms of political influence. 
These biographies ihuminated their ideas of the nation-state, public duty, 
social reform, the 'in :ernational community', the Orient and the Pacific, 
and their actions as' internationalists'. I was also particularly fortunate to 
be able to read unpublished biographical notes of Edward Carter by his ~on, 
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William Carter,46 and also the semi-final draft of the memoirs by the last 
Secretary General of the IPR, William Holland.47 
Chapter One examines the major elements which influenced the 
formation of the IPR: WWI and the peace process, Wilsonian 
internationalism, and the power dynamics in the international context. It 
argues that Wilsonian internationalists were world-oriented, and that 
they operated on the bzise of the nation-state system and the colonial 
system. They were, however, aware of the new forces in international 
poli~ics. This awareness led some of them to promote tht role of non-
official experts in foreign affairs, and to advocate new attitudes to the 
Orient. Chapter Two examines the original setting of the IPR, focusing on 
the Yale Club meeting in New York in February 1925, and suggests the 
emerging direction of the IPR. 
Chapter Three examines the National Councils of the IPR in Australia 
and Japan. It argues that members of each council pursued their ideas of 
the nation in the "Pacific Age" through IPR channels. The chapter 
illuminates the differences in their perceptions of the Pacific, which arose 
from different understandings of the inlernatiouJl status quo. It also 
demonstrates contrasts in the nature of the relationship between each 
council and its respective government, and the varying expectations for 
the role of the IPR which resulted from these relationships. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six move from National Councils to conferences 
and the ISIPR. Chapter Four analyses the successes and problems of the 
experiment of the first two conferences of 1925 and 1927, especially in 
terms of new attitudes to the nation-stale, the Orient and the Pacific. It 
also examines the process of institutional.Ling the IPR, in which the trend 
for the IPR to become a regional affairs experts' organization was 
increasingly clear. 
46 I thank Prcfcssor Mark Elvin for making this contact possible. 
47 I thank Prc11cssor P. F. Hooper at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, and Professor 
Yamaoka Micnio at Waseda University, Tokyo, for this copy of the draft. The memoir 
will be published by the time this thesis is finished. My reference in this thesis is, 
therefore, to the semi-final drait, not the published memoir. As for the role of W. L. 
Holland, sec J. Fairbank, 'William L. Holland and t!1e IPR,' pp.587-590. 
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Chapters Five and Six focus on a few key figures in the IPR: their visions 
for the IPR and concepts of 'internationality', 'non-governmentality', the 
Orient, the Pacific and the 'international order'; and how their visions 
were implemented in the structure of the organization. Chapter Five 
examines these issuES in the context of the proposal for re-organization, 
and the responses to and consequences of its proposal. It argues that in 
this period, a strong state-focused orientation, a failure to establish:· w 
attitudes co the Orient, and the loss of a re.gional per~pective all becc. 
evident within the IPR. The argument is not that the nature of the Il- R 
changed, but rather that elements inherent in the original structure 
became increasingly manifest. 
The final chapter, Chapter Six, fo(uses on Carter's admir.istration, and 
argues that in this period, existing trends were intensified, and that the 
IPR became more American, nation-oriented and official-oriented. Most 
significant was the role of the nation-state in the organizationa! structure 
of the institution. The IPR clearly aimed to be non-governmental, ;;nd 
provided occasions for networking among various groups by way of 
gender, belief, profession and race I culture as well as nationality. 
Although providing the possibility of transnational alliances, however, 
the IPR failed to create an issue-oriented structure which might have 
reinforced and developed these alliances.48 The IPR assumed, instead, a 
nation-state-centred structure. This character was furthered by economic 
and political crisis, and became particularly manifest during WiNII. 
48 Willells argues the importance of issue-oriented promotional pres<:;re groups as 
transnational actors in 1982. His edited book contains the studies of the groups focused on 
certain issues such as Anti-Apartheid, Palestine Liberation, Human Rights. 
De1:elopment, Conservation of Resources, and Women. Peter Willetts ed., l'ressure 
Group3 i11 tlze Global System: Tiie Trn11s11atio11al Relations of Issue-Orientated No11-
Governmental Orga11izatio11s (London: Frances Printer, 1982), pp.~ and 24. 
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Chapter 01ze: Liberal Inten1atio1talism and the Pacific Age 
The East is to be opened an :i transformed, whether we will or no; 
the standards of t::ie West are to be imposed upon it; nations and 
peoples which have stood still the centuries through are to be 
quickened, and made part of the universal world of commerce and 
of ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of 
European power from age to age. 
(Woodrow Wilson, 28 Jimuary, 1904)1 
This chapter examines the intellectual and institutional c01: \ext which 
influenced the formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) in 1925. 
The IPR was the product of three historical factors: WWI and the peace 
process after the war; various internationalist movements, especially 
Wilsonian internationalism; and the power shift in international politics. 
These hctors ar~ examine~ in the first three sections in order to 
illuminate the nature of Wilsonian internationalism and the 
implications for the Pacific. Section Fot1r summarizes various streams of 
internationalism and the :nstitutional context of these movements, an ' 
would outline the characteristics of the IPR. 
1) The Paris Peace Conference: Hopes and disillusionment of liberal 
internationalists 
This section portrays the experience cf participants at the Paris Peace 
Conference from the USA, Britain, Japan and Australia, and illuminate:; 
the nature of the 'international order' which the conference constructed. 
The experiences at the conference were significant. The conference 
produced t.he League of Nations as the embodiment of Wilson's visions of 
the international community. Many participants in the conference 
became Wilsonians who supported the League and Wilson's visions. 
They became the core of internationalist movements, and later of the IPR, 
1 Woodrow Wihon, 'News report of an address in Monclair,' N. J., 28 Januar}', 19(14, cited in 
T. J. Knock, To End All Wars: \ll.oodrow Wilson and the quest for a New W~rld Order 
(New York: Qyford University Press, 1993), pp.10-U. 
I 
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in various countries.2 On the other hand, the conference illuminated the 
problems of the order, which left profound disillusionment in some 
pdticipants. 
The conference also reflected the intellectual paradigm of the tim·~. Most 
evident were strong democratic forces of gender, class and 'race~·. The 
Russian revolution w::;,s going on in 1919, and sociali:,;: and ',"1omen's 
movements were stnving to gain equal political and economic rights. 
Not only the opinions of the powerful frw, but also wider public opinion 
began to be seen as a ~. 1ificant element in foreign affairs. Furthermore, 
the first non Euro-Amedcan power, Japan, asserted equal ri.~hts with the 
Euro-American powers. Another cru::ial element in background to the 
conference was the process of national mobilization. The conference was 
held just after the first total war, when non-governmental parts of society 
had been organized for war efforts, and as a consequence, the lines 
between the official and :.mofficial were blurred. 
'l'he first half of this section focuses on groups of foreign affairs experts 
who felt the need for a reform of international relations, and some of 
whom formed non-governmental organizations of foreign affairs experts. 
The second half examines the problems inherent in the new international 
order. Wilsonians had a clear vision for non Euro-American colonies, but 
no! for non Euro-American powers such as Japan. The Japanese claim at 
the conference, therefore, illuminated the p: :>blem inherent in the 
proposed new international order. It defined the race issue in 
international politics as being not about moral principle, but about power 
and national sovereignty. 
i) War and National Mobilization 
"''r;e First World War laid the foundations for the organization of 
internationalist movements in the 1920s.3 At a personal level, the 
2 The situation in the USA was slightly different. While some supported the cause of the 
League and urged American entry to the League, a majority of internationalists were 
sceptical and opposed to the entry. See the following section, Section Two. 
3 Conceptual works on international cooperation or peace go back to the works of Hugo 
Grotius (1625), William Penn (1693), the Abbe d~ St Pierre (1713), Jeremy Bentham 
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experience of war had convinced many of the importance of world peace.4 
Institutionally, it consolidated various nationai organizations for the 
purpose of international cooperation: a process which was strongly tied up 
with the trends of national mobilization in the first few decades of the 
twentieth century. 
WWI mobilized individual and institutional resources for national 
security. It accelerated existing trends towards the national consolidation 
of various organizations for war, and therefore for official, purposes. For 
example, in the field of science in the USA, the National Research Council 
(NRC) played a leading role in the wartime national coordination of 
various scientific research activities, which had been carried out in 
corporations, research foundations, government bureaus and 
universities.0 In Japan, the NRC was also founded in 1920 for a similar 
purpose,6 but other scientific institutions such as the Institute for Physical 
and Chemical Research (1917) already had been established to mobilize 
scientists in unofficial sectors for strategic reasons.7 
WWI also promoted official and unofficial co0peration across the borders 
of nation-states. The establishment of the NR': in various cc.,:ntries, 
which was initiated by the International Research Council (founded in 
1919), was one example. The International Research Council was to 
(1789) and Immanuel Kant (1795). Bentham opposed secret diplomacy and colonial 
imperialism, ideals which were realized in the Fourteen Points of Wilson. The practices 
and" stitutions of international law were established in 1899. The first Hague 
Conference of 1899 resulted in the formation of a court of arbitration where disputing 
nations were able lo seek mediation or resolution. 
4 In this sense, especially in Europe where th~ war was fought, these internationalists nut 
only envisaged the ideal international community, but they were also committed lo 
pacifism. See, for example, Martin Ceadel, Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945: The Defining 
of a Faith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). 
5 David F. Noble, A111erica by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977), p.112. Noble argues that this 
national coordination was a part of the process of organization of science into industry in 
the first three decades of the twentieth century. 
6 It contributed to institutionalization of the scientific community. James R. Bartholomew, 
The Formation of Science in Japan (London: Yale University Press, 1989), pp.254-263. 
7 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, The Tecl1nological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth 
to the Twenty-first Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.126-127. 
24 
promote international cooperation in science after WWI.8 Actual war-
time cooperation also occurred on an unprecedented scale. Official 
organizations such as the War Cabinet, the Allied Forces and various 
other war organizations were formed to support war efforts. Often staff 
were stationed in foreign countries, and wc;rked with colleagues from 
other countries. Unofficial organizations worked in a similar 
multinational manner. The Red Cross and YMCA International, for 
example, organized civilians from various countries, and looked after the 
welfare of soldiers. Many internationalists who became key figures of the 
IPR came from these official and unofficial war organizations. Americans 
of particular importance were Newton Baker (1871-1937), Secretary of War 
in 1916-1921, Jerome Greene (1874-1959), Executive Secretary of the 
American Shipping Mission of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, 
London in 1917, and Edward Carter (1878-1954), Chief Secretary of the 
YMCA with American Expeditionary Force in France in 1917-1919. 
ii) The Emergence of Non-governmental Foreign Expert Organizations 
The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 brought many officials and non-
officials together. It was a conference to make a peace treaty, but it was also 
formative, physically and intellectually, leading to the creation of an 
international organization, the League of Nations. Participants felt the 
excitement of being present at this occasion, and public expectation was 
high. Cne American recorded his excitement in witnessing the great 
public response to the conference. On Saturday 14 December, 1918, when 
Wilson's carriage passed the Champs Elysees, tens of thousands of people 
welcomed him. 'Wilson the Just' (le juste), one big placard said: 
Looking down from our windows [at Crillon Hotel] we could see 
the crowds converging down the different streets into the square 
like a solid black stream, filling the streets from side to side. The 
soldiers tried to keep a single track way open for the President 
(Wilson) from the bridge over the Seine through the Place de la 
Concorde .... But the pressure of the crowd was so great that the 
line of soldiers was moved in and out until the space which they 
B Germany and the Central Powers were excluded from this process, much lo the resentment 
of Germany. Daniel Kevles, "'Into Hostile Political Camps": The Reorganisation of 
int~rnalional Science in World War I,' Isis Vol. 62 (1971), pp.47--60. 
were to keep clear was all indented and twisted instead of being a 
straight line .... There may have been anywhere from fifty 
thousand to a hundred thousand people in the square before 
Wilson came.9 
Major delegation groups stayed in grand hotels on the Champs Elysees. 
The Majestic housed the British delegation and Crillon the American. 
Each delegation numbered more than a thousand. While the ordinary 
people of Paris struggled to get food, these delegations wined, dined and 
discussed issues at these hotels, removed from war and its aftermath. 
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The main participants were politicians and senior government officials, 
but they were accompanied by many official and unofficial younger male 
assistants. Among these young male public servants, lawyers, 
businessmen, academics or journalists was the most important group of 
twenty-three unofficial Americans. The group was a part of the "Inquiry", 
a project organized in 1917 by Edward Mandell House, Wilson's foreign 
policy adviser.JO The major part of the concrete territorial solutions 
contained in the "Fourteen Points", the founding document of the 
Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations, was furnished by this Inquiry 
group, and Wilson added six ge;ieral principles relating to the new 
international order.11 
The Inquiry was the first non-governmental brains trust for foreign 
policy-making in A1nerican history. While Wilson ordered its formation, 
the group reflected House's opinion:12 diplomats were equipped t" handle 
9 James T. Sholwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p.86. 
JO House recruited academics, journalists and lawyers for the Inquiry. They included James 
Shotwell, historian at Columbia University, Walter Lippmann, journalist for New 
Republic, Sydney E. Mczes, President of the College of the City of New York and 
brother-in-law of I-louse, Davis Hunter Miller, a partner in a law office of House's son-
in-Iaw, and Isaiah Bowman, Director of the American Geographical Society. Within a 
year, it developed into 126 specialists, mainly academics. The office was first set at the 
Public Library of New York. For details, sec Ronald Steel, Walter Lipp111a;1n and tl1e 
American Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1981), pp.128-134. 
11 Walter Lippmann was involved with the draft of the Fourteen Points, cspcdally on the 
section of territorial issues in Europe. It was first cnliUcd 'The War Aims and Peace 
Terms It Suggests.' When Wilson presented the Fourteen Points al Congress on 8 January 
1918, Lippmann boasted, 'This is the second time that I have put words into the mouth of 
the President!' R. Steel, Walter Lippmann, p.134. 
12 T.J. Knock, To End All Wars, p.140. 
daily problems, but were too busy to address long term issues. The State 
Department had no time, House concluded, to draft proposals or recruit 
highly trained thinkers for the job.13 James Shotwell (1874-1965), a 
principal member of the Inquiry and historian at Columbia University, 
described the Inquiry: 'never before had universities been mobilized for 
such a service ... it called for specialists whose interests lay in a different 
academic world from that of undergraduate instruction'.1 4 
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The formation of the Inquiry was partially due to the special relations 
between House and the President, but was also due to the national 
mobilization process for the war. Shotwell commented that the utilizing 
of resources outside the government was familiar to war time 
operations.IS The attitudes of government officials to this first 
experiment were not corrlial, and rivalry from the State Department to ar1 
unofficial organization of' amateurs' existed.1 6 To the :;urprise and 
excitement of these twenty three men from the InquL:j, ,,owever, they 
were brought into the actual working of the Inter-Allied Commissions. 
Instead of merely furnishing information, they were given responsibility 
to shape the terms of the Treaty.17 
These Americans worked closely with British counterparts. Among the 
foreign experts in the British delegation was the Round Table group. The 
Round Table was established in London in 1909, but its origin went back to 
Milner's Kindergarten, a group of young Oxford graduates appointed to 
key administrative positions in South Africa in 1901 by Alfred Milner 
(1854-1925), then High Commissioner for So:ith Africa. Branch offices of 
the Round Table were created in major cities of the British 
CommonweaJthlB soon after 1909.19 
13 Robert Shulzinger, American Diplomacy in t/Je Twentiet/J Ce11t11ry (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), p.88. 
14 J. Shotwell, Tire Pe!lce Conference, p.5. 
JS Ibid., pp.12-13. 
16 Ibid., p.12. 
17 Ibid., p.17. 
18 The term began to replace the British Empire during WWI. The British Commonwealth 
implied more independence for the Dominions than the British Empire had done for 
white colonies. 
19 For its origin, see John Kendle, Tire Ro1111d Table Movement and Imperial Union (foronto: 
Univr.rsity of Toronto Press, 1975), the first three chapters, and Chapter Four on the 
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Members of the Round Table became leading foreign policy experts in 
Britain and Dominions. Because such experts w~re still very scarce in 
these countries, a large proportion of them were sent to the Peace 
Conference. Some of the Round Table members were government 
officials, such as Alfred Milner, Secretary of State for War and for the 
Colonies during the time of WWI, and Philipp Kerr (1882-1940), Private 
Secretary to Lloyd George. Others such as Lionel Curtis (1872-1955) were 
not government staff. The distinction bet·v :en official and non-official 
was often blurred, because most of them were involvec; in war 
organizations during the war. 
For Japan and for Dominions such as Australia, the conference was their 
debut on the world stage. It was the first time th<>t Dominions had had 
representation separate from Britain at any major international 
conference. The influence of those from Japan and Australia did not 
match that of their British or American counterparts. Although Japan 
was one of the five Great Powers, major decisions were made by four 
Great Powers (the USA, Britain, France and Italy). One Australian 
observed: 'Now we feel what small potatoc:s we are'.20 Yet their presence 
was in itself evidence of the 'new international order', and their views 
often illuminated its crucial problems. 
Major Australian participants belonged to the Round Table: Robert Garran 
(1867-1957), John i ··· .3m (1877-1964) and Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954). 
The latter two bee, 1e the core of the internationalist movement in 
Australia. From Japan, young diplomats such as Matsuoka Yosuke (1880-
1946), Yoshida Shigrru (1878-1967), Arita Hachiro (1884-1965) and 
Shigemitsu Mamoru (1887-1957), and the non-diplomat, Konoe 
Fumimaro (1891-1945), all of whom were to become key figures in inter-
war diplomacy, were sent to assist the special envc 1, Makino Nobuaki 
(1861-1949) and Saionji Kinmochi (1849-1940). 
formation of Dominion branches. For the Australian Round Table movcmcn~ sec Leonie 
Foster, Higli Hopes: Tiie Mell a11d Motives of tlie Australian Ro1111d Ta/Jle (Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1986), especially Chapter Two. 
20 'Diary of Eggleston,' 24 January, 1919, MS 423/6, NLA. 
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These younger experts from Australia and Japan belonged to the modern 
elite of university graduates, most of whom had majored in law. They 
were predominantly public servants. Latham and Eggleston studied law at 
Melbourne and both were public servants. Except for Matsuoka and 
Konoe,21 all the young Japanese were graduates of Tokyo Imperial 
Univ( . ity. They had all passed a compei.;tive examination for the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to become career diplomats. 
Europe was geographically remote from Japan and Australia. The 
Japanese delegation travelled to Paris from Yokohama via San Francisco, 
New York, Liverpool, Folkstone and Calais. The office for the Japanese 
delegation was in the Hotel Bristol which was not as grand as Crillon or 
Majestic, but was still in an elegant quarter of the Place Vend6me. The 
Japanese delegation numbered only a tenth of its British or American 
counterparts. Japan, being so far away from Europe, had to mobilize 
almost every Japanese who happened lo be in Europe at the time for the 
Conference.22 
In spite of some differences, however, young American, British, 
Australian and Japanese experts all shared a sense of the strong force of 
democracy at work at the conference. Public opinion was taken more 
seriously not only in domestic policies, but also in foreign policies. The 
awareness of these democratic forces convinced them of the significance of 
new open diplomacy as opposed to secret diplomacy. They felt the need to 
adjust diplomatic machinery to the changing society both domestically 
and externally: a view which became dominant among Wilsonians.23 
21 Matsuoka went to high school and university in the USA not on any government 
scholarship, but privately. While earning his living, he graduated in law from Oregon 
University. Konoe was born into a high ranking aristocratic family and was educated 
mainly at Gakushiiin, a school frequently allended by aristocrats. He then went on to the 
public school [lcliiko], and Tokyo Imperial University. Within a short lime, he transferred lo 
Kyoto Imperial University and graduated from there. 
22 Shigemitsu Mamoru, Shigemitsu Mamoru Gaiko Kaisoroku (Mainichi shimbunsha, 
1953), pp.38-39 and 41. 
23 Shigemitsu and Arita, for example, talked about the need for reform of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and established the Kc;kushi11 Dcx;li ika i (Reform Club) within the 
Ministry. Ibid., p.44. The Ministry was reformed in October 1920 with emph'1sis on 
strengthening information collection ability and specialization on certain regions. 
.. 
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The new machinery was discussed by British and Americans at the time of 
the conference, and they formed non-governmental organizations of 
foreign relations in Britain and in the USA. These organizations were 
based on the recognition of the importance of public opinion and the need 
for study of increasingly complicated foreign situations. Their founders 
asserted the universality of their vision of the international community, 
and they were Atlantic-oriented in interest and focus. Participants from 
Dominions brought home similar ideas, and founded branches of the 
British organization. These organizations played a key role in 
international movenents, which inevitably influenced the IPR activities 
in the various countries. 
On Friday, 30 May, at the Majestic Hotel, thirty three 'British'24 and 
Americans proposed a new institution for British and American foreign 
affairs experts.25 The core of this Anglo-American group were from the 
Inquiry and the Round Table. Lionel Curtis initiated this move based on 
his recognition that the British needed to adjust to various new forces in 
international politics. One of t'1e"e new forces was the USA, and he urged 
the importance of cooperating,,,... this new power. By 1919, he had 
developed the idea that: 
The British and American Ccn'lmonwe.i.lth[s] are the two .1tral 
pillars upon which [the peace c:f the 'Norld] must rest and if either 
crumbles, the whole shucture will fall to the ground ... 26 
His feeling also reflected the growing desire among some British groups 
such as the English Speaking Union,27 to strr ·gthen the ties between 
A~ada S., Ryo taisenkan 110 nicliibei kankei: Kaig1111 to seisaku kettei katei (fokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 1993), p.69. 
24 They included those from the Dominions such as Latham and Carran from Australia. 
25 Minutes on the establishment of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), 
Webster Paper, 3/12, LLSEP. 
26 Note from Curtis to the secretaries of the Round Table in the Dominions, 29 November, 
1919, MS 1009/19, NLA. 
27 This Union was founded in 1918 lo promote 'English speaking people's brotherhood' and 
had h::adqu ·;·~ers in Philadelphia and London. Evelyn Wre:•cr. 'The English-Speaking 
Union: The Story of Its Founding,' (unpublished manuscript) Fi-'·· --J, LESU. Another 
organization of " similar purpose was the "British Committee on Exchange between the 
British and American Churches". Lynch to Wilson, 17 March, 1919, cited in Arthur S. 
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Britain and the USA. Curtis was convinced of the prospect of Anglo-
American cooperation during the conference. Sharing a common 
language, Americans and British dined and discussed frequently. As a 
result, they felt that tl ,ey understood each other better than their leaders 
did and better than they had expected.28 Curtis outlined the main goal of 
the proposed organization at the Majestic: 'The British and American 
Commonwealths had the advantage of a common tongue to initiate 
interaction between foreign affairs experts of the different countries'. 
The aim should be to create [an] institute like the Royal 
Geographical Society, with libraries where the members would 
study international affairs. The result of their studies could be put 
in the form of papers for discussion by the members. This would 
keep officials and publicists in touch with each other .... More 
important still, the institutes would form centres where they [the 
members] would converse on these subjects, just as they now 
conversed in the Crillon and Majestic Hotel[s].29 
Another new force in international politics was public opinion. Curtis 
thought that the experts who gathered at the conference constituted the 
most valuable factor in the production of sound public opinion. 
Right public opinion was mainly produced by a small number of 
people in real contact with the facts who had thoug11t out the 
issues involved .... National policy ought to be shaped by a 
conception of the intP.rests of society at large; for it was in the 
advanc':!ment of that universal interest that th~ particular interest 
of the several nations would alone be found. It was all important, 
therefore, to culth· le a public opinion in the various countries of 
the world which k pt the gener".l interest in view.30 (emphasis 
added) 
Link ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (PWW) Vol.56 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1987), p.57. 
28 R. Shulzinger, The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The Hi>tory of the Council 011 Foreig11 
Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), pA. Shotwell and other 
Americans thought that 'the English were "all right"'. He was particularly impressed 
by Curtis and called him 'the brilliant young statt~sman of the British Commonwealth 
plan of British federation'. J. Shotwell, The Peace Co11fere11ce, p.111. 
29 'Minute of a meeting al the Hotel Majestic on Friday, 30 May, 1919,' Webster Paper, 
3/ 12, LLSEP. 
30/bid. 
Curtis' idea strikingly demonstrates his mistrust of public opinion. His 
view probably reflected the dominant view of the 'masses' among the 
intellectual elite at the time.31 It also illustrates, not only his confidence 
about what was sound and right, but also his concept of national 
coherence. 
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Three Americans and three 'British' were appointed as a provisional 
committee to work on the establishment of the Institute of International 
Affairs in each country.32 Curtis and an American, Whitney Shepardson 
(1890-1966), became joir secretaries. John Latham, a member of the 
committee, reported on the progress in February 1920: 
[T~ .. t:!] Institute of International Affairs is getting well on with its 
labours and has secured the most formidable list of original 
members. Practically everybody of any importance in England and 
America has joined.33 
Three Australians at the Peace Conference-Latham, Garran and 
Eggleston-became founding members of the British Institute of 
International Affairs (BIIA) when it was inaugurated in London in July, 
1920.34 
The path for the American counterpart was not easy due to scepticism 
about American involvement in European politics among the public and 
foreign policy experts. Shotwell and Shepardson tried to form a sister 
organization of the RIIA in the USA, but it was difficult: 'American public 
opinion would not permit them to join with the British' .35 They decided, 
then, to form a similar organization independent of the RIIA. Their 
31 This view was well elaborated by Walter Lippmann's The Phanto111 f'ublic (New York: 
Macmillan, 1925). For its anti-mass implication, sec R. Steel, Walter Lipp111ann, pp.212-
213. 
32 These Americans were James Brown Scott, Director of the Inquiry, Archibald Coolidge of 
Harvard, and Shotwell, and three 'British' were Sydney Peel, Robert C~cil, MP of 
Conservative Party, and an Australian, John Li·1tham. 
33 Latham to a secretary of the League of Nations in Parle;, :Z3 February, 1920, '.1S 1009/23, 
NLA. 
34 Hazel King \t Mid-Century: A Short History of t11e New South Wales Branch of the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1924-1980 (Sydney: AIIA, 1982),p.1. The 
BIIA was chartered as the Royal Institute of international Affairs, the RIIA, from 1926, 
and I make use of the title RIIA even for the period of 1920-1926. 
35 W.R. Shepardson to BIIA, July 19, 1921, cited in R. Shulzinger, The Wise Men, p.5. 
group merged with the group of bankers and lawyers organized by Elihu 
Root (1845-1939), former Secretary of State in the Roosevelt 
admhistration, which was c;.:lled the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR).36 It was incorporated as the CFR on 29 July, 1921. 
iii) Race, .?ower, and Nation 
32 
While founders of the RIIA and the CFR were influenced by Wilson's 
ideas of 'new diplomacy' and argued for the need to adjust to certain new 
forces in international politics, they were not prepared to accommodate 
another new force, non Euro-American power. T':le case of the Japanese 
claim to insert a racial equality clause into the Covenant of the League of 
Nations illuminated the problem of Wilsonians and the new 
international order of the League, and the complex nature of racial issues 
in international politics: the issue which was to play the major role in the 
formation of the IPR. 
Wilsonians in Europe shared the dominant perception of the time: the 
centrality and the dominance of Western Europe. For them, Western 
Europe was without question the centre of the international community, 
and what they termed the 'East', existed only in the periphery of their 
minds. The League of Nations was concerned with self-determination, 
but this was ma:nly applied to Europe. The colonial system prevailed 
then, and there were very few independent countries in Asia and Africa, 
let alone prosperous ones. 
One of the basic principles of the League, anti-imperialism, however, had 
significant implications for matters outside of Europe. The "Fourteen 
Points" called for: 
'a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that 
in dete1mining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of 
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable 
36 This CFR was more like a social club, and its members dined monthly at the 
Metropolitan Club in New York. Ibid., p.6. 
claims of the government whose title is to be determined'.37 
(emphasis added) 
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This principle was implemented into a mandate system, and its key word 
was the 'advancement of civil: .ation'. The degree of the advancement 
depended on the 'remotene.:.,, from the centre of civilizatiLn. 
The system, however, only affected the former~ )lonies of the defeated. In 
other areas, the colonial system prevailed. Furthermore, the mandate 
system assumed a certain power relationship between a weaker 'East' and 
a o:tronger ·west'. Thcrn is critical of Wilsonians on this point: 'Nor were 
ovErt and i:·, plicit assumptions of racial superiority abandoned within 
• ·, i.s new and Western order of international brotherhood'.38 Of 
Wilsonians in Britain, Kendle questions whether they really had faith in 
non-EuropP.ans' capacity for si::!f.rule.39 
The paternalism of Wilsonians may have worked in colonial contexts, but 
did not in the case of non .uro-American powers s ·:has Jr.pan, which did 
not fit into the assumed relationship between 'West' and 'East'. Japanese 
d£'.egates at the conference challenged this relationship, by arguing for the 
insertion of a racial equality clause intc the League's Covenant:. It was a 
significan. issue for Japan, and was one of three major aims of the 
Japanese delegation, not a bargaining tool for the other territorial claims.40 
Behind the Japanese claim for racial equality was the following belief, as 
Makino, special envoy of Japan, stated: 
37 'The final draft of the Fourteen Points.' PWW, Vol. 45 (Princl'lon, N. J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p.525. 
38 Christopher Thorn, Tiie Um its of Foreign Policy: Tiie West, the League and the Far 
Eastern Crisis of 1931-33 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1973), p.419. 
39 John Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1975), p.303. · 
40 The claim of racial equality was one of the three issues lha the delegatiun was 
instructed to pursue at the conference. The instruction said: 'In order to eliminate 
disadvantage of the Uapanese] Empire caused by racial prejudice, one should try some 
means to prevent it as long as the circumstan•;es can ~low', 'Kowa no sandai h6shin' and 
'Uiruson beidaitoryo no jilyonkajo k6ryo ni taisuru iken oyobi chintao sh'.'bun ni kansuru 
hoshin.' in Kajima Morinosuke ed., Ni/Jon Gaike<;/Ji, Vol.12 (Kajima kenkyasho 
shuppankai, 1971), p. 63. 
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The League of Nations is E'-e an international security 
organization .... 'rherefore, .. ·.e people of foe member countries of 
the League will share the nilitary exp1?11diture for the common 
purpose and have to sacrifice their !~ves if it is necessary .... We 
hoped that those people should stand on equal £outing and it was 
natural to request an equality ... 41 
The Japanese delegation argu~d that it was a matter of prb :iple and pride, 
'for pride is one of the most forceful and sometimes uncontrollable causes 
of human action' .42 They saw the removal of racial discrimination as 
crucia: for world peace, and denied that this implied interference h, ihe 
rights of national sovereignty.43 Representatives from Italy, France, 
Greece, Czechoslovakia and China, took the view that it was a matter of 
principle.44 
Makino did not, however, deny the political irr:plications of the 
amendment of the discrimi·;.:.tory immigration laws against Japanese. 
When it was suggested to him thr,t the claim shOl_ j be confined to those 
resident in the country, not immigrants, Makino did not agree.45 This 
meant that the Japanese claim for racial equality had possible implications 
for immigration policy, and W. M. Hughes, Prime MinistE;: of Australia, 
was convinced that Japan aspired to break the White Australia Policy.46 
He played a crucial part in blocking this proposal at the conference.47 In 
late Ma_•. 1919, Japanese delegates received syir.z;3thetic approval for thdr 
rompro1:1iEc drv.t, .~ram fr.· TTSA, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and 
41 'Diary of Nagaoka Har .. 1zu,' in Gaimusho ed., Nihon Gaiko Monjo: Nilwn Gaiko 
Tsuikairoku, 1900-1935 (Gaimusho, 1983), p.504. 
42 Minutes, 11April,1919, PWW, V0i. 57 (Princeton, N.J.: 'rinceton University Press, 
1987), p.260. 
43 Ibid., p.261. 
44 Ibid., pp.262-264. 
45 Robe1t Garran, 'League of Nations: Proposed Japanese Amendment,' n. d., -ited in Peter 
Spartalis, Tl e Diplomatic Battles of Billy H11gl1Ps (Sydney: Hale and lremonger, 1983), 
p.181. 
46 On the background of Hughes's conviction, see L. F. Fitzhardinge, 'Australia, Japan and 
Great Britain, 1914-1918,' Historical Studies, Vol.14, No.54 (April 1970), pp.250-259. 
47 In an initial stage of this proposal, House wrote: 'I understand that all the British 
Delegation were willing to accept the form the Presider.I, Makino, Chinda and I agreed 
on excepting Hughe~ of Australia. He has been the stumbling block'. Diary of Colonel 
House, 13 February, 1919, PWW, Vol.55 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ~rsity P~ess, 
1986), p.155. 
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South Africa. Only Hughes remained an ardent opponent. It was not a 
matter of the words of the clause, Hughes argued, but the idea behind 
them. 'The idea was what ninety five out of one hundred of Australian 
people wot1ld oppose', therefore, as the representative of Australian public 
opinion, Hughes had to oppose it.48 
After a few more compromises, the Japanese delegation brought the 
proposal to the vote on 11April,1919. In that draft, race was substituted by 
nation. Makino proposed that 'the endorsement of the principle cf the 
equality of nations and the just treatment of their nationals' should be 
included in the Covenant. Eleven favoured the proposal, including two 
from Japar;, France and Italy, and one from China, Portugal, Greece, Serbia 
and Czechoslovakia. Wilson as chairman ruled out the proposal due to 
the failure to reach unanimity.49 House described the meeting: 
It was an exhibitior. of Anglo Saxon tenacity ... in some way we 
always carried our point. The Japanese brought up their 
amendment to the Preamble. The President was for accepting it, 
but Cecil, under instructions fro TI' his [British] government, could 
not, and since I knew that Hughes would fight it and make an 
inflammatory speech in the [Plenary] Session, I urged the President 
to stay with the British, which he did, and in '' ?eech made the 
argument I gave him. It wa_; a fine fight fror:1 5tart to fir» ch and 
since we won I went to bt.d at two o'clock quite content ... su 
This shows his strong sense of Anglo-Americ:in i:olidarity, but more 
importantly that Hughes only differed in his manner, not in his points of 
argument, from his m...ire sophisticated counterparts. However displeased 
with 11is manner, many shared his fear of the consequences of adopting 
the pr: ·iple of national equality. An American noted in his diary on 11 
April: 
Conc~aled in the Japanese apparently simple request was the 
nucleus for serious trouble in the United States should it be 
adopted, inasmuch as it would allow the Asiatics to demand the 
repeal of the ft_.;;iatic Exclusion Law of the United States. However, 
it wa:; not necessary for the United St;»-, openly to oppose the 
48 Diary of Nagaoka,' p.499. 
49 Ibid., pp.498-501. 
50 Diary of Col<'n.1 Hot<>c, i2 April, 1919, PWW, Vol.57, p.285. 
suggested amendment because Australia and New Zealand 
through the British representatives had taken the positive 
opposition.SI 
The Canadian Prime Minister also wrote on 15 April: 
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Immigration and Naturalization are regarded under international 
law as matters of domestic concern. Further the position of Great 
Britain and the United States as the most important Powers on 
[the] League of Nations Council, and the fact that no action can be 
taken except by unanimous consent, seems to remove absolutely 
any danger of attempted interference by the League with these 
domestic questions.52 
Hughp:;' crudeness uncovered two fundamental problems in Wilsonian 
internationalism. The rationale for rejecting a racial equality clause was 
that it would interfere with the right of national sovereignty.53 This 
signifies the complication of the race issue in international politics, where 
it was dealt as an inter-governmental issue. And those who supported the 
League and Wilsonian principles felt that domestic opinion, including 
their own, was not at all ready for racial equality. 
· .- 's it a matter of principle? Yoshida Shigeru, a diplvmat and son-in-law 
·.Makino, thought that the proposal was based on Makino's sincere 
concern, which originated from the experience of the anti-Japanese 
movement in California.54 The issue touched people's pride, and was, 
therefo , very personal and emotional. Because the media further stirred 
the popular feeling ir: Japan, public pressure on him was strong. But did 
the Japanese delegation and public want racial equality! Did, for example, 
Makino mean all Asians should have equal rights as a priPciple? 
51 Diary of Dr Grayson, 11 April, 1919, PWW, Vol.57, pp.23~ -240. 
52 Bord2n to White, 15 April, 1919, PWW, Vol.57, p.373. 
53 Robert Cecil, a main opposer of the Japanese proposal of 11 April stated, The British 
Government realized the importance of the racial que~tion, but its solution could not be 
allempted by the Commission ·without encroaching upon the ;overeignty d States 
members of the League'. Minutes of a meeting of the League of Natior.:: Commission, 11 
April, 1919, PWW, Vo!.57, p.261. 
54 Makino was Minister of Foreign Affairs when the dispute over Japanese discrimination 
occurred in California in 1913. Yoshida Shigeru, Kazso]ilnen, (Shinchosha, 1958), Vol.4, 
pp.97-98. 
Racial discrimination hurt Japanese pride because the Japanese were not 
only treated as unequals, but also like other Asians. The replacement of 
the vord, 'race' to 'nation' by Makino highlights this point: 
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I submitted a_ proposal to modify the Covenant ... which sdid that 
the people of the countries which had advanced culture and could 
be recognized as a member of the League shm.tld be treated as equal 
no matter what race or nationality they were.SS (emphasis added) 
Both Wilsoni21s and their critics agreed in the thinking that inequality in 
international politics was not a matter of race, but of nation,56 and 
therefore, race in international politics was not about principle, but about 
nation-state and power: 
The questions and conflicts which arise out of [race] have never 
admitted and never will admit of judicial determination; they are 
political questions ... and must be handled by wise and 
understanding statesmanship on both sides.s7 
Here race loses a united force in international politics, and instead the 
power of the nation, disguised in the words 'advancement of civilization' 
takes over. While using the rhetoric of the new democratic forces, 
Japanese delegates did not deny the old imperial framework of the 
European powers. 
Japan's reaction to the mandate system shows further the double standard 
of the Japanese delegates. At the conference, Japan laid claim to all former 
German territories in the Pacific islands n,·rih of the equator. The area 
became Mandate C, under terms which banned imperialistic activities 
such as military education and oppression of the freedom of belief of the 
local population. This was a far cry from the original Japanese claim for 
imperial annexation.SB The Japanese delegation accepted these terms 
SS 'Diary of Nagaoka,' p.503. 
S6 E. I-I. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (London: Papennac, 1993, first published in 1939), ~p.165-lti6 
and 227. 
S7 A. Zimmern, The Prospects of Demucracy: And other Essays (London: Chatto and 
Windus, 1929), p.191. 
SB Imaizumi Yumiko, 'Nanyo guntO inin lochi seisaku no keisei,' in Oe ShinC'bu el al eds., 
Kindai Nilwn to slwkuminchi, V<Jl. 4 (Iwanar.,: shoten. 1993), p.SS. 
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reluctantly, but then demanded 'racial equality' in the otrer territories of 
Mandate C controlled by Australia and New Zealand. This was because 
Australia and New Zealand would apply their domestic immigration laws 
to these mc.ndates, which meant that former Japanese residents would 
lose the rights they once had under German control. Japan's claim was 
overruled by the same rationale as had been used in the rejection of the 
racial equality clause.59 To the 'inferior', the Japanese delegation used the 
old ru:::s of imperial order, and to the 'superior', they used the rhetoric of 
the new internationc•l order. 
The doubie standard of Japanese diplomacy at Versailles was criticized by 
contemporary Jai::.inese. Ishibashi Tanzan, economist and journalist of 
Toyo Keizai Sh{1,.1poargued: 'Japan demanded equal status with the 
Western powers, but practiced discriminatory treatment towards the rest 
of Asia'.60 This remained the crucial element of Japanese foreign policy in 
Asia in the inter-war period. Nevertheless, the fact that Japanese were 
one of the first to bring the 'race' issue into intercational politics should be 
emphasized. The issue of race was that of power, and it was the power of a 
nation, not of an individual. If no non Euro-American power had existed, 
the problem of race would not have been acknowledged in 1919. In other 
words, th'.! right to ciaim equal treatment was not 01en to every 
m1•ioP.ality, but only those who belonged to powerful nations. While the 
new international order differed from old imperial order primarily in 
manner, not in essence, certain changes became possible in the new order. 
What was significant about this inck.<·:.\t was its pc;ychological impact. As 
Chapter Three, Section Two describes, it made some Japanese realize that 
the essence of the 'new' international order was much the same as the old 
imperial order, and Dower interpr~ts the impact of the experience as wide-
ranging and long-lasting.61 Piesse, Head of the Pacific Branch of the 
59 'Diary of Nagaoka,' pp.465-477. 
60 Ishibashi Tanzan, 'Dai Nihonshugi no genso,' Toyo Keizai S/JimpO, Vol.13, 1921, 
compiled in Ishibashi Tanzan, Is/Jibas/Ji Tanzan hyoron senshil, 1884-1973 (Toyo keizai 
shimposha, 1990), p.215. 
61 J. Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigem and t/Je Japanese Experience, 1878-
1954 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp.45-47. 
Australian Prime Minister's Dep&rtment summed up the incident in a 
letter to Latham on 7 May, 1919. 
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How much better it would have been to accept the Japanese 
amendment in one of its lea: : noxious forms and rely on the 
opportunities the Covenant of the League gives to protect 
ourselves from any ·avourable interpretation. As it is we have 
been perhaps the chief factor in consolidating the whole Japanese 
nation behind the imperialists-and it needs little imagination to 
see how serious that may be with Japan's new assured 
opportunities for expanding her power through China's 
resources. 62 
Since WWII, people in various countries have interpreted this 
:.1cident as one of the major factors leading to the Pacific War.63 
At the Peace Conference, British ,md American foreign experts founded 
non-governmental organizations in their countries, based on their 
visions of the international community. Australians joined this move. 
These institutions became the core of internationalist movements 
promoting the cause of the League and the new international order. This 
new order, however, remained ambiguous. The Japanese delegation 
questioned the justice of the new international order in terms of race. The 
Pacific, which was filled with colonies, and far beyond the horizon of 
many internationalists at the League of Nations, was, therefore, the crucial 
testing ground for the 'validity' of the new order. As this section 
demonstrated, the Japanese claim of 'racial equality' was not based on 
'r~<:e', but the notions of power and national sovereignty. The following 
section focuses on the issue of the nation-state in Wilsonian 
internationalism. 
62 r ssc to Latham, 7 May, 1919, MS 882/5/25, NLA. 6' .ssion of the Japanese Emperor' cited in 11<Jtc 3 in Asada S., Ryo taisei..kan , p.318. 
A. Australian was convinced that one of the ma,:ir causes of Pearl h bour w.is 
Vcrsaillr•. A. F. Thomas, 'Japan and Post War Relations,' address given or: S SeFlembcr, 
1944 at ti.e Australian Institute of Intcrna~onal Affairs, Melbourne. Harri;on Moore 
Papers 11/l, AUM. 
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2) Wilsonian Internationalism 
Wilsonian internationalism was central in internationalist movements 
in the 1920s, and it played a significant role in the IPR. This section looks 
at the meaning of the nation-state for Wilsonians in historical context. It 
argues tha'. far from being 'utopian cosmopolitans', Wilsonian 
internationalists held a philosophy based on the nation-state system, and 
they did not question the coherent national unity. Second, it examines 
Wilsonian internationalism in the American context, which was the 
important backbone of the IPR. Third, it briefly looks ::t the project of 
Wilsonians in the USA and Brit.1in, which became a model .for the IPR. 
The ideals and visions of these \Vilsonians were based on the belief in the 
greatness of their nations. Their internationalism was, in this sense, an 
externalized vision of their nationalism . 
i) Various Streams of Internationalism 
Internationalism refers to a vision for the international community and 
activities to promote that vision. Various streams of internationalism 
existed after WWI, and created the intellectual and institutional arena for 
the formation of the IPR. They were: 1) Wilsonian internationalism; 2) 
Christian humanitarian internationalism; 3) women's internationalism; 
4) legalist internationalism; 5) economic internationalism; 6) sociali5t 
internationalism; and 7) new British imperialism. Th-ese categories, 
however, are abstractions, and intellectually ancl institutionally, they 
overlapped extensively, with the possible exception of socialist 
internationalism. 
Wilsonian internationalism was vVilson's vision of the international 
community based on principles such as 'new diplomacy', anti-imperialism 
and self-determination. Because it laid the foundation for the 
establishment of the League of Nations, I use the term for activities to 
promote, not only Wilsonian visions, but also the cause of the League. 
Christian humanitarian internationalists saw the brotherhood of human 
beings and charity for the less fortunate as the foundation of the 
international community. For women's internationalists, female nature 
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was the key to making the community more peaceful. Legalist 
internationalism promoted the codification of actions in the international 
community. Economic internationalists believed that freer trade and 
closer economic ties would promote world cooperation and contribute to 
peace. For socialist internationalists, the union and rule of the working 
classes would make the world a better society. New British imperialists 
believed in the supremacy of the British way of governing and the organic 
union of the Commonwealth as a foundation of world peace. 
ii) The Nature of Wilsonian internationalism 
Among these streams, various visions for the international community 
existed around the time of WWI, and Wilson's idea of a league was just 
one among many visions for the international community.64 While the 
League of Nations was not the exact embodiment uf Wilsonian's ideas, it 
was based on them. Although scepticism and critici$m existed, and the 
degree of the influence of the League differed from country to country,65 
the League of Nations began to be seen as the international status quo, a 
setting for the 'new' international order. Wilsonian internationalism 
became central in internationalist movements in the 1920s. New British 
imperialists were dominant in Britain and the Dominions, but were 
largely supportive of Wilsonian iG.eas and the League of Nations. 
64 In this thesis, the League of Nations refers lo the League which was founded al the 
Paris Peace Conference, and I use the term a league of nations as a form of organization 
which many people envisaged in the same period. For various ide;;_s of a league of 
nations in Britain, see Henry R. Winkler, Tire League of Nations Movement in Great 
Britain, 1914-1919 (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers Press, 1952), Chapter One. 
65 Britain was a major supporter of the League, but Birn concludes that the League 
remained a peripheral factor in British policy-making in the inter-war period. Donald 
S. Birn, The League of Nations Union, 1918-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p.228. 
The Japanese government was committed to the League from the beginning. Inoki 
Masamichi, Yoshida Slrigeru Oiji tsnshinsha, 1986), pp.43-15. Japan was one of the 
permanent members of the Council of the League, and provided the first Vice-Director of 
General Afiairs, Nitobe Inaz0, who was succeeded by Sugimura Yotaro in 1927. Strong 
oppusilion to the League, however, existed in some quarters from the beginning. In the 
case of Australia, William Hughes (Prime Minister, 1915-1923) was never a whole-
hearted supporter, while his successor, Stanley M. Bruce (Prime Ministrr, 1923-1929), 
was more enJmsiastic. W. J. Hudson, Australia r ~ the League of Nations (Sydney: 
Sydney University Press, 1980), p.5. 
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The nature of the League was complicated. It was based on Wilson's 
visions, which were influenced by the progressive climate of social 
inquiry,66 and it is symbolic that Wilson's plan had strong support among 
women's and socialist associations, especially in the early stages. Against 
the old, secretive diplomacy, the League promoted the idea of a new, open 
diplomacy, which was more in touch with public opinion. It expressed 
progressive views on such issues as gender and social class. Agendils and 
committ(;es were set up to tackle these issues. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO), for example, was one organization which grew out of 
such an agenda.67 In all of these aspects, the League promised the 
capability to reform the' faults' of the old imperial order. 
The League, however, proposed reform, not revolution. As the League's 
failure to recognize racial equality demonstrated, it was too cautious to 
satisfy those who be:ieved in more progressive reforms.68 The League's 
reactionary attitudes in dealing with labour issues were criticized,69 and 
some historians have argued that Wilson's new world order was intended 
to counter the socialist revolution in Russia in 1917.7° While the League 
offered certain reforms of the old imperial order, it was also a means to 
preserve the established order against revolutionary forces. The Lea.gue 
was regarded as the organ of imperial powers not only by communi;ts or 
socialists, but also by some leading American internationalists.71 
As argued in the Introduction and demonstrated in the previous section, 
Wilsonian ideas were significant in the formation of foreign affairs 
experts' organizations. These organizations believed in the irr '::mrtance of 
non-official players in international politics in promoting more rational, 
scientific and democratic ways to conduct diplomacy, which would 
66 T. Knock, To £nd All Wars, Chapter Two. 
67 J. T. Shotwell, The Origins of the International Labour Organization (Ne .. York: 
Columbia University Press, 1934), Vol.2, pp.387-409. 
68 Charles DeBenedetti, Origins of the Modem American Peace Movement, 1915-1929 
(New York: Kto Press, 1978), pp.17 and 27. 
69 Colonel House reported that drafts of 11 April on labour issues were reactionary and 
unsatisfactory by Labour opinion. Hou•e lo Governor, 20 April, 1919, PWW, Vol.57, 
p.528. 
70 N. Gordon Levin Jr, Woodrow . •;!son and World Politics: America's Response to War 
and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), .,p.7--K 
71 C. DeBenedelti, Origins of tl:c Modem American Peace Movement,, pp.17 and 19. 
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contribute to world peace. This emphasis on non-official 'experts' by 
Wilsonians was criticized by Carr on the grounds that 'experts' were 
'theoreticians' and 'utopians'. The criticism led to a false dichotomy 
between 'utopian' internationalists and 'realistic' nationalists. Carr and 
the Wilsonians, however, shilred a common intellectual paradigm, which 
was based on the assumptions of the nation-state system, the existing 
power structure and the centrality of Western Europe. Wilsonians faced, 
therefore, the problems inherent in their assumptions and in the 
structure of international politics. Some of these issues remain relevant 
today. 
Carr argued that the backbone of Wilsonianism was the idealist school c 
T. f'.. Green, and its central concept was the strong nation-state. The 
school was described in 1915 as follows: 
That philosophy could satisfy the new needs of social progress, 
because it refused to worship a supposed individual liberty which 
was proving destructive of the real liberty of the majority, and 
preferred to emphasise the moral well-being and betterment of the 
whole community.72 
It urged stronger power for the state to achieve the welfare of the society as 
a whole, not a system of laissez-faire which promoted the liberty of a 
privileged few.73 The school was often termed 'New Liberalism' and had 
a strong influence among inter-war intellectuals in Australia,74 and New 
Dealers in tJ-~ USA in the 1930s.75 
The Wilsonians at the League did not question the nation-state system. 
Alfred Zimmern,76 an ardent Wilsonian, for example, argued that states 
72 Ernest Barker, Political Thought in Engla11d, 1848 to 1914 (London: Thomlon 
Uultrr.'1nrth, 1932, first published in 1915), p.11. 
73 Carr i.>S:erted that Wilsonians prnmoled laissez-faire and the interests of the 
privileged few. E. H. Carr, The Twe11ty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: All Introductia11 of the 
Study of /11ternat',nal Relations (London: Papcrmac, 1991, second edition, the first 
edition was first published in 1939), p.43-16. 
74 See Chapter Three, Section One. 
75 Walter Lippmann discussed the end of laissez-faire and the obligation of the modern 
stale. He gave a strong logical background for New Dealers. W. Lippmann, The Method 
of Freedom (London: George Allen and Un win, ~934), pp.24-28 and 33-36. 
76 He was Professor of international Politics at Aberystwyth in 1919-192') and at Oxford in 
1930-1944. 
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were the building blocks of the international community.77 'The work of 
internationalism', as he argued, 'is more properly called as the work of 
inter-state organization' .78 ·while the nation-state system had been the 
predominant factor of international politics since the end of the Middle 
Ages, the inter-war nation-state system was distinct in terms of the 
emergence of national mass society. The franchise was extended to much 
wider populations, a development which politically increased both the 
rights of the people and the control of the state. Economically, the inter-
war economic crises reinforced belief in a self-contained 'national 
economy'.79 The period also saw the phenomenon of 'national culture' 
emerge in various countries.so These movements, strongly influenced by 
social Darwinism and eugenic thought, mobilized people ideologically in 
order to strengthen the perception of a united nationhood. Tradition was 
re-invented to construct this modern natic ;,al myth.Bl Notions such as 
'the unity of •he nation', 'society as a whole' and 'social welfare' became 
important for both administrators and popu!ations.B2 
Wilsonians of the idealist school did not question the power structure 
behind the domestic order. Carr saw a coercive element in the rhetoric of 
social welfare deployed by these Wilsonians. 
77 A. Zimmem, Tiie Prospects of Democracy: And ot/Jer Essays (London: Challa a;\d 
Windus, 1929), p.166. 
78 Ibid., p.79 
79 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myt/J, Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 132. 
BO Morris-Suzuki suggests the phenomenon of Japanese 'national culture' making happened 
in the 1920s-1940s. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 'The Invention and Re-Invention of "Japanese 
Culture",' Journal of Asian Studies (Forthcoming issue, 1995), pp.4-5 and 10-13 (page 
numbering based on the draft). Mark H. Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian Altitudes in 
American Tlioug/Jt (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1963), pp.155-159, 
and Jonas Frykman, 'Becoming the Perfect Swede,' Paper presented at the work-in-
progress seminar at the Humanities Research Centre, the Australian National 
University on 11August,1992. 
81 David Cannadine, 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British 
Monarchy and the "Invention of Tradition", c. 1820-1977,' in Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence 
Ranger eds., Invention of Tradition ,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
pp.139-150. 
82 For example, the works of a prominent sociologist of the time, Emile Durkheim, were 
concerned with the unity of society. De la division du Travail social [Division of labour 
in society] was first published in Paris in 1926 a11d an English translation appeared in 
1933. For 'society' as an imaginary construction, see Cornelius Catori;dis, Kathleen 
Blarney trans., The Imaginary Institution of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987, 
oribrinal published in 1975), Chapter :>~ven. 
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Once industrial capitalism and the class system had became the 
recognized structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests 
acquired a new significance, and became ... the ideo~'1gy of a dominant 
group concerned to maintain its predominance by asserting the identity 
of the interests with those of the community as a whole.83 
Zimmern anc.: others probably used the rhetoric of state service to the 
society, genuinely believing that it would serve society as a whole. A lack 
of awareness of the power structure was evident in their vision of a 
..:oherent and harmonious society and the personified nation-state.84 Far 
from being utopian cosmopolitans, they assumed not only the nation-
state as a basic unit, but also the unified monolithic state as an actor in 
international politics. They ignored the power structure within which the 
'nation' and 'national interests' were selected and constructed. 
Wilsonians did not question the power structure behind the 'new' 
international order either. They applied the principle of anti-imperialism 
only to the former colonies of the Central Powers, not to the colonies of 
Britain or France. It was assumed that the Great Powers determined 
major decisions. In 1918, for example, Zimmern suggested that the 
institutions of the League of Nations should be based on the form of the 
Inter-Ally War Committee, not the War Court.BS He also argued that the 
'non-annexation' slogan was nonsense, because some areas were not in a 
position for self-government and' civilized' governments were alone able 
to give it to them.86 
Wilsoni?-, intern .. tionalists reflected the intellectual paradigm of the 
time. 1. ~y did not questio;1, but assumed tr.c: nation-state system, 
national coherence and power politics in the 'new international order' of 
the League. 
iii) Wilsonian internationalism: the American Conl .t 
83 E. H. Carr, T/Je Twenty Years' Crisis, p.14. 
84 Zimmern wrote: 'It is as right and healthy for a state to have a foreign policy as for an 
individ•~al to manifest its personality. A state without foreign policy is a dead state'. 
A. Zim1;iem, T/Je Prospects of Democracy, p.214. 
85 Ibid., p.181. 
80 /b1u., p.175. 
46 
In the USA many internationalists s11pported Wilsonian ideas of 'new 
diplomacy' and anti-imperialism, but a majority were reserved in their 
commitme,1t to the League of Nations. Th~' was due to traditional 
American foreign policies and the party politic - c the time. The idea of 
founding a league of nations under American leadership was supported 
by Democrats, Republicans and non-partisans alike. But the League of 
Nations was founded on the initiative of Wilson, a Democratic President, 
and his uncompromising and stand-offish manner alienated man\" 
otherwise ardent supporters. 
More importantly, involvement with the League contradicted the core of 
American foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine, which stated that the USA 
should not become tangled with European politks, but should exercise 
independent leadership. The modern internationalist movements in the 
USA emerged from the recogni.tio:l of American responsibility in 
European and 'world' politics. The specific purpose of the movements 
during WWI was not just to achieve peace, but also to get the USA directly 
involved in the war in order to attain peace.87 The negotiations 
surrounding the establishment of the League, however, did not convince 
many of the possibility of American independent leadership over the 
world affairs, but suggested the dominance of European powers. Congress 
voted against American membership in the League, and the League issue 
complicated federai politics as well as international movements. 
The history of the American internationalist movements in this period 
saw splits and coalitions between conventional political and ideological 
groupings. There were pro-League and anti-League internationalists, and 
the division did not necessarily coincide with that between Democrats and 
Republicans or progressives and conservatives.BB While the 'peace' 
87 Ruhl F. Bartlett, Tire League to Enforce Peace (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina r tess, 1944), p.3. 
88 Ray Wilbur was a Republican who served as Secretary of Stale !n the Hoover 
administration in 1929. He was pro-League and remained Wilsonian. Edgar Eugene 
Robinson and Paul Carroll Edward< eds., Tire Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949 
(Stanford: Stanford University Pre· ·, 1960), p.J;•o. Wilbur became the first Chairma.'1. of 
the Pacific Council of the IPR in 1925. Historically, liberals were more concerned with 
domestic issues, and international involvement was not seen desirable for their reform 
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movement was seen as a part of social reform schemes,89 these reforms 
were pursued not only by Democrats but also by Republicans. Theodore 
Roosevelt (President in 1901-1909) pursued RepubEran progressive 
reforms, and founded the "Progressive Party" in 1912, because he was 
unhappy with conservative forces in the Republican Party.90 The split 
resulted in the Democrat formation of an administration in 1913-1921 
under Wilsen. Unity was achieved for the 1921 election, yet the 
progressive element h the Republican Party remained strong in the 1920s. 
In the 1920s, the Republican administration (1921-1 OJ3) pursued 
'independent internationalism',91 which concluded the Pact of Paris in 
1928, the first international treaty to outlaw war as a means of solving 
inter-governmental disputes. De11~nedetti argues that it was 'the most 
advanced expression of the postwar Republican goal of tying the popular 
dre'lm of world peace to its partisan vision of an organizing world of law 
and · · anomic cooperation free from political pre commitment' .92 
Although pro-League internationalists welcomed it, the Pact did not mean 
a change to the Monroe Doctrine or American entry to the League. 
In this context, political affiliat ·m was not the main formative influence 
on international movements. E 'ihu Root, Republican 'lnd a major figure 
in internationalist movements, ,:ommented in 1923 cm the irrelevance of 
party affiliatior. on certain issues :·uch ,1ational interests and foreign 
policy. Emphasizing the importance of the CC\use, he reduced political 
affiliation to a matter of custom and manner. 
schemes. Those liberals opposed the League. N. G. Levin Jr, Woodrow Wilson and 
World Politics, p.254. DeBenedelli argur.s that although internationalists from various 
camps, such as conservative legalists, sc;dal reformers, feminists or Protestant church 
member.;, achieved a momentary coalition in 1923-1925, the urlty was difficult in Lhe 
1920s because of thr.ir diverse views on many issues including the American rntry lo the 
Lcagu~. C. DeBenedclli, Origins of the Modern American Peace Moveme1'i .. Chapters 
One, Two and Three. 
89 Ibid., pp.236-237. 
90 R. Shulzinr,cr, American Diplomacy, p.44. 
91 The word was used by Rober!. F. Smith. R. F. Smith,' American Foreign Relations 1920-
1942,' cited in C. DeBeneddti, Origine ·: t/111 ~Aodern American Peace Movement, p.xi. 
92 C. DeBenedetti, Origins oft11e Moder•• ,";merica11 Peace Movement, Chapter Four and 
p.235. 
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Judge Parker [Democratic Presidential candid.tte in 1904] and I 
belong to different parties but we are in the same bloc .... There are 
a lot of Republicans and Democrats in this room. Why? How 
many of you are Republican except because you were horn ~nd 
brought up Republican; and how many 0f you are Democra. 
except because you were born and brought up Democrats?93 
Root was against Wilson's League,94 but there were pro-League 
Republicans. Thomas Lamont (1870-1948), Republican and a partner of 
the Morgan Bank, was one of them. He went to the Paris P~ace 
Conference as an adviser on fir,ancial issues, and developed a faith in 
Wilson's vision. Lamont donated large amounts of money into 
organizations supporting Ar~erican entry into the League. Lamont called 
himself 'a poor Republicu.n ... who has faith in our present Democratic 
administration' .95 
This mixture of Democrats and Republicans, conservatives and 
progressives in internationalist movements in the 1920s became a 
characteristic of American members of the IPR at its foundation. They 
were largely pro-League, and argued for Americ"ln entry to the League 
with certain reservations.% Tl.2se pro-League internationaiists were in a 
93 E. Root, 'Speech in the Committee on Foreign Relations and National r'•.'(ence of the 
Natioml Civic Federation, Washington, 17 January, 1923,' in Robert Uacon and Jame~ 
Brown Seal, ~ds., Men and Policies: Addresses by Elihu Root (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard 
University Press, 1924), pp.486 and 488. 
94 Root expressed Rcpt•blican official views of the opposition to Wiison' s idea of the 
League of Nations. Firs Uy, the objection to the old power politics of :he League system. 
He argued Article X of the proposed Covenant suggested the clement of the old power 
politics. Second, the objection to the possible interference of the League in American 
policy. Root argued ihat the 'Old Politics of the Old World' of Europe was evil and that 
a super-government such as the Wilson's League would destroy the in·iependence of the 
USA. Third, the objection to the fact th<lt Wilson's League entirely ignored the whole 
system of international Jaw. E. Root, 'Speech at a rr.~eUng under the direction of the 
nntional Republican Club, in the presidential election of 1920, New York, 19 October, 
1920,' ;n Bacon and Scott eds., Men and Policies, pp.278-279. 
9< Ron Chernow ru-gues that Lamont exposed enough libcml views on intema•ional 
organ;zations and civil liberties to make himself uniqudy palatable to the Democratic 
intelligentsia. Ron Chernow, The House of MPrga11: A11 American Banking Dynasty and 
the Rise of Moder:i Finance (New Yo;l-: Touchston<', 1990), p;..206-207. 
96 The general vi~w of the League among American members i:; described in Chapter Four. 
Notable Lc;igue supporters at the IPR included a Democrat, Newtor. Baker. and a 
Republican, Ray WilC;i: :. 
_________ J 
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minority, becaust a majority argued for American independent leadership 
with·~ut involvement in European politicio. 
If polith:al or ideological affiliation was not a good guide to these 
internationalists' commitment to the movem~nt3, then what were the 
reasons? Did they have something in common? And how were these 
commonalities, if any, shaped in the historica: context? 
While social scientists t.:nd to analyse incidents or phenomena in terms of 
interest (political, economic and social), the sense of mission or service as 
a motivation for human action can often be neglected. This intangible 
element Gecomes important in abstro.ct issues such as international 
relations. Those who were involved with internationalist movements 
needed not only curiosity and imagination, but also a sense of public spirit 
and service to the commu•.tity. A sense of' service' first originated in 
national c::ntexts, whkh modern internationalists extended to the 
international context. 
Like those of the idealist school, Wilson expresstd a sense of service to the 
community in his role as a reformer of domestic situation, and this was 
based on the observation t!.at society was going through drastic changes.97 
The old society protected a privileged few, ana the government promoted 
these interests,98 but' a new nation seems to have been created which the 
old formulas do not fit or afford a vital interpretation of'. 99 Vvhat was 
needed for a new nation v.ras a new role fur the state.100 '-Viison's key 
word in coping with the changes was progress,101 but in reality this 
progress aimed tu preserve the essential feature of the existing system.1°2 
Remaining sceptical about the centralization oi too much power in the 
hands of the government, Y\"ilson saw the state as an organic entity, 
97 Woodrow Wilson, Th~ New Freedom, (London:]. M. Dent and Sons, 1916), p.27. 
98 Ibid., pp.16-17, 49 and 57. 
99 Ibid., p.8. 
100 Ibid, p.23. 
101 Ibid., p.37. 
102 Ibid., p.38. 
'" ~ ' 
r· ~-----_.__J 
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which would protect minorities and satisfy the majority by administrative 
means:103 
[I]n these great bPehives where in. every corridor swarm men of 
fle::;h and blood, it is ... the privilege oi the Government, whether 
of t'1e state or of the United States, as the case may be, to see that 
human life is properly cared for, and that human lun5s have 
something to breath.104 (emphasis added) 
Apart from this sense of public service for the community, 
internationalists in the USA shared a strong faith in American idealism. 
Wilson stated in lS:i.2: '[E]ver since we were bon1 'IS a nation we J:iave 
undertaken to be the champions of humanity and the rights of men' .105 · 
This faith was his principal motivation for reform. 
Tf I see somebody suffering, suffering crue!ly, suffering unjustly, 
md believe that by the aid of force on my part I can stop the 
suffering, it is not a law, but an exal•.::d passion which leads me to 
wish to go in and help. And there are men in this country ... wh() 
believe that we ought to intervene to stop the intolerable 
suffering.106 
T :1is faith, coming frnm a sense of social justice, led him to pursue an 
A.nerican world mission to save the lt:s~ brtunate, just as he did in 
dr,mestic polifr:s. America was unique and the ideal country to lead the 
world, and the world would need America: 'America is now going to be 
called out into an international position such as she never has occupied 
1::-.?fore'.107 Although Roosevelt criticized Wilson in 1918 as 'an 
unpatriotic and undesirable .__;: izen' because of his emphasis on American 
responsibility to the world,108 Wilson's sense of responsibility came from 
his strong belief in t::te American system. While Koosevelt emphasized 
the power of a great nation, Wilson demonstral ~d the importance of its 
duty to serve the world, and he did so even beyond the srhere 
103 Thorsen argues that Wilson was the first American President to view the state in these 
terms. Niels Aage Thorsen, T/Je Political T/Joug/Jt af Woodrow Wilson, 1875-1910 
~Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp.220 and 230. 
10 W. Wilson, New Freedom,, p.23. 
105 Ibid., p.261. 
106 Ibid., pp.272-273. 
107 [l;id., p.278. 
JOB New York Time,;, 7 September, 1918, cited in T. J. KnoC:. '; o End All tile Wars .• p.169. 
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defined by the Monroe Doctrine. 
Another Republican, Elihu Root, shared a sense of America's duty to the 
world based on the concept of self-respect rather than social justice. 
Although he opposed Wilson's League of Nations, he promoted the idea 
of duty as a member of the 'international community'. In 1922, he wrote 
in the first issue of Foreign Affairs: 'Whether the country enters into that 
contract [of the League of Nations] or not, its membership of the 
co1 -.unity of nations continues with all the rights and obligations 
incident to that membership'. The key issue for him was self-respect:' A 
self-respecting democracy... wishes to respond fairly and fully not 
only to the demands of its own interests but to the moral obligations of a 
member of the community'.109 His sense of obligation came from a 
different ideological position to Wilson's, but they both promoted the idea 
of American responsibility to the world. 
These internationalists argued for American involvement with the world 
based on their strong belief in American ideals. The argument 
contributed, therefore, to reconstruction of national values and ideals. 
Herbert Croly, influentiai editor for the New Republic in 1914-1930, noted 
that the old days of the frontiersman and rugged individualism were over 
and the distinctive fact of modern times was socialization and 
collectivization.110 In the 1920s, American society """'"t through a period 
of redefinition of collective national culture and values, w";d,.,,";essentiaHy 
cor.cerned with the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant population.111 
DeBenedetti argues that internationalists from various ideological camps 
conformed to thL dominant climate, rather than challenging it.11 2 As a 
result, American internationalist leaders, from the very beginning, did 
not have the logic to t:.ansci'nd the nation-state, but. operated firmly 
within the framework of n<», J ,-state. The way they crossed national 
1 °9 E. Root," A Request for the Success of PopularDemocracy,' Foreign Affairs, No.1 (15 September, 
1922), reprinted in R. Bacon and j. B. Scoll eds, Mm amt Policies, p.483. 
110 Alan Pendleton Grimes, American Political Thought (New York: Holl, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1964), p.387. 
111 Nativ1st movement was strong, and the membership of anti-black, anti-Catholic, and 
anti-Semitic Ku Klux Klan (the second KKK from 191.5 to 1944) reach•?d over three 
milli(ln in the int'!r-war period. M. H. Haller, Eugenics, pp.157-159. 
; 12 C. DeBenedetti, Origins of the Modern American Peace Mwement, pp.75 and 112-113. 
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boundaries was not by finding unifying shared elements with others, but 
by exte 1ding their 'national' ideals beyond national boundaries. Some 
had vested interests, and many had a sense of duty and service towards 
the imagined international L<:>mmunity. 
iv) The Institute of Politics and Wilsonians in Britain and the USA 
While visions for the international community in the USA originated 
from an ideal of a national democratic system, British visions were based 
on an ideal vision of the empire. In the 1920s, the term "British Empire" 
v.•as being replaced by the term "British Commonwealth". The change 
reflected a new environment, with white colonies being given more 
independence (They were called Dominions). Debates centred on the 
issue of a new way of strengthening imperial ties in this context, and the 
centre of this discussion was the Round Table.113 
Members of the Round Table also had acute awareness of the change in 
the nature of the society. John Kendle points out the great impact of the 
idealist school, especially T. H. Green, on key members of the Round 
Table, such as Lionel Curtis, Philipp Kerr and Alfred Zimmem. Curtis 
and Kerr were influe·:ced by Green's 'view of the state as a positive and 
moral good, and social improvem~nt and reform as a moral duty' .1 14 This 
reformist orientation brought Curtis and Kerr close to the Lloyd George 
faction of the Liberal Parly.115 Some members of the Round Table were 
also involved with social movements such as the v\Torkers Educational 
Association mo" ement.J 16 Quigley argues that the main motivation of 
the Round Table for social reforms was to preserve English elitist 
traditions r< ther than to put in place measures to assist the less fortunate. 
113 It was founded in London in 1909, and major members also formed t•1e RUA in 1920. Sec 
the previous section about the Round Table. 
114 ). Kendle, The Round Table Movement, pp.18 and 172. 
115 H. R. Winkl~r, T/Je League of Nations Movement, p.156. Kerr was Private Secretary to 
Lloyd George at the lime of the Paris Peace Conference. 
116 ). Kendle, T/Je Rcu11d Table Move111e11t, p.182. Carroll Quigley, Tragedy and Hope: A 
History of tire World in Our Time (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p.132. The WEA first 
started i't Oxfu..!, and soon spread aroui.d the colintry and to the dominions. On its 
movement in Australia, see Helen Burke, '~ocial Scientists as lnlel\ecluals,' in Brian 
Head and James Waller eds., 111tellectual Movement and Australian Society (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.51-56. 
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Founders of the Round Table felt that these traditions were in danger, and 
that the only way was to extend them to the working classes and the 
colonies, before they were destroyed by these new forces.117 
Members of the Round Table discussed new ways of strengthening 
imperial ties. While favouring more independence for the Dominions, 
they remained ambiv,1!c1ti towards non-white colonies. Kendle argues: 
They had no use for the Tory-jingoism and expan~donist fever of 
the late nineteenth century. They simply held the Anglo-
dominion relationship up for examination and found it sadly 
wanting. They also helped demolish the prejudice against 
granting self-govemme~t to India .... They were concerned about 
the relations of East and West, and argued that the superior 
position of the European in the world involved not a privilege but 
a "special obligation to serve" .11s 
Here, 'he parallel between American internationalism and British 
'internationalism' is clear. It was the moral duty of the powerful to serve 
the world, and naked imperialistic exploitation was no longer possible. 
How then did these British internationalists respond to Wilsonian 
internationalism? They were not unanimous in th~ir attitudes to the 
League of Nations nor to American Wilsonians. The league which 
Round Table members envisaged differed from \l\/ilson's League.119 After 
the League came into being, some became favourable to the League of 
Nations. Curtis argued for Anglo-American solidarity which he 
maintained would complement the League. He and Philipp Kerr worked 
closely with Lloyd George at the Paris Peace Conference in the making of 
the League, and Zimmern was involved with the League after it was 
established. Enthusiasm for the League amongst these members created 
scepticism amongst the others who were more concerned with imperial 
issues, and who thought that support for the League was anti-imperiaJ.120 
117 Quigley points out that this original inspiration came from john Ruskin, the first 
Professor of Fine Arts at Oxford from 1870. Ruskin lectured the core members of the Round 
Table when they were undergraduates. C. Quigley, Tragedy and Hope, p.13l.. 
118 J. Kendle, Tiie Round Table Movement, p.302. 
119 Their league had more limited functions than Wilson's League. H. R. Winkler, Tire 
League of Nations Movemwt in Great Britain, 1914-1919, pp.156-157. 
120 J. Kendle, The Round Table Movement, p.290. 
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Even to those sceptical about the emphasis on the League over the 
Commonwealth, the idea of Anglo-American cooperation was appealbg. 
The idea was often expressed as the solidarity of English speaking people, 
and had been promoted by the Rhodes Scholarship.121 The newly 
established RIIA in London and the CFR in New York were to become 
channels of Anglo-American cooperation. Considering the circumstances 
of its foundation, the RIIA must have attracted the more Wilsonian, and 
more Am~rican-oriented, members of the Round Table. 
The CFR included many Wilsonians, and they were predominantly 
Europe-oriented.122 Its members started a joint project with l.1e RIIA,123 a 
project which the IPR was to look to as its model in the mid 1920s. This 
was the Institute of Politics. The Institute was ,;tarted as a summer school 
in Williams College at Williamstown, Massachusetts in 1921 by Harry A. 
Garfield (1863-1942), President of the college and son of a former President 
of the USA.124 Probably due to his connection with officials,125 and with 
European diplomatic circles through the RIIA, well-known diplomats and 
121 Cecil Rhodes, a mining millionaire in South Africa, set up the Rhodes Foundation lo 
promote the solidarity 0f Anglo-Saxons. The foundation was the main source of the 
Round Table activities. The Rhodes Scholarship was also set up by this foundation and 
it was given lo male students i11 · ne Empire, Germany and the USA lo study at Oxford. 
122 R. Schulzinger, The Wise Me11, pp.22-23. 
123 The close lie between this Institute and the RIIA WilS evident in the ullendanls and 
the method of discussion. Curtis and Kerr were the main speakers at U1e first meeting of 
1921. Witney Shepardson took a key role in the organization. Curtis lo Shepardson, 25 
February, 1925, Shepardson lo Curtis, 21July,1925, and Shepardson to Professor Corelius, 
29 July, 1925, MS Eng Hisl 872, BL. 
124 James Garfield was the twentieth President who served only a few monih; before he 
was assassinated in July 1881. The tic between Harry Garfield and the Round Table may 
.1ave developed while Harry Garfield read law al All Souls College at Oxford in the: 
late 1880s. In 1887-1888, Garfield was al All Souls at Oxford and al the Inns of Court in 
London. Garfield became more interested in the ideas of Curtis, and discussed the first 
joint meeting of foreign affairs experts from the English speaking world, based on the 
RIIA and the CFR. Garfield ...... ent to Oxford in 1924 lo discuss these matters with Curt;o 
Shcpardson's wife, Eleanor, a niece and secretary of Curtis, helped to organize this 
gathering. Debora Lavin, 'Lionel Curtis and the Idea of Commonwealth,' in F. Madden 
and D. K. Fieldhouse eds., Oxford and the Idea of Com111011wcaltlz (Londo11: Croom helm, 
1982), p.113. Curlis lo Shepardson, 30 March. 1923, MS Eng Hist 872, BL. 
125 Jn addition lo having a father who was a politician, his younger brother JJmcs 
Garfield (1865-1950) was also active in politics. He was the Secretary of Interior under 
T. Roo£evclt. Although he withdrew from political life in the 1920s, he must have had 
good connections with officials especially in the Republican Party. 
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politicians mainly from the USA and EuroFe gathered to discuss 
inte(national politics, chiefly League matters, in this small town on the 
border of Massachusetts, Vermont and New York.J26 The event received 
extensive publicity in newspapers.127 
Although the Institute of Politics only lasted for a decade, it was highly 
regarded among many other foreign affairs institutions, including the IPR. 
While it was more Europe-oriented and official-oriented, the Institute was 
important for the IPR because of its format and its policy. It was an 
organization based, not on 'national' foreign affairs experts like the CFR 
and tht: RIIA, but on periodic international conferences. Its policy was 'to 
educate the leaders of public opinion in the new world situation' .J28 It 
targeted 'experts' which it defined as university teachers, officials at the 
Military and State Department, business people in international banking 
and finance, and newspaper editors and other public figures.J29 Although 
official representation was strong, it was inspired by the achievement of 
the "IP'1uiry" at the Paris Peace Conference, a group of non-official 
experts.130 Later this idea of non-official 'foreign affairs experts' became 
central to the IP~i..131 
Does the background of the Institute of Politics suggest that Wilsonians in 
the USA and Britain achieved certain influence in official circles, and 
promoted the strong Anglo-American alliance and the identical goals for 
the international community?l32 And does this mean that their kind of 
internationalism played a significant role in other internationalist 
126 Except for those from the USA, there were ·very few from non European countries 
(Japan, China, Turkey, Brazil and Russia). The Institute of Politics, Ifs First Decade 
<Williamstown, Mas5: The Institute of Politics, 1931), pp.47-18. 
127 These newspaper cuttings of 1921-1931 were housed at the Library of Williams 
College, Papers of Institute of Politics, Series JII, Vol.1-31, Library of Williams College. 
Numerous newspaper m"'.icles on the Institute appeared in 1921-1931. On 31July,1921, 
for example, Boston Sunday Herald had a very big article titled 'Viscount !Jryce Gets 
Warm Welcome at Williamstown'. Series III, Vol.3, Library of Willi<'ms College. 
128 The Institute of Politics, Its First Decade, p.7. 
129 Ibid., p.7. 
130 Ibid., pp.7-ll. 
131 Minutes of the meeting at the Yale Club in New York, 22 February, 1925, A 931; Org 93, 
AA. 
132 C. Quigley, T/Je Anglo-American Establislm1e11t: From R/Jodes to Cliveden (New York: 
!Jooks in Focus, 1981), pp.227-310. 
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organizations, such as the lPR, which modelled the Institute? As a result 
of their background or education, some American internationalists, 
especially those at the CFR, were Anglophile. Kendle and Shulzinger, in 
respective studies of the Round Table and the CFR, however, question the 
Anglo-American solidarity and it!' \nfluence in official and public 
thinking.133 Depending on the issues and timing, their solidarity and 
influence was not consistent. Whitney Shepardson, former Rhodes 
scholar and member of the CFR, for example, was deeply influenced by 
Curtis' work on the Commonwealth, but he had strong identity with and 
loyalty to 'American' values, as distinct from 'British' ones: 
I always had the feeling about Curtis that h2 believes in his heart 
that the US is a temporary lost section of the British 
Commonwealth which some day ... will come back within the 
fold. I do not think he realises to any important degree that we 
have grow- nd developed along Lines of our own and that we 
have h1 :is country a civilization essentially different from 
the Bri. ·"i 
The key to the internationalism was, therefore, the definition of national 
values. 
In the inter-war period of national mobilization a!id national culture 
building, the conflicting interests within amnion-state in international 
politics were often ignored by Wilsonians. The monolithic and coherent 
nation-state was assumed, and colonies and mandates were excluded as 
actors of international politics. The issue among internationalists was 
how to combine national interests with the interests of the 'international 
community', but the latter was also a political construct. While the 
imperialists could put national concerns first without reservation, the 
internationalists not only needed to consider their own interests, but they 
133 J. Kendle, Tlie Round Table Movement, pp.304-305. Kerr, one of the strong promoters of 
Anglo-American cooperation, felt in 19-10 that his attempt at Anglo-American 
cooperation had been futile. Ibid., p.238. R. Shulzinger, The Wise Men, pp.2-17, 2-19 and 
253. Shoup and Minter argue that there was much b'l·eater influence oi the CF" on the 
American foreign policy. Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Bi .in Trust: 
The Council on Foreign Relations and United S:ates Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly 
Review Press, 1977), p.5. 
13.t Shepardson to Bram.:eis, 26 September, 1925, MS Ent~ Hist 872, BL. 
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also had moral obligations to serve the international community. It was 
here that the real dilemma of the internationalists began. 
58 
3) Opportunity: The Pacific Age 
The IPR attracted slightly difforent internationalist groups from the CFR, 
although there was an overlap of membership. Both groups were 
enthusiastic about Wilsonian ideas and the cause of the League of 
Nations. But the IPR attracted those who were interested in the Pacific 
and more precisely the Orient, while the CFR was more focused Oil 
Europe. Dealing much more closely with the emerging new powers in the 
Orient, Japan and China than European counterparts, some American 
internationalists strongly felt the need to change the manner 0£ dealing 
with these Oriental powers, especially Japan. This was a challenge 
(although a limited one) to the assumed perception of 'West' and 'East'. 
The new perspective was based on the clear recognition by these 
internationalists of the power shift from Europe to the Pacific, which they 
termed the Pacific Age. 
This section examines the third important element in the formation of 
the IPR: the perception of a power shift towards the Pacific in 
international politics. Two major factors were at work here: the rise of the 
USA as a world power, and the recognition of a non Euro-American 
power, Japan. This power shift was symbolized by the term "Pacific Age". 
The Pacific of this term was largely an ~.::ierican invention, 11ot a 
European or a Japanese one. Reflercing the American slogan of anti-
imperialism, the "Pacific Age" also indicated the possibility of new 
attitudes towards the Orient among Americans. 
i) The Pacific Age and Pan-Americanism 
World leadership was a complicated issue for the USA due to its 
traditional isolationist policy with regard to Europe. This complication 
did not, however, exist in foreign policy on the American continent and 
in the Pacific. There, Americans asserted and initiated leadership. After 
W\VI, with the sense of a decline of the European Powers, American 
leadership in tht: Pacific became strongly pronounced. The Washir.5ton 
Treaty of 1922 represented this ;nitiative in regional matters, and scholars 
. 
. '~ 
. ~' ' ... ~ .. 
o\ '•• 
argued that it promoted the new international order set by the League of 
Nations, rather than chalk:lging it.135 
59 
The term for the region reflects the political and economic contexts of the 
time. The Pacific of the inter-war period is now called the Asia-Pacific 
region, reflecting the political reality of the independence of colonies in 
Asia and the economic reality of industrial and commerdal growth in the 
countries of Asia. The term "Asia-Pacific" is also inclusive of non-Asian 
elements in the region, ar.d therefore serves a region that includes 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA.136 In the 1920s, the regic.,n 
was called the Pacific with more emphasis on the rim countries than the 
islands within it. This contrasted with other concepts, such as French 
'Pacific', which focused more on the Pacific islands. 
While Arif Dirlik argues that the Pacific is a Euru-American invention,137 
t;.~ 'Paciii.:' in the IPR context in the inter-war period was clearly an 
American invent'.nn. John Tilley, the British Ambassador to Tokyo, 
reported American enihusiasm for the Pacific in October 1928 with 
puzzlement and alarm. 
135 Akira lriye, After Imperialism: Tlte Search for A New Order in tlte Far East, 1921-
1931 (Camb1idge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp.13-22. lriye argues that 
this Washington system collapsed in 1925-1926, leading lo the revival of the old order. 
A. lriye, Ibid., pp.87--88. Hosoya argues that Lile 'old order' did not work in East Asia in 
the 1920s, and that the USA tried lo accommodate China as a Pacific power, equal lo the 
USA, Britain and Japan: a plan which Japan opposed because of its claim of 'special 
interests'. Hosoya C., 'Washinton taisci no lokushilsu to hcnyc,' in 1-!osoya C. and Saito 
M. eds., Wasltinton taisei to nichibei kankei (Tokyo Jaigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.3-1. 
lriye and Dingman deny the 'unrealistic' or 'utopian' clements of the Treaty. lriye A., 
Ibid., p.301. R. Dingman, Power in tlte Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 
1914-1922 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), pp.215-216. And these 
works suggest the ambiguous nature of the new order in terms of 'new diplomacy' and 
'anti-imperialism'. . 
136 For the meaning of the t~rm, the Asia-Pacific region and the role of Ute USA, see 
Tomoko Akami, 'Osutoraria no taiheiyo ishiki lo the Institute uf Pacific Relations, 
1920-1930,' O;utoraria kenkya. Vol. 5 (December, 1994), p.58. For an account of the 
current move1 ·nt of regional institutionalization, see Rkhard Higgotl, Andrew Cooper, 
and Jenelle Bonner, Cooperation-Building in tire Asia-Pacific Region: APEC and the 
New Institutionalism (Pacific Economic Paper~, No. 199) (Canberra: Austraiia-Japan 
Research Centre, 1991). 
137 A. Dirlik, 'The Asia-Pacific Idea: Reality and Representation in the lr.vention of a 
Regional Structure,' Journal of World History, Vol. 3, No. 1(Spring,1992), pp.6-1-66. 
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at San Francisco I found, to my surprise, that the subject in the air 
was pan-Pacific relations, and particularly the international [IPR] 
conference which is to be held at Kyoto in 1929 .... There were three 
American speeches ... pointing out that the Pacific was now the 
crucial region, so to speak, of the world .... I heard talk of a Pacific 
civilization and philosophy, which was something superior to its 
European counterpart. I believed this was a myth.138 
Among these Americans, the power shift to the Pacific was clear. It 
reflected popular disillusionment with the old European powers which 
had caused the World War, and also an American confidence expressed in 
Wilsonian anti-imperialist slogans. A similar feeling was shared in Japan. 
Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes was translated into 
Japanese and became a best-seller in the mid 1920s. The decline of Europe 
meant the rise of new powers and new frameworks. In 1928 Saito Soichi, a 
secretary of the Japanese YMCA and a council member of the Japanese 
Council of the IPR (JCIPR), thought the IPR symbolized "The Arrival of 
the Pacific Age": 
Once there was an age when the world cdlcred around the 
Mediterranean, and then came an age of the Atlantic .... But from 
now on, the world will be centred around the Pacific.139 
This centrality of the Pacific was influ.;nced by American thinking, as Saito 
quoted the words nf Theodore RooseveJt.140 Saito was, however, aware 
that the major ?layers in this Pacific Age were not only the USA but 
also Japan,141 JatJan and China were seen as Pacific powers along with the 
USA and the USSR at the IPR conferences in the 1920s and 1930s. Dirlik 
argues that Japan did not challenge the Jominance of the E'.iro-American 
Pacific, nor did it come up with an alternative vision.142 J:lpan did, 
however, eventually pursue an alternative vision for Ute region: Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which led it to the Pacific:: War. 
138 Tilley•~ Lord Cushend:.m, October 18, 1928 A 981; Org 93, AA. 
139 Saito Soichi, 'Taiheiyo jidai no torai to sono shomondai,' B oeki, Vol. 28, No.7 Uuly, 
1928), p.18. 
140 Although Saito believed Uiat he quoted the above phrase from Roosevelt, there is no 
evidence to support the fact. 
141 Saito S., 'Taiheiyo jidai,' p.19. 
142 A. Dirlik, 'The Asia-Pacific Idea,' p.73. 
The Pacific Age, therefore, contained at least two main aspirations; Pan-
Americanism and Japanese Pan-Asianism. They represented various 
forms of regionalism-visions and movements for a regional 
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community. Both aspired to establish a new order in the Pacific, not only 
strategically or economically, but also morally. In this sense, regionalism 
differs from internationalism only in the limi~ation of its scope. The Pan-
Asianism of Japan was equated with Pan-Americanism by Wilson and 
other American participants at the Paris Peace Conference.143 In the 1920s, 
however, Pan-Americanism predominated over Pan-Asianism. Those 
who gathered at the IPR believed that there should be a new order in the 
Pacific and the USA should lead it. 
The u~;A asserted its leadership on the American continent and in the 
Pacific by way of the Monroe Doctrine, but Roosevelt (President in 1901-
1909) transformed the Doctrine from a warning to the Europeans into an 
American commitment to intervene whenever the United States saw 
'chronic wrongdoing' amongst its neighbours.144 This re-interpreted 
Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism, was first practiced on the Ar1erican 
continent. The Pan-American Union was established officially to promote 
regional cooperation with Central and Latin American countries.145 
American s'rategic and economic commitment to the Pacific strengthened 
in the sam~ period. John Hay, Roosevelt's Secretary of State, m<'intained: 
'We believe our interests in the Pacific Ocean are as great as those of any 
power'.J46 Although a late-comer, the USA became a Pacific power. It had 
143 They thought: '1t would be impossible to put in the Covenant (of the League of Nations] 
a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine without a similar reservation of an Asiatic doctrine 
of the Japanese'. Diary of David Hunter Miller, 18 March, 1919, PWW, Vol. 56, p.80. 
144 R.Schulzinger, American Diplomacy, p.31. 
145 The Pan-American Union originated from the First International Conference of 
American Stales, held in Washington D. C., in October 1889, which led to the 
establishment of the "International Union of the American Republics" in April, 1890. 
The headquarters of this "International Union" was called the "Commercial Bureau of 
the American Republics". It had a conference every five years. At the fourth conference 
al Buenos Aires in 1910, the name "Pan-American Union" was adopted. In the same year, 
with funds from Andrew Carnegie and member governments, a building for the Union was 
erected in Washington D. C. on land donated by the USA government E. E. Robinson and 
P. C. Edwards eds., The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875-1949 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1960), p.353. 
146 Cited in R. Shulzinger, American Diplomacy, p.20. 
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gained the Philippines, Guam and Samoa as well as Puerto Rico in 1899 as 
a result of the Spanish-American War, and had annexed Hawaii in 1900. 
It also urged the opening of markets and demanded favourable trade 
treatment from Japan and China from the mid nineteenth century. After 
WWI, the Wilsonian rhetoric of anti-imperialism gave the USA a strong 
position from which to critidze the existence of European powers and 
legitimize American advancement in the Pacific. In some American 
minds, the Pacific was an extended frontier where the USA should pursue 
its manifest destiny. 
At the non-governmental lev;c.~. Pan-Americanism inspired many 
Americans. Some argued for its extensio11 into the Pacific, and they often 
had strong commercial interests. Alexander Hurne Ford was one of them. 
Bo.rn in Charit:5tcn, South Carolina in 1868, Ford developed his career in 
journalism in the 1890s in Chicago. Among his colleagues was William E. 
Curtiss, a vou1l advocate of internationalism and later the first Director of 
the Bureau of American Republics, the predecessor of the Pan-American 
Union. Ford came to Hawaii in 1907, and began the promotion of the 
place as a model of racial and cultural harmony. He acknowledged later 
that many of his ideas had grown out of his association with Curtiss and 
his idea of Pan-Americanism.147 Ford started a monthly bulletin, the 
Mid-Pacific Magazine in 1910, .m.i founded the Pan-Pacific Union (a direct 
copy of the Pan-American Union) in 1917.148 
Ford organized many "Pan-Pacific Conferences"149 which were attended 
by influential members of the Pacific rim countries of the USA, Japan, 
147 A.H. Ford, Genesis: Part 1, p.269, cited in Paul F. Hooper, Elusive Destiny: Tile 
Internationalist Movement in Modern Hawaii (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1980), p.76. 
148 Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Union is doing for the Pacific what the Pan-American 
Union has done for Latin America,' The Pan-Pacific Union Bulletin [1923], p.11. P. F. 
Hooper,' Alexander Ford: Shaping Hawaii's Image,' Honolulu: Holiday Annual, 
(November 1979), p.172. 
149 One conference grown out from this movement was the Pan-Pacific Science Congress in 
1920. See Philip F. Rehbock, 'Organizing Pacific Science: Local and International 
Origins of the Pacific Science Association,' in R. Macleod and P. F. Rehbock eds., Nature 
in Its Greatest Extent: Western Science in the Pacific (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1988), pp.195-221. Other conferences organized by the Pan-Pacific Union.~ere the 
Pan-Pacific Educational, Press and Commercial Conference (1921), the Pan-Pac1f1c 
Surgical Conference (PPSC) (1928) and the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference 
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Australia, Canada, China, New Zealand ar .. '.the Philippines. He 
emphasized the unofficial character of the conferences, although he 
sought recognition from th12 vario11s governments. The essence of his 
Pan-Pacific movement could be reduced to local commercial interests and 
self-pron-.o~i::.:, Honolulu was promoted as an ideal spot for tourism, and 
these conft·1, : .. ::.:s ~vere the best form of advertis.:!ment. Local plantation 
factories needed to attract cheap coloured labour, and Ford's promotion 
matched these local business interests. Furthermore, he loved associating 
with the influential and he was good at making contacts. The reality of 
the islands, however, was rather different from the image that Ford 
presented, and social and economic division was based on race.150 
Despite their flaws, his Pan-Pacific conferences aroused interests and 
enthusidsm for peace and cooperation among the participant countries. 
Pan-Pacific Clubs were created in these countries, and Japan took a 
particularly active role. In Tokyo, the Club was formed on Ford's second 
visit in 1924.151 Diplomats, businessmen, politicians, and academics-' the 
leading men of all Pan-Pacific races'-were invited to listen to speeches 
related to the Pacific. Many who later became members of the Japa:iese 
Council of the IPR were associated with the Club. An Osaka branch was 
also formed, with a stronger business emphasis. Those who gathered 
were patrician and male, and had business interests in the Pacific. The 
club set up information offices, arranged events, raised finance for 
activitie£ and Frepared for Pan-Pacific conferences.152 Pan-Pacific 
enthusiasm was taken by other organizations such as Chambers of 
Commerce, Rotary Clubs, the Red Cross, Chambers of Industry and Trade 
(1924). For the PPSC, sec A981; Conf 256 and Conf 262, AA. Also for the Food Conference, 
sec MSS 1638/19, ML. 
150 P. F. Hooper, E/11sive Desti11y, pp.179-181. 
151 His first visit was in 1922. Ko Sakatani shishaku kin en jigyokai ed., Sakata11 i 
Yos/Jiroden (Ko Sakatani shishaku kincn jigyokai, 1951), pp. 601-602. Ford established 
the custom of weekly Friday lunches at the Imperial Hotel at a cost of 1.25 yen (US$ 
0.60). Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Club in Tokyo,' T/Je Mid-Pacific Magazine, (May, 
1924), pp.19 and 21. 
152 /bid., pp.17-29. Shibusawa Eiichi, a businessman and leading internationalist and 
philanthropist, contributed to the establishment of the Pan-Pacific Club and to its 
activities. Kawai Yahachi to Shibusawa, 16 July, 1924, Shibusawa Eiichi dcnki shiryo 
kankokai ed., S/1ib11sawa Eiic/Ji denki slriryo (SEDS), (Shibusawa Eiichi dcnki shiryo 
kankokai, 1961 ), Vol.37, p.452. 
Unions. Branches of these organizations in Japan, China, Hawaii, 
Australia and other countries held their own Pan-Pacific conferences.153 
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Besides promoting their own agendas and interests, the conferences 
enforced a sense of regional coherence. Interests and personal contacts 
through the conferences became the important intellectual and 
institutional base for the IPR. Honolulu was chosen as the site for the first 
two IPR conferences and also as the headquarters largely because of the 
achievement of these Pan-Pacific conferences. 
ii) Image of ilie Orient and ilie Pacific Age 
What was the impact of the Pacific Age on perceptions of the Orient 
among Americans? It furthered interests in and anxiety about the Orient. 
More importantly, it made some Americans feel the need for a change in 
attitudes towards the Orient, which were based on the dominant 
assumption of a hierarchy between 'West' and 'East'. 
The Pacif.ic ;11spired curiosity and provided new opportunities for 
commerct:, 'nissions, tourism, journalism and academia. These 
opportuniti~~s were welcomed with fascination by a small but influential 
group. Interest in the u. 1ent already existed before the 1920s. The USA 
had a particularly significant business and missionary presence in China. 
Many Americans visited China as missionaries, or through various 
schemes of Christian on;anizations such as the YMCA or universities.154 
To a lesser extent, American missionaries also went to Japan.1 55 Personal 
153 Pan-Pacific Rotary Conference was held in Tokyo m i'l'.'.i!. See E. R. Pearnd JCcond 
Pacific Rotary Conference ([Melbourne): publisher unkn<>'m\ [1929]). 
154 Yale University took the lead amongst college missionary groups. It started a project in 
1901, popularly called "Yale-in-China", which sent entll'JS.iastic students to China for 
missionary work. By 1909, Yale was leading all other collegiate mission groups with its 
annual gift of some $10,000 for missionary purposes. E.T. Bachmann, 'Keneth Scott 
Latourette: Historian and Friend,' in Wilbur C. Harr ed., Frontiers of tire Christian 
World Mission since 1938: Essays in honour of K. S. Latourette (New York: Harper and 
Brother, 1962), p.237. The movement was inspired by the Student Volunteer} '.ovement, 
and a medical branch started December 1917. Reuben Holden, Yale i11 China: Tlze 
Mainland 1901 -1951 (New Haven: The Yale in China Associatior>, 1964j, pp.5 and 72. 
155 Jn 1920s, American missionaries in Japan accounted for only 1,600. Asada S., Ryo 
ta isenkan , p.346. 
contacts through missions or business provoked i'."lterest in the Orient 
amon:~ Americans. Friendship associations were established in major 
cities.1.;5 China and Japan became popular destinations for wealthy 
tourists. Especially in the 1920s, the flow of American tourists to Japan 
expanded,157 and shipping companies increased the frequency of the 
servic.:s. 
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Academics turned their eyes to the region as a new field for scholarship. 
American anthropologists were increasingly interested in the Pacific, 
especially in the islands rather than the Oriental countries. As a result of 
this interest, the Bishop Museum in Honolulu became a centre of 
anthropological research in the Pacific, mainly led by staff from Yale 
University.158 Studies on the Orient at American universities started in 
California from the end of the nineteenth century.159 In the 1920s and 
1930s, the importance of these studies was advocated, particularly by 
American IPR members,160 although they lagged behind Europe in the 
mid-1930s.161 
From all these activities, popular and academic first hand observiltions of 
the countries in the Pacific started to appear. Magazines such as Harpers 
156 The Japan Society was established in New York in 1907. 
157 In the 1910s, American tourists accounted for 2,000 to 5,000 annually. In 1929 it recorded 
8,500, and in 1920s, total 55,368 visitors were recorded. Asada S., Ryi5 taisenka11 , p.333. 
158 Herbert Gregory of Yale University, a geologist, became Director of the Bernice P. 
Bishop Museum in 1919. He was Chairman of the National Research Committee on the 
Pacific expedition. He became one of the major advocates of scientific cooperative 
research in the Pacific. He administered anthropological investigations in the Pacific. 
He was also a founder of the Pacific Science Association. P. Rehbock, 'Organizing Pacific 
Science,' p.206, and A. P. Elkin, Pacific Science Associati911: Its History a11d Role i11 
/11ternatio11al Cooperatio11 (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1961), pp.9and19. 
159 Chinese studies were stronger than Japanese studies. H. Borton, Sato M. trans., 'Nihon 
kenkyi.l no kaitakushatachi,' in l·losoya C. and Saito M. eds., Waslzi11to11 taisei to 
11 ic /z ibci ka 11 ke i, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), pp.5-15 and 553-554. Lectures on 
Japanese studies and Japanese history started at the Yale University in 1906, at Stanford 
University in 1907, and at the University of California in 1911. 
160 Especially Jerome Greene and Edward Carter took a leading role. Ibid., pp.552-553, 
555-.556, 560--565, 568 and 572. 
161 There Vias, for example, no doctoral course in Japanese studies at Amerkan universities 
in the mid-1930s, and students had to go to Europe. Ibid., p.563. In the late 1930s, 
Columbia, Harvard, California, Michigan, Washington and Hawaii Universities 
developed strong postgraduate courses in Japanese studies, and Japanese stud;es were 
recognized as an important and legitimate research field. Ibid., pp. 568-571 and 573. 
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or Christian Science Monitor featured articles about the Orient written by 
corresponc!ents in East Asia.162 Missionaries contnouiec' to knowlcr!ge 
about these countries,163 and some of their works gredtly influenced ~he 
way that images of the countries and people were constructed. The view 
that people of these countries were backward and had to be enliglit~ned 
was at times expressed,164 and this view contributed to the justification of 
American 'intervention' in these countries as a moral good.165 
With the development of communications and transport, the Orient was 
nearer to the USA than ever before and irneraction was growing. Tilley 
was especially struck by: 
the wide interest felt along the [US] Pacific coast in things Japanese. 
Many had Japanese friends who passed backwards and forwards 
from Japan .... There is nothing strange in this, given the relative 
nearness of the two countries, but it brought home to me the 
weight of influence which America is bound to exercise on Japan 
as compared with England, where ... practically no interest is felt in 
Japan except in some special cirdes.166 
In Europe, the image of Japan was reflected in Gilbert and Sullivan's 
operetta The Mikado,167 or in the Japanese Ukiyoe paintings which 
162 The Cliri:itia11 Science Monitor started from 1908 in Boston as a daily newspaper. I! 
was based on the Christian Science Church, "hich believed in the goodness of the nature 
of the human being. The Monitor sought to perform public service in the local, the 
national and the world community, and it was particularly popular in Mid-West and the 
Pacific Coast. In the 1920s, it established its position as a quality paper. In 1910, it also 
started the international edition, which was read widely in the world. Edwin D. 
Canham, Commitment to Freedo11: Tlze Story of the Christian Science Monitor (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1958), pp.xv, and xvii-viii. 
163 For writings on missionary cxpcri-;:nccs, sec, for example, F. H. L. Paton, The Kingdom 
in tlze Pacific (London: United Col;;odl for Missionary Education, 1913). One of the most 
popular images of China was created by a daughter of a missionary family, Pearl Buck 
whose The Good Earth (1931) received the P1Jlitzcr Prize for fiction. Daniel B. Ramsdell 
ar1,'Ucs the strong impact of AmcriC4ln novels, such as those of Pearl Buck, on popular 
American images of Asian countries. D. B. Ramsdell,' Asia Askew: U.S. Best-Sellers on 
Asia, 1931-1980,' Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 15, No. 4 q983), p.8. 
164 Sec, for example, Katherine Mayo, T/Je Isles of Fear: The Truth abo.:< ;,, .• Philippines 
(London: Faber and Gwyer, 1925). 
165 Asada S., Ryotaisenka11, pp.14-15. 
166 Tilley to Lord Cushcndun, 18 October, 1928 A 981; Org 93, AA. 
167 The Mikado was first performed at the Savoy Theatre in London on 14 March, 1885. 
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inspired French impressionists.1 68 But personal contacts with Japanese 
were minimal. There were very few Japanese immigrants or business 
people except for diplomats and a handful of students sent by the Japanese 
government or by wealthy families. 
In contrast to the situation in Europe or even on the Bast Coast of the 
USA, on the West Coast, the more visible Oriental presence and 
geographical proximity to the Orient brought not only fascination with the 
Orient, but also anxiety. As the title of a book by A. T. Mahan, The 
Problem of Asia (published in 1900), suggests, Asia became not only an 
opportunity, but also a challenge to the USA. The problems were 
threefold: questions of security, economics and race. Influenced by 
Mahan's thinking, some started to consider strategic preparation for 
'national security' on the Pacific Coast and in the Pacific.169 
This anxiety was increasingly addressed to Japan. The Japanese victory 
over Russia in 1905 convinced some Americans of its strategic potential. 
In 1910, an article in the Round Table portrayed Japan ;,ot only as a 
strategic power, but also as an economic power.17° Japar, also became a 
threat to American interests in China. Since the USA took th~ initiative 
in the peac:e treaty between Russia and Japan in 1905, it kept a close eye on 
J apanef.e expansion within China. Various agreements to respect the 
rights of each countryl71 were negotiated, but underlying them was a 
profound distrust of Japan and greater degree of compassion for 
victimized China within the State Department.172 
168 On this movement, Japon is me, sec Jean-Pierre Lehmann, The lnrage of Japan: From 
Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), 
p.54. 
169 Asada argues the great influence of Mahan about the centrality of the Pacific in 
international politics on thinking of politicians not only in the USA, but also in Europe 
and Japan. Asada S., Ryo taisenkan, p.1--50. 
170 A Canad:; .. n author wrote: 'British Columbia is destined to become an industrial 
province of );:.pan', Anonymous, 'Canadian Affairs,' Tire Round Table, Vol. 1 (November, 
1910-August, 1911), p..194. 
171 These were the agreements of Root-Takahira (1900) and Ishii-Lansing (1917). 
172 Akira Iriye, Beiclr a kankei no imeji (Nihon kokusai mondai kenkyilSho, 1965), pp.42, 
47 and52. 
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Racial problems on the Pacific Coast placed further strains in relations 
between the USA and Japan, both at diplomatic and psychological levels. 
Racial discrimination issues in California after 1882 mainly concerned 
Japanese immigrants because those from other Asian countries were 
already excluded. Anxiety was caused not by the hundreds of Japanese 
studying at American Universities or by Japanese business visitors, but by 
the thirty thousand Japanese immigrants who lived mostly in 
Califomia.173 As Japanese entry into the labouring classes became more 
visible, boycotts of Japanese shops and violence against Japanese were 
often reported.174 
There were three main periods when discrimination against Japanese 
immigrants in California caused high tension in diplomatic re\ations 
between Japan and the USA: 1907, 1913 and 1924. Each time, a similar 
popular reaction, predicting the inevitability of a clash between 'East' and 
'West', and therefore of a Japanese-American war, was recorded. On the 
.-;merican side, it demonstrated the way Americans reacted to a situation 
which did not fit the familiar scenario of a strong 'West' and weak 
'Orient'. 
This issue was manifested in 1907 by the segregation of Asian children in 
San Francisco schools. The governments of Japan and the USA concluded 
the so-called 'gentlemen's agreement' by which the former voluntarily 
restricted emigration to the USA. In this period, popular literature 
aggravated the feeling of racial conflict and constructed a confrontational 
identity of 'East' and 'West'. In the USA, negative sensational images of 
the Orient, such as the "Yellow Peril", were promoted by the mass 
media.175 They publicized the image of teeming Asians invading Euro-
173 Sydney Gulick, 'Nichibei mondai ni !suite' (Statement presented al the Tokyo Bank 
Oub on S June 1923, translated into Japanese for the publication), Ryunon Zasslii, July 
1923, reprinted in SEDS, Vol.34, p.26. 
174 Shibusawa Masahide, Tailieiyo ni kakern /zashi: Shibusawa Eiichi 1w shogai 
(Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), p.229. 
175 Jack London, 'Yellow Peril,' in J. London, Revolution and Other Essays (London: Mills 
and Boon, 1910), pp.220-237. It was originally written in Manchuria in 1904. London 
wrote other novels of similar topic such as Unparalleled Invasion. These were published 
by the Atlantic Monthly or the sensational press owned by W.R. Hearst. Shibusawa M., 
Taiheiyoni, p.231. 
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American lands. These books were translated into Japanese, which 
accelerated hostility to the USA among the public.176 Japanese created the 
word Hakuka [white peril], and emphasized imperial exploitation by 
white 'races'. Books and articles discussed the racial clash between yellow 
and white.177 
The pattern was repea'.ed in 1913 and 1924. In 1913, California p::ssed a law 
banning the ac'iuisition, ownership, or long-term lease of property by 
foreigners who did not have ti1.e right of naturalization. This meant a ban 
on Japanese ownership of f;irm·,1. Following protests by the Japanese 
government, Wilson sent out the Secretary of State to persuade California 
to repeal the law, an action which failed. While security problems wE:.:e 
parLaily resolved by the \Vashington Tn:~ty. Congress passed a law 
ban;1ing all Asian immigration in 1923. This meant -virtually the 
complete exclusion of all Japanese immigrants from the USA, and is 
th ~refore popularly called the Hainichi I minh o (Anti-Japanese 
immigration law of 1924).178 The society and the government of Japan 
protested strongly because they thought the Japanese would be 
ciiscriminated against in the same manner as other Asians to whom 
Japanese felt superior. Pcpular gatherings and protest marches were 
organized in Tokyo.179 Again literature whkh predicted a fatal clash 
between Japan (East) and the USA (West) stirred the public in both 
countries.180 
iii) American internationalists and the Orient 
176 The most famous and popular novel of this kind, which argued the necessity of war 
between Japan and the USA was written earlier. Homer Lea, Valor of Ignorance (New 
York: Harpers and Brothers, 1909). This was translated into Japanese in 1911 and sold 
forty thousand copies. Shibusawa M., Tailieiyoni, p.239. 
177 Asada 5., Ryo taisenkan, p.291. 
178 The Jaw prohibited the immigration of those who did not have the right of 
naturalization and it denied citizenship to children whose parents had no right of 
naturalization. Congress passed the Jaw in 1923 with a majority of 323 to 71. President 
Coolidge signed for its implementation in 1924. Henceforth I use the term• Anti-
Japanese immigration Jaw of 1924" unless specified. 
179 Shibusawa M., Taiheiyoni, p.417. 
!BO Asada S., Ryo taisenkan, pp.338-340. 
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The effect of this hysterical literature cannot be overestimated. Asada 
argues its significance in the thinking of naval strategists in both 
countries, and he suggests that the issue of racial discrimination was an 
indirect, yet crucial reason for the Pacific War.JS! While V/ilson showed 
more sympathy towards the American labouring classes and supported 
moves against Japanese landownership in 1913, some American 
internationalists played key roles in the movement against the anti-
Japanese immigration law of 1924. The movement mostly consisted of 
middle class businessmen, lawyers and religious leaders. The labouring 
classes on the Pacific coast felt the threat of Japanese immigration more 
acutely than did busi11ess or professional classes,182 and consolidated as an 
anti-Japanese immij!1ation force. 
This movement against Japanese discrimination also took the form of 
joint action by non-official individuals and groups in the USA and Japan. 
The channels cf this transnational alliance were: Japan Society (New 
York); Chambers of Commerce; and church organizations. There were 
two important factors in this alliance. First, the strong business backup of 
the movement reflected the prosperity of business between Japan and the 
USA in the l 920s.1 83 Second, the movement generally mobilized 
Americans who already had contact with Japan, and were referred to in 
Japan .. s shin nichika (pro-Japanese people). In other words, these 
Americans joined the movement, not only on the ground of principle, 
but also because of their connections. 
In 1920, Wallace Alexander, who was Chairman of the Chamber of 
Commerce in San Francisco and a famous shin nichika, organized the 
Japan and USA joint committee to discuss the issue of Japanese 
discrimination and to influence government policy.IB4 Responding to 
this move, Shibusawa Eiichi (1840-1931), a very influential businessman 
and philanthropist who donated much money to internationalist 
181 Ibid., pp.275 and 312. 
182 For an example of a dispute over Asian labour and immigration, see Avner Offer, Tire 
First World War: An Agrarian I11terpretatio11 (Melbourne: Oarendon Press, 1989), 
Chapters 12, 13 and 14. I owe this inf 'rmation to Donald Denoon. 
183 Asada S., Ryo taise11ka11, p.343. 
184 Shibusawa M., Tai/1eiyo11i, p.331. 
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activities, organized a Japanese counterpart "Nic/zibei kankei iinkai 
"(Japanese American Relations Committee: JARC). Its members were 
businessmen and academics, and the JARC held joint meetings in Japan 
and the USA. It actively dealt with the exclusion issue for almost four 
years. Its members, organizational skills, and networks became the core of 
the JCIPR when it was set up in 1926.185 
After the law passed in 1923, these Americans organized a movement in 
San Francisco and New York, not for the repeal of the law, but for a quota 
system for Japanese immigrants. Active members included leading 
internationalists, many of w· om were Republicans. Members included 
Julius Rosenbald, a philanthropic Chicago busir.essman, Thomas Lamont, 
a partner of the J.P. Morgan Bank,186 Elihu Root, a Republican senator, 
John Mott (1865-1955), a YMCA leader of the I:· rriational Student 
Volunteer Movement, and Henry Taft, brotr.c W. i-I. Taft and \ttorney 
General. George Wickersham (1858-1936), forn:~r Attorney General, 
Republican, an influential member of the CFR and strong League 
supporter, was also a member. Because of i:is central position, the 
movement in New York was called the "Wicker~ham Movement". 
Another active American in this movement was Sydney Gulick at the 
Oriental Section of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in 
America, based in New York.J87 Ee was a long-tim<! friend of Shibnsawa 
Eiichi and had lived in Japan for twenty-five years as a missionary. After 
discussion with the JARC members in Japan in 1923, Gulick started a one-
man campaign of public lectures to 'enlighten' America:1:> about Japanese 
exclusion. 
185 Ibid., pp.331and339. Yamaoka M., 'Taiheiyo mondai kenkyilkai ni okeru nichibei 
ka'\kei iinkai no katsudi5,' Shakai kagaku t/'J(yQ No.105(D-ccmbcr,1990),p.99. 
186 Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan, p.236. 
187 5. Gulick, an American mi..sionary, was known as an introducer of Japan to the USA. 
His books on Japan include The Growth of the Kingdom of Gou (18%), Evolution of the 
Japanese, The White Peril in the Far East: An Interpretathz rj the R.usso-Japanese War 
and Towards Understanding Japan: Constructive Proposals f::r Removmg the Menace of 
War (1935). 
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The opposition to Japanese immigration was centred in California, at the 
California Joint Immigration Committee in San Francisco, which 
consisted of such state organizations as the American Legion, the State 
Federation of Labor, Grange (an agricultural union association) and 
Native Sons of the Golden West (a citizens' association representing the 
uryper and upper middle classes). V. S. McClatchy, a proprietor of three 
newspapers in San Francisco, was Secretary of the Committee in 1924, and 
led a campaign for Japanese exclusion. His anti-Japanese sentiment was 
said to have originated in his travels in Korea in 1919 where he witnessed 
the oppression of Koreans ~y the Japanese police.188 McClatchy criticized 
Americans in the movement against anti-Japanese exclusion as being 
disloyal to a nation. I-Ie argued that 'the long established policy of the 
nation has been the preservation of this country for the white race' .189 
Other than consolidating labour interests, the Joint Immigration 
Committee reflected. the nativist tenor of American society in the 1920s.190 
Not only Asians, but any ethnic group other than Anglo-Saxon Protestant. 
was discriminated against in immigrati0n laws.191 While the East Coast 
worried about the problems of Jews and Germaris,192 the West Coast was 
concerned with Asian immigration.193 
188 Shibusawa M., Tai11eiyo11i, p.384. 
189 Cited in the icllcr, Gulick lo McClatchy, ~.7 November, 1924, SEDS, Vol. 34, p.404. 
190 The nativist movement emerged in the USA in 1890 and reachc:I a climax in the 1920s. 
Various immigration laws were set to protect 'old-stock' Americans. Mark Haller argues 
that emphasis uron Nordic greatness and racial purity in the 1920s influenced the 
movements toe~ 1-nd and strengthen laws barring miscegenation. M. H. Haller, Eugenics, 
f p.53-54, and 157-158. 19 The sentiment was anti-Jewish, anti-Catholic and anti-Ncb'TO, and around the time of 
WWI, anti-German. The war period created a <ledication to 100 percent Americanisll', 
and a hatred of radicals and pacifists, who were G:ten associated with foreign names. 
M. Haller, Eugenics, p.154. Communists, socialists, and anarchists were also restricted in 
immigration under the Sedition Act of 1918. 
192 The YMCA International Immigration Service was based in New York and dealt with 
problems of mainly European immigrants. LSRM/Jil-4/ 55/ 588, RA. A German Jewish 
anthropologist, Franz Boas, who was based at Columl:>ia University, fought against the 
racialist trend in the USA around the lime of World War I, both in academia and 
society, C. W. Stocking, Race, Culture and Evolution: Essays ill t/1e History of 
A11tliropology (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p.287. 
193 Geographical proximity explains the difference of the reaction. By ,he same r(ason, 
Australians were more concerned with Asian immig:-ation than British were at the time 
of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty in 1902. For the protest oft~~ Australian 
rnlonics over the issue of Japanese immigration with regard to the .'.nglo-Japancsc 
Treaty, sec Anonymous, 'The Anglo-Japanese Alliance,' Tiie Round Table, Vol. 1, 
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Gulick argued against McClatchy on Christian humanitarian grounds: 
It is absurd now to c;ill the United States a "whiteman's country", 
... when one-tenth of our population is Negro and when there are 
considerable numbers of American Indians, Mexicans, Chinese 
and Japanese .... If ... you merely mean that we cherish and intend 
to preserve our Christian civilization with its characteristic and 
essential principles of liberty, equality, humanity and brotherhood, 
several things should be said .... The belief and practice of these 
principles is not a matter of race or color. It ~s entirely and 
absolutely a matter of education, of training, of personal character 
.... The Christian and democratic civilization characteristic of our 
country is not in the least endangered by the presence of a few 
score thousand Japanese .... [T]he preservation of our Christian 
citizenship depends on the practice by American citizens of these 
Christian ideas and democratic principles in our relation with all 
races, including Asiatics.194 (emphasis added) 
While Gulick was known as pro-J apan,195 his rhetoric based on Christian 
humanitarianism presented a possibility of breaking down the dominant 
racial prejudice. Although labelled a disloyal American citizen, Gulick did 
not lack loyalty or faith in American values and citizenship. His 
principles, indeed, were based on his faith in American citizenship. In the 
mid-1920s, however, Gulick, Taft, Wallace, Lamont and Wickersham had 
to fight against the claim of disloyalty and 'unAmericanness' in order to 
act publicly against Japanese exclusion.196 Through dealings with the 
JARC, these Americans realized that the Japanese knew a great deal about 
the USA, while they knew so little about Japan.197 This realization was 
important in the formation of the IPR.198 The thinking is a major 
(November, 1910-August, ''911), p.123. The issue of immigration came up al the time of 
the renewal of the Treaty. Neville Meaney, T/Je Searc/J for Security in t11e Pacific, 
1901-1914 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), pp.107 and 127. Far away from the 
threat of Japan, South African had no problem with the renewal: 'We have never 
attracted Japanese immigr<•lion in large numbers'. Anonymous, 'South African P<Jlitics,' 
T/Je Round Table, Vol. 1, No. 3 (November,1910-August. 1911), p.350. 
194 G .. tlick to Mcc.Jatchy, 17 November, 1924, SEDS, Vol., 34, pp.404-105. 
195 Asada S., Ryo taisenkan, p.347. 
'.96 Letters of Wickersham i'l protest against this legislation, SEDS, Vol.34, pp.157-159. 
;97 Shibusawa M., Tail1eiy)11i, p.350. 
198 Minutes of the meeting at Yale Oub or. 22 February, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA. 
74 
departure in the American psyche, and it was radical in the contemporary 
aativist comext. 
This new attitude was the result of American business interests, their 
sense of social justice or Christian humanitarianism. Adding to thesi! 
elements, their realization of Japanese power probably played a significant 
part in their actions. Just as at the Paris Peace Conference, the issue would 
not have been a 'problem' if Japan had not be~n perceived as a great 
power. Neither the Japanese government nor the public would have felt 
any right and need to protest had they not thought they deserved the same 
treatment as Euro-American powers. Similarly, Americans engaged in 
business or professions might not have argued for the quota system for 
Japanese immigrants if they did not see Japan as a big power, a .~ouncry 
important enough to consider. 
iv) Japanese internationalists and Pan-Asianism 
The anti-J.:panese immigration law of 1924 was the second serious blow to 
internationalists in Japan after the rejection of the racial equality clause in 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. They felt that they were excluded 
from the ideals they believed in. !nfluential internatLn:alists such as 
Shibusawa Eiichi and Nitobe Inazo (lB 62-1933) were """-t'i much 
disillusioned,199 and many opposed the law publicly.20~ Although the 
discriminatory Japanese immigration policy was pointed out as 
contradictory to their claims,2°1 Jai_i,'l.nese internationalists were eager to 
199 Shibusawa Eiichi made a speech at the Pan-Pacific club lu:icheon, saying lhal all the 
long-term effort~ were wasted and there was no God or !ludda in this world. Shibusawa 
M, Ta i/1eiyo ni, p.413. His letter expressing this profound grief was sent lo American 
members of the Japanese American Relations Committee, Shibusawa lo the members of 
the JARC, 21, April, 1924, in SEDS ,Vol.34, p.192. George Oshiro, Nitobe Inazo: 
Kok" .rnis/Jugi 110 kaitakuslia (Chil?> d~igaku shuppansha, 1992), p.183. 
200 Sakalani Yoshiro, son-in-law of Shibusawa Eiichi and the leading inlcrnalionalist, 
wrote, 'Shiryoaru l>eikokujin ni uttau,' Kokusai Cliisl1iki, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1923), reprinted 
in S EDS, Vol. 34, pp.221-224. Yamada Sanzo,t. \:J.ding expert of International Relations, 
also wrote, 'Beikoku "1minh0an ni tsuite,' Ryw11011 l.">~hi, Vol. 429 (1923), reprinted in 
SEDS, Vol.34, pp.224-225. . 
201 Director cf the Pacific Br,1r.ch of the Prime Minister's Department in Australia, E. L. 
Piesse, who Lecame a member of the Victorian branch of the IPR, wrote an article on this 
;:mint. E. L. Piesse, 'Australia's Position in the Pacific,' News Bulletin [of the IPR/ 
75 
achieve equality with other powers, and did not see this contradiction. 
Their beliefs gradually lost m0ral ground, but they had not given up in 
the mid 1920s. They thought that Americans did not realize the injustice 
of the situation, and felt the need to declare their feeling that an entirely 
new philosophy and new attitudes were required in the Pacific Age. 
In this new Pacific Age, Japan, as a Pacific power, had to seek a ne'' role. 
Sawayanagi Masataro (1864-1927), President of the Imperial Educat J ·al 
Association of Japan, stated at the IPR conference in 1927: 
The Pacific Ocean is gradually becoming the centre of the world, 
and Japan has firmly lodged in the thinking of internationally 
minded people as one of the important !'acific Powers. As such, 
Japan's future is inseparably linked with the slowly unfolding 
destiny of the great Pacific area.202 
Sawayanagi presented a vision dominant among internationalists in 
Japan: the vision of a Pacific Age led by Americans with Japanese 
cooperation. This role was to be achieved with self-sacrifice, as Zumoto 
Motosada (1862-1943), another member of the JCIPR, argued: 
Uapan] has irrevocably identified herself in every way with the 
broad and general interest of the world civilization. Scrup11lously 
loyal to the League of Nations and the high ideals of world peace 
which it embodies, Japan imposes upon herself the role of 
harmonizer between the civilization of East and West. If Japan's 
influence counts for anything in As: a, all that influence will 
always be exerted in the interest of peace and harmony between 
East and West.203 (emphasis added) 
While the 'war scare' literature during the high tension ave:: Iapanese 
discrimination showed clear identification of Japan with the 'East', 
Zumoto, like other JCIPR members, did not identify Japan or the Japanese 
(March, 1927), p.3. American members of the JARC also pointed out the issue, Shibusawa 
M., Ta i/1e iyo ni, p.344. The Japanese regulation of 1899 particuhrrly aimed to ban the 
immigration of Chinese labourers. Hi5mushi5 nyllkoku kanrikyoku ed., S/111tsu11yfvwk11 
kanri to so1w jittai (Okurasho insatsukyoku, 1964), pp.7-8. 
202 Sawayanagi M., 'The Opening statement,' Problems of t/1e Pacific 1927 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1928), p.30. 
203 Zumoto M., 'Japan and the !'an-Asiatic Movement,' News Bulletin [of tile IPR], January 
1927, p.15. 
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with the 'East', but located them somewhere in the middle between 'East' 
and 'West'. On the other hand, his nocion of the 'West' was simple, 
putting the League, Europe and the USA into the same category. The 
same image of Japan as a mediator with a mission as self-sacrificing 
harmonizer between 'East' and 'West' had been expressed by the Japanese 
in relation to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty (1902-1921) and the Versailles 
Treaty (1919).204 There was tension between the roles of harmonizer and 
natural leader in the crusade for Asian liberatio!1 from European powers. 
Those who supported the latter role for Japan advocated a union of 
'Eastern' races against 'White' rule in Asia.205 
During the last twenty years Japan had been visited by a succession 
of radical leaders and political adventurers from different parts of 
Asia for the purpose of enlisting Japanese sympathy and assistance 
in various propaganda against one or another of European 
Powers.206 
This movement culminated as the Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki, 
Japan, in August 1926. Zumoto, however, c.enied the importance of the 
movement, and emphasized a cooperative spirit toward the American 
initiative. This attitude was common among internationalists, especially 
at the JCIPR, in the 1920s. 
However, some internationalists were more enthusiastic about Japanese 
Pan-Asian initiatives. A journal, Kokusai chishiki (International 
Knowledge) which promoted the cause of the League of Nations 
published an article in October 1926 arguing the existence of a positive and 
cooperative side to Pan-Asianism. Inspired by the Pan-American 
movement and German geopolitical thought, it argued that a super-
national movement was the natural course to take in the 1920s. It was 
204 It was considered a duty of Japan to police the region for Britain, not a benefit for 
Japan. Anonymous, 'Naval Policy and the Pacific Ocean,' The Round Table, Vol. 4 
(December, 1913-September, 1914), p.432. The similar sense of duty was expressed at the 
time of the Versailles Treaty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought that Japan had 
to cooperate with the League not because it was benefi~al .for Jap~, but. becaus~_Japan 
should not isolate itself from the world. lnoki Masam1ch1, Yosluda Slugeru (J1J1 
tsO.•hinsha, 1986), pp.43--45. 
205 Sun Yat-sen tried to recruit sympathy with this movement in Japan in the 1920s. 
Shibusawa M., Taiheiyo ni, p.433. 
206 Zumoto M., 'Pan-Asiatic Movement,' p.15. 
77 
dismissive of colonies in Asia: Japan should not associate with other 
Asian non-independent countries, because this would justify the 
solidarity of all European countries against Asian countries. Instead, 
Japan shouid ally itself with the other independent Asian country, China. 
In the article, this alliance was called the Tea Rengo [East Asia Association] 
:md its aims were defined as the pursuit of economic, political and 
cultural cooperation in order to promote regional peace and welfare. In 
this way, it would, the article argued, be able to contribute to world 
prosperity and peace while not being objectionable to the European 
powers or the USA.207 
The article also ?Ointed out a possible danger that could ensue if regional 
associations took discriminatory trading measures against each other: 'If 
Europe and others take discriminatory measures in trade with the East 
Asia Association, it will be forced to take the same measures'.2°8 This 
concept of the East Asia Association was taken up by a military officer, 
Ishihara Kanji, when he established Tea Renmei [East Asian League] in 
1940, and tl1e same concept appeared as the core ideology of the Greater 
East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. While it existed from the mid 1920s, 
support for more assertive leadership by Japan in the region became more 
201 
pronounced in various journals on international affairs in the 1930s. The Pacific 
Age contained inherent competing ideologies right from '·he beginning. 
Wilson's Fourteen Points were the guiding principle of the new 
international order, but they did not encompass non Euro-American 
powers. A new order was needed not only in strategic and economic 
fields, but also philosophically to deal with the 'post-imperialist' system. 
While Iriye argues the failure of governmental attempts to establish a new 
order to replace the old European imperial system within the Pacific,210 at 
the non-governmental level, there were attempts towards creating the 
new order, and these attempts carried all the excitement of a dawning new 
207 Nagatomi Morinosuke, 'Gendai no chi'ikokkateki rengo undi'i no ichishimyaku to shite 
no pan-ajia undo,' Kokusai Chishiki, Vol. 6, No.10 (October, 1926), pp.2-13. 
208 Ibid., p.13. 
209 Nakaya Takeyo, 'Ajia rengo wa hatashite fukani'i nariya,' Ga iko l i/1 o, Vol.SB, No.632 
(1 April, 1931), p.290. 
210 A. Iriye, After Imperialism, pp.302-303. 
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era. The IPR attracted those who felt the need for ch2nge in the n~gion, 
which was far away from Europe and populated by Hvn Eurc-A;:.1ericans. 
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4) Visions and Institutions in fue 1920s 
This section briefly summarizes various streams of the internationalist 
movement which influenced the formation of the IPR. Then it examines 
q,:1. institutional a::pect of these movements, and locates the IPR in this 
context. 
i) Characteristics of Various Streams of Internationalism 
In Section Two, various streams of internationalism in the 1920s were 
introduced. They were 1) Wilsonian internationalism; 2) Christian 
humanitarian internationalism; 3) women's internationalism; 4) legalist 
internationalism; 5) economic internationalism; 6) socialist 
internationalism; and 7) new British imperialism. 
Significantly, Wilsonian internationalism and new British imperialism, 
two major stream~ ;it the IPR, were based on an idealized vision of the 
nation-state: che American ideal of liberal democracy in the first case, and 
the British way of governing in the second. They were an externalized 
ideology of the nation-state, and assumed a strong sense of centre of the 
world. 
Both were born of the intellectual context of the <iay, and shared elements 
with other streams of internationalism. Both contained a strong moral 
sense, devoted to serve the welfare of the society. While this strong social 
consciousness was influenced by the New Liberalism and reformism of 
the time, it was also related to Christian beliefs. Wilsonian 
internationalism demonstrated concerns with gender and class, too, and 
therefore shared certain elements with women's and socialist 
internationalism. 
In contrast to Wilsonian internationalism and British imperialism, 
Christian, women's and ,;:;cialist internationalism were based on 
identities which could un!~e across the boundaries of nation-states. Their 
beliefs came from a strong ~"·nse of social or moral justice, and these 
streams constituted important components of the internationalist 
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movement in the 1920s. The case of the movement against the anti-
J apanese exclusion law in the USA demonstrated that Christi.: :i, legalist 
and economic internationalism showed strong capacity to cross not only 
national boundaries, but also racial/ cultural boundaries, although the base 
of their argument was not free from the nation-state ideclogy Studies 
demonstrate that identities such as religion, gender and class wt.:re 
subjugated under the stronger identity of the nation-state in this period.211 
Through words such as 'unpatriotic', 'unAmerican' or 'unJcpanese', 
activities based on identities and interests which contradicted 'national' 
identity or' national' interests were undermined or even prohibited. 
Like Wilsonian internationalists and new British imperialists, legalist 
internationalists shared a strong sense of centre of the world. While Euro-
centricity was evident, their aim was to standardize codes of actions 
outside of nation-state boundaries. "rhis gave them a more' cosmopolitan' 
character, not based on the nation-state, and their institutions reflected 
this character as will be discussed shortly. 
While economic internationalism was an important part of Wilsonian 
internationalism,212 it focused, not on strong uniting identities, but on 
relations/zips among independent actors such as individuals, companies 
and governments. Its primary aim was mutual profit rather than the 
welfare or peace. Economic internationalism was important for a number 
of reasons. On the one hand, it was perceived by some as being the main 
cause of imperialism and warfare,213 but on the other hand, it provided an 
211 Ogata Sadako, 'Kokusaishugi danlai no yakuwari,' in Hosoya C. ct al eds., Nicliibci 
kankeislli: Kaisc11 ni itaru jib1c11 Vol.3, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), pp.307-353, 
and C. DeBcnedctti, Origins of t/Je Modem American Peace Movement, 1915-1929, pp.75 
and 112-113. As for women and the nation-state, Muta Kazuc, 'Senryaku toshiteno onna: 
Meiji Taisho no "onna no gensetsu" o m~gutte,' ShisO, No.812 (February 1992), pp.214-
219. The implication of gender, class and religion in the national mobilization will be 
suggested in Chapter Three which deals with the domestic contexts of internatirnalists 
in Australia and Japan. 
212 Article lil of the Fourteen Points stated: 'The removal, as far as possible, of all 
economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the 
n?.tions consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance'. 'Final 
draft of the Fourteen Points, 7 January, 1919,' in the PWW, Vol.45, p.525. 
2B J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Stlldy (London: Allen and Un win, 1938, first published in 
19G2). 
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alternative motivation (that of maximum profit) for going beyond the 
nation-state boundaries, and an alternative non governmental source of 
support for internationalist activities. While it carried the potential to be 
a tool in the expansion of the nation-state, therefore, it also provided a 
motivation and resource for transcending national boundaries and state 
(official) intervention.214 
For example, the case of Thomas Lamont, partner of the Morgan Bank and 
ardent supporter of Wilsonian internationalism, does not fit the 
simplistic model of a 'merchant of death' fuelling imperial conflicts. 
Lamont was well known for his progressive attitudes towards social 
welfare. Being an international banker, pursuing profits for his bank and 
not necessarily for his nation, his loyalty was often to foreign clients, 
rather than 'national' interests.215 In this sense, ironically both econontic 
and socialist internationalists shared the commonality of being labelled as 
disloyal towards their own countries, altl.ough their loyalties were 
different. 
A similar point can be made regarding the major (predominantly 
American) foundations, such as the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and the Rockefeller Foundation, although these 
foundations were established specifically with non-profit aims. Without 
funding from the above two foundations, certain internationalist 
activities, inclu.ding the IPR, would not have happened. These 
founcLlions were vital in enabling the organization to remain 'non-
governmental' in terms of funding. Berman argues that these 
philanthropic foundations furthered the interests of the class that 
con~rolled them by inculcating certain types of ideas :md knowledge both 
in the USA and the 'less developed world'.216 Later chapters suggest the 
'.!~ .; Reg~rding elements of conflict between multinational businesses and national . 
governments, see Louis T. Wells Jr, 'The ivlullinational Business Enterprise: What Kind of 
International organization?' in Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr eds., 
Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, ivfass: Harvard University 
Press, 1972), pp.97-114. 
215 Ron Chernow, The House of Morgan, pp.236-237. 
216 Edward H. Berman, Tire Ideology ~r Philanthropy: T11e Influence of the Carnegie, 
Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 1983), p.40. 
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importance of the notion of public service and the belief in scientific 
research as factors determining the nature of the activities which the 
foundations assisted. Other studies a:so suggest that the problems of these 
found.:tions lay not in the infiltratiou of class ideology, but in the 
coordination with governmental policies.217 
While a' socialistic' element was important for the IPR' s formation, the 
IPR was not part of the socialist strand of internationalism in the 1920s 
and 1930s. This raises a question about the nature of the IPR, which was 
labelled as a communist front organization in the 1950s. The gap in the 
perception of the IPR probably occurred because those who saw the world 
in termf.' of clear dichotomies of the Cold War period failed to understand 
the nature of liberalism in the inter-war period. In the inter-war period of 
drastic changes and crises, intellectuals acutely felt the inadequacy of the 
existing system. They were conscious of strong democratic forces, 
culminating in the spread of socialist movements and the Russian 
Revolution. Even in the USA, New Russia captured considerable 
intellectual attention.21 8 Most of those who were inspired by and became 
associated with the causes of the League of Nations and later at the IPR 
were concerned with class issues, as seen in their commitment to the 
International Labour Organization, but the nature of this concern was 
reformist, not revolutionary.219 
217 Bell examines the o::ornplcxity of the various political factors influencing the 
foundations in Peter D. Bell, 'The Ford Foundation as a Transnational Actor,' in Keohane 
and Nye eds., Transnat i:"tal Rel.<tions, p.116 and 126-128. There is a strong clement of 
interaction not the simple imposition, in the activities of these foundations outside the 
USA. Those outside the l !SA rnuld make use of the ideology and resources of these 
foundations not only to prese~ve the particular ir.tcrests of certain classes or regimes in 
the domestic politics, but conduct critical refo;m. 
218 Douglas Craig, "'Man Versus the State: American Intellectuals and the Triumph of 
Corporatism": Th~ American Context, 1930-1949,' unpublished paper presented at 
History Dcpartn1cnt, Australian National University, 18 October, 1991, pp.1-2 
(following page numbering in the draft of the paper). 
219 Overlap between liberalism and socialism in the inter-war period was not understood 
in the McCarthyist period. A progressive liberal thinker of the inter-war period became 
a communist in the cold war mental framework. For example, while some argue that 
Herbert Norman (associated with the IPR from 1938) was a communist and a spy for the 
USSR, it seems more likely that he was a conscientious intellectual who lived in the 
socialistic climate of the 1920s and 1930s. Although he was radical, he was never 
revolutionary. Rage: Bowman, Innocence is not enouglz: Tlze Life and Deatlz of Herbert 
Norman (New York: '.1. E. Sharpe, 1986), pp.53 and 65. R. Bowman, 'Cold War, 
McCarthyism, and M•Jrder by Slander: E. H. Norman's Death in Perspective,' in R. 
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ii) Institutions 
How were these various visions institutio11 ;ilized, and how did the issues 
of nation-state and race I culture manifest within these institutions? Each 
stream of internationalism had organizations to promote its vision 
within and across national borders. The League of Nations, the 
Permanent Court of International Justice22D and the International Labour 
Organization were official organizations, based on governmental 
representation and focusing on inter-governmental issues. But most 
internationalist organizations were non-governmental. 
The following analysis of the structural characteristics of International 
Non-governmental Organizations (INGOs) is mainly based on a Ph.D. 
thesis by Lyman C. White, submitted to Columbia University and 
published as The Structure of Private International Organizations in 
1933.221 As explained in Introduction, I use the term !NGO for those 
organizations which were called private international organizations in 
the inter-war period. 
Bowman ed., E. H. Norman: His Life and Sclrolarslrip (foronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1984). Maruyama negated the accusation of Norman being a communist, pointing 
out Norman's balanced view and elitist manner. Maruyama M., 'Mumei no mono eno 
aichaku: Herbert Norman no koto,' Mainiclri Sllimbtm, April 18-19, 1957. Dower 
criticized a tendency among Euro-American scholars in the post-WWll period to reduce 
Norman to a crude Marxist, which distorted the sophistication and complexity of 
Norman's works on Japanese history. john Dower, 'E. H. Norman to jiyil shu;;iteki 
gakumon no gendaiteki kiki,' Slriso, Vol.4, No. 634, (1977), p.127. 
22lT The Permanent Court of International justice was established in 1922. Despite its 
mention in Article 14 of the Covenant of the League, it was not an o; gan of the League. 
There was no statute to make member countries automatically belong to the Permanent 
Court. The International Court is its successor and was ~ftablished in 1946. The United 
Nation Charter states that member countries belong to the court. The term 'world court' 
is used to describe both. Shabtai Rosenne, Tire World Court: Wlrat It !~and How It 
Works (Leiden: Oceania Publications, 1973), pr> Zl and 27. 
221 Lyman Cromwell White, Tire Structure of Pri' ate International Organizations 
(Philadelphia, Penn: George S. Ferguson Company, 1933). The thesis was based. on 
White's extensive first hand experience at various institutions, and was supervised by 
Joseph Chamberlain, expert in lnte1 national Relations and leading internationalist, 
who later became involved with the IPR. 
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Although new British imperialism is included as a stream of 
internationalism in this thesis, White omitted :ts organizations such as 
the Round Table and the RIIA from his discussicP of INGOs. Both 
satisfied his basic criteria for INGOs in that they possessed the following 
features: 1) private (non-officials, or officials with private capacity) 
individual or group membership; 2) the existence of a permanent 
organization; 3) they were not aimed at pecuniary profit; and 4) they were 
controlled by non-governmental authority. They were, however, 
ambiguous in the other criteria of membership by at least two countries, 
and of not having a strong national base. White US{;;d various tern's for 
Britain (England, Britain, Great Britain and the United Kingdom). \\Then 
Dominions had separate representaticn in an organization, they were 
listed as independent entries. But in cases such as the League of Nations 
Union, where the headquarters were in Britain and Dominion 
organizations were affiliates, the entry was given as Great Britain with no 
separate entry for the Dominions. According to White's classificatory 
system, the Round Table and the RIIA would be organizations of Great 
Britain and therefore not recognizable as INGOs. 
Wilsonian internationalism was promoted by unofficial organizations. 
The headquarters of the International Federation of the League of Nations 
Societies were established in Brussels, and member associations were set 
up in thirty-three countries including non-member countries such as the 
USA and China. The British League of Nations Union was established in 
1918, earlier than the foundation of the League,222and after 1919 it began to 
promote the League. Its branches were also formed in the Dominions and 
were affiliated to the British headquarters. The British League of Nations 
Union belonged to the International Federation of the League of Nations 
Societies. The federation was mainly a Europe-centred organization, but 
Japan's financial contribution was noteworthy. In 1931, when Britain's 
contribution was 76,179 Belgian franc, Japan made contribution of 62, 209 
B. francs followed by the USA with 39,404 B. francs. Other major 
contributors were all European.22; 
222 Por t~e early development of the League of Nations Union, see Winkler, T/Je League of 
Natin1;~ i,;uvement in Great Britain, 1914-1919, especially Chapter One. 
223 L. C. While, Private International Organizations, p.259. 
85 
Christian humanitarian internationalism was promoted by Christian and 
missionary organizations such as the World Student Christian Federation, 
the International Miss:onary Council, the International Red Cross and the 
Wr :1d Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associatiuns (YMCA).224 The 
International Red Cross was the biggest !NGO in terms of membership, 
revenue and scale. The World Alliance and the World Student Christian 
Federation also ~ncluded members from Asia, but their centres were in 
Europe. In all of these organizations the USA played a particularly 
prominent role.225 
The International Alliance of Women for Suffrage and Equal Citizenship, 
the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union, Women's 
International League for Peace and Freedom and other such organizations 
promoted the cause of women's internationalism. The fir5t two sh0wed 
strong representation from countries in Asia. Most notably, memL ... rship 
of the Tempero:nce Union was open to 'Christian women of the world 
without distinction of race or colour'. The League for Peace did not 
confine its membership to those from nation- tates, but opened it to 
colonies.22°. 
Economic internationalism was promoted by international banks, 
International Chambers of Commerce, Rotary International and other 
bodies. Rotary was centred in North America with its headquarters in 
Chicago. It had wide represP!:1ation in the countries in Asia. The number 
of staff employed at the headquarters was particularly large at eighty-two 
224 While excluded Catholic Church from his study in 1933 because of 'its peculiar 
position in international law', and also because 'the head of th;,t Church has nearly 
always exercised territorial sovereignty and has always maintained diplomatic 
relations with governments'. L. C. White, Private I11ternational Orga11izatio11s, p.14. E. 
Theodore Bachmann, in describing the missionary activities of I~. 5. Latourette, sketches 
the background of missionary institutions from the late nineteenth century. E.T. 
Bachman". 'Kenneth Scott Latourette: Historian and Friend,' in Wilbur C. Harr ed., 
Fro11tie . ; . :•e C:1ristia11 World Missio11si11ce1938: Essays in ho11011r of K. S. Latourette 
(New·,.,/ (, · rpcr and Brother, 1962), pp.231-259. John R. Mott was a pioneer and 
lca,(~1 . · ; , . ,nternational student Christian mt·vemcnt of the YMCA from the late 
mnctcc!ith century. For John Mott, sec Basil Mal.hews, ]oh11 R. Mott; World Citizen 
JN2w York: Harper and Brothers, 1934). 
22, L. C. White, Private I11ternatio11al Orga11izatio11s,, pp 227-231, 261-273 and 283-292. 
i26 Ibid., pp.101, 103, 157-160, 182-186, 220-223 and 231-236. 
" 
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people while the headquarters of many other organizations were run by 
very few staff or did i10t exist at all. Rotary' s membership was restricted tc 
males. The International Chamber of Commerce was located in Paris, and 
represented 1.5 million business and professional people. Both the above 
mentioned organizations promoted not only business ir.terests, but more 
importantly high moral standards in business.227 They became part of the 
institutional background fo:- the formation of the IPR. 
How was the IPR located among other INGOs !:1the1920s and 1930s? 
White includes the IPR as an !NGO in his stL .. dies in 1933 and 1951.He 
describes it as 'one of the most interesting ussociations, whose 
contribution to scientific investigation has been outstanding',228 despite its 
clear regional focus in agenda and membership, and strong American 
representation. The following examines the IPR in terms of the 
characteristics of INGOs as described in White's study, and in particular 
analyses the IPR stance on the issues of the Orient and the nation-st11·~e. 
a) Headquarters 
The location of the IPR headquarters in Honolulu was most unusual for 
this period. Among 560 international organizations (including 
governmental ones) listed in the Handbook of Inlrrnational 
Organizations and its Supplement, White found that 95% were located in 
Europe. Paris topped the list with 128 (23%\ followed by Brussels (59) and 
London (57) (both at 10%), then Ge:\eva. (41.'o). In the United States, there 
were only eight in Washington D. C., and six in New York. In Asia, 
(White uses the term Asia for all areas east oi Constantinople and west of 
the American continent, and therefore Middle Eastern countries, 
Australia and New Zealand were in a category of Asia) there was only one, 
the IPR headquarters in Honolulu.229 While White predicts the future 
trends towards Paris and Geneva, he does not see any move to New York 
or Washington D. C. in 1933. Accordingly, r:-rGOs in the 1920s and early 
227 Ibid., pp.106, 115, 162-172 and 212-220. . . . 
228 L. C. White, International Non-Governmental orga111zatwns: Their Purpose, Methods, 
and Accomplis/Jments (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.1951), p.228. 
229 L. C. White, Private International Organizations, p.126. 
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1930s were heavily centred in Europe. It is noteworthy that some 
organizations did not have fixed headquarters, and the office or home of 
the head of the organization became the temporary headquarters in such 
cases. 
b) Membe1ship 
The number of members of INGOs varied substantially. The League of 
Red Cross Societies had member associaticins in sixty countries, and the 
total membership was 24,682,411 persons (11,181,934 in the USA, 4,121,429 
in Japan; and 1,828,000 in Italy). The International Federation of Trade 
Unions had member unions in twenty-nine countries, almost entirely 
confined to Eu:ope, with 13,516,269 memb~rs. The World Alliance of 
YMCA's had member associations in thirty-three countries and 
membership was 1,570, 907 (944,421 in the USA, 176,426 in Germany, 
27,790 in China, and 22,000 in Japan), with the countries Clf Asia well 
represented. Rotary International had clubs in seventy cmmtries with 152, 
581 members (108,424 in the USA, 16, 648 in Britain, 6,152 i;\ Canada, and 
1,679 in Australia). Interestingly, organizations from English-speaking 
countries with very few continental European member-countries, that is, 
the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union and the World's 
Student Christian Federation, had stronger representation in the countries 
of Asia. The smallest membership of 121 was that of the Institute of 
International Law (20 in France, 10 in Belgium, 10 in Germany, 7 in 
Britain, 4 in J apan).230 Figures for IPR membership are not listed in 
White's study, but due to its selective nature, the number must have been 
small. At biennial conferences, 250 was considered too many, and the 
meeting was often confined to around 150. If this figure was a twentieth 
of the entire membership of each country, the total membership would 
have been around 3,000. Even though this is perhaps an underestimation, 
the total number could hardly have been above 5,000. 
In White's analysis of country membership of the selE'cted thirty-one 
organizations, Britain belonged to 30, the USA to 25, Japan to 22, Australia 
230 Ibid., pp.95-125. 
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to 20, and China to 17. As for the proportion of individual membership in 
these organizations, the USA topped the list, followed by Britain and five 
European countries, then Japan, Czechoslovakia, Australia and China. On 
the basis of the pr0 ; rtion of the membership to national population, 
Australia came fourth following the USA, Britain and Austria in this 
order, and then ten other European countries along with C nada and New 
Zealand, Japan is ranked as 17th.231 
Analysis of membership shows strong American as well as European 
involvement in INGOs. Australian membership is also strong, 
considering its population and geographicai ~~moteness. Probably the tie 
with British organizations was a reason for this high representation. 
Japan ranks the highest among all non Euro-American countries in the 
participation rate in INGOs. The proportion of Euro-Americans to non 
Euro-Americans was probably far better balanced in IPR conferences than 
those of any other INGOs because its participants came from Japan, China, 
Korea and the Philippil'es as well as from the USA, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.232 The IPR was, therefore, unique in the composition of 
membership. 
c) Conferences 
Conferences were a crucial element in these INGOs. Without travel and 
conferring, they could not function. This became possible because of the 
dramatic technological development of transport and communications 
which was accelerated by WWI, and which contributed to an age of 
international conferences.233 Personal contacts, rather than exchanges of 
written documents, gained credibility not only among officials, but also 
among people in business and academia. Participants who travelled by sea 
began to share common visions and to contribute to common scholarship 
231 Ibid., pp.121-123. 
232 Participating countries varied from conference to conference. Se~ Appendix~· . 
233 For internationalization in communication, see Daniel R. Headnck, Tl1e Inv1s1b/e 
Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
Univers:ty Press, 1991). Conferences of many organizations such as the International 
Research Council the Red Cross, the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the 
Chambers of Co~merce and the Rotary Club, were held not only in Europe, but also in the 
Pacific. 
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in many fields.~34 In other words, these conferences provided a common 
intellectual paradigm from which the internationalists of the 1920s began 
to operate. White argues that conferences generally had executive power 
for personnel selection and policy making, but that this was not the case in 
the IPR.235 
d) Resources 
The sources of incomt: of INGOs were subscriptions, gifts or donations and 
the earnings of the o~·~anization from publications, but this last source was 
normally very small.236 Donations from individuals or foundations, such 
as the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, usually accounted for 
a large amount. Although White does not mention it, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, another American foundation which contributed 
substantially to international organizations, should also be mentioned 
here. The latter provided the major portion of IPR funds, and its 
donations promoted activities of international and domestic non-
governmental organizations such as the CFR, Foreign Policy Associations 
and the YMCA.237 
Of the thirty-one INGOs White closely examined, the USA contributed the 
most, followed by Britain, France, Germany Canada and Japan. When he 
calculated these amounts per head of population, Britain came top, 
followed by the USA and Canada. Japan came in the 17th ranking, as the 
first non Euro-American country. New Zealand ranked 5th, Australia 
11th, while the others were European countries.238 
234 In the fields of sciences, this phenomenon of 'world' scholarship developed more 
rapidly. Roy and Kay MacLeod, 'The Social Relations of Science and Technology, 1914-
1939,' in Carlo M. Cipolla ed., T/Je Fontana Economic History of Europe: T/Je Twentieth 
Century Part One (Glasgow: Williams Collins Sons, 1976), pp.301-335. Noble analyses 
how the centralization of national scientific institutions provided a base for 
international scientific organizations. He emphasizes the impact of WWI on this 
movement. D. Noble, America by Design, pp.148-160. 
235 L. C. White, Private I11ternatio11al orga11izatio11s, p.42. 
236 Ibid., p.88. 
237 The files of the IPR, the CFR, and the international division of the YMCA at the 
Rockefeller Archives show the details of its donations. 
238 L. C. White, Private I11tematio11al Orga11izatio11s, pp.90-9~:. 
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Regarding the scale of annual revenue, the Zionist Organization topped 
with US $ 2,737,507; Rotary Intenrntional second with only a quarter of the 
scale at$ 1,020,300; third, the International Red Cross with substantially 
less than the first two at$ 291,150; and fourth the IPR with$ 128,564. The 
IPR was followed by the World Sunday School Association at$ 96,450; and 
the International Federation of Trade Unions at$ 66, 349.239 Considerir>g 
the membership, and the scale and scope of the organization, the IPR's 
revenue is distinctly high. 
e) National Base 
The most striking character of INGOs in White's study is their nation 
based structure. He classifies the organizations according to membership. 
Although there are a few combined patterns, the major criterion is 
whether individual members belong to national organizations which are 
member associations of INGO, or whether they belong to the INGO 
directly. For the former, he uses the term, 'inter-national', and the latter, 
'cosmopolitan'. His findings proved the dominance of 'international': 'by 
far the greatest number ... are the inte1-national type'. Of the thirty-seven 
selected organizations, twenty-eight were of the 'inter-national' type. The 
'cosmopolitan' type included the Institute of International Law, Institute 
of the Olympic Committee and the Universal Esperanto Association, 
while there were a few which combined both characteristics.240 
He argues: 'Not only do national organizations seem to form a satisfactory 
basis for most international organizations, but international organizations 
tend to develop and strengthen national organizations'. Certain 
organizations, such as the International Federation of League of Nations 
Societies, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the International 
Federation of Trade Unions, required the formation of national groups 
out of local groups. Many organizations, especially the V\'orld Alliance of 
the YMCA and the World's Women's Christian Temperance Union, saw 
239 Ibid., p.89. 
240 Ibid., pp.31 and 34. 
the development of local and national groups as an important part of 
their work.::o.;1 
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Similarly, the IPR required the organi.:ation of Nationu.l Councils. As 
White points out, the 'cosmopolitan' type is possible only with a small 
membership. It is noteworthy that the IPR with its relatively $mailer 
membership took such a strong inter-national structure. This structure 
was also clear in the governing body of the IPR. While the governing 
body of the 'inter-national' type of INGO did not necessarily have 
representation from each member national group, the IPR took a strong 
line so as to ensure national represePtation as far as it was possible.242 
However, some other inter-national type organizations gave stronger 
power to certain national representatives according to the amount of 
financial contribution, the activities or population, while the IPR 
governing body gave equal weight to each national representative. The 
governing body of the IPR had far fewer members and met less frequently 
than other INGOs. This gave more power to the fewer people either at the 
executive body or the secretariat. 
As White comments, the strong national representation structure of 
INGOs in the 1920s and 1930s was not necessarily ideal, but many found it 
satisfactory. Accordingly, the making of an international body also meant 
the making of national bodies, and these 'national' bodies were likely to 
generate a certain official or governmental orientation. As demonstrated 
in the following chapters, this was the case for the IPR. The development 
of the IPR as an international body happened at the same time as the 
formation of the National Councils, and from its inception it incorporated 
the essential problem of being at once inter-national and 11011-
governm en ta[. 
The IPR embodied considerable potential in terms of its focus on the 
Pacific, and it was the first such organization in the period to have strong 
representation from a non Euro-American population. At the same time, 
it embodied the problems of internationalism and international 
241 Ibid., pp.35-36. 
242 Ibid., p.68. 
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organizations of the time. The following chapters show how the IPR was 
constructed, a~cd examine the intellectual and institutional implications of 
this experiment. 
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Chapter Two : Fou11ding the I11stitute of Pacific Relatio11s: 
America11 Context 
1) From Vision to Influence 
It was a rainy Sunday afternoon in New York on 22 February, 1925. 
Around half past two, at the Yale Club, near the Grand Central Station 
Terminal, men who were 'particularly interested in inter-racial and 
international questions' gathered to' consider the plan of the proposed 
institute, its purpose, scope and method and the nature of American 
participation in it'. The proposed institute was to become the Institute of 
Pacific Relations later in the year. The day was chosen because it was a 
Sunday in a congressional recess. Busy public figures came mainly from 
the East Coast, and some from Chicago and the West Coast. 
Invitations were sent to men who were thought to be not only interested 
but also op in ion leaders in the fields of religion, press, business, academia 
and education. It was organized by the temporary executive committee, 
which had been discussing the institute for a few months. The committee 
itself also consisted of prominent men: George Blakeslee, Professor of 
Political Science and 'Far Eastern' specialist at Clark University in 
Washington D. C. and a reputable organizer of the Institute of Politics at 
Williamstown; John Finley, Editor of the New York Times; John Mou, an 
inspirational leader of the international student movement of the YMCA; 
G. A. Johnston Ross, Professor at the Union Theological Seminary, New 
York; Chester Rowell, an influential journalist of World's Work 
Magazine, San Francisco; James Speers, owner of a shipping company, 
James McCutcheon Company, New York; and Ray Wilbur, President of 
Stanford University.I 
The purpose of the meeting was explainr-l in the invitation letters: 
'Problems arising from the increasing intercourse between the Peoples of 
the Pacific Basin have inspired the proposal to hold at Honolulu an 
1 Invitation Jetter, 5 February, 1925 Al/2, AUH. 
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institute somewhat similar to the Williamstown Institute, under the 
auspices of an international committee made up of representatives from 
Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, the Philippines, Canada, and the 
United States' .2 
This chapter argues that the discussion at the Yale Club determined the 
direction of the proposed institute, which was to become the IPR, and 
defined the nature of the IPR in the future. It became clear that the 
Institute would aim ~ :i become an international non-governmental 
organization of regional experts, and to influence public opinion and 
policy-making. This original setting itself later proved to be the cause of 
the change in the early 1930s.3 
Already two months before the meeting at the Yale Club, Merle Davis, one 
of the main organizers, who later became the first General Secretary of the 
IPR in 1926, wrote of its potential implications: 
Should the eminent men meeting in such a preliminary 
conference decide against participating in the Hawaii meeting, it 
would not prevent our carrying out the original plan. However, 
should such a group approve and become interested in 
cooperation, it would mean a great enlargement of the scope and 
influence of the Hawaii program .... Practically all the men ... see in 
it [a] very important possible development, and agree that it may 
lead to our Pan-Pacific conference exerting both a national and 
international influence expressed in formation of public opinion 
and new legislation of tlze first importance.4 (emphasis added) 
At the meeting two months later, Davis felt that the Institute would have 
much more influence than he had originally anticipated. 
i) The Background to the Yale Club Meeting 
2 Ibid. 
3 Full details will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
4 Davis to Atherton, 26 December, 1924, Al/l, AUH. 
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Until the Yale Club meeting, the initiative and organization for the 
Institute came mainly from the YMCA.5 The plan was first a proposal for 
a Y:tvfCA conference in Honolulu concerning race relations in the Pacific, 
not an institute, and the Christian element was very strong in this 
original plan. It was particularly concerned with the disputes over 
Japanese immigration to the USA. In 1921, the YMCA in Honolulu 
proposed a conference of representatives of the countries bordering on he 
Pacific to meet in 1923 to deal with the problPms caused by the racial 
relations. 
This call for a conference could only happen in the context of the Pan-
Pacific movement in Hawaii which A. H. Ford of the Pan-Pacific Union 
had started in 1917.6 Pan-Pacific conferences were held under the auspices 
of the Union and had created enthusiasm for peace and cooperation 
among limited but influential circles in the Pacific area. Frank Atherton 
(1877-1945), a philanthropic businessman in Honolulu, assisted the 
financing of Ford's Union and the organization of Pan-Pacific 
conferences.7 Atherton came from a prominent family which combined 
business with a strong missionary tradition. They were heavily involved 
in many local religious and philanthropic activities, including the 
YMCA.B Ford persuaded the Honolulu YMCA to call for a conference in 
the Pacific.9 Atherton was conscious of anti-Japanese sentiment on the 
mainland and closely connected with Japanese groups led by Shibusawa 
5 The origin of the IPR war. described in the proceedings of the first conference in Honolulu 
in 1925. All are mainly introductory and descriptive. 'History and Organization,' [The 
IPR ed.], Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu Session, June 30-July 14, 1925: History, 
Organization, Proceedings, Discussions and Addresses (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), pp.7-13. 
Herc, basing on the new documents mainly at the Archives of the University of Hawaii, 
I analyse the nature of the original selling of the IPR. 
6 Sec Chapter One, Section Three. 
7 Report of J. 0. Miller, 4 May, 1921, A981; Org 93, A.A. 
B G. E. Allen, Bridge Builders: Tire Story of Tl1eodG'e and Mary Atlrerton Riclrards 
(Honolulu, publisher unknown, 1970), p.195. Ath•?rton family controlled much property, 
business, politics, church and education in Honolulu. Frank Atherton's parents were 
property owners and educators, and they were also active in missio~at')'. act~vities. They 
believed that Chiristianization was an importm1t clement of Amcncamzal!on. 
Concerned with the Oriental problems in H~waii, they established the "Mid-Pacific 
Institute" for the education and C~:!~!!::.111.zation of the younger generation of island-
born Asians. The Institute promoted the exchange program between Hawaii and Japan. 
Ibid., pp.60, 129, 131, and 144-145. 
9 G. E. Allen, Tire YMCA ill Hawaii, 1869-1969 (Honolulu: Honolulu YMCA, 1969), p.99. 
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Eiichi, who tried to ease this tension.JO At the end of 1921, a committee of 
the Honolulu YMCA met at the Pacific Club, a local gentlemen's club,11 to 
discuss the proposed conference. The main object of the conference was, 
they believed, to 'discover what is fundamental and universal in 
Christianity and consider how this might be made a common basis of 
understanding and motivation for the Pacific peoples' .12 
The Honolulu Pan-Pacific movement joined the international YMCA 
movement when this proposal gained the strong support of John Mott, a 
leader of the YMCA student movement, in 192?.. In the same year, the 
matte•· was discussed with YMCA leaders in the countries of Asia, and the 
pian g1ined an enthusiastic response. As the result, the second "World's 
Conference of YMCA Workers among Boys" at Portschach, Austria, in 
May 1923, resolved on the initiative of the YMCA in Hawaii to hold a 
Pacific YMCA conference in Honolulu in February 1925, inviting the 
YMCA's National Committees of the 'nations bordering the Pacific'.1 3 
They cho.se Hawaii because it was thought to be an ideal location for 
'long time promotion of a community of interest of the people in the 
Pacific, and progress in the development of inter-racial underslJuJinr; and 
good will'. A.H. Ford's Pan-Pacific Movement was largely responsible for 
the success of the Honolulu YMCA. 
As a result of this decision, the central executive committee (the 
Honolulu group, composed of Hawaiian residents-six Americans, two 
Chinese and two Japanese) and the central committee were founded in 
Honolulu. The latter was an international body and comprised 
JO As for Shlbusawa's activities al the Japanese American Relations Committee CTARC), 
sec Chapter One Section Three. Atherton knew Shibusawa Eiichi alrcad; :n 1917 when 
he was invited to Japan as a member of the JARC. Atherton wrote lo Shibusawa about 
his commitment to the cause of the JARC. Atherton lo S'1ibusawa, 20 October, 1923, 
SEDS, Vol. 34, pp.81-82. 
11 The club was founded first as the "Mess" in 1851 aild then changed to the "British Oub" 
in 1867. It became the "Pacific Club" in 1892. B. Hyams and E. C. Cluff, Cente1111ial 
Memories of t/1e Pacific Club i11 Ho11cl11lu, 1851-1951 ( H~nolulu: the Pad.fie Club,_ 1951), 
p.92. It was a British style gcntlem .. n's club. Although 1l h?sted m:my mtcr-rac1al 
functions of the Pan-Pacific Union i!l1C: the IPR, the member hst even m 1944 shows no 
narnc other than English origin. [Th~ Pacific Club], A111111al Report, the Pacific Club 1944 
{llonolulu: the Pacific Club, 1945), pp.20-23. 
12 'History and Organization,' I11stitute of Pacific Relations, 1925, p.8. 
13 Ibid., p.9. 
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representatives from each member country; Australia, Canada, China, 
Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines and the USA, and one from 
Hawaii. These countries were selected because of their YMCA 
representation. Reflecting its strong identity and initiative, Hawaii had 
separate representation from the mainland USA until 1929 when the two 
merged under American representation. Most representatives were from 
the YMCA. The committee sent an invitation to each National 
Committee of the YMCA in Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Korea, New 
Zealand, the Philippines and the USA on 7December1923. The initial 
activities for the IPR conference began in 1924, and were conducted by the 
YMCA National Committees. 
The task of organizing the conference and shaping th<· program was 
undertaken by the Honolulu group with the assistance of the mainland 
members of the central committee and the American YMCA. The main 
members were Atherton, Arthur Dean, President of the University of 
Hawaii, Charles Loomis, a YMCA officer from Hawaii, and G. A. Johnstun 
Ross and James Speers from New York. While the Hawaii group 
remained central in organizing programs for the conference, 
developments in the mainland, especially in New York, brought a new 
dimension to the conference. 
There were two major elements to this new dimension which led to the 
Yale Club meeting: the organization of an American national group; and 
the search for ir'Huence. Organizing the national group of a country was a 
massive task, not least on the mainland of the USA, so vast and so far 
away from Hawaii. The process of organizing an American national body 
influenced the nature of the IPR. Furthermore, many involved in the 
organization felt that influential people and substantial funding were 
necessary to influence official policy and public opinion making. 
By April 1924, the Honolulu group made a firm decision to take the 
Institute of Politics at Williamstown (IPW) as a model of their project. 
Atherton described the proposed project in the letter to General Education 
Bcilrd (New York) as a 'conference or institute closely resembling that of 
the Williamstown Institute of Politics, although it is narrower and more 
••• 4'" 
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specific in its subject'.14 While there were already some organizations of 
foreign affairs experts, 5uch as the Council o" Foreign Rr~ :itions (CFR), the 
IPW was the only one which held multinatio· ·.al conferences ar;nually.15 
The Honolulu group aimed to create an international conference or 
conference-ori.ented institute, like the IPW, rather than a national 
institute on its own. Encouraged by the success of the iPW, some 
organizers became more ambitious about the pote1 . .Ial influence of the 
project on public opinion, and felt it crucial to secure prominent 
participants. The main focus of the project was. however, significantly 
different from the IPW: to solve racial conflict in the Pacific by fre~ and 
frank discussion.16 
Action was taken quickly. Almost a week after Atherton's letter to the 
General Education Board, the rep~·ec-cntative of the Honolulu group, Jay 
A. Urice, a YMCA man at the New York office, and Johnson Ross, 
Professor at the Union Theology Seminary in New York and a membE!r of 
the central committee, met Harry Garfield, org:mizer of the IPW and 
President of Williams College, at the Century Club, New York. Garfield 
greeted the outline of the proposed confer,_ :\ce 'heartily' and thought it a 
part of a growing trend set by the IPW. He suggested four points had led to 
the IPW' s success: finance, personnel, method, <ind rel;;tions with the 
State Department. 
G;irfield emphasized 'academic freedom in a degree' and the avoidance of 
funds from too many sources, because they would dominate the direction 
c'.' the enterprise. He explained that his way of getting prominent people 
wa:> to make personal contacts with those who were the centre of the 
network, either in the USA or Europe. He also took great care 'to vary the 
viewpoints'. The "methods" he outlined were 1) the Round Table, a 
small group of discussion led by an expert on a subject, 2) the open Round 
Table, and 3) the Public Address on more general issues. No resolutions 
were permitted, so as to make discussions free and avoid misleading 
publicity.· Garfield maintained that relations with the State Department 
14 Atherton to General ~dur.atlon Board, 24 April, 1924, A ~/l, AUH. 
15 For its origin and the relations with the RIIA group, sec Chapter One, Section Two. 
16 Atherton to General Education Board, 24 Apnl, 1924, Al/1, AUH. 
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had been cooper alive. Secretary Hughes was enthusiastic, the department 
loaned maps, and staff attended the conferences unofficially. 'The State 
Department seemed ready to encourage such efforts as the Institute,' he 
said.17 
While following the first three points given by Garfield, organizers of the 
conference in July took a more independent attitude in regard to the State 
Department. This was mainly because the State Department did not wish 
the issue of Asian exclusion to be publicized, and strong opposition from 
official circles to the conference was expected.. There was a positive 
attitude to the promotion of nun-official m1c. ilational organizations 
among those who were involved in the preparation of the conforence. 
This attitude will be discussed later in this chapter. 
The meeting with Garfield furthered personal contacts with his social 
group. At the Century Club, Garfield introduced Urice and Ross to 
Raymo11d Fosdick, trustee of the Rockefeller Fuundati0n.l8 Urice and 
Ross tried to get Fosdick to participate in the conference and to advise on 
foundation money.1 9 A student of Garfield at Princeton in the 1900s, 
Fosdick was Under Secretary General at the Leap,ue of Nations in 1919-
1920 and became a trust£'~ (1921-1936) and President (1936-1948) of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. Fosdick was influential at the Foundation, the 
fact which IPR members, especially in New York, fully recognized. 
The involvement of Fosdid, in the IPR project started earlier than •he 
lunch at t!ie Century Club. Atherton had already made an approach to the 
Foundation and Fosdick. They discussed how to apply for grants from 
variou.s foundations.20 As a judge of these applications, Fosdick' s 
comments were appreciated He was sympathetic to the IPR project from 
the beginning, because he saw great value in the cause and the method of 
its original project. 
17 Memorandum ofJ. A. Urke, 30 April, 1924, Al/l, AUH. . . 
18 The Rock~feller FoundJilon was called the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memonal unttl 
1929. Jn tnis thesis, l :.:se the term the Rockefeller Foundatio.n for both. 
19 Urice to Looms, 2 May, 1924, Al/l, AUH. 
20 Atherton to General Education Board, 24 April, 1924, Al/I, AUH. 
Although sceptical of religion-biased projects, he showed great interest 
in the idea of applying Christian principles to modern 
100 
problems such as racial conflicts. The idea first came to his attention in 
1922 through Edward Carter's project, the "Notional Inquiry into the 
Christian Way of Life". While Carter, a YMCA man, was Secretary of the 
American Council of the IPR (ACIPR) in 1926-1933, his primary interest 
and his salary came from this project, often called the "Inquiry" (1922-
1932).21 His office, which was to become an office of the ACIPR, and later 
the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR), was on 129 East 52nd street, 
an annex of the YMCA building (135 East 52nd street) which also faced to 
Lexington Avenue. The aim of Carter's project was to solve the problems 
of international, racial and industrial relations by applying Christian 
principles in modern life. Fosdick wrote to the Foundation on the project: 
Personally, this is one of the most unique matters that has ever 
been brought to my attention .... The question is constantly asked 
whether Christianity has any applicability to modern life .... Here is 
an honest attempt ... to get people all over the country to think 
about it. I find myself hoping that you will see your way clear to 
support this venture somewhat liberally .... Of course the study is a 
venture-it is even something of a leap in the dark-but it is 
aimed at a real goal and it is in capable hands.22 
Fosdick did have some reservations, but his sympathy was apparent. 
More importantly, his belief in the ability of Carter is striking. Thereafter, 
Carter cultivated and maintained good relations with the mc.jor staff of 
the Foundation, including Fosdick, l•:ho were also closely •:onnected with 
other foundations. The Honolulu office's lack of this access to the 
foundations was one crucial element in the move of the headquarters' 
functions to New York in tl.: early 1930s. 
Although the basic direction of the conference was shaped by the middle 
of 1924, a real change came in the mid-December, just after the 
appointment of Merle Davis in November 1924, to organize the American 
21 Carter louk this name the "Inquiry", probably because he was inspired by the "Inquiry" 
organized by Colonel House for the Paris Peace Conference, and hoped ~he similar 
influence in public affairs. For House's "Inquiry", see Chapter One, Seclion One. 
22 Fosdick to Rockefeller, 22 January, 1924, LSRM/ 111-2-N I 47 /376, RA. 
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representatives and the conference as a whole.23 Around the time of his 
appointment, the temporary executive committee (the American 
committee) was formed. This committee was distinct from the central 
executive committee (the Honolulu group) or the central committee of 
international representatives. While the last two were heavily dominated 
by the YMCA members, the American committee consisted mainly of 
experts on Asia and race issues. 
Davis satisfied all these criteria. He was a YMCA man, and an expert on 
Japan and racial problems in the USA. He was born and grew up in Japan 
as the son of a missionary family. He worked in Japan for many years as 
general secretary of the international YMCA before he took up a job of 
Director of the "Survey of Race Relations: A Study of the Orientals on the 
Pacific Coast", which was based in San Francisco.24 Chairman of the 
executive committee of the "Survey" was Ray Wilbur, President of 
Stanford University, who also became a member of the America:; _ 
committee for the proposed conference, and later after the first conference, 
became · "e first chairman of the Pacific Council, the executive body of the 
IPR. 
Davis was close to the Honolulu group, especially Atherton, to which he 
felt his primary loyalty and responsibility. Davis saw two pivotal points in 
the development of the project, Honolulu and New York. Davis knew 
various projects and institutions on the West Coast dealing with race 
relations, and was himself involved with one of these projects. Yet, 
significantly, he felt at this stage that the pivotal points were not on the 
West Coast but in New York. He wrote to Atherton that he would have to 
make New York his working centre for some time and that he would start 
23 John B. Condliffe, Reminiscences of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Vancouver, B. C.: 
Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1981), p.2. This booldet 
was given from Dr William Holland to me in Marc~ 1993 and~ thank hi~ f~r this copy. 
24 The organization was initiated in 1923 by the Institute of Social and Rehgious Research 
of New York City. The Pacific Coast was divided into five research regi.ons, including 
British Columbia, and each division was supervised by local research dl.l'eclor. E. E. 
Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., Tiie Memories of Ray Lyman Wilbur, 1875-1949 
(Stanford: Stanford Un'.versity Press, 1960), p.315. 
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West :;ot before the mid-February.25 While keeping his job in San 
Francisco, Davis headed for New York immediately after the 
appointment. He remained there until 18Dcc:ember1924, and returned to 
New York on 5 January 1925. Based at the International Committee of the 
YMCA, at 347 Madison Avenue, and working with the officers there (the 
New York group) such as Urice, he travelled frantically to various parts of 
the East Coast. 
The direction of the IPR project became clearer in the draft of the letter, 
dated 19December1924, to John D. Rockefeller Jr. In this letter, Davis 
denied the central role of the YMCA, the Hawaiian group and the 
connection with the Pan-Pacific Union. Instead, he emphasized the 
similarities between the IPW and the proposed conference to bring 
together 'men of the East and the West for a thorough discussion of racial 
problems'. 
The national YMCAs ... act as agents only, and do not consider this 
a YMCA conference. The work of the YMCA will have no place in · 
the agenda .... The conference is not in the hands of a Hawaiian 
committee, but is directed by an international committee ... 26 
Who was responsible for this emerging emphasis? Was it an initiative of 
Davis or the New York group against the wishes of the Honolulu group? 
Although Davis had a clear sense of the centrality of the Honolulu group, 
being so far away from Honolulu, he was often uncertain how far he 
shJuld go in this direction: 
It is somewhat difficult for me to know how far I can nzhtly and 
wisely assume responsibility and initiative. The New Yo.k 
Committee are leaving these to me as a representative of the 
Central Committee, and I am so far from you Hawaii leaders that 
one is in danger of going too far, or of not going far enough ... 27 
Davis' correspondence suggests that this change happened not because of 
his intentions, but because of the need to secure prominent delegates and 
25 At this point, Davis was in San Francisco. Davis lo Atherton, 30 December, 1924, Al/1, 
AUH. 
26 Draft letter from Davis to J. D. Rockefeller Jr, 19 December, 1924, Al/1, AUH. 
27 Davis to Atherton, 30 December. 1924, Al/1, AUH. 
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substantial funds. After experiencing difficulties in achieving both aims, 
his major concern became compiling efficient applications for funds. The 
advice of Raymond Fosdick played a crucial role in this process. 
Although there wa~ never any direct instruction or pressure from the 
Foundation, those who wrote the IPR applications for funds could not 
ignore the views of its influential trustees and advisers whose advice 
often decided the result. Consequently the applications largely shaped the 
IPR programs. On the other hand, this influence was only possible 
because IPR organizers themselves wanted the kind of prominence and 
influence which the trustees suggested. 
Funds other than those from wealthy philanthropic foundations and 
individuals were limited in this period. Some organizations depended on 
subscriptions or the revenue from their publications, but the amount of 
money through this method was limited. It was also only possible when 
strong organizational bases were founded. Without a permanent body 
and with the main purpose of holding an international conference, IPR 
organizer& needed a substantial amount of money fro;n outside. 
Furthermore, as an unofficial body, they could not in principle seek 
government funding, although the case of the Japanese Council suggests 
otherwise.28 The idea of relying on a few wealthy foundations or 
individuals attracted Garfield and Davis, because they felt that relative 
independence would be achieved. Funding for the first budget came from 
the Honolulu group (US$ 25,000), mainly from Atherton, $ 10,000 from 
Rockefeller Jr,$ 5,000 from Carnegie Endowment, and some from wealthy 
philanthropists such as Julius Rosenwald (Chicago), Thomas Lamont 
(Morgan Bank) and other banking and shipping companies. For its size 
and membership, as Chapter One Section Four showed, the IPR enjoyed a 
relatively big budget due to the contributions of these foundations, and 
this fortunate situation made officers unaware of the need to cultivate 
other sources. 
28 Sec Chapter 'fhree, Section Two. 
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On 10 December, Urice and Davis found that the application for funds for 
the conference written by the Honolulu group to the General Education 
Board had failed. Fosdick, having insider knowledge, explained the main 
reasons for the failure. First, an international conference was outside the 
Board's inte-0 <>ts. Second, Ford gave a bad impression to the Board, when 
he had approached it for his Pan-Pacific conferences. They thought Ford's 
Pan-pacific Union was an advertising agency, and that the proposed IPR 
conference was related to Ford's projects. Third and 'probably the most 
important factor' was the criticism of the YMCA auspices of an 
international project of this kind. The YMCA might be promoting its own 
purposes and it was not a suitable convenor for such a gathering.29 
Following these comments, Davis drafted an application to the 
Rockefeller Foundation. He also proposed the formation of the advisory 
board which comprised eminent men in the field who were not YMCA 
members.30 
Fosdick and the directors at the General Education Board were not alone 
in thinking that the project should not be built on the YMCA. Wilbur, 
Chairman of the American committee, noted: 
I told the group backing [the conference project] that I would not 
care to have anything to do with it unless it would be free from 
any religious denominational influence. The program was 
changed to conform to this view.31 
This view of Wilbur probably came from his experience of the "Survey of 
Race Relations". Born in a pioneering F •• ily in Mid West and brought 
up in the frontier of California, he lectur~J and practiced medicine before 
he became President of the Stanford University (1916-1943). Concerned 
with the racial tension in California, he chaired the "Survey of Race 
Relations". He was convinced that the results of this survey 
demonstrated the usefulness of Japanese agricultural labourers to the local 
economy and life, and a remarkable degree of Americanization among 
American-born Japanese and Chinese.32 Wilbur recorded that 'the survey 
29 Davis to Atherton, 12 December, 1994, Al/1, AUH. 
30 Ibid. 
31 E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., Tlze Memories of Wilbur, p.317. 
32 Ibid., p.316. 
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was a new departure in American education' on race relations.33 Based on 
this experience, Wilbur voiced the importance of knowledge of the 'truth' 
and 'facts', because he felt that misunderstanding and ignorance were the 
cause of problems. It is likely that Fosdick's view was not the only cause of 
the emphasis on 'science', but that this scientific view was also shared by 
the professional elite of the East and West Coasts, whom Davis wished to 
enlist for the conference. 
Other influential advice came from Roger Greene in the Rockefeller 
Foundation. Born in Japan as the son of a Congregational missionary 
family and brought up there, Greene served as a diplomat before he took 
up a position at the Foundation in 1914. He was most active in the 
medical program of the Foundation in China in 1914-1935. His elder 
brother, Jerome, was a Wall Street banker at Lee and Higginson Company. 
Jerome was involved in the formation of the IPR, and was to play a 
significant role espedally in 1929-1932. 
Roger Greene's advice was to diversify fupding of the project from 
American sources to overseas ones. This helped to emphasize the 
'international' outlook of the project. But at the same time, despite the 
efforts of the staff, the IPR was never to overcome the American 
dominance of its funding. In other words, this is an area in which the 
advice of the Foundation made an impaci, but was not fully put into 
practice. Roger Greene told Davis that Rockefeller Jr would not support a 
project if his money constituted more than half of the finance of an 
enterprise. The suggestion led Davis and the American committee to 
emphasize the cooperat:ve principle and joint promotion method for 
finance as well as organization and program.34 The principle could have 
led the project to become an institution funded, staffed and run 
cooperatively by various member countries. Wilbur supported this 
principle, insisting that no one country and no one religion should have 
preference.35 The principle was expressed at the Yale Club, and later 
attempts were made to implement it. The IPR project was, however, 
33 Ibid., p.317. 
34 Davis to Atherton, 30 December, 1924, A 1 /1, A UH. 
35 E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., The Memories of Wilbur, p.318. 
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predominantly financed by American philanthropic money and staffed by 
Americans all through the 1920s and 1930s, and the headquarters were 
never located outside the USA.36 Americanization was further 
&.rengthened in the 1930s. 
The next crucial advice came from an official, former Ambassador to 
Japan Roland Morris. Morris suggested a preliminary American 
conference to Davis, which became the Yale Ciub meeting. Atherton 
approved, providing that 'it was deemed essential'.37 John Mott strongly 
favoured the idea of this meeting, because he felt 'Morris presented a large 
challenge to their conference plan" and th ! meeting would be a good 
chance to resolve the matter.38 He thought that the meeting would play a 
great role in defining the nature of the planned project: if it went well, 
then the project would have more influence on public and official 
thinking and might even bring about a change in immigration legislation. 
But if it did not, they could still hold a smaller scale conference in Hawaii. 
Morris shared the negative attitude of the State Department to the 
proposed conforence: the conference could do more harm than good by 
resuming debates over the immigration issue. The k•. · of discussion 
would be the debate on immigration and racial equalit, rovoked by the 
dispute over the Immigration Act of 1924, the so-callt:!c!. nti-Japanese 
immigratiori act. DeFpite the movement to amend the act l.Jeth in Japan 
and the USA, the State Department saw it as a settled matter.39 Assistant 
Secretary of State, John MacMurray, told Davis in January 1925, that while 
it was now 'far worse to attempt to stop' the confer"nce, official 
cooperation and involvement should not be sought: 
We cannot forget, and you should not forget, that the Government 
has a very great stake in how these matters are handleci .... I would 
appreciate having reports sent me on the development of the 
conference plans. 40 
36 On the discussion on the location of the headquarters, sec Chapters Five and Six. 
37 Davis to Atherton, 26 December, 1924, Al/1, AUH. 
3B Ibid. 
39 Interview with John MacMun·ay, Assistant Secretary of State, 22 January, 1925, Al/2, 
AUH. 
40 Ibid. 
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Recognizing the hard task of organizers, he gave positive suggestions: the 
conference should face up squarely to diff Prent opinions, choose anti-
Oriental groups who would not embitter the discussion, and not overdo 
the publicity. 
You are attempting a very difficult task. It will require great skill 
and wisdom in your leaders to hold discussions on the track and 
not let the situation get out of hand.41 
As the result of these meetings with officials, Davis gained confidence: 
Mr Morris will be an able opponent but we will have present at the 
preliminary conference several men of equal abi!ity like President 
Wilbur, Chester Rowell, Professor Wilson of Harvard and others 
who will put up a strong case for holding the Hawaii meeting.42 
These meetings with officials clarified the fo~us of the conference. The 
main issue of the project was the Orient, especially Japau and China, and 
the officials and professional elite who were concerned with race relations 
did not perceive any serious problem with South American countries in 
the mid-1920s. An official at the State Department suggested excluding the 
South Americans: 'the Latin countries would be liable to stand solidly 
with the United States against the Oriental nations' .43 The representative 
of the Pan American Union also did not show much interest in the 
project, mainly because 'the Latin American countries were not specially 
interested in racial matters'.44 
ii) Yale club Meeting 
The Yale Club meeting had two sessions: a morning one of the core 
members; and a general meeting in the afternoon. The morning session 
was attended by Davis, Wilbur, Urice, Speers, Blakeslee, Carter, Professor 
Stanley Hornbeck, a China specialist at Harvard, Professor Archibald 
Coolidge of Harvard and Editor of Foreign Affairs (the journal of the 
41 Ibid. 
42 Davis to Atherton, 27 January, 1925, Al/2, AUH. 
43 Interview with MacMurray, 22 January, 1925, Al/2, AUH. 
44 Ibid. 
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CFR), C. Batchelder, former Commissioner Far Eastern Trade Bureau, and 
Galen Fisher, Executive Secretary of Social and Religious Research. Davis 
recorded: 'The morning meeting was very helpful in that it allowed the 
leaders to come to a uniform policy' .45 
At two-thirty, the afternoon session started. The following table shows 
background of the participants. 
Academic 
Press: Publisher /J ournaii st46 
Business 
Officers: Public Servic•. (4) 
Non-profit foundations (4) 
League of Nation (1) 
Religion: YMCA (5) 
Church (2) 
Total 
15 
10 
7 
9 
7 
5147 
They were male professionals. The lack of women probably reflected their 
marginalized position, although women's groups were active in various 
social movements such as peace and temper;'lnce movements an<l were 
enthusiastic about the proposed conference. Davis had appealed to 
women's associations, mainly female suffrage groups.48 They became an 
important base of IPR activities, organizing public addresses and 
luncheons for th!:! IPR. Despite substantial numbers of women at IPR 
conferences '!nd general support of women's associations for the IPR, 
however, tney ·1ere not offered an import<mt role in terms of agenda and 
policy decis:ons at the lPR. Therefore, they had to start their own 
organizations in 1928.49 
45 Davis' record of the Yale Club meeting, n. d., Al/2, AUH. 
46 They were publisher and/ or journalist and it is hard to draw the line from the 
documents. 
47 The minutes of the meeting says: 'forty-one men came', but the report sent to Honolulu on 
6 March attached th;: list of the attendants of forty-six men. Also the list of the 
attendants in the proceedings of the fin· ~onfcrcncc shows only thirty-eight. This list of 
thirty eight men included five names which were not on the report of 6 March. To sec the 
background of the attendants, or those who were likely there, I combined these two lists 
and analysed combined fifty-one men's background. 
48 Davis to Atherton, 12 December, 1924, Al/1, /\UH. 
49 Sec Chapter Four. 
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The above table suggests that representation of religiu11 and the YMCA 
was weaker than the orighal plan, but that it remained an important 
element. If the backgr .. :mnd of other professionals is more closely 
examined, probably missionary experience would not be negligible. Law 
and medicine were not re:-;restnted, although some may have had 
university degrees in the fields. 
Political affiliation is hard to identify except for a few cases, such as Chester 
Rowell and Wilbur, both well-known Republicans. 'Born and brought up 
as Republican', Wilbur was active in the party politics and known for his 
friendship with Herbert Hoover. Furthermore, it is hard to establish the 
specific positions of these participants in relation to the League of 
Nations.so For example, although a Republican, Wilbur was a strong 
supporter of Wilson's proposal for American entrance to the League. 
Herbert Croly, editor of New Republic, supported Wilsonian principles 
expressed in the "Fourteen Points", but disapproved of the way the peace 
was negotiated. The proceedings of IPR conferences from 1925 onwards 
suggest that amoi •he participants for these conferences, including a 
maj::irity of those ... )0 were at the Yale Club meeting, the validity of the 
League of Nations was not q. estioned, but that they had reservations 
about the Am::>rican membership in the League. They felt that they could 
achieve Wilsonian principles outside the League, but 'iu harmony and 
constructive relationship' with the League.Sl 
The memLr:;olf.<j'apanese American Relations Committee (JARC) played a 
significant role in the IPR, although only a few rr.embers actually attended 
the Yale Club meeting. Sydney Gulick of the Federal Council of Churches, 
a most active JARC member in the movement to amend the Immigration 
Act of 1924, was there, but not George Wickersham or Henry Taft, both 
former Attorneys General and Republicans. Wickersham was a member 
of the CFR, but did not join the IPR. When he was approached in late 
1934, he was reluctant about his commitment due to his involvement 
with other 'benevole11t and charitable enterprise': 'I shall not be expected 
SO See Chapter One, Section Two. . . 
SJ 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' inJ. D. Condliffe ed., Problems of tl1e Pacific, 1927 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928, p.172. 
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to do anything more than occasionally to read the publications'.52 
Although Gulick played no major role in the IPR in the following years, 
other JARC members, Frank Atherton, Chester Rowell and Wallace 
Alexander, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerr. at San Francisco, did. 
Probably due to the distance, the only one to att<!nd the meeting from this 
group was Ro' !ell. 
The reasons for their interest in the conference project involved some 
personal elements. These included personal background, upbringing and 
curiosity. The Orient a11d the Pa .·Hie stirred American curiosity in this 
period, although this interest was 11ot necessarily based on personal 
background. While l1H:re were other foreign affairs experts' organizations 
in the USA, the I1'R was the only one which focused on the Pacific. 
Although some IPR members belonged to these other foreign affairs 
experts' organizations, this kind of fascination with the Orient and the 
Pacific was probably characteristic of those at th<> Yale Cfob, and later at the 
IPR conferences, in comparison with those wh .. belonged only to the 
other organizations. 
Discussion in the afternoon w~s marked by new attitudes to the issues of 
state and race.53 New attitudes towards the state were expressed in the 
emphasis on the unofficial status of the conference. Despite the opinions 
of Morris and John Abbott, Vice-President of Continental and Commercial 
Bank of Chicago, the majority thought the proposed conference and 
in:titute should be non-governmental, because unoffidal status would 
allow participants to talk freely and frankly. Ellsworth Huntington, 
Professor of Geography at Yale, stated that less official intervention would 
promote discussion, based on his experience at the Pan-Pacific Science 
Conference in Australia in 1923. Philip Brown, Professor of International 
Law at Princeton, also opposed official involvement: 'intelligent and 
democratic society would make progress on a spirit of liberdity and a 
Christian spirit'. 
52 Wickersham to Field, 21November,1934, CPR, Box 145/Wickersham, BLCU. 
53 The following discussion at the Yale Club is based on the minutes of the meeting. The 
minutes of the Yale Cub meeting, 22 February, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA. 
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To ensure unofficial status and protect speakers' freedo1:1. some suggr.sted 
that the conference avoid resolutions, political issues and excess;.ve 
publicity. Compared to the British foreign affairs experts' organization5 
such as the Round Table and the R!IA, which toc•k a very discreet 
approach of not reveaiing who said what in order tC' protect freedom of 
speech, the meeting showed a relatively open attitude to publicity. At the 
same tirne, however, they were aware of another damaging force, the 
jingoistic press.54 
Huntington also voiced a new a~titudes to Orientals, by which he meant 
the Japanese and Chinese: 
We have to get the Orientals to tell us ,;hat they think about us. 
The Orientals underst11nd us a great deal better than we 
understand them .... We have to go to the r·,•nference primarily to 
learn from the Orientals. 
This attitude reflected the thinking of some Americans, who observed 
through their movement against Japanese discr;mination that American 
knowl.~dge about Japan lagged far behind Japanese knowledge about the 
USA.55 
There were contradictory e]Pr.'!ents, however, in these new attitudes tu the 
sUte. Although t:1ey insist..zd ,Jn ihe i,,-.2orian..:~ :J~ unofficial status and 
individual qt· 'ity, participants in t!1e conference still represented their 
countries. This idea of individuals representing a nation did not 
neces 'ly mean representing its government. But delegates had to ~'"· e 
the nationality of the cot:ntr.v they represented end h11c; to b?. selected t ;· a 
national committee. Coupled with their background as a member of the 
'national elite', this method made it more likely that they would defend 
their governrr.ental policies. On the other hand, their effort to include 
54 Jingo press became powerlul around the time of the Spanish Americ'.11' War in 18.98. 
Some interprl!ledil1 "'"" ,,.;;i:aused by the journalism. F. L. Mott, A111er1ca11 Jou ma/Ism: A 
History of Newspapers in t11e United States t/Jrougli 260 Years, 1690 to 1950 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1950), p.539. 
55 Shibusawa Masahide referred to Taft's speech at the Banker~' Club in New York on 15 
July, 1920: 'Japanese people understand us far much more than we do them. Americ'11l 
people should have more right knowledge on the "ar East'. Shibusawa M., Tailieiyo ni 
kakeru Jiaslii: Sliibusawa Eiic/1i 110 s/J/5gai (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 197(1), p.351. 
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people of diverse O};;.lions implied that the IPR had the potential to lead 
discussions which were not based on national entities. 
From the very beginning of the project, only elite men and women 
mattered. The common view at the meeting and later at the IPR was: 'The 
masses should be educated and guided' by 'opinion leaders'. The aim of 
conferences was to p;:ov1de these leaders with the' facts'. While it is easy 
to condemn this Platonic attitu.d.e of wise men's rule-'Knowledgable 
experts educating the ignorant m.1sses'-as pi!temalistic and elitist, it 
reflected a common attitude of the time. This attitude was dominant in 
various foreign affairs experts' organizations such as the RIIA and the 
CFR, and remained so in the following years.56 
The sense of optimism and enthusiasm at the meeting, however, should 
not be forgotten. The IPR grew out of the strong leadership and the faith 
of those who gathered for the project. The capacit: tc challenge 
governmental in .• csts was demonstrated by Wilbur. Convinced of the 
findings of the "Survey of Race", he said: 'if it does not go well, we will 
take blame, but if it goes well, then the government will be gl;id'. Wilbur 
was 'just the man to accept such a challenge'57 
Optimism was supported by faith in science. Those at the Yale Club 
believed that any problem could oe solved by scientific and objective 
methods. Rationality and science prevailed, and was mixed with their 
secular sense of mission as public figures. The Institute should be bast::d 
on research fact-finding, which should be objective, practical and scientific. 
This somewhat linear view, believing in certain directions of evolution 
and progress, was not unc, 'llmon in the period. 
56 R. L. Sundquist de~ .. · ed the nature of current INGOs as follows: 'In short, they engage 
in research brokage-uutlding institutions where intellectuals can work, rescuing ideas 
from obscurity, synthesizing them and putlinr !hem in the hands of influential :·,wple', 
cited in R. Higgc ti and D. Stone, 'The limits of influence: foreign policy think tanks in 
Britain and the USA,' Review of I11ternatio11al Studies, Vol. 21 (1994), p.14, (emphasis 
added). 
57 ]. B. Condliffc, Remi11isce11ces, p.4. Davis rr.peatedly commented that Wilbur's 
leadership was one of the main reasons for the success of the project. Davis' recr .f the 
Yale Club meeting, n. d., Al/1, f, !JI-I, and M. Davis,' An inside story of the Inst. 
[written after the fir:.t coni..encej, p.14, Wilbur 1'.:ipers, 40/5, HJ. 
113 
Those who gathered for the IPR had faith and enthusiasm. They were 
concerned with the problems caused by racial conflicts and the IPR was a 
new experiment to solve these problems. They thought that new attitudes 
were not only necessary, but also possible in the new era of the Pacific Age. 
They were confident of American moral leadership in the Pacific. There 
was no complication ln the Par.ific as in European affairs. Not having 
soiled its hands with old-fanhioned colonialism, they felt that the USA 
was the one nation which could lead the new age and generate new 
attitudes. 
Most of them were not leisured men, but busy working professionals. To 
invest their time and money nn Sundays, dinners at the clubs or meetings 
in business hours, and to take time df for travelling to conferences, they 
had to have faith, conviction, energy, money and even more importantly, 
excitement. After expressing his first impression that all gathered at the 
Yale Club felt the project to be significant and full of 'such immense 
possibilities for future good,' Davis wrote about this excitement: 
Another impression was the amazing response of the greatest 
American experts in the different fields that we are proposing to 
discuss at Haw · · Nearly every man who attended expressed 
surprise a1 gr. ification at the very unusual group of men that 
assembled. This gives us hope that, with the leadership and 
participation of such able men, we will be able to carry out to a 
successful finish a plan of large proportions.58 
The Yale Club meeting defined the nature of the IPR. It decided that the 
conference should not be one isolated event, and that they should aim to 
found a permanent institute to hold confere:ices periodically. It was an 
enterprise of hope and enthusiasm, caused by the desire to establish the 
new system in thP Pacific. They aimed for an international non-
governmental ori:,unization of regional experts to influence public 
opinion, and indirect! y policy-making by this way. It was predominantly 
male, professional, elitist, rationalist and science-oriented, and it was 
initiated by Amr.deans, and based on American philanthropic money. 
58 Davis' record of the Yale Club meeting, n. d., i\1/1, AUH. 
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This original setting itself determined the direction of the IPR, which 
became increasingly clear in the 1930s. But first the next chapter examines 
the process and implicatio;-, of the experiment of the IPR in Japan and 
Australia. 
Chapter Three: National Setting of the IPR in Japan and 
Australia 
115 
The IPR reflected the intellectual paradigm of the day, but it was formed 
specifically in the American context. What it represented, however, 
varied in different countries, ~.nd it attracted certain kinds of people 
because of its implications. f,;cusing on the background of the formation 
of National Councils in Australia and Japan, this chapter examines what 
the IPR represented in these countries, and what kind of people became 
actively im·"lved with the IPR. It particu J;1rly focuses on the reformist 
nature of these people both in domestic and international politics, and on 
the implication of their rhetoric: words such as nation, state, the Orient 
and the Pacific. 
In the 1920s, the Pacific occupied an ambiguous position in relation to 
perceptions of the international order. The League of Nations established 
an international 0rder, but this was based far away from the Pacific. The 
Washington Treaty, seen as an extension of the League system to the 
Pacific, settled some ambiguity. Different interpretations of the 
'dominant' international order, however, were contested in the Pacific. 
This chapter argues tha\. the IPR represented an age of new international 
codes of conduct, led by Americans. It provided a stimulus to those who 
felt the need to reform the old codes. Japanese saw in the IPR a chance to 
reform the attitudes !:n the Japanese 'race', and Australians an opportunity 
to achieve the vision of a more independent, new Australia''·' the Pacific. 
Their attempts contained contradictions and problems, but in ·ooth cases, a 
strong sense of th~ nation-state was clear behind their aspirations. The 
chapter points ou'; the complexity of 'nationalism' for intl'rnationalists in 
both countries. 
It also argues the importance of the sense of crisis of the inter-war period 
and the process of national mobilization under this pressure. While 
people who were involved in the IPR promoted the vision of an 
international community and cooperation, they were not immune from 
this crisis and national mobilization. The institutionalization of the IPR 
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in both countries took the form of creating National Councils. While the 
difference of history and the magnitude and nature of the crisis produced 
different consequences, these domestic movements also influenced the 
nature of the IPR as a 'non-governmental' 'international' or -:;anization. 
1) The New Australia in the Pacific and the IPR 
This section argues that the IPR gave a stimulus to some intellectuals in 
Australia for a vision of the new Australia in the Pacific. They felt the 
need for more independence from Britain, and were increasingly aware of 
the n:gion they belonged to. But they were seen challenging the status 
quo, the British imperial order. Domestically, their biggest concerns in the 
1920s and 1930s were the social and economic crises of class conflicts and 
depression. They felt the need to create the unity of society against 
disintegration, and developed the theory of responsible citizenship, based 
on maintenance of the standard of living and the ability to assimilate the 
liberal democratic system. Though they did not use crude racist 
arguments, it was clear that non-Europeans in the region they belonged to, 
as well as aboriginals in Australia, were excluded from this concept. They 
used the idea of the Pacific to promote the new Australia more 
independent from Britain, and the idea of the Orient to achieve national 
unity by a process of exclusion. 
i) Perspective: New Liberals and the New Australia 
a) New Liberals 
The core group of the internationalist movement and organizations were 
drawn from a small circle of the urban cultured elite. They were mostly 
·nale Australian-born professionals with university degrees, such as 
. :iwyers, academics, educators, priests, ministers, journalists, business 
people and public servant including military officers. Many came frrm 
the intellectual tradition : New Liberalism of the late 1890~ .1 
1 Among studies dealing with the NE Liberals in Australia u:i the late ni.netee!l_th_ ~entury 
and the inter-war period, John Docker uses the term, New Liberals, which defm:tion 
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Influenced by T. H. Green, this tradition had profoundly penetrated 
Australian intellectual, political, literary and religious life.2 They were 
reformist on issues of domestic and international politics. They were 
concerned• ·ith social problems arising from the enlargement of 
democratic rights, and argued for a re-orientation of policy and philosophy 
to deal with these issues. They felt '.he need for a greater state role to serve 
the welfare of society as a w/zo/e. Criticism of laissez-faire economy and 
support for general social and economic reforms came from this source.3 
Some New Liberals became more 'conservative' in the 1930s,4 but others 
seems closest to mine. J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?: Conceptions of State,' in Sydney 
Labour History Group ed., What Rough Beast?: The State a11d Social Order in 
Australian History (Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). Michael Roe calls them 
Progressives, indicating an influence of American progressivism in Australia. M. Roe, 
Ni11e Australian Progressives: Vite/ism i11 Bourgeois Social Thought, 1890-1960 (St 
Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984). Stephen Alomes, more focused on the 1930s, 
uses the term Reformists. Stephen Alomes, Rcaso11able Men: Middle Class Reformism i11 
Australia, 1928-39, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1979. 
Tim Rowes argues that Australian intellectuaJs felt that Australia •Nas a purest 
example of T. H. Green's thought, and pursued reformist schemes which failed by 1920. 
He summarises the nature of New Liberals in Australia in the following: 'The 
intellectuals who first articulated the New Liberalism in Australia ... tried to construct 
an institutional base for their program of consensus-making. They saw their function as 
teachers of the working class and as reform-minded counsellors of the government, but 
they gained very little foothold or recognition for these activities. They were reformists 
attached lo a frail political centre and by 1920 this centre had collapsed'. Although 
Rowes suggests that New Liberalism was a lost cause, which saw only the partial 
survival in the inter-war period, he argues the importance of this reformist tradition in 
Australian intellectual life in the twentieth century. T. Rowes, A11stralia11 Liberalism 
a11d National Character (Melbourne: Kibble Books, 1978), pp.22, 27-28 and 32-3. David 
Walker suggests the disillusionment of theJe New Liberals in the 1920s and 1930s. D. 
Walker, Dream anti Disi//usio11: A Searc/1 for Australia11 Cultural Identify (Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1976), pp.198-199. Stuart Macintyre emphasizes 
the linkage of liberalism between the pre-1890s and twentieth century. He argues 
colonial liberalism constructed in the late nineteenth century was revived by Eggleston, 
Latham, Brookes and others who were defined as New Liberals or Progressives above. 
He suggests that the new emphasis on stale and society of New Liberalism was already 
there in thoughts of colonial liberals in the pre-1890s. S. Macintyre, A Colonial 
Liberalism: The Lost World of Three Victoria11 Visio11aries (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), Chapter Five. All of these works on liberalism agree that this reformist 
nature has been important in forming 11atio11al character as well as intellectual life in 
Australia. 
2 John Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?' p.79. 
3 Warren Osmond, Frederic Eggleston: A11 l11te/lect11al in A11stralia11 Po/Wes (Sydney: 
Allen and Unwin, 1985), p.55. James Barrell, medical doctor, promoted medical and 
educational reforms. He was a key figure in promoting the Workers' Education 
Association, and also enthusiastic for the Round Table and the League of Nations 
movements. M. Roe, Nine Australian Progressive8, pp.65, 71and78. 
maintained their belief in greater state involvement for social and 
economic welfare in the time of depression.s 
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The core members of the internationalist movement belonged to a few 
social sets. For example, in Melbourne, the key figures such as John 
Latham (1877-1964), lawyer, (federal) politician (1922-1934) and diplomat, 
and Frederic Eggleston (1875-1954), lawyer, (state) politician and diplomat 
belonged to a social circle around Alfred Deakin (1856-1919), Prime 
Minister in 1903-1904, 1905-1908 and 1909-1910. Deakin was considered 
the father of Australian liberalism, against laissez-faire, and conscious of 
social reforms. In the 1920s, this set was hosted by and centred at the 
home of Herbert Brookes (1867-1963), son-in-law of Deakin and a wealthy 
pastoralist and businessman. Latham, Eggleston and Brookes were 
Australian-born, and joined the Round Table (an organization to promote 
the new British imperialism) which became the central focus of the 
internationalist movement. They discussed literature, politics, religion, 
music, and imperial and international issues. Like various societies such 
as the rationalist association and arts societies, internationalist 
organiz1tions in Melbourne were centred on these social groups. 
These social sets in metropolitan areas clustered around universities, 
government departments, court, churches and other educational 
institutions. The Workers' Education Association (WEA) (founded in 
1913 in Australia) was one of the most important institutions in this 
context, as will be discussed later. Quite often, those in these social sets 
belonged to more than one organization or club, and dined and discussed 
together. These networks provided the intellectual milieu of the New 
Liberals. 
4 Walker argues that there was disillusionment among these New Liberals in the 1920s 
and some took ou more conservative tum. D. Walker, Dream and Disillusion, pp.8 and 
199. Mathews argues Latham and Shann became anti-union and ~onservativc in t.h~ 
1930s. R. Mathews, Australia's First Fabians: Middle-class Radical, Labour Act1u1sts 
and t11e Early Labour Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.219 
and 221-222. 
5 AJomes argues that the influence of the reformist thinking was still great in the 1~30s. S. 
1\lomes, Reasonable Men, pp.287-289. goe agrees with this view, t~a.t th~ e~sential 
bciief and approach of the New Liberalism of the 1890s (or Pr~i,'Tess1v1sm m · 'term) 
were repeated in the 1920s. M. Roe, Ni11e Australian Progressives, pp.316-317. 
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b) The New Ausb·alia and the Pacific 
These New Liberals were assertive about the role of a more independent 
new Australia in the Pacific. Deak.in was one of the pion..:ers of this field. 
He led the federation movement, and proposed strong national naval 
forces. This stronger assertion of the new Australia has to be understood 
in "1e context of the developmer;t of cultural confidence in the inter-war 
period. Previous studies have described this development as the rise of 
nationalism.6 The word, nationalism, however, is misleading. Those 
who were presented as 'nationalists' tended to be more concerned with 
issues in the region they lived in, than those at the other side of the 
globe.7 They were not inward looking isolationists, and this regional-
awareness did not contradict the internationalist movement. In fact, they 
had a strong orientation towards the outside world beyond the imperial 
framework. In the following discussion, these 'nationalists' will be 
termed 'regionalists' or 'regional internationalists'. 
The distinction between imperial internationalists and regional 
internationalists, however, was not clear-cut. Both were 'internationalist' 
in a sense that they felt the need for active involvement in 
internationalist movements and organizations. At the same time, both 
were 'imperialists' who believed the imperial framework, and the virtue 
of the Bri,:.:;h system. Probably the clearest distinction between 'imperial' 
and 'regional' internationalists is the latter's readiness for a change in the 
sense of centre. 
In the 1920s, the Pacific provided the opportunity to put their vision of the 
new Australia into practice. Roe points out that this awareness of the 
Pacific was characteristic of the New Liberals (Progressives).8 Their 
6 R. M. Crawford, An Australian Perspective (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1960) and G. Serie, Fram Deserts the Prophets Come: Tiie Creative Spirit i~1 Au~tralia, 
1788-1972 (Melbourne: Heineman, 1973). Their works focus on cultural nat10nahsm and, 
therefore, mainly on artists. . . . 
7 Most of those who were argued to have rontributcd to the development of natiom:hsm m 
the 1930s, such as Macmahon Ball, a po1ilical scientist at t. 'University of Melbourne, 
dweloped an awareness of Australia's location. 
B M. Roe, Nine Australian Prognssives, p.130. 
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attitudes to external issues were, however, complicated. Concern with 
domestic social welfare did not necessarily mean a similar concern for 
unfortunates in other countries. For many social z:eformers, their loyalty 
to the tmpire did not contradict their sense of social justice, either.9 The 
-:hief aim of British Fabians, by whom Australian New Liberals were 
influenced, was the promotion of the national and imperial interest.JO 
Roe uses the term, 'welfare imperialist', and Docker 'Liberal imperialism' 
to describe Australian reformers' attitudes to external issues. As Docker 
argues, the New Liberals' imperialism after WWI was more imperial-
oriented compared with the anti-colonialism and cosmopolitanism of the 
earlier liberals.11 Their emphasis on the greater moral role of the state led 
them not to cosmopolitar..~sm, but internationalism, firmly based on the 
nation-state. 
Their attitudes to race and the Pacific, therefore, were not simple. These 
attitudes were significant in the development of the new Australia's 
relations with the region, because they were the first group to 
acknowledge the importance of this relationship. They were interested in 
thC' regional issues and pioneered studies on the region. Roe points out, 
however, that New Liberals (Progressives in his term) had little sympathy 
for non-white populations,12 and Docker argues further that they had 
almost an antipathy to non-white, especially Asian populations.13 The 
new Australia meant for them stronger autonomy as a nation from 
Britain. This enhanced not only th 'ir regional sense, but also Australia's 
national sovereignty. As demonstrated by William Hugh - 'Prime 
Minister, 1915--1923) at the Paris Peace Conference, the national 
sovereignty of the stronger new nation-state was expressed mainly 
through the White Australian Policy. Similarly, New Liberals developed 
a unifying code, citizenship, not based on racial superiority but on 
9 For example, on the more progressive end of the spec.trum of reformism, Jnmes Barrett 
believed in Britain's right and duty to bestride the world, and advocated the importance 
of the imperial federation. M. Roe, Nine Australian Pro;sres_siv~s, p.71 .. 
JO Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: Engl1sl1 Soc1al-l111per1al Tlzoug/zt, 
1895-1914 (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p.133. 
11 J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold?' p.72. . , . . . 
12 M. Roe, Nine Australian Progressives, p.12. He points out that welfare 1mpenahsm 
derived from the benevolent duty of a master race'. 
13 J. Docker, 'Can the Centre Hold'?' p.61. 
'cultural' difference which prevented non-white populations from 
assimilating to their system, to integrate and strengthen the national 
society.14 
ii) The Pacific and the International Order 
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New Liberals were concerned not only with domestic, but also external 
issues. The main figures of the internationalist movement belonged to 
the (Australian) Fabian Society.IS Internationalism, however, was 
complicated due to Australia's lack of power and its imperial ties with 
Britain. While great powers pursued their visions of the international 
order, later comers such as Japan, or small powers such as Australia, had 
to have a clear understanding of the 'dominant' order, and adapt 
themselves to that order. Understa.'lding the dominant order was 
increasingly difficult in the Pacific after WWI. A majority understood the 
British imperial order as the international order, and the international 
community as an extension of the empire. But among certain circles, 
there was a growing awareness of the power shift in the Pacific, from 
Britain to the USA, or at least, a sense that Australia could not solely 
depend on the British navy to protect it strategically. This led to debate as 
to whether the new order should displace the old one, or whether the old 
one should be preserved. 
Australia shared the diplomatic codes and assumptions of international 
arrangements through its connection with Britain, but it did not have 
independent repre~.!ntation in world affairs before the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919. It did not have a separate department of External 
Affairs until 1934 and except for one High Commissioner in London, it 
did not have independent diplomats until 1940.16 The inter-war years 
were a formative period not only for Australia's own diplomatic 
14 lb id. Rickard argues a similar point of race I culture as a b:is, : the citizenship and 
social unity. John Rickard, Australia: A Cultural History (Melbourne: Longman 
Cheshire, 1988), pp.116-117. . 
15 R. Mathews, Australia's First Fabians, pp.196-200. There was a close connection. 
between the members of the Round Table and the Fabian Society in Australia. Ibid., 
pp.193-195. . . 
16 From 1937 to 1940 there was an Australian Counsellor at the Bnti•h Embassy, 
Washington D. C. 
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machinery, but also for the form of involvement with the internationalist 
organizations and movements. Australians started to assert their own 
national identity, rather than their affiliation to Britain, through these 
activities. 
In the 1920s, the Pacific presented for some the opportunity for a more 
independent and assertive new Australia, but for others it meant a threat 
to the status quo. The implications of the Pacific were threefold: 
recognition of Japanese power: recognition of the USA presence: and 
Aust.:alian 'responsibility' for the mandates (gained at the Paris Peace 
Conference). Except for the last, these meant a possible challenge to the 
politicai, economic and social paradigm of the British Empire. 
Awareness of the Pacific was enhanced by the consciousness of the 
importance of these two powers, Japan and the USA, and involved a 
mixture of fear and hope. Japan was seen as an expanding military power 
and a future trade partner. Both prospects suggested the need for new 
arrangements with Japan. Its military strength, especially after the Russo-
Japanese war (1904), became a serious threat, which led to the recognition 
of the ino. quacy of existing defence arrangements in 1907-1914.17 
Hughes c...so provoked fear of Japan's challenge not only to national 
defence, but also to the White Australian Policy. Edmund Piesse (1880-
1947), a Tasmanian-born lawyer and Cambridge graduate, was a head of 
the newly established Pacific Branch (1919-1923) at the Prime Minister's 
Department. He was one of the very few experts on Japan because his job 
was to compile information o . · apanese immigration policy for the 
League of Nations' assemblies. 18 He thought Hughes's suspicion was 
groundless: There was 
little or nothing in the conduct of Japan to support the view which 
many Australians hold that she will challenge the White 
Australian Policy and that ~.:. ~ future domination of Australia is 
17 Anonymous, 'The Conference and The Empire,' The Round Table, Vol. 1, (November, 
1910-August, 1911), p.390. David Sissons,Attitudes to Japa•i and Defence, 1890-1923, 
unpublished MA thesis, the Unive~oity of Melbourne, 1956, p.48. 
18 !'rime Minister's Department, 'l'ap~·rs Prepared in the Pacific Branch in Connection 
with the First Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva, November, 1920,' Al; 
1919/8756, AA. 
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part of her policy .... Living far removed from the centres of 
international discours~ and unaccustomed to deal (sic) with 
external questions they [s.;me public men in Australia] hav 'been 
ready to suppose that Australia was of great importance to Japan, 
and ready to treat her every act with suspicion.19 
Though often ignored, the prospect of Japan as a trade partner also began 
to be recognized in the 1910s. This recognition emerged particularly early 
in Sydney. In 1912, the Senate of the University of Sydney resolved that 
learning Japanese was most important because of its commercial potential. 
Japan is a near neighbour, closely connected with ourselves by a 
!uge and increasing trade and very important also on political 
grounds .... China is a near neighbour and of political and social 
importance but less intimately connected with us in trade, thou5n 
possibly it might be developed. Russia belongs definite! y to the 
Pacific system and its remoteness has hitherto prevented very 
close relations. A change in this respect may b1~ expected in the 
near future.20 
Accordingly, five years later, James Murdoch was appointed to the Hrst 
chair of Oriental History. This, however, combined a strategic purpose 
because the positi• ,, was coupled with tear:hing at the Royal Military 
College, Duntroon.2 1 While Japan's importance as a trade partner was 
argued in 1936 by a member of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs (AIIA),22 John G. Crawford (1910-1984),23 most people saw Japan in 
strategic rather than economic terms in the inter-war period.24 
19 Draft for the article which appeared in American Foreign Affairs in 1926, written 
sometime in 1925, MS 882/9, NLA. 
20 'Senate Resolution, l\'.iy, 1912,' Paperf of Chair of Oriental History, FLUS. 
21 D. Sissons, 'James Murdoch (1856-1921): Historian, Teacher and Much Else Besides,' 
Historical S!udies, Vol.2, 1987, p.45. 
n As described later in this chapter, the AllA was a national body which ama1gammca·n1e 
branches of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (R!IA) and the IPR in New South 
Wales (NSW), Vicloria and Queenslaw.l. On the RllA, sec al"> Chapter One, Section One. 
2~ ''rnwford argued this point in the debate over the Trade Divcrsior. Policy in 1936. Along 
with Crawford, another member of the AllA, Eggleston, also criticized the imperial 
preference of I.he Trade Diversion Policy. W. Osmond, Frederic [ggle.<1011, p.183. On the 
details of the Trade Diversion Policy, sec D. 
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Piesse felt that the conclusion of the Washington Treaty in 1922 meant 
that the order in the Pacific based on Anglo-American cooperation was 
established, and Japanese expansion would be checked.25 He thought 
there should be not much need for gathering information on Japan for a 
while. He resigned his office soon af:er in 1923, and his writing on Japan 
as a military threat began only in the mid-192.!Js, this time as an 
independent writer and a member of the lPR.26 In the 1920s under the 
succeeding Bruce-Page government, sentiment against Japan was calmed, 
and therefore a cooperative and friendly atmosphere was possible. 
Rccog1'ition of the American presence was connected to f.ustralia's 
concePI at the rise of Japanese power. The Great White Fl!:!et sent by 
Theo''ore Roosevelt was greeted with mass enthusiasm in 1908.27 This 
symbolized a new step in s:,·.tegic thinking in Australia both at official 
and popular levels, represented most notably by the statements of Prime 
Minister, Deakin.28 Attitudes to the USA were, however, ambiguous. In 
contrast to the glorified image of the USA as a "Star '.lf Hope" of 
democracy among Japanese IPR members, its images c. ·.ong Australian 
counterparts were mixed. Positive images of progressh ism and efficiency 
exi~ted as well as ne' ative images of materialism and pditical 
t:·A1 iption.29 
Sissons, 'Mauchester vs. Japan: The Imperial Background of the Australian Trade 
Diversion Dispute with Japan, 1936,' A11stralia11 011tlook, Vol.30, No. 3 (1976). 
24 The Trade Treaty was C' :Iuded only in 1957. Even then, there was much opposition in 
Australia because of the anti-Japanese sentiment caused by WWII experience. Alan Rix, 
(0111i11g to Terlils: The Politics of Australia's Trade with Japan, 1945-57 (Sydney: Allen 
,md Unwin, 1986). 
25 D. Sissons,Attitudes to Japan, Ch~?ter Five, Section II. 
26 E. L. Piesse, 'The Real Rulers of Japan,' The [Melbo1m1e/ Age, 25, 26, 27 and 29 June, 1936. 
27 Tue contemporary press reported \hat the mass gathering for this occasion was one o( 
the largest and most publicised national events in Australian history, Daryl Adah·, 
'"Pacific Parade": The American Fleet in Australia, 1908,' Paper presented at the 
Australian Historical Association Conference, Canberra 1992, p.4. 
28 Deakin welcomed the Great White Fleet. He initiated Australia's independent defence 
system. Australian navy was created in 1909, the firsL1'.11ong th~ D~·:;nio.,s. This move 
created conflict over the defence issue brtween Australia and Bmai.; :•1 1913-1914. N. 
Meaney. The Search for Security, Ch.ipte:r Nine and p.195. 
2" M. Roe 'lin~ A11stra: "' 1 Progressives, pp.11, 97 and 188. 
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The image of the Pacific, promoted by the IPR, was perceived ~s 
predominantly American. Some regional-oriented internationalists were 
enthusiastically involved with the IPR because it represented new 
attitudes to the Pacific region: a new sense of centre in the Pacific, not in 
Europe. As discussed in more detail later in this section, however, they 
had to fight against strong anti-Americanism. For a majority, the IPR and 
the Pacific Age meant a serious challenge to the British order. 
iii) Imititutbnalization: Predominance of New British Imperialism 
Australian members of the IPR came from various streams of 
internationalism. As we saw in Chapter One, the main categories of 
internationalism in the inter-war period were Wilsonian 
internationalism; Christian humanitarian internationalism; economic 
internationa!ism; women's internationalism; legalist internationalism; 
socialist internationalism; and new British internationalism. In 
Australia, new British imperialism was the dominant force. 
Each form of intr~rnationalism had its own organization to promote its 
ideal for the int-=rnational community. They were the League of Nations 
Union; the YMCA, International Christian Student Movement and other 
church organizations; the Chambers of Commerce and the Rotary Clubs; 
various women's organizations; the Trade Unions; and the Round Tabie 
and the RIIA. 
Other organizations focused more on domestic issues. With the exception 
of socialist internationalists, membership of these organizations 
overlapped extensively with internationalist organizations. These 
dnmestically0 focused organizations were the WEA (1913), the Public 
Questions Association (1918), t!::e Fabi<m Society (1890s), and the 
Australian Institute of Political Science (1932). The membe,·s of these 
or?;ilnizations were drawn mainly from upper-middle or middle class 
b1ckgrounds, and they were reformists not revolutionaries. Thev feit the 
need for change within ehlsting social and economic frameworks, and 
believed that reform was necessary to preserve these frameworks. 
---------
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a) The Round Table and the \.\/orkers' El.!ucation Association 
Among various streams of internationalism in the inter-war period, new 
British imperialisrr: and its insti~utions, especially the Round table, 
occupied a predominant position in Au~tralia. The Round Table's 
predominance can be explained by severnl factors. It was the earliest 
organization (1910) to recruit and consolidate the interests of 
'internationally' -concerned people in Australia. Its dominance meant a 
strong shared assumption of the British imperial. order. Members were 
male and professional, and businessmen wer;: less well represented than 
in American internationalist organizations. 
;·;·2 nature of the Australian membership was greatly influenced by this 
initial setting. Lionel Curtis, a major figure in the London Round Table, 
travelled to the Dominions to recruit members. He came to Australia for 
three months in September 1910 and travelled to Sydney, Melbourne and 
Brisbane. Branches in these cities were formed as a result.30 The people to 
whom Curtis was introduced v:ere urban male professionals who were 
already interested in his ideas of some imperial tie. The propertied class. 
in contrast to the professional class, was absent in Melbourne and Sydney 
except for a very few cases.31 The Round Table did not attract many men 
from the Labor camp, either. Foster argues that Sydney had more Labor 
sympathizers, while Melbourne had none except for Eggleston.32 The 
more open attitudes to rolitical ideology" .w; ·~the Sydney group can be 
seen from •he example of Gamet V. Port us (1883-1954). Portu~, 
Australian-born.Oxford graduate, historian and educator, was to write 
Marx and l.1.odern Thought (1921). He was invited to join the Round 
Table group in Sydney late in 197.0, because it sought to introduce' a litti, 
radical leaven' .33 
30 Leonie Foster, Higli /-lopes: Tiii! lvTen and Motive· ••f Ilic Australian Round Table 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University !'ress, 1986), Ch<.pler Two. 
31 L. Fosler, Higli Hopes, pp.28 and 32. . . 
32 These Labor sympalh:.O:ers were Mungo McCallum, Vice-Chancellor of the Unr"~!"Stty of 
Sydney, ;ind R. F. lrvir.e, economist and social reformer, who supported the WEA 
movement in Sydney. L. Fosler, Hig/1 Hopes, pp.26 and J?-31._ , 
33 G. Portus, Happy Hig/11.•ays (Melbourne: Melbourne Umvers1ty Press, 1953), p.-32. 
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The journal, the Round Table, was edited in London and established itself 
::s llze journal for 'internationally' -concerned people in Britain and the 
Dominions. Portus described the Round Table in 1920 as follows: 
Before the Economic Reco ·d and the Auslralian Quarterly, no 
other than the Round Table gave continuous account of current 
events [of internatio1.al affairs] in Australia. It was conservative 
in general outlook, but well-informed and reliable.34 
The formation of the Round Table in London in 1910 reflected an 
international power shift which directly dfe<"ted Australia. The group 
advocated reforms in order to adjust to the new context and maintain the 
strength of the British imperial connection. The new elements in 
international politics were: the increasing independence of the 
Dominions and thl!ir growi~' :nput into imperial matters, and the rise oi 
the new powers of the USA, .--:rmany and Japan. T1'e rise of Germany 
iorced the re-location of British Naval forces to Europe, which left fewer 
fleets in the Pacific. The first issue of the Round Table featured articles on 
strategy in the Pacific and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.35 This new 
element directly affected Australian national security, and caused much 
anxiety. 
Egglestc·\ voiced this d11xiety to the Round Table. Although he believed 
in the virtue of the British system, he became more and more critical of its 
Anglo-centricity especially in the strategic field. Already in 1912, he saw 
the emergence of the Japanese empire, and felt that the existing security 
system was inadeqt•ate.36 This regionalist inclinatk: · later led him to 
promote the IPR, which filled the gap he felt in Australia. 
Along with th~ Round Table, the WEA was another influential 
organization in the internationalist arena, especially for the IPR. The 
34 Ibid., p.232. 
35 Anonymous, 'The Anglo-Japanese AU:ance,' Tl1e Round Table, Vol. 1, (November, 1910-
August, 1511), p.113-15~ . . . 
36 Corr•2spondence between Eggleston and Curtis espeaally m 1912 and 1913 shows Egglest~n's concern with the Pacific naval policy. MS.Eng Hist 778 and 798, BL. As for 
the discussion about his view, see W. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, p.U . 
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WEA was supported by the New Liberals,37 and widened the scope of the 
move;nent in terms of social groups and intellectual dynamics. Although 
elitist in its nature, the founders of the Round Table were influenced by 
New Liberalism not only in its emphasis on the role of the state,38 but also 
in re!;,tion to its concerns of the welfare of the working classes. The WEA 
movt~ment started near Oxford, and it gained the support of progressive 
and social-mfr.Jed scholars at Oxford University. The WEA and the 
Round Table were not directly connected, but their supporters overlapped. 
Curtis beH<eved that 'Grou1 ·irganized in the spirit of the WEA will read 
the Round Table and the Round Table studies of their own accord'.39 
Originally, the WEA was founded in Britain in 1903 (it became the WEA 
in 1906) by Albert Mansbridge, a devout Christian and Trade Unionist. Its 
ideal was to provide education for the working classes to 'lift themselves 
up through higher knowledge to higher works and higher pleasure, 
whi · •. if responded to, will inevitably bring about right and sound action 
upon municipal, national and imperial affairs' .40 Mansbridge wanted to 
provide the workers with much more intensive and ambitious education 
than the existing extra-mural lectures. His idea materialized at Oxford 
University around 1907 with the support of scho,ars at the university. 
Classes were organized under a joint committee composed of 
representatives of the university and delegates from the trade unions and 
community groups affiliated with the WEA, and were condu.cted as 
university tutorial classes.41 A director of tutorial classes was appointed to 
supervise them as well as to do university work. The movement spread 
to other universities in Britain, and to Australia. To boost the activities in 
37 Eggleston was a supporter of the WEA,. a.nd Barret was a key figure, arranging. tutorial 
classes of the WEA in cooperation with the University of Melbourne. M. Roe, N111e 
Australian Progressives, p.65. 
38 J. Kendle, The Round Table Movement, p.18. 
39 Cited in J. Kendle, The Round Table Movement, p.182. 
40 Roy Shuker, Educating t/Je Workers?: A History of Workers' Education Association i11 
New Zealand (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1984), p.15. 
41 Helen Burke, 'Soda! Scientists as Intellectuals: From the Fir~t World War to the 
Depression,' in Brian Head and James Walter eds., l11tellect11al Movements and , . 
Australian Society (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp.51-52. Burkes thesis 
also details the British background of the WEA movement, s~e I-I. Burke, Wor~er 
Education and Social Inqui~y in Australia, i:nJ-1929, ur.pubhshed Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Adelaide, Jc;>"~' Chapter One. 
•" 
Australia, Mansbridge arrived -• Sydney in 1913 as Director of Tutorial 
Classes. 
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While the Round Table was a closed urban elites' discussion group, the 
WEA had wider audience in terms of social class and geography. It 
reached an audience even wider than those addressed by later established 
internationalist organizations, such as the RIIA and the IP,\, The targets 
and activities of the RIIA and the IPR were largely confined to the major 
cities of Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Hobart. Radio 
broadcasts of five minute talks by WEA tutors started in 1929,42 which 
further widened the auciience. Probably due to the geographical 
environment, however, the Australian WEA remained a relatively 
metropolitan phenomen:nwith an audience consisting of middle classes as 
well as artisan classes.43 In this sense, the Australian organization was 
quite different from its New Zealand counterpart.44 
This WEA net work of tutors and directors was si~ificant for the 
internationalist moveme;1t in Australia, particularly for the IPR. This 
was because it attracted those who were not only concerned with, but also 
had knowledge of domestic and external contemporary issues. Tutors of 
the WEA were quick to respond to the chanc:;:ng world, either of ac .. demia 
or politics, and ready to deal with contemporary society. They were also 
attuned to the new s.\imulus of theories of social sciences, and they 
introduced these to Australian academia. 
The directors in Sydney and Melbourne.. Meredith Atkinson (1883-1929) 
and Portus, were invo'Lved with various internationalist and other 
organizations, and publicly debate-1 '3ocial issues. Atkinson, a thirty-one 
42 G. Portus, Happy Hig/Jways, p.243. 
43 Eric Willliams argues that the WEA brought in new stimulus to the education of the 
working classes in Auslralia. He suggests t.hat the WEA improved the working class 
education which was rather neglected by the pre-1913 university extension movement. 
But he also suggests lhat previous middle-class audience remained almost intact. Eric 
Williams, 'The Beginnings of the Auslralian Universit:• Extension Movemen~,' in.R. J. W. 
Selleck ed., Melbourne Studies i11 Ed11catio1• 1972 (Melbourne: Melbrurne Uruvers1ty 
Press, 1972), pp.197, 198, 202, 206 and 208. . . . 
44 The WEA classes in N~w Zealand were directed to rural cummumlies arid working 
classes. R. Schukcr, Ed11cati11g tile Workers? pp.SS, 67, 87 and 91. 
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year-old Oxford graduate and member of the Round Table, came to Sydney 
to become assistant Director in 1914. His publi-ly pronounced pacifist 
view auring WWI, coupled with his personal ambition, caused a bitter 
fight at the university. He left for Melbourne and vecame Professor in 
charge of Tutorial Classes at the University of Melbourne.45 He published 
a book, The New Social Order: A study of Post-War Reconstruction (1919), 
edited journals and later joined the RIIA and the IPR. 
Portus took over from Atkinson as acting Director in Sydney in 1918, and 
devoted himself to the job for the next sixteen years. Convinced of the 
importance of adult education, he was also involved in various 
organizations such as the IPR, the League of Nations Union, the Student 
Christian Movement and the Australian Institute of Political Science. 
Portus was interested in the new social science theories. He read and gave 
lectures on Marx's work on the theory of value and surplus value, and 
recorr;ed that this was one of his best received classes.46 He also pioneered 
the fields of Australian studies, American studies and Australian labour 
studies. He wa.s an editor of Studies in Australian Affairs (1928), which 
was a part of the IPR research projects, and he wrote The American 
Background (1928), and a chapter, 'The labour movement in Australia, 
1788-1914,' in Australia, Economic and Political Studies (1920) which 
Atkinson edited. 
Except for the WEA classes, there were very few institutions which taught 
international relations, or Asian and Pacific studies in the 1920s. The 
Universil,<l'Melbourne started a course in international relations as a part 
I . 
of history in 1932, and Australasian history (history of Australia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific after the 'discovery') in 1926, while the University 
oi Syd~ey had anthropology, Oriental history (both in Arts), and 
international law :n Law, but no course of international relations in the 
1920s and 1930s.47 Although army education and the YMCA during WWI 
45 G. Portus, Happy Highways, p.174. 
46 Ibid., pp.1.40-241. . . 
47· · .. :.Mel/lourne !lniversity Calendar, 1926 and Tiie Melbourne U111vers1ty Calendar, 
1932 (Mclboume: Ford and Son, 1925and 1931), Calendar of tire University of Sydney 
1924 and Calendar of tire University of Sydney 1933 (t:ydney: Angus and Robertson, 1924 
and 1'.)33). 
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provoked an awareness of fordgn relations, Portus regretfully recalled: 
'How rare the books on foreign relations were!'48 This reflected the 
general ;Tl.difference of society. Some had developed an interest in world 
issues due to the World War and socialist international movement, but 
the interests even of most of these internationally-minded people did not 
go far beyond imperial issues. 
Tutors at the WEA took a leading role in pioneering the new disciplines 
of International Relations and .Pacific studies, and their interests in these 
fields led them to the involvement with the IPR. Especially important 
were Hessel Duncan-Hall (1891-1976) tutor of Tutorial Classes in Sydney, 
:md Stephen H. Roberts (1901-1970), lecturer in Melbourne, who taur;ht 
WEA classes at Bendigo, a prosperous mining town in Victoria.49 RobPrts, 
a member of the Round Table and the RUA, not only introduced the new 
social sciences of psychology and anthropology from Europe, but also 
brought the Pacific to the attention of Australian academia. With the 
support of his mentor, Ernest Scott (1868-1939), an Englishman who 
became Professor of History at the University of Melbourne (1914-1936), 
Roberts succeeded Gordon 'Wood (1890-1953) as Professor of History at the 
University of Sycl.ney at the age of 28 in 1929. Both Scott and Wood were 
members of the Round Table and the RUA, and later involved with the 
IPR. Roberts' s interest in continental Europe and i'.. expansion in the 
Pacific re-oriented the direction of the department. His work, Population 
Problems of the Pacific (1927), Schreuder comments, drew inspiration 
from the 'fashionable' new socirJ science of anthropology, and even 
deployed fr~udian writing on 'myth' and 'taboo', while its core was based 
on political economy and urged the need for economic development in 
the Pacific.50 
48 G. Portus, Happy Highways, p.173. Until WWII, international relatio~s wa.s part of 
the history school and taught by Macmahon !Jail in the 1930s at the Umvers1ty of 
Melbourne. The Department of Political Science became independent during WWII and 
!Jail became the head. I owe this information to Professor Macintyre. 
49 Dcryck Schreuder,' A "Second Foundation": S. H. Roberts as Challis Professor of History 
1929--17,' in Barbara Caine ;rnd others eds., History at Sydney, 1891-1991, Centenary 
Reflections (Sydney: Histor; Department, University of Sydney, 1992),p.31. 
~·O D. Schreuder,' A "Second Foundation",' p.32. 
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International R~lations was oned. t~ajor subjects taught at the WEA 
classes. Roberts taught contemporary international politics at WEA classes 
at Bendigo.51 Another WEA director at the University of Tasmania 
introduced international politics along with economics, industrial history 
and sociology.52 Duncan-Hall promoted this discipline, too. He was a 
member of the Round Table, and later the RIIA, the League of Nations 
Union and the IPR. He was close to the Fabian Society, and his 
involvement with the WEA started at Oxford probably through this 
connection. He studied at Ballioi after taking a Master of Arts degree at 
Sydney. He became a tutor of Tutorial Classes at Oxford, before he took up 
a position at Sydney. His book, Tlze British Commonwealth of Nations 
(1920), was widely read especially among those at the Round Table. It was 
a legalist interpretation of the Commonwealth. He criticized closer 
economic integration within the British empire, and proposed various 
legal frameworks for the empire with the Crown as the unifying factor. 
For him, the Commonwealth was the base of internationalism. By 
promo ti . "": the idea of the 'Cr _,1monwealth', he argued, the Dominions 
became a 'pioneer of internationalism'.53 This new British imperialism 
did not conflict with, but complemented the League of Nations. 
The WEA was particularly important for the IPR. The six Australian 
representatives at the first IPR conference in 1925 included two WEA 
tutors, while the other four were either YMCA people or missionaries. 
Tbese two were Duncan-Hall and Roberts and they became the central 
figures of the IPR. Why these two young men were chosen is not known. 
Probably they became well known as rising experts on international 
relations and Pacific .~tudies among the YMCA circles, where there was 
also int~rest in adult education, and therefore some connection with the 
WEA. After the first IPR conference, Duncan-Hall organized the Sydney 
group of the IPR. Soon after, he left for Syracuse University, NY, and then 
worked at the League of Nations Secretariat in 1927-1939. 
51 Ibid., p.31. 
52 H. Burke, 'Social Scientists,' p.61. 
53 Cited in W. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston:, pp.99-101. 
While Duncan-Hall saw his future across the Pacific, Roberts stayed in 
Australia and pursued his vision of. the new Australia in the Pacific, 
which was echoed in his speech at the first IPR conference. 
Australia feels that the knowledge of Pacific facts i.:I:d a fair 
presentation of the various points of view provide the best way 
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to~a~ds tol7rance a~d goodwill and understanding .... In a word, a 
definite national attitude has emerged on this point .... [I]t is the 
New Australia ... 54 
Rober'.s was strongly influenced. by his mentor, Ernest Scott, who was 
aware of the importance of thi: Pacific in 1918.55 Scott led the delegation a' 
the IPR conferences in 1931and1933. Roberts' student, Jack Shepherd 
(1913-1944), worked in his department in 1935-1938, and served as 
secretary of the AIIA in charge of the IPR activities. Shepherd attended 
the IPR conference in 1939 and worker! IPR headquarters in New 
York as a researcher. 
b) The League of Nations Union 
The foundation of the League of Nations in 1919 gave another new 
stimulus to the international movement in Australia, and this was well 
interpreted in the British imperial framework. John Latham attende~ the 
Paris Peace Conference and was inspired by Wilsonian idealism. Coming 
back to Australia, Latham tried to organize an association along the lines 
of the British League of Nations Union. It was not an easy task. He wrote 
to Harold Nicolson, a British diplomat involved with League issues: 
I did my best to get a Branch of the League of Nations going in 
Australia. I approached a number of prominent people and 
obtained provisional promises of support .... Difficulty was to find 
a secretary .... In August [I] got hold of an excellent man, a cultured 
54 S. Roberts,' Australian View of Pacific Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], 111stit11te of Pacific 
Relations: Honolulu Session June 30-/uly 14, 1925· History, Organization, Proceedings 
Discussions and Addresses (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), p.65. Schreuder argues that Roberts 
had a strung sense of regional identity and the confidence in this vision. D. Schre:ider, 'A 
"Second Foundation",' p.30. 
55 Stuart Macintyre discusses Scott's interest in the Pacific and involvement with the IPR. 
Professor Macintyre kindly lent me his draft of Chapter Five on Biogr~phy of Ernest 
Scott. S. Macintyre, A History for a Nation: Ernest Scott and t/Je Makrng of Austrulzan 
History (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1!!94). 
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lawyer ... then he was appointed to a position in the Solomons. In 
Sydney, things are a bit better. I got my friend T. R. Bavin, MP, to 
move '."'.He has ~oi:med an association in Syd!l.ey ... but he writes 
to me 1t is very difficult to get the quite right sort of people to 
join.56 (emphasis added) 
What was meant by 'right' c~n be illustrated by the background of Thomas 
Bavin, member of the Round Table, and a cultured. m~ .nered and 
middle-of-the-road reformist.57 
Despite the difficulties, however, on 18 February 1921, Latham organized 
the first meeting of the Victorian b:c:nch of the LNU at Melbourne. Beside 
him, Atkinson, Eggleston and dght .:;~h~r prominent men were present.SB 
A'most half were members of the Round Table. At the second meeting 
they resolved to affiliate with the British LNU, and decided upon office 
bearers, a constitution and subscription at a minimum of one shilling per 
year.59 The first public meeting was held on 12 April at Town Hall, and 
attracted 150 people. Latham became President and Eggleston Vice 
President, and a General Council was elected. 
The activities of the LNU were not confined to Melbourne but extended to 
rural centres. This feature, though shared with the WEA, differed from 
the approach of more urban elite oriented organizations such as the RIIA 
and the IPR. The Union's policy was education about the cause of the 
League, and churches and schools were important tools. Reflecting this 
policy, the General Council included the Bishops of Bendigo and 
Gippsland. This character made the Union more attractive than the 
Round Table to progressive internationalists.60 The progressive element 
56 Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA. 
57 Bavin belonged to the Progressive !'arty (political party in NS\' in 1920-1925, and 
pushed reformist schemes. M. Roe, Nine Australian Progressives, p.177. Jn the inter-war 
period, he was in the opposition to the Labor Party Jed by J. Lang (Bavin became Jcader 
of the Nationalists in 1925 and Premier of NSW in 1927-1930). 
58 These eight men were Rev. J. W. Burton, J. W. Colvill<;, L. E. Groom, j. :-!. i..a~y, ) .. 
Mon<.sh, W. W PhiJlips, H. Stead and G. Webber. Minutes of the LNU al V1ctona, 18 
February, 1921, MS 1009/1, NLA. 
59 Minutes of the LNU in Victoria, 23 March, 1921, MS 1009/1, NLA. 
60 Six of Roe's 'nine Australian progressives' were either members of the LNU or strong 
sympathizers. They were W. J. Brown,). W. Barrett, J. I-1. L. Cumpston, G. A. Taylor, A. 
B. Piddington, and R. F. Irvine. 
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seems to have strengthened over the years, which aroused scepticism 
among other internationalist organizations.61 
The constitution of the LNU in Victoria shows that Wilsonian idealism 
did not contradict new British imperialism. The LNU did not deny the 
virtue of the British empire. Like Lionel Curtis, it believed that: 'No 
league of nations will be effective in maintaining the freedom of the 
world unless the British Commonwealth achieves some organic nnity' .62 
Whether Latham agreed with the idea of 'organic' unity or not, he 
believed in the importance of the imperial tie. 
First, [the Union] is to secure the whole hearted acceptance by the 
British people of the League of Nations as the guardian 01 
international right, the organization of international cooperation, 
the finer arbiter. in international differences, and the supreme 
instrument for removing injustice which may threaten the peace 
of the world. Second, it is t'.' foster mutual understanding, 
goodwill, and habit of cooperation and finer dealing between the 
people of different countries.63 
Particular attitudes to race and the Pacific, and a ~ense of Australians' 
responsibility tc govern, were explicit in the objects of the LNU in 
Victoria: They said that the LNU would: 
guarantee the freedom ''l nation's act as trustee and 
guardian of backward races and undeveloped territories, maintain 
international order, and finally liberate mankind from the course 
of war.64 
For the first few years, Latham enthusiastically made addresses at 
churches, schools and public m~etings, advocating the ideas of 
international cooperation and interests in international affairs, and 
inspiring students to be responsible for At"•tralia's mandates in the 
61 Th·! LNU was often referred to as a propaganda body by the AIIA. A report said: 'The 
Cr.undl doubted the advisabi~'ty of collaborating with a propaganda organization such 
as the League of Nations Union'. 'Report of the Council of the NSW Branch of the AIIA 
to the 11th Annual Meeting, for the Year Ende(! june 30th, 1940,' AIIA Papers, GC. 
62 Curtis to the Dominion secretaries [of the Round Table], 29 Novem?er, 1919, MS 1009/19, 
NLA. 63 Minutes of the LNU in. Victoria, June 1921, MS 1009/23, NLA. 
64 Ibid. 
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Pacific.65 The imperial element was less obvious in the constitution of the 
l'!f"; Sci.!.th Wales (N'SW) branch of the LNU. While it mentioned the 
'protection of b::.c•:ward races,' the word 'British' was not used as in the 
constitutions of Victorian branch.66 
While the LNU cooperated with various women's organizations, its focus 
remained largely in Europe. ~atham stated as a member of the LNU in 
1926 that the League was the 'principal agent in preserving the peace of 
Europe upon which tf.e peace of the world depended'.67 Another key 
figure in the LNU dismissed the idea of forming the Pan-Pacific Union of 
Nations, since il would be 'useless unless America joined the League'.6B 
In contra5~ to Eggleston, who saw the possibilities in the Pacific and was 
later actively involved with the IPR, Latham still saw the centre of the 
international or-...:1 ;:::: ~'.:!~"~in Europe. Although he led the first trade 
commission toi.:r in Asia 'n 1934, ,,:id became the first Australian minister 
to Japan in 1G10, he was cautious about ti;? shift towards the Pacific, and 
remained outside of the IPR. 
c) The RIIA: A Modem Foreign Expert Organization 
Like the LNU, the RIIA reflected the new climate after WWI, and was 
formed within the British imperial framework. Its outlook was, however, 
more elitist. Latham and Eggleston were involved with its formation, 
first in London, then in Australia. On their way back from the Paris Peace 
Conference, L::itham and Eggleston attended the inauguration of the RIIA 
in London in July 192Q.69 Before the establishment of an Australian 
branch, some Australians were elected as members by Chatham House 
(the RUA headquarters in London) probably during their visits to England. 
65 Notes of addresses of Latham in 1926, MS 1009/23, NLA. 
66 Constitution of the LNU, !he NSW group .. MS 2198/3, NLA. The box contains the 
correspondences of the NSW branch of the L NU from l'ebruary 1921 lo October 1926. 
Meetings were held al least once a month dt i ng the periJd. The documents sho;'., 
overlap ;;f the members of the LNU and the IPR and the !UIA as well as the LNU ' 
emphasis on cooperalio11 with Christian organizations such as churches and the YMCA. 
67 Address to the LNU in Sydney, 8 March, 1926, MS 1009/23, NLA. 
68 Minute af Executive Committee (NSW branch), MS 2198/3, NLA. . 
69 Hazel King, At Mid Century: A S/Jort History of tlie N.S. W. Brancli of tlic Australian 
Institute of International .:jj:iirs, 1924-1980 (Sydney: The AIIA, 1982), p.1. 
137 
-
The move to form a local branch in Australia did not occur until mid-
1923. Harold S. Nicholas (1877-1953), a Tasmanian-born judge, Oxford 
graduate and member of the Round Table, wrote to Margaret Cleeve, 
Secretary of the Chatham House: 'There is no difficulty finding a sufficient 
number of people in New South Wales' .70 In June 1924, Nicholas 
reported that the branch in Sydney had been formed.71 Curtis told 
him to gu ahead and that Australian members would also be members of 
the RUA. Publications such as the Report on Foreign Affairs by the 
Empire Parliamentary Association and Foreign Affairs by the American 
sister organization, the Council on Foreign Relations, would be sent to 
those who paid a subscription.72 The NSW branch was the first outside 
Britain. Selection was totally left to local members. Curtis told Nicholas: 
'We must depend on you, without the least interference with your 
autonomy, to select pt:i'?le who would be elected here' .73 
The origina! members were six prominent men, Nicholas, Bavin, Latham 
(Latham lived in SyJriey at that time), Archibald Charteris (1873-1940), A. 
l\11. Pooley and R. C. Garcia, and except for Pooley and Garcia, all were 
Round Table members. Bavin, Latham and Charteris were also very 
active in the LNU. Charteris became President of the NSW branch of the 
LNU in 1923 after Bavin resigned. Garcia was a commander of the Royal 
Australian N,,vy. Pooley, a Cambridge graduate and author of books on 
Japan and Argentina, was the m1ly joun1alist. After liaving worked in 
America, Russia, India and Asia for the London Observer and the New 
York Times, he became editor of the Australian Investment Digest in 
Sydney in 1924. It was probably his war time expe:rienc~ in Naval 
intelligence that brought him into this circle.74 A bank account was 
opened in the name of the BUA [RUA], Australian Branch, with a credit 
balance of£ 19. 13. 11 at the Commonwealth Bank and the address was 
given as 167 Phillip Street, Sydney. Frank Beasley (1897-1976), a student of 
Charteris at the University of Sydney, Oxford graduate and Round Table 
70 Nicholas to Secretary of Chatham House (CH), 20 Jul., 1923, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
71 Nichola. •o Secretary of CH, 24 June, 1924, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
72 Curtis to Nicholas, 5 August, 1924 and 28 October, 1924, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
73 Curtis to Nicholas, 5 August, 1924 MS 2821 I l, NLA. 
74 H. King, At Mid Century, p.2. 
member, served as the first Honorary Secretary and Treasurer till 1927, 
when he was succeeded by Pooley. 
The connection of the RUA in Sydney with the legal and university 
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worlds was evident from the beginning. The main push for the 
formation, as King argues, came from the Scotchman Charteris, who was 
Professor of International Law and Jurisprudence at the University of 
Sydney. He was already a member of the RTIA in England. He came to 
Sydney to take up the post in 1920. He inspired students with the ideals of 
the League of Nations, and was himself involved in the LNU movement. 
Another two members were added to th<; RUA membership list from the 
University of Sydney in 1925: Duncan-Hall and Arthur Sadler (1882-
1970).75 Sadler, London-born and an Oxford graduate, taught in Japan in 
the 1910s, and became Professor of Oriental Studies in 1922, specializing in 
Japanese history and language.76 Charteris and Sadler both attended the 
IPR conference in Kyoto in 1929. 
Communications between Sydney and Melbourne were difficult.77 
Nicholas did not know whether Australia should have one group or 
whether there should be sub-grnups in Victoria and NSW, because they 
could hold very few joint meetings.78 The Victorian branch of the RUA 
was not established until late 1926, although from 1924, informal meetings 
were held periodically by those elected by Chatham House. Keith Officer 
(1889-1969), a Melbourne born di1110mat, and member of the Round Table 
and RIIA, wrote in August 1925 about the failure to form a local branch in 
Melbourne: 
[W]e discussed the question of the formation of a local branch of 
the institution on the lines of your letter of 7 Aug., 1924. We 
decided for the present to have regular meetings ... and leave the 
question ... to a later date .... Some of the present members showed 
a reluctance to surrender their members/zip of tlze present body, 
75 Beasley to Secretary of CH, 20 July, 1925, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
76 Paper of Chair of Oriental History, FLUS. 
77 For example, because of the difference of the width of gauges in two states, one had to 
change trains when crossing the slate border. 
78 Nicholas to Secretary of CH, 28january, 192-1, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
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wlz icll tlzey prize, in return for membership of a local autonomous 
branch . ..79 
This strong loyalty to Chatham House •.vas a distinct feature of the 
Melbourne group, and was to prevent not only the formation of a local 
branch but also amalgamation between the RIIA and the IPR later. 
Nevertheless, action took place. In March 1926, another informal meeting 
wa:c · 1eld at the Mitre Tavern in Melbourne and it was decided to form a 
local branch in April.BO Gathered for these informal meetings were 
prominent professional men: Latham, Atkinson, Eggleston, Scott, 
Harrison Moore (1867-1935), Barrett, Brookes, and Piesse. Moore was a 
London-born lawyer with degrees from Cambridge and London 
Universities. He was Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne in 
1892-1925, and involved in imperial federation issues and various 
international organizations, including the Round Table, the RIIA and the 
LNU. He was also a member of the Australian delegation to the League 
assemblie.,; in 1927-1929, and led the Australian group at the fourth IPR 
conference in Hangchow in 1931. 
fa;~;entially the RIIA maintained elitist attitudes to public opinion similar 
to those of the Round Table-the wise men of expertise would educate 
and lead the masses. RIIA members were uncomfortable with the LNU' s 
concept of mass propaganda. While the RIIA emphasized the importance 
of public opinion in foreign policy-making, it focused more on the 
formation of 'experts' who would enlighten the masses. It was a prototype 
of the modem foreign expert organization. Strongly connected to 
universities, it was more research-oriented than previous internationalist 
organizations, and was based on scientific studies of. international affairs 
of politics, economics and law.Bl 
79 Officer to Secretary of Cl-I, 25 August, 1925, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
BO Officer to Secretary of Cl-I, 29 March, 1926, MS 2821 /1, NLA. 
Bl In recognition of the importance of national policies encompassing the welfare of the 
society al large, the aims of the Institute were: To advance the science of international 
politics, economics and jurisprudence: To provide and maintain means of information upon 
international questions: To promote discussions and exchange information on these issues: 
To encourage and facilitate the formation of the branches in Dominion countries. In order 
to keep the freedom of the speakers in these discussions, the names were recorded 
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As its origin in the Anglo-American gatherings at the Paris Peace 
Conference suggests, the RIIA reflected the 'modern manner of thinking' 
of foreign affairs. Lathc.m described this new mentality and its recE.ption 
in Australia as follows: 
[G}enerally, the attitude of Australians towards the League of 
Nations is lukewarm ... more or less contemptuous. The default 
of America has naturally produced a tremendous effect .... The 
other side [of Labor} in politics is led by Mr Hughes, whose ideas 
belong to the pre-war period. In short, there's almost a complete 
absence of the modern manner of thinking of which the League is 
the expression.82 (emphasis added) 
Hughes, he argued, represented the old code and was dismissive of this 
'modern thinking'. 
His ideas belong to the pre-war period .... He apparently solves 
problems by sagely and weightily observing that it is necessary to 
be prepared for war, whatever paper covenant may be executed.
83 
However, the RIIA was not the first to perceive this new paradigm. The 
foundation of a Pacific Branch in the (Australian) Prime Minister's 
Department shows a growing awareness of the importance in certain 
official circles not only of expert knowledge but also of control of public 
opinion. The aims of the branch were to 
take every opportunity to assist in the instruction of the public 
opinion on matters within the scope of the Branch .... [I}t will be 
possible for the staff of the Branch to assist in the work of private 
study groups, by preparing syllabuses of reading and taking part in 
discussions of foreign affairs: to advise public libraries in the 
selection of books: to give information to newspapers and 
magazines: to support movements such as for the closer study of 
foreign affairs in the Universities, or for the foundation of 
periodicals for the discussion of the foreign relations of the 
anonymously and the attendants should not quote the names of the speakers. The 
members were also not allowed to express any politicai statement on any issues publicly. 
The Royal Charter and by-laws of the RllA. 
82 Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA. 
83 Ibid. 
----------
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Commonwealth: and to take part, with discretion, in •Jublic 
discussions.84 ' 
Piesse was Director of this one-man branch in 1919-1923, dealing with the 
issues of and collecting information on relations between Australia and 
Asia and the Pacific. Piesse worked especially hard on Japanese 
immigration issues, but inevitably his views, not to mention the 
principles behind the setting of the branch, were in conflict with those of 
Hughes. The branch was formed by the Acting Prime Mim~ter with very 
little consultation with Hughes when Hughes was away at the Paris Peace 
Conference.BS Piesse resigned in November 1923, and felt that 'for some 
time his opinion was not fully utilized by the government' .86 While 
support for the principles of the branch existed, the opposition was also 
still strong. 
The principle behind the establishment of the Pacific Branch, especially on 
expert knowledge and public opinion, however, seems to have been 
inherited by the newly formed Department of External Affairs in 1934, 
into which the Pacific Branch was absorbed. Including Piesse, many 
internationalists with similar principles experienced semi-diplomatic 
activities through the RIIA and the IPR, and later became diplomats. 
These men brought new diplomatic principles, fostered by these 
organizations, into the Department. 
Hostility to the modern manner and thinking which the League 
represented did not only come from the old-fashioned Hughes, but also 
from the L:ibor Party. Latham reported: 
[T}he LaiJl;f 0 arty, originally, r' _:ing the war, a strong advocate of 
the League of Nations, has ~·.1nehow or other discerned that the 
i..eague is redly the ... symbol of a capitalist plot.87 
84 'The Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department, Object and Duties,' n. d., Al; 
1919/8756, AA. 85 Peter Edwards, Prime Mi11isters a11d Dipwmats: t/1e Maki11g of Australia11 Foreig11 
Policy, 1901-49, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1983), p.55. 
86 Piesse to Baijpai, 13 January, 1925, cited in Edwards, Prime Mi11isters, p.58. 
87 Latham to Nicolson, 10 November, 1920, MS 1009/1, NLA. 
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The League of Nations became an establishment organ in Labor's eyes. 
The Labor camp claimed that internationalists, especially the Round Table 
members, were un-Australian, elitist, and 'influential only in a limited 
circle ... in touch with some Federal Ministers, and embracing a number of 
imperialistic lawyers and university professors and totally out of touch 
with Labor opinion'.88 
iv) The Meaning of the IPR: The Regionalist Challenge to the British 
Order 
a) The IPR and the Pacific as an American Construction 
Although attracting those interested in Japan and the mandates in the 
Pacific, the IPR was predominantly perceived by Australians as a tool of 
American influence in che Pacific. Although America inspired and 
attracted some, the loyalty of the majority to the British empire was far 
stronger. As discussed in the next section, Japanese IPR members saw 
America as a "Star of Hope" of democratic ideals. In contrast, the attitude 
to the USA in Australia was one of uneasiness or scepticism. However, 
one form of cooperation with Americans was promoted by an 
organization of British origin called the English Speaking Union. The 
Pan-Pacific Union of Honolulu, which was one interesting episode in the 
initial formation of the IPR, was also involved in this promotion. 
The Pan-Pacific Union encouraged some to favour Australian-American 
cooperation. Before the first IPR conference of 1925, some Australians 
attended Pan-Pacific conferences in Honolulu, China or Japan both in an 
official and unofficial capacity. NSW showed readiness to send 
delegations to these conferences, while the other states did not join this 
new enterprise. Joseph Carruthers (1856-1932), former Premier of NSW 
in 1904-1907 and member of the cabinet (in 1924), attended the Pan-Pacific 
Food Conservation Conference in 1924 as a representative of the NSW 
88 W. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, p.98. 
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state government.89 Cani.;.thers, a personal friend of the Prime Minister 
Stanley Bruce (Prime Minister, 1.923-1929), sought representation by tl:1e 
Federal Government at th.: .:or!erence, but t!"ie commonwealth decided 
not to be represented.90 
Bruce took ri. cordial attitude to the Pan-Pacific movement. According to 
the Mid-Pacific, the Pan-Pacific Union's journal, he was sympathetic to the 
League of Nations movement, and proposed to establish a similar 
orgo.nization in the Pacific.91 He also acknowledged that tl1e Food 
Conference achieved 'very useful work', and would go' a long way toward 
promoting better understanding among the people in the Pacific' .92 
Through this conference, Carruthers promoted an Australian-American 
cooperative spirit, which he referred to a.> a link between the English-
speaking people. This concept diJ not contr:idict the British imperial tie, 
but reinforced it: 'Americans arid Australians would always be linked 
together in a brotherhood as children of the same good old stock'.
93 
He 
pursued this idea by re-constructing the image of Captain Cook from the 
existing Hawaiian perception of him as an evil captain into an image of 
Cook as an introducer of English civilization.94 To i.:elebrate the new 
image of Cook as a symbol of the English-speaking peoples' tie, he 
proposed the re-furbishing of Cook's memorial at Kaawaloa Bay in a 
Hawaiian island. This project, although small in scale, became a joint 
event supportec:I by the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Britain, 
89 The Premier of the NSW government reported that they decided that Carruthers would 
represent NSW for the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference. Fuller lo the Governor 
of Hawaii, 30 January, 1924, MSS 1638/19, ML. 90 Carruthers to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, 23 May, 1924, Carruthers to Bruce, 28 ~>'iay, 1924, Carruthers lo Earle Page, 29 May 1924, Secretary of the Prime Minister's 
!Jepartment to Carruthers, 11June,1924, MSS 1638/19, ML. 
91 Anonymous, 'The Pan-Pacific Club in Tokyo,' Tile Mid-Pacific Magazine, (May, 1924), 
p.21. 
92 Bruce to Carruthers, 1August,1924, MSS 1638/62, ML. 
93 Carruthers to Prof. Gartner, University of Minnesota, 25 November, 1924, MSS 1638/59, 
ML. 94 Carruthers was troubled when he ic;,r"' out that Cook was seen as an evil captain by 
Hawaiians, and argued for the need tr· ·~·1ange this 'wrong' image. Paper given on Cook 
to the Royal Historical Society of NSW, 11November,1924, MSS 1638/60, ML. 
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the USA and Japan.95 Ford and Carruthers shared the idea that Cook 
introduced civilization to the Pacific including Australia and New 
Zealand. Although others such as Herbert Gregory, (American) the 
Director of the Bishop Museum in Honolulu and a major figure of the 
Pan-Pacific Science Congress, opposed this glorified image, it is significant 
that Carruthers' s rhetoric obtained official support in these countries. 
Wh\le Carruthers remained marginal at the IPR (he attended the second 
IPR conference), his view shows a particular way of accommodating the 
USA into the British imperial order.96 
T n contrast to these pro-American activities which remained within the 
imperial framework, the IPR scheme suggested a more independent 
approach to the Pacific, and therefore created scepticism an<' hostility 
among imperial-oriented internationalists. 
In Australia, after the first conference, the IPR was separately organized as 
local branches in Sydney, Melbourne and later Brisbane. The formation of 
the National Council did not happen until early 1930s. When these local 
branches were incorporate(!. as a national council, hc.wever, it became the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). It was the Australian 
counterpart of the RIIA, not a distinct national council of the IPR. The 
institutionalization of the IPR in Australia was, therefore, intertwined 
with that of the RIIA. 
The organization for the fir:;t IPR conference, including the selection of 
c!elegates and the provision of s~cretarial personnel and offices, was done 
not through the Round Table or the RIIA groups, but through tile YMCA. 
95 A part of the land of this planned memorial park was owned by a japa11ese land 
syndicate. The Japanese government bought this land and endowed it to the Territory of 
Hawaii, MSS 1638/ 48 and 60, ML. 
96 The English Speaking Union was founded in London in late 1910s and later in 
Philadelphia to promote close ties in the Anglo-Saxon community. It still has an office 
in London. Articles in Landmark, the journal of the Union, in the 1910s and 20s, show its 
enthu5iasm for Anglo-American cooperation through the Rhodes Scholarship, the 
YMCA activities and the League of Nations. A typed draft of T/1e Englis/J Speaking 
Union: Tl1e Story of Its Founding, and The Landmark, (April, 1919), pp.255 and 294, and 
Oanuary, 1920), p.121, LESU. There were branches in Australia, which were mor~ like 
social clubs. Their American orientation was rather distinct Lulu, Egglcston's wife, and 
H. Brookes were very active in this Union. W. Osmond, Frederic Eggleston, p.138. 
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This meant the injection of different elements into a group of 
internationalists centred around the Round Table: church people and 
women. The members for the first conference included four YMCA 
related people out of a total delegation of six. Janet Mitchel (1896-1957), 
daughter of a prominent educationalist,97 and graduate of the University 
of London, was one of these s!x, and she did the IPR's initial secretarial 
work through the YMCA national headquarters' office in Melbourne. She 
was the educatitmal secretary of the YWCA then (1924-1926), and active in 
the LNU. She was a member of Australian group at the IPR conferences 
in 1925 and 1931. 
Eleanor Hinder (1893-1963) was another woman from the YMCA who 
made a distinct contribution to the IPR. Born in f'.TSW and educated at the 
University of Sydney, she was involved in the Student Christian 
Movement, the WEA, the YMCA, the YWCA and the City Girls Amateur 
Sports Association. She became an expert on industrial relations, which 
led her to work for the National YMCA of China in Shanghai in 1926. She 
attended the first Pan Pacific Women's Conference in 1928, and the IPR 
conferences at Kyoto in 1929, at Hangchow in 1931, and at Mont 
Tremblant, Quebec in 1942. She later worked for the British Foreign 
Office, the ILO and the United Nations. 
The YMCA in the 1920s espoused an interesting mixture of eugenics and 
Christian idealism. It promoted phycical exercise as well as international 
cooperation based on CLr;stian humanitarianism. While its journal 
featured IPR-related Pacific issues, its Christian humanitarian 
internationalism did not contradict the new British imperialism. In 1927, 
Melbourne's Manhood, the monthly journal, featured a series of articles 
titled 'The Pacific of the Future'. Contributors stated the importance of the 
IPR movement.98 They included some Round Table members, and other 
97 Her father was Alexander Morrison, Principal of Scotch College, Melbourne. 
98 The contributors were D. D. Trainer, national secretary of the YMCA of Australia, K. H. 
Bailey, member of the Round Table and lecturer in History and later Law a~ the. 
University of Melbourne, and G. A. Wood. Professor cf Commerce at the Umvers1ty of 
Melbourne. Melbourne's Manhood, January, February, March, April, June, July, and 
August 1927. 
articles in the same magazine promoted organic imperial ties.99 This 
suggests some influence of the Round Table on the YMCA. 
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The national headquarters of the YMCA (ir. Melbourne) initially acted as 
the IPR's national secretariat in 1924-1925 c:lthough in this period no 
national unit of the IPR was yet organized. The YMCA in Melbourne 
organized preparatory meetings for the conference and approached the 
Federal Government to send official observers. Th~y invited officials at 
the Prime Minister's Department to the meetings. The government made 
an early decision not to be ir.volved, J judgement which was based on the 
report of the Commissioner in the USA: the IPR was an unofficial 
organization, and the conference would discuss the immigration issue.100 
Autc;nomy of the IPR from the government was, therefore, the result of 
gover11ment action rather than the policy of the IPR in this period. 
In the process of the actual formation of the local IPR branches, the YMCA 
lost its control very quick!y. Instead, the RIIA members took over the core 
positions. Coming back from the first IPR cortference, Duncan-Hall was 
convinrf:d of the importan-:e of the IPR tor Australia. His loyalty to the 
British empire did not disappear,101 but he was prafou,1dly excited by this 
new movement. During the conference, he became keen on the idea of 
forming a Pacific League of Nations.102 There was something very 
attractive about American manners to him, and he started to consider job 
prospects, not just in the British empire, but in the USA and the League of 
Nations. After contemplating whether to work with Ford at the Pan-
Pacific Union, he obtained a post at Syracuse University, New York 
through the connection:; he made at the first conference.103 
99 Melbourne's Manhood featured a series of eight articles, titled as 'Problems of the 
British Empire' in 1926. Melbourne's Manhood, January, February, March, June, July, 
September, and November 1926. 
100 Nole of Walter Henderson, 24 October, 1924, A981; Org 93, AA. 
101 In his report to the government, he emphasized the importance of the British 
representation at the IPR conferences. H. Duncan Hall and J.B. Condliffe eds., What of 
the Pacific?: A Search 011 Its Problems (Honolulu, 1925), A981; Org93, AA. 
102 Duncan-Hall mentioned this idea of the League of Nations for the Pacific sometime 
between 25 June and 1July,1925, Diary of 1925, MS 5547 /10, NLA. 
103 Duncan-Hall's search for his work both in Honolulu and in American universities was 
detailed in his diary. Diary of 1925, MS 5547 /10, NLA. 
147 
Just before he left for New York, Duncan-Hall organized the Sydney group 
of the IPR. Being a member of the Round Table, the LNU and the RUA, 
he first approached the ke::; figures in this network, Latham and Mungo 
Maccallum (1854-1942). Maccallum was a Scottish-born scholar of 
modern languages and Vice-Chancellor of the University of Sydney (1924-
1927). In mid March, 1926, Duncan-Hall held the first meeting. A 
committee was formed to consider the possibility of establishing an IPR 
branch in Sydney. Charteris 'Ind Nicholas were elected to it. At the first 
committee meeting, Duncan-Hall suggested close cooperation between \he 
IPR and the RIIA.104 
This created disturbance :n an otherwise cordial and cosy group of 
internationalists. Beasley wrote to the London RIIA: 
The danger in any proposal such as that put forward by Mr Hall is 
that the number of people interested in the subject is naturally 
limited and is lar;,dy confined to persons already members of this 
Branch and to per~ons whom we do not want to elect to this 
Branch for (in many cases) personal reasons. For example, several 
of our members are also members of the Round Table group in 
Sydney; the Executive and Council of the League of Nations Union 
also claims others; so that the list of possible membl!rs of any new 
institute must include many who are already members of kindred 
organizations. Since this branch was founded by us a few years 
ago, all the necessary committee work and organization has been 
done by Professor Charteris, Mr Nicholas, Major Longfield and 
myself, and we feel very proud that our efforts have resulted in 
the continuance of a Branch which shows every sign of a long and 
healthy life. At the same time we realize that if we stand aloof 
altogether from the new institute, the latter being supported by 
American propaganda and possibly appealing to a fow more people 
because its subscription will ... be much lower, we are in danger of 
being 'swamped' out of existence altogether - and that, we feel, 
would be very poor recompense for the efforts of the past three 
years. For these reasons, we cannot afford to ignore the existence 
of a new movement, and must do something even if we do think 
that the new institute will prove to be only a 'flash in a pan'. You 
I 04 Beasley to Sec of CH, 30 March, 1926, MS 2821I1, NLA. Chatham House was named by 
Canadian Colonel Leonard who donated the money to buy the property in order to house 
the headquarters of the RIIA in 1923. S. King-Hall, ~l1atl1arn House:. A Brief ~ccount of 
the Origins, Purposes, and Method of the Royal /11st1tufe of /11tematzo11al Affairs 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1937), pp.18-20. 
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hardly need my assurance that we all prize our membership of the 
British Institute, and for that reason we shall cling more 
tenacio11sly to 011r independent existence: but it is undoubtedly a 
time when we need your sympathetic advice.105 (emphasis added) 
While the NSW group discussed whether to amalgamate the IPR into the 
already existing RUA, the Victorian branch was in a different situation. In 
Victoria the local branch of the RUA was not formed until April 1926. 
Therefore the formation of the IPR branch was not a matter of whether 
they should amalgamate it with the local RUA, but a matter of how they 
should form local bnn~hes of the IPR and the RUA. 
Anti-American sentiment, clear in Beasley's letter, was caused by 
Australian RUA members' perception of the USA as a challenge to the 
existing imperial order. However, Chatham House thought otherwise. 
T' ~y wrote to Beasley to urge the formation of a single strong body. 
[Y]our letter ... happened to come shortly after we had been 
considering tlie question of the representation of Great Britain at 
the project·~c' · 'P~ting of the Institute of Pacific Relations at 
Honolulu;. · .Jpring [1927], and after discussion at our executive 
Committ·~e yr:sterday it was settled to send you the following 
telegram: 'Institute is arranging representation from Great Britain 
at Honolulu and suggesting similar course to Canadian members. 
To avoid duplication could you invite affiliation Pacific Group to 
Australian Institute'. 106 
The Chatham House executive committee concluded that th.:y co11ld not 
afford to ignore the IPR movement, and realizeu that this mc·;t apply 
even more in Austra!i;i than in Britain. A single strong institute rather 
than a number of weaker and sectional organizations was important; 
otherwise, they thought, a great deal of effort might be wasted as had 
happened in the USA. They also felt that it was important th'lt British 
interests should be represer·~ed even unofficially at the IPR conferencc:s.1°7 
105 lleasley to Sec of CH, 30 March, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
106 Bourdillon to Beasley, 6 May, 1926, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
107 Ibid. 
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It is interesting to note that the RIIA in London was ready for Anglo-
American cooperation, and that members in Australia remained more 
sceptical. Probably this was because th~ Round Table and the RUA in 
London were prepared to adjust to changes (including growing American 
power) which would affect the imperial arrangement. In Australia, t:i1 the 
other hand, some members were attracted to these British organizations, 
not because of their outlook on c:~:ange, but precisely in order tu preserve 
the status quo. Tf!ere were, however, others who gathered around these 
organizations because of their vision of change. "'1is latter group of 
internationalists welcomed the new IPR movement. 
Eggleston, already known for his criticism of Anglocentricism and for his 
assertion of the need for regional awareness, was one who realized the 
importance of the IPR and welcomed the amalgamation. With his 
experience as leader of thr: Australian group at the sei::ond IPR conference 
in 1927, he tried to convince sceptics of the importance of the 
amalgamation. The situation in late 1927, howf "er, was hopeless. He 
wrote: 
There are some funny people about. First, men like Nicholas and 
Laby insist that th2 Institute of Pacific Relations is a vehicle or 
American propaganda. Being on the sp:.,t and carefully watching, I 
had reported to them there was nothing of the kind, but they were 
simply incredulous. I regarded this as an insult to me and our 
relations are rather cool at present.108 
Besides Nicholas or Laby, who thought all organizations other than the 
Round Table unnecessary, there were also a number of people who were 
hostile to the IPR and the USA in general. Merle Da·:is, the first General 
Secretary of the IPR, visited Australia in 1926, and found general 
scepticism towards the USA. 'If the IPR can succeed in Australia, it ·:.'n do 
so anywhere in the world,' he commented,109 
This anti-Amedcanism originated in the fear of a challenge not. only to 
the existing imperial order, but also to their own social standing. In other 
108 Eggleston to Cur..i.s, 17 November, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
109 IPR: Report Letter, No.IV by J. M, Davis, 14 August, 1926, A981; Org 93, ,\A, 
.. 
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words, it reflected the elitist nature of some members of the Round Table 
and the RIIA. The IPR set a lower subscription fee, and seems to have had 
a less elitist outlook than the RIIA in Australia. Eggleston thought there 
were a lot of cliques in Melbourne and Sydney with deep mistrust of some 
members of the IPR. 
[T]hey [Nicholas and Laby] and 0thers say that the members of the 
[IPR] in Australia are not carefully chosen, that they contain a good 
proportion of cranks, and that confidential things cannot be 
discussed before them .... In Melbourne we have deliberately 
chosen one or two Bolsheviks and extreme Labour partisans, and 
the other crowd will not meet them, or at any rate, discussion 
before them will not be free, and will, therefore, be of little 
value.110 
Eggleston continued: 'Personally I am always read~· to cooperate with 
anybody. Possibly my sympathies are too catholic, and my energies 
dissipated' ,i 11 He agreed with Curtis on the folly of duplicating 
internationalist organizations. One solution, he thought, was to have an 
inner group of the Round Table and the RIIA, discussing confidential 
issues, and the IPR making some sort of appeal to the public.112 
'Nhile Eggleston was hopeful, others remained sceptical. Even in August 
1928, Officer, now an adviser to the Department of External Affairs in the 
Prime Minister's Department, was adamant. The librarian at Chatham 
House, M. Cleeve,113 recorded a conversation with him, in which he 
expressed r: .~ep scepticism. 
[Officer] did not think there was a possibility of the RIIA joining ur 
with the IPR. The latter had a number of members which the 
RIIA could never admit with the feeling that the confidential 
character could be maintained.114 
110 Eggleston to Curti:;, 17 November, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 IJoudillon replacea her as Secretary in 1926 and she became librarian and publishing 
officer al Chatham House. S. King-J-lall, Cllatllam House, p.16. 
114 Memo of Conversation with Major Keith Officer, M. E. Cleev.,, 10 August, 1928, MS 
2821/1, NLA. 
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Officer even denied the possibility of the IPR's becoming a branch of the 
RIIA. All the RIIA in Australia could do, he thought, was to send 
representatives to IPR conferences. Although he valued the research 
which the IPR was promoting, for him the IPR was a harmbl propaganda 
organization.115 
Symbolically, these more 'imperial-oriented' internationalists were 
against the concept of the Pacific. Officer opposed the concept of the Pacific 
as an entity. He thought that this notion would challenge the existing 
British imperial order. 
[Officer] thought that the irl~a of the Pacific as a whole was an 
incorrect one as Australia 1rnd New Zealand tended much more 
towards Euro-Asia than to the eastern shores.116 
The view was supported by other imperial-oriented internationalists. 
Richard Casey (1890-1976), an Australian-born diplomat and graduate of 
Cambridge, was member of the Round Table and the RIIA, and Australian 
political liaison officer in London (1924-1931) at that time. He agreed with 
Officer. Casey thought that there was no Pacific problem of the kind that 
the IPR conference sugp,-·:::sied, but only world problems. To create any 
independent arrangem;-nt ·ir. the Pacific was absurd, and all matters 
should be dealt with by the League of Nations.117 To see the problem as 
particular to the Pacific meant an independent policy for Australia, 
separate from imperial arrangements and outside of the imperial 
framework. Although not so adamant as Officer or Casey, officials at the 
Prime :tviinister's Dep:;rtment, who had been dealing with IPR issues since 
the first contact from the YMCA in 1924, felt: 'The Pacific problem was a 
dangerous concept' ,118 
It took a long time from the ChatP.am House proposal of 1926 to ach\eve 
the amalgamation, but Sydney led the way. The amalgamation of the 
NSW branch was achieved in September 1929.119 Members of the RIIA 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid. 117 Casey to Extemal Affairs [of Australia], 25 May, 1929, A981; Org93, AA. 
118 Nole [of Henderson], 28 June, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA. 
119 Buesst lo Sec of C!-1, 6 June, 1930, AllA file, LCH. 
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and the IPR decided that neither would absorb the other, so they should 
form a new organization to be called the Australian Institute of 
International Affairs (AIIA) which -,..,ould affiliate independently with the 
headquarters of the RIIA in Londo11 and the IPR in Honolulu.120 
There was little enthusiasm in Mell~·~c,.ne for this scheme.121 The reason 
appeared to be institutional. Tristan B.,r:,.~;t (1894-1982),122 a businessman 
and Secretary of the RIIA in Melbourne, explained that the chief obstacle 
was the existence of the Bureau of Social and International Affairs (BSIA). 
The BSIA was established in 1928 as an incorporated body of the RIIA, the 
IPR, the LNU, and the Round Table, and was financed by a wealthy 
businessman.123 It provided the office, secretarial staff, and expenses. 
Each organization in the BSIA shared the office, but remained 
independent in their activities, although the members of executive bodies 
overlapped. Buesst thought the amalgamation of the RIIA and the IPR 
would seriously prejudice the success of the BSIA, and confuse or estrange 
the financiers. It would also lose revenue based on the subscriptions to 
the RIIA and the IPR. However, they already shared a common secretariat 
and executive officers, therefore he thought the amalgamation should 
come eventually.124 
Probably behind these administrative problems, th~re was both a 
reluctance to ; ose the dir~ct connections with the RIIA and a sense of 
prejudice towards the IPR in Melbourne. The crucial issue, RIIA members 
argued, was that the IPR in 'iictoria included non-British subjects, which 
the charter and by-laws of tlit PIIA forbade. The NSW branch at Sydney 
did not have non-British members, so this never became an issue. The 
120 Ounics Ross to Curtis, n February, 1929, Whydham to Buesst, 22 April, 1929, AllA 
file, LCH. 121 Hon Sec of the RIIA in Sydney to Nicholas. ;:. June, 1929, AHA file, LCH. 
122 He was born in England, but educated both at tr., Melbourne University and Oxford 
University. He was also member of the Round Table. 
123 This businessman was Edward Dayson (1886-1949), Bendigo-born and graduate of the 
University of Melbourne. He was member of both the Round Table and the RUA. 
124 Buesst to Sec of CE, 6 June, 1929, and Whyndham lo Sec of the RllA, 30 October, 1929, 
AIIA file, LCI-1. 
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Queensla '.d branch of the AHA was formed in August 1931 along the lines 
of NSW, as an amalgamated body, and also did not have this problem.1:; 
The issue of amalgamation consequently brought another issue, the 
formation of a national body. The establishment of the national 
headquarters of the RIIA's local organizations, the AHA, was delayed by 
the amalgamation process, but also some felt that they were not ready yet. 
In 1927, Officer, Latham and Nicholas opposed the idea of forming the 
AIIA's headquarters in Canberra. The time was not ripe because Canberra 
as a capital city was still developing, and many did not want to sever their 
relationship with Chatham House.126 
Almos• five years later, on 17 August 1932, plans for the national 
headquarters of the amalgamated body, and a constitution of the AHA 
were drawn up at a meeting at the University of Sydney. The constitution 
was brought back for the discussion in Melbourne in October and finally 
accepted, altJ: •.. >Ugh the BSIA framework remained intact, and the RUA 
and the IPR kept independent activities under this federated body. The 
integration of these two groups (the RIIA and the IPR) in Victoria did not 
take place until 1937.127 The Canberra office was only formed in 1937, and 
the national headquarters office, the Commonwealth Council, remained 
in Sydney until 1951.128 
b) National Unity 
Pioneering works on Australian relations with Asia and the Pacific were 
produced by the group of regionalists linked to the IPR,12
9 
with 
stimulation from meetings at IPR conferences, its international programs 
125 Memo of the 1932 Sydney Conference of Victorian, New South Wales and Queensland 
representatives of the Stale Branches of the AJIA, 17 August, 1932, MS 2821 /1, NLA. 
126 Nicholas to Sec of CH, 27 September, 1927, MS 2821/1, NLA. 
127 Report of the AHA, 1937-1938, says that the merger was mainly caused by the joint 
action in the project of the Austral-Asiatic Bullet i11. Report of the AIIA, 1937-1938, CPR 
Box 120/ Australian Council, BLCU. 128 The headquarters' office was then moved to Melbourne, and in 1975 it was transferred 
to Canberra. I owe this information to Professor john Legge. 
129 Nick Brown,' Australian Intellectuals and the Image of Asia, 1920-1960,' Australian 
Cultural History, No. 9 (1990), pp.82-83. 
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and the financial support from the IPR headquarters. A journal, the 
Austral-Asiatic Bulletin was started by the Melbourne group in 1936.130 
Other pioneering works included: F. W. Eggleston, P. D. Phillips, G. 
Packer, E. Scott, and S.S. Addison eds., Tile Peopling of Austr:1lia 
(Melbourne: Melboi:rne University Press, 1933): I. Clunies Ross ed., 
Australia and tile Far East: Diplomatic and Trade Relations (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1935): D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes, Australian 
Trade Policy: A Book of Documents 1932-1937 (Sydney: Angus and 
Robertson, 1937): W. G. K. Duncan ed., Australia's Foreign Policy (Sydney: 
Angus and Robertson, 1938): J. Shepherd, Australia's Interests and Policies 
in tile Fc•r East (part of the IPR Inquiry series). 
Although reflecting and confined by the intellectual paradigm of the day, 
these works pioneered the studies of foreign policy in the region, and 
therefore, influenced the frameworks of later studies.131 It is noteworthy 
that these works were not on the region per se, but on Australia in the 
region. In other words, they were the first attempts to define the new 
Australia in relation to the region. These pioneers envisaged a stronger 
and more independent nation-state of Australia. 
Strong nation-state building was also felt important for domestic reasons. 
In the 1920s and 1930s, a l ucial issue was the social and economic crisis. 
Modernization and in du ... 1alization were, it was felt, undermining social 
cohesion, and social unity should be achieved. Regionalists felt that only 
a strong confident national entity could deal with its region without the 
support of great powers outside the region. For example, Eggleston was 
deeply concerned with the disintegration of Australian society due to class 
conflict. While propagating the need to develop awareness of the region, 
130 Report of the AHA, 1937-1938, CPR, Uox120/ Australian Council, ULCU. 
131 Brown especially suggests the importance of developmental themes in Asian studies in 
Australia in the 1950s and onwards, N. Brown,' Australian lnt.ellcct.uals,' p.90. One of 
the most influential IPR members was W. Macmahon Ball. He advocated the 
importance of the region in th·~ 1930s, and aitcr WWII, he continued to promote the 
;igenda: the need of modifying Australian official policy to .Asia. He w~s infl~?nlial in 
shaping the base of Australian scholarship on Southeast. As.1a. Rex Mortimer, .l·r,o.m 
Ball lo Arndt: the Liberal Impasse in Australian Scholarsh1p on Southeast Asia, in R. 
Mortimer ed., Showcase State: The /llusion of /11do11esia's Accelerated Modernization 
(Melbourne: Angus and Robertson, 1973), p.107. 
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he sought a theory to unite society.132 Promoting the welfare of society, 
regionalists strove to develop unifying codes of identity. These were often 
formed in terms of citizenship, and the non-European population of the 
region as well as Australian aboriginals were excluded from the concepts. 
Australian IPR members we:e progressive in the sense of supporting 
reform of external and domestic arrangements, and the internationalist 
organizations -the RIIA, IPR and later the AHA-contained some 
progressive elements including worr •:n, church leaders and those with 
socialist-leanings. Yet members were predominantly middle-class and 
male, and these organizations were regarded as a 'capitalist plot' by the 
Labor camp and did not gain much support in that quarter.133 
While endorsing 'modern' tr.inking on foreign relations in the spirit of 
the League, and criticising the old thinking of Hughes, 'regional' 
internationalists shared Hughes' belief in the White Australian Policy. It 
will be argued in Chapter Four that Eggleston and Roberts's promotion of 
the idea of the new Australia and new attitudes to the region actually 
protected the existing White Australian Policy. The failure of the Pan-
Pacific Trade Union movement,134 and the complicated nature of 
132 Draft of 'The Story of Social Integration', MS 423/20, NLA. It was published as Scarc/J 
!or a Social P/Jilosop/Jy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Prc~s, 1941). 
13 S. Carpenter, 'Honolulu Institute of Pacific Relations,' T/Jc Pan-Pacific Worker, 1 May, 
1928, p.8 and 15 May, 1928, pp.6-8. 
134 The Pan-Pacific Trade Union movement started in Australia ir. 1921 in order to unite 
workers for the anti-war movement. This was materialized at the ?an-Pacific Trade 
Union Conference in Hankow, China. It had two purposes: anti-war and anti-
imperialism. The secretariat was set in Shanghai and branches in the USSR, China, 
Britain, France, Australia, Indonesia, the USA, Korea, japan, and the Philippines were 
affiliated to this body. The editorial headqunrters of the journal, Pan-Pacific Workers, 
was transferred lo Sydney in late 1927 to early 1928. One of the objects of the secretariat 
was 'to fight against and remove all racial and national barriers and prejudices which 
still divide the exploited dass~s and oppressed peoples'. However, the foundation of 
this Pan-Pacific Trade Union movement in these countries, except for the USSR, was very 
weak. In Australia, this movement created hostility among local labour organizations. 
The executives of the Australian Labor Party thought this was a dangerous movement for 
two reasons. First, they saw it as a threat to the hegemony of Britain, an<! second, a 
threat to "White Australia". The Australian Workers' Union was also hostile to this 
Pan-Pacific movement because they feared an alliance with Asian workers would lead to 
introduction of their cheaper labour into Australia. In 1929, this movement faded into an 
appendage of the Comintern and th~ regional enthusias~ was lost .. Frank Farrell, 
/nternational Socialism and Australian Labour. T/Je Left rn Australia 1919-1939 
(Sydney: Hale and lremonger, 1981), pp.126, 129, 132, 134 and 137-143. I owe this 
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women's movements in Australia135 demonstrate further that 
'progressiveness' in terms of class and gender did not necessarily lead to 
similar attitudes to race in Australia in the inter-war period. Regionalists 
defined the new Australia externally as a part of the Pacific and 
domestically as distinct from the Orient. 
A strong sense of nation-state among the internationalists was shown 
over the issue of membership of non-British subjects. Eggit!ston was in a 
minority when he suggested that the IPR was an international body, and 
therefore, that membership should be open to people of any nationality. 
This argument was challenged by the secretary of Chatham House, who 
stated that although the IPR was an international body, each country had a 
national council whose membership was limited to its own nationality.136 
This idea of national representation was already strong even before the 
formation of the national body. Eleanor Hinder was working at the 
YWCA in Shanghai when she asked whether she could join the 
Australian delegation to the fourth IPR conference in Hangchow in 1931. 
There was a debate about her eligibility to be in a 'national' group due to 
her foreign residence. She complained that while the IPR should be a 
gathering of unofficial participants in their personal capacity, one could 
not attend the conference without joining a national group.137 
The institutionalization of the IPR took the form of the consolidation of 
various existing internationalist organizations into a united national 
body. The difficulty of forming the national headquarters reflected the 
strong desire to protect the imperial order. It also showed the practical 
problem of communication and the distinct sense of local identities 
within Australia. It is interesting to note that the nationalization of the 
AIIA happened at the same time as the change of direction in the IPR 
reference to Frank Donjiomo. For official documents on the Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Conference in 1928, sec A981; Conf 258, AA. 135 Lake argues the issue of race as a complex clement of tnc w•Jmcn's movement in 
Australia in the inter-war period. Marilyn Lake,' A Revolution in the Family: The 
Challenge and Contradictions of Maternal Citizenship in Australia,' ln Seth Kovcn and 
Sonya Michel eds, Mothers of a New World: Materna list Politics and tlic Origins of Welfare 
States (New York: Routledge, 1993), p.380. 
13( Macadam memo, 21:1 February, 1934, AllA file, LC!l. 
1371 linder lo E)\)\lcston, 8 janu;:iry, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA. 
from the Pacific to the Atlantic (discussed in Chapter Five and Six) and of 
the formation of the British Cori1monwealth Relations Conference 
(1933-). At the time when the o:ganization was put on a national footing 
and became the unofficial channel of communication within the 
Commonwealth, an opportunity to develop alternative identities in 
Australia in relation to the regh 1 was lost. 
While members aspired to influence government policy, the Federal 
Government decided on nor.-involvement with the IPR in the initial 
stages. It declined invitations to the meetings and refused to offer 
financial help to cover the costs of the delegations.138 Some government 
officials were nervous about non-officials discussing issues such as 
disarmament at the IPR conference in 1929.139 The Prime Minister's 
Department, however, did not intervene. A note suggests confidence in 
the capability of the delegation members and a strong reluctance about 
officLi intervention.140 The Department was not indifferent nor 
unsympathetic. Although it felt the ccncept of the Pacific dangerous, it 
had a fairly good knowledge of the iPR and valued th<! quality of its 
conferences and activities.141 
This relaxed attitude of the Prime Minister's Department reflected the 
Department's belief that the organization was under the control of the 
RIIA and that it did not have to worry about the American domination.14
2 
Official involvement with the IPR conferences started in 1942, reflecting 
the change of the IPR headquarters' policy towards a more official-
orientation in the war situation.143 From the eighth conference in 1942 
138 Beeby to the PM Department, 25 February, 1927, Addison to Deane, 25 February, 1927, 
Note of Secretary, PM Department, 8 March, 1927, A981; Org 93, AA. 
139 The Director, Investigation Branch, The Attorney General's Department to Secretary, 
the PM Department, 17 April, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA. 
140 Note of I-Icnderson, 19 April, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA. 
141 Walter Henderson al the Depurtment did not hold a blind objection lo the IPR 
activities. He was alive to ail the information on the IPR and had a positive opinion of 
the IPR especially after meeting j. B. Cot,dliffc, the Research Director of the IPR, in 
April 1929. Note of Henderson, 29 May, 1929, A981; Org93, AA. 
142 Nole of Secretary, PM Department, 29 May, 1929, A981; Org 93, AA. . 
143 The ISIPR, War and Peace in tlte Pacific: A Preliminary Report of tire £1gltth . 
Conference of tlte Institute of Pacific Relations on Wartime and Post-war Cooperatw1! of 
the United Nations in the Pacific and tlte Far East (New York: the ISIPR, 1943), p.v1. 
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till the eleventh in 1950, diplomats attended the conferences, with 
expenses paid by the government.144 Furthermore, during WWII, some 
AIIA members were mobilized as intelligence officers to contribute to the 
war effort.145 
The nationalization of the AIIA was part of the professionalization of 
various' expert' organizations of the time.146 Professionalization meant 
the establishment of an ethic of service to society and a status of 'expert' 
authority in a specialized field. Still in 1944, however, the AIIA retained a 
philanthropic rather than a professional element. It recorded 'the lack of 
members with qualifications and leisure',147 and this statement suggests 
that the 'foreign experts' at the AIIA regarded activities for international 
gatherings as extra work added to their own jobs. While they were 
concerned with the education of the public, their emphasis was more on 
research than on education, and they pursued 'service' not so much to the 
public as to the Federal Government. 
After WWI1, specialists of International Relations established themselves 
in academia. While these academics were increasingly utilized by the 
Federal Government, the expertise of bureaucrats also developed. These 
experts also found careers in INGOs and international bodies such as the 
United Nations. In the inter-war period, the AIIA contributed to the 
training of, not only diplomats and academics, but also 'international 
public servants'. 
144 Dopartment of External Affair~nominated P. Hasluck to join the Australian delegation 
for the conference in 1942, I lasluck to Clunies Ross, 13 February, 1943. And a delegate for 
1942, R. J. F. Boyer, member of the Australian Broadcasting Commission and Director of 
the American Division ,Department of Information, claimed the travel expenses from 
the government. For the increasing 'official' nature of the IPR, and its importance for 
Australia, see Watt to Hodgson, 1December,1943. But for the conference; of 1945 and 
1950, the government reduced the amount of assistan~e, and urged the AIIA lo send 
participants already stationed al the place of the conferences. Hasluck to Watt, 14 
March, 1942, M1942; 6, AA. 
145 William Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the \ustralian Inst ;e of 
International Affairs: Some Personal Recollections,' Australian Outlook, Vol.28, No.1 
(April, 1978), p.44. . . . . . 
146 i'lcming argues that economists in Australia achieved the pro~ess10nal1za~on m the 
inter-war period. Grant Fleming, T/Je Early Years of t/Je Australian Eco1101111_cs 
Con11111111ity: Working Paper in Eco110111ic History, No.183 (Canberra: Austrahan 
National University, 1995), p.4. 
147 Hasluck to Walt, 14 March, 1944, M19~2; 6, AA. 
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The national organization of the AIIA coincided with the establishment of 
the BCRC. The latter symbolized the loss of the regional dynamism 
initially generated by the IPR in the mid 1920s. The IPR, however, had 
inspire.:' both a regional sense and a stror.g sense of t~.::> new Australia, and 
had provided an experiential base for ofJ:icials ::nd academics who led the 
region:1list movement after WWII.148 
148 These people included Ball, Crawford and Eggleston. For). Cra~ford, sec H. W. Arndt, 
Sir Jolin Crawford; Research Paper No.128 (Canberra: the Austraha-japan Rcsear~~ 
Centre, 1985). Probably Egglcston's efforts to establish the Research School of Pac1f1c. 
Studies at the Australian N~ljonal University after WWII can be seen as a part of this 
process of regional expert making. 
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2) The Natioi.-State and the Orient for 'Reformists' in Japan 
This section argues that the problem of the members of the Japanese 
Council of the IPR (JCIPR) was not only their unquestioning acceptance of 
the nation-state, the colonial system and the role of the elite, but also the 
nature of the international order of the time. This acceptance was shared 
with members .:if the IPR in other countries, but they became most 
problematic at the JCIPR. JCIPR members initially supported the 
international status quo. Their position was weak, not only because of 
military pressure, but also because of the nature of the international order 
which did not have much popular support in Japan. 
The JCIPR initially attracted people who supported the status quo in 
international and domestic politics, but who desired moderate 'reforms' 
within the existing framework. They were mainly Wilsonians, 
promoting the ideas of the League of Nations, while accer>ting Japan as an 
imperial power in Asia. They felt the nee>ri for reform of the internaticinal 
order to promote 'racial' equality, and·_.. · : 1•.•d this goal at the IPR. 
Rather than identifying with the Orient, they de,.ned themselves as being 
between 'East' and '\Vest'. Using the term the "Pacific community", they 
sought a synthesis with the 'international community'. Domestically, 
they saw the n•;ed to make the attitudes of the old elite more 'civilized' 
and 'sophisticated' instead of 'militaristic'. But they had much in 
common with the Meiji military elite in terms of their sense of public 
duty and their ultimate belief in the nation. 
Younger JCIPR members were more reform conscious. Being 'public 
figures', they identified themselves strongly with the state. In the crisis of 
the war situation, they were mobilized for official functions, and pursued 
statist reform policies, which terded to neglect individual human rights. 
The more concern they had for reform in the domestic context, the more 
they questioned the valir'.ity of the international status quo. They 
publicized the 'Japanese' perspective to the world. This was, however, not 
a sudden change in the mid-1930s, because from the beginning of 
internationalist movement:; in Japan, internationalists always played this 
publicis' 1·ole. After the Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations 
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in 1933, the JCIPR began to propose an alternative regional order, similar 
to the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. They became increasingly 
close to Asianism. In Asianist arguments, a strong identification with the 
Orient was evicient, an identity to which JCIPR members retained an 
ambiguous attitude. 
i) Perspective 
a) International Cooperationists and Asianists 
In Chapter One, it was suggested that 'nationalism' was not necessarily a 
concept opposed to internationalism. Most internationalists in this 
period, whether Wil~..inian or not, believed in the nation-state system, 
and they had strong loyalty to and identity with their nation. This was 
true of internationalists in Japan, and particularly of those at the JCIPR.149 
The framework of 'nationalists' vs 'internationalists' is, therefore, not a 
useful one. Also, as suggested in the Inlroduction, internationalism in 
'late corner' countries or non great powers had different implications from 
those that it had for the great powers. Rather than initiating visions for 
the international community, and promoting them, internationalists 
sought to 'preserve' the interna\\onal status quo. In this sense, these 
internationalists were 'internatiur.al cooperationists', and most 
internationalists in Japan during the 1920s belonged to this category. 
This particular position explains why Japanese internationalists in this 
period were called the pro-Anglo-American faction [eibei-lza]. The 
dominant perception was that the international status quo was the League 
or Nations and the Washington Treaty of 1922, the Versailles-
Washington system, and that the system was ruled by Anglo-American 
149 Nakami Mari, 'Taiheiyo mondai chOsaka! to Nihon no chishikijin,' Slliso, No.728 
(1985), p.117, Ogata Sadako, 'Kokusai shugi danlai no yakuwari,' in Hosoya cl al eds., 
Nicliibei kankeislii: Kaisen ni itaru junen, Vol.3 (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1971), 
p.346, Sandra Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese lnlcllccluals: The 
Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' Modem Asian Studies, Vol.26, No.3 
(1992), p.537, and Kitaoka Shinichi, 'Nitobc Inazo ni okcru tcikoku shugi lo kokusai 
shugi,' Kindai Nilwn to shoku111i11clii, \1<:11.4 (Iwanami sholcn, 1993), p.199. 
powers. The system was supported by Japanese governments of ti'" 
1920s.150 
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Among international cooperationists, liowever, there was a division. The 
division was based on the perception about what was the most dominant 
force in international politics. The first faction was Wilsonian 
internationalism, which accepted the USA as a world leader and readily 
endorsed Wilsonian ideas of New Diplomacy. This faction was 
represented by Shideilara Kijtiro (Minister of foreign Affairs in 1924-1925, 
1926, 1929-1930 and 1931) and Makino Nobuaki. Despite strong 
opposition, they dominated mair. "tream of diplomacy in the 1920s. 
Although they were pro-American, rather than pro-British, most of these 
Wilsonians were rather vague about distinctions between the USA, 
Britain, other European powers and the League of Nations. 
The other faction of international cooperationists was imperial 
internationalism, which saw the centre of international politics as still 
located in Europe, especially in Britain. Although accepting the USA as a 
new dominant power, imperial internationalists were sceptical of 
American leadership.151 They thm ~nt that the dominant framework of 
diplomacy was based on the old Realpolitik of secret treaties and military 
actions as a means to :.olve international disputes, and that this had not 
been greatly c'1anged by the League of Nations. The new order of the 
150 Hosoya Chihiro, 'Nihon no eibeikan to senkanki no higashi Ajia,' in Hosoya C. ed., 
Nichiei kankei shi 1917-1949, (Tokyo daig:Iku shuppankai, 1982), pp.4, 8 and 10. Prime 
Minister Hara Takashi (Kei) in 1918 ruled c;ut the opposition and insisted on the 
importance of cooperation with the allied powers. Hosoya C., 'Nihon no cibeikan', p.4. 
The instructions which the Japanese government gave to the delegates for the Paris 
Peace Conference were cooperationist: 'although Japan should receive the rewards for its 
contribution during the war, it should avoid isolation from the other powers, especially 
Britain'. The instruction emphasized: 'Japan should keep in step with Britain'. 'Kawa 
no sandai hoshin' and 'Uiruson beidaitoryo nojilyonkaji5 kOryo ni taisuru iken oyobi 
chintao shobun :li kansuru !;;:>shin,' in Kajima Morinosuke ed., Ni/JOll Gaikoslli, Vol.12 
(Kajima kenkyilSho shuppankai, 1971), pp.53-63. 
151 J. Dower, E111pire and After111ath: Yoshida Slligeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-
1954 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979), p.38. In the review of Dower's 
book, Mitani argues that Yoshida modified this scepticism to the USA and became closer 
to Shidehara's pi c»Amencan cl.iplomacy which supported the Washington Treaty. 
Mitani Taichiri5, Book review in Kindai Nihon kenkyUkai ed., Taiheiyo scnso: Kais en 
kara kawa 111ade (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1982), p.488. 
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League was thought 'a pious experiment in ii period of adjustment'.152 
Although Wilsonians defined the main tone of diplomacy in the 1920s, 
imperial internationalists remained strong in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.153 Both factions saw the Versailles-Washingto11 system as the 
status quo and tried to preserve it, but their manners, methods and, most 
of all, perceptions of international politics differed. In this respect, those 
who supported the League of Nations in Japan were not necessarily the 
supporters of Wilsonidn principles such as New Diplomacy. The terms 
"Wilsonian internationalists" or "Wilsonians" in Japan, therefore, only 
refer to those who endorsed Wilsonian ideas, not necessarily the 
institution of the League of Nations. 
Hosoya explains the differences between the diplomacy of Shidehara and 
Tanaka Giichi (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1927-29) 
not in terms of 'nationalism' vs 'inti;•rnationalism', but in terms of this 
different perception of the dominant power and the nature of diplomatic 
dealings.154 Shidehara's diplomacy was pro-American and in the style of 
New Diplomacy, while Tanaka's was pi:o-British and in the manner of old 
Real poli t ik.155 
Both camps were nationalist in the sense that thej' wanted to preserve the 
national polity [kokutai] and Japan's national interests in China. Both 
15~ Yoshida continued that 'imperialism had been condemned in princi;;le, bul colonial 
territories olher lhan lhose of a defeated Germany continued lo exisl' ... 1. Dower, Empire 
a11d Aftermat/J, pp.46-7. 
153 Hosoya C., 'Nihon no eibeikan,' p.1. 154 The difference of diplomacy lo China between Shidehara and Tanaka had been 
explained by the dichotomy of liberal internationalist and mil Haris tic nationalist. N. 
M. Bamba, ]apa11ese Diplomacy iii Dilemma: A Comparative A11alysis of S/Jidehara 
Kijuro'> a11d Tu11aka Giiclli's Politics toward Chi11a, 1924-29, unpublished Ph.D .. thes~s, 
University of California, Berkeley, 1970. McCormack argues that both were nalionahsls 
by accepting lhe Japanese national interests. G. McCormack, Cha11g Tso-li11 ill Nort/Jeast 
Chi11a, 19:1-1928: C/Ji11a, ]apa11 a11d t/Je Ma11ch11ria11 Idea (Folkeslone, Kent: Dawson, 
1977). 155 Hosoya C., 'Nihon no eib ikan,' p. 10. Dower also suggests the difference of a degree 
rather than of essence. Dov .·r describes Shidehara and Makino Nobuaki, a strong 
League supporter and the father-in-law of Yoshida, as 'more sanguine to Wilsonian 
idealism and new diplomacy in Asia'. ). Dower, Empire a11d Aftermath, p. 46. :"sada. 
argues lhat not lhe Versailles Treaty, but lhe Washington Treaty was the starting poml 
of the New Diplomacy of lhe Japanese government. Asada S., Ryo taise11ka11.110 
Nichibei ka11kei: Kaig1111 to seisaku kettei katei (fokyo daigaku shuppanka1, 1994), 
p.138. 
_____ .,, .. ----
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were international cooperationists in another sense: they felt the need to 
cooperate with the powers and to act within what they thought to be the 
exiEtins:; framework. The Pact of Paris, which outlawed war as a means of 
resolving international disputes, was concluded by the Tanaka cabinet in 
1929: the same cabinet which had started military intervention in China 
in 1927.156 
Strong opposition to these internatioral cooperationists (Wilsonian or 
imperial) existed in Japan from the beginning of the Versailles-
Washington system. While numerous associations opposed to the system 
came from various points on the ideological spectrum from right to left, 
they can largely be categorized as Asianist. Asianism w11s 'regionalism' in 
the sense that it involved a vision of a regional community, and activity 
to promote the vision. As suggested in Chapter One, Section Three, 
regionalism was also intc:t nationalism because it was vision and activity 
for the community beyono:: ';he nation-state border. It differed from 
internationalism only in its limited scope. Asianism was, however, 
problematic, due to its implii.!d challenge to the international status quo. 
It saw the international order as an Anglo-American imperial order. Like 
imperial internationalists, Asianists saw that the framework of the League 
was largely based on Realpolitik, not New Diplomacy. But they differed 
from imperial internationalists in seeing no distinction between the old 
imperial European powers and the new power of the USA. Asianist 
rhetoric also involved a distinctive racial emphasis. It argued that the 
existing imperial order exploited coloured races, and that Japan should 
'correct' this injustice: the argument which bw. tme the backbone of the 
ideology of Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere in the late 1930s. 
Members of the JCIPR belonged to the international cooperationist t;-roup, 
and the major figures were, not imperial internationalists, but 
Wilsonians. They supported Wilson's visions, promoted the cause of the 
League of Nations, saw the USA as the most powerful new world power, 
and admired the USA as a model of democracy. This did not mean that 
156 6hata argues that the Tar>·'ka cabinet sigried the Pact because it wanted to obtain 
favours of other powcl5 Jbuut Japanese pcilcy lo China. Ohata Tokushiro, 'Fusen joyaku 
to Nihon,' Kokusai seiji, Vol.28, No.2 (1964), p.83. 
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they were not 'imperialist'. Like v\'ilsonians in other countries, they 
accepted the colonial system. Wilsonians at the JCIPR saw Japan as an 
imperial power and did not question its holding of colonies in Asia,157 but 
they proposed 'reforms' of imperial conduct. International 
cooperationi~ts, both impeiid and Wilsonian, denounced the right of 
colonies and the countries which, they judged, had little self-governing 
power, to be a part of the 'international community'.158 
b) Liberalb .n and Wilsonian internationalists 
An examination of the nature of JCIPR members has to deal with the 
seemingly contradictory 'reformism' of the Wilsonians. Like Wilsonians 
in the USA and Britain, their reformism originated from the domestic 
political, economic and social context of the time. How did JCIPR 
members stand in the domestic politics, and how did this affect their 
views on external affairs? 
In this examination, the key term seems to be their 'liberalism'. JCIPR 
members were called 'liberal internationalists' Uiya kokusai slwg1slin] in 
this period. The term not only distinguished them from socialist 
internationalists, but also indicated their political/philosophical 
orientation. It reflected the general intellectual paradigm of the Taisho 
period (1912-1925) which was described as "Taisho democracy" as we shall 
see shortly. JCIPR members in general supported 'liberal' reforms. But 
what was the nature of their 'liberalism'? 
In Chapter One, I argued that those who were involved in the IPR were 
influenced by New Liberalism. The core of this philosophy was a greater 
role for the state in the welfare of society, and an emphasis on the moral 
duty of the state. Previous works on Japanese liberalism [jiya shugi], 
however, do not seem to have fully discussed the complexity of New 
157 Wilson argues that 'the single most important point' which JClPR members_ sought to . 
convey to non-Japanese during the 'Manchurian Crisis' was that 'Japanese cl31m.s lo sp_e~1~l 
rights and interests in Manchuria were legitimate'. S. Wilson, 'The Manchu nan Cn,1s, 
p.531. · · 1 d d Ch" 
!SB These countries which were perceived to have little self-governing pow~r i~c ~ ~ ma 
and the USSR. Fujisawa Chi~o, 'Kokusai shugi no kiso kannen,' Kokusaz ch1sl11k1, Vol.8, 
No.9 (1928), p.32. 
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Liberalism in the inter-war period.159 Liberalism in Japan has been 
defined and discussed in terms of individualism and laissez-faire, and its 
complexity in relation to state and society has not been fully analysed. 
This leads to a difficulty in locating the nation-state in liberal 
internationalist thinking. Scholars often implicitly saw the emphasis on 
the nation-state not oni.)' as 'problem', but also 'morally wrong'. 
Inadequate understanding of the position of the nation-state in 
internationalism has resulted in a simplistic dichotomy between 
nationalism and internationalism, or nationalistic militarism and 
liberalism, and this dichotomy seems to have been promoted further after 
WWII. John Dower summarises this view of dichotomy as a pendulum 
theory which suggests that power shifted between two distinct camps.160 
Scholars argue that two crucial weaknLic.of liberal internationalists at the 
JCIPR were their nationalism and their elite status.161 This argument 
explains why the JCIPR shared the government approach to l\::1tional 
interests, and was unable to convey its members' views to society at large. 
Underlying these arguments, however, is the implication that 
internationalists became, or were, identical to 'guilty' nationalists. The 
meaning of being 'nationalist' especially in the 1930s and the nature of the 
'international community' has not been fully elaborated. 
159 The central figure of Japanese liberalism in this period is Ishibashi Tanzan (1884--
1973). Ishibashi's thought came more from Manchesw· liberalism and American 
pragmatism than from German idealism which influenced T. H. Green. Masuda Hiroshi, 
/sliibaslii Ta11za11 kenkyil: "Sli0Nil1on slrngislia" no kok11sai 11i11sliiki (loyo keizai 
shimposha, 1990), pp.3, 6 and 254. Sharon Nolte, Liberalism in Modern Japan: lsliibaslii 
Tanzan and His teacliers, 1905-1960 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 
pp.6 and 340. Naga Yukio, 'Nihon shihon shugi ni okcru riberarizumu no saihyoka: 
Ishibashi Tanzanron; Sliiso, No.437 (1960), p.20-21, Although Hoston states that 
Japanese liberalism was similar to British New Liberalism, she gives no further 
elaboration of New Liberalism, nor any mention of its implication for Japanese society. 
Instead, she uses the framework of collectivity and individuality, and Japan and the 
West. G. Hoston, 'The State, Modernity, and the Fate of Liberalism in Prewar Japan; 
The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 51, No. 2 ( 1992), p.289. 
160 Against this framework, Dower presents the case of Yoshida Shigeru, a 'liberal' 
internationalist diplomat in the inter-war period, and argues that these two camps were 
never completely distinct J. Dower, Empire and After111atl1, p.3--6. 
161 Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai,' p.117, Ogata S., 'Kokusai_shugi da~t~i,' 
p.346, S. Wilson, 'The Manchurian Crisis; pp.522-528 and 537, and Kitaoka S., N1tobe 
Inazo ni okeru teikoku shugi to kokusai shugi; p.199. 
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The neglect of the ambiguity of 'New Liberalism' in the 1920s and 1930s 
owes much to the "debate on liberalism" [jiyus/111gi ronsO] in 1933-1936. 
The debate defined the 'liberalism' of the 1920s as laissez-faire and 
individualistic, and dismissed it as the ideology of privileged few.J62 Just 
as Carr's criticism became dominant in evaluatinl" Wilsonians in the 0 
1920s, this criticism of Japanese liberalism of the 1920s seems to remain 
influential among later scholars. 
While 'liberals' were seen as preserving the domestic status quo, those 
who questioned the status quo were called, not New Liberals, but 
kakushin and kakushinlia in Japan. A pioneer of the study on kakuslzin, 
Ito, translates it reformism and reformists.163 Probably, it is more precisely 
called 'revolutionary' reformism because his concept of kakushin 
contained a strong element of destruction [/zakai].164 While preaching the 
need to overcome the deadlock created by the status quo, kakushinlza did 
not challenge the national polity, which they narrowly interpreted as the 
emperor system. This made it possible for some socialists and Marxists to 
join the kakuslzinha. While combining socialist rhetoric with strong 
patriotic and impf'rialistic slogans, kakusliinlza involved quite a few ex-
socialists, and pursued national-socialistic schemes.1 6~ Although a 
positive interpretation of kakushinha leads to a justification of Japanese 
162 Matsuzawa H' :oaki, 'Jiyil shugiron,' /wanami koza, Ni/ion ts wit i, Vol.18 (Iwanami 
shoten, 1994), pp.2..11 and 268-270. 
163 Ito Takashi translates kak11sltin as reformism, rather than radicalism or 
progressivism. Interview with Ito Takashi, Tokyo, 13 June, 1994. Ito T., Showa slioki 
seijislti kenkyO: Rondon kaigu11 gunsltuku mondai o meguru slwseiji dantai no taiko.to 
teikei, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1991, first published in 1969), PP· 8-9. As fonts 
formation, see Ito T., 'Nihon kakt.shinha no seiritsu,' Cl: ao ki5ron, Rekislti to ji111b11ts11 
(December, 1972), pp. 28-53, and 'Showa seijishi kenkyil eno ichishikaku,' Sliisi5, Vol. 
624 Uune, 1976), pp.222-227. Tire Cambridge History of japan also 1:1ses th~s translation, 
reformism and reformists, for kakusliin. Peter Duus ed., Tile Cambridge History of Japan, 
Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres,;, 1988), pp.128 and 294. 
164 Ho T., Showa slwki srf1.ikenkyO. pp.8-9. 
165 These socialists were, however, removed Crom the influential po. ition. Ito T., 'Kyil 
sayokujin no "shin taisei" undo: Nihon kenselsu kyokai to kokumin undo kenkyilkai,' in 
J<indai Nihon kenkyilkai ed., S/wwaki 110 sliakai undo (Yamakawa shuppansha, 1983), 
pp.293-294. These socialistic schemes failed by the end of 1940. Ito T., Konoe sliintaisei: 
Taisei yokusankai e no rniclti (Chilo koroni;ha, 1983), pp.187-213. 
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military expansion in Asia,166 the examination of kakushinha will reveal 
the complicated nature of the authoritarian regime. It is too simple to 
explain the oppression of individual freedom and military expansion in 
Asia purely in terms of guilty 'nationalists' associated with the military-big 
business complex.167 
How was New Liberalism located in th;, political context, and what was 
the position of the JCIPR? If kakushin is called 'revolutionary' reformism, 
the reformism of New Liberalism should be ten:~ed 'moderate' 
reformism. The two overlapped in several respects: they advocated a 
greater role for the state in the welfare of society and the moral duty of the 
state to serve society. The influence of New Liberalism is evident in the 
works of Japanese intellectuals in the 1930s. They discussed the problem 
of state, society and individual. Matsuzawa argues that Royama 
Masamichi (1895-1965) was one of the intellectuals who was influenced by 
this new stream of liberalism.168 Royama was a leading member of the 
younger generation at the JCIPR. This stronger reform consciousness led 
younger JCIPR members closer to the kakuslzinlza, as will be discussed 
later. 
In the following section, I look first at the background of the strength of 
the Asianists, second at the institutional background of the 
internationalist movement and the JCIPR, and last at the intellectual 
paradigm of the JCIPR, focusing on their 'moderate reformist' aspect, and 
their attitudes to the nation-state, society, the Orient, the Pacific and the 
international community. 
ii) Asianism 
166 Matsuo Shoichi, 'Taikai hokoku ni yosete: Gendai handoteki rekishikan no 
ichitenkei-llo Takashi,' Rekislli /iyoron (August 1977) p.5, and G. McCo.rma~.k, . 
'Fashizumu lo Nihon shakai,' in Sugimoto Yoshio and Ross Mouer eds., N1/1011Jlll roll m 
kansurujanislio: Tswetsu ni igiari (Gakuyo shobO, 1982), pp.144-145. 
167 Maruyama also notes that this reformist aspect of Konoe's new ~rder movement 
presents a problem for his fascism argument. Maruyama Masao, 1'.1e Jd~oloi,'Y and 
Dynamics of Japanese Fascism', Maruyama M., Tllouglit and Beliavwur Ill Modem 
Japanese Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 33. 
168 Matsuzawa H., 'Jiyil shugiron,' pp.276-279. 
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a) The Time of Crisis 
The Taisho (1912-1925) and early Showa (1926 onward) period was a time 
of crisis. The term "Taisho democracy" implies one aspect of the trends, 
the expansion of democratic forces, in the Taisho Era. Ihe first party 
cabinet was established in 1918, and male franchise was introduced in 
1925. The first general election based on this franchise took place in 1928. 
This was also the result of the pressure of popular social movements. In 
1920, a pro-universal franchise demonstration attracted 30,000 people at 
Nijabashi, Tokyo. As manifested in the Kawasaki and Mitsubishi 
shipyard strikes of 35,000 workers in 1921, industrial disputes were 
wides1,read. Also in rural areas, disputes between landlords and tenants 
became serious issues. Furthermore, the influence of the Russian 
Revolution was perceived as a threat to the government. Communists 
and socialists were severely oppressed by the Public Peace Maintenance 
Law of 1925. This banned ideas and activities which challenged the 
national polity and private property. The law was strengthened by an 
amendment of 1928, which added the death penalty, further restricting 
freedom of expression and belief until 1945. This assisted the official 
imposition of a certain kind of national identity. 
The political and social crisis was compounded by economic crisis. In 
1923, the Kanto Earthquake, which killed 100,000 people, caused serious 
economic disruption. Although the recovery was rapid, financial 
depression hit Japan in 1927, and this was aggravated by the Great 
Depression of 1929. Government economic policies failed to achieve 
results. The population saw the political parties as corrupt and serving 
only big business. Among the unemployed and poor, frustration and 
discontent with government policies were very strong. Concepts and 
arguments deployed by Marxism became popular among wider 
populations than the limited number of socialists and communists. 
Using socialistic rhetoric combined with strong imperialistic slogans, 
military officers and activist-thinkers such as Kita Ikki (1883-1937) and 
Okawa ShUmei (1886-1957) voiced the need for revolutionary reform. 
Even though they adopted military coups as their means, their schemes 
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remained reformist because they did not challenge the national polity, 
which they interpreted as the emperor system.169 Stirring, reflecting and 
manipulating the anger and frustration of the population, they attacked, 
verbally and physically, the 'privileged class' [tokken kaikya] of political 
leaders and influential businessmen, including international 
cooperationists.1 70 Military officers who were influenced l:>v these ideas 
attempted a number of military coups d'etat.171 Their stated aims were to 
eliminate corruption and prepare for the new order.172 
These acdvists also propagated the need to reform or challenge the 
international order, and called for Japan's leadership to liberate 'coloured' 
races in Asia.173 Not confined by the concept of the national polity, they 
were more aggressive in their attacks on the international status quo. 
Discontent with the domestic situation was strongly related to these 
attacks. Matsuo' s work suggests that profound and wide-spread popular 
social movements in the Taisho period were often supportive of military 
expansion in Asia.174 Military propaganda gained popular support by 
manipulating popular discontent with domestic hardships, and mobilized 
it to support imperial expansion in Asia. Mass media stirred the popular 
169 Kita (1883-1937) was a leader of the national, ''cialist movement in the inter-war 
period. He used the word, revolution [kak11mei], in his argument of Showa is/Jin 
[restoration] but it was not a denial of the national polity or the emperor system. He 
argued that japan's evolution toward socialism was the realization of its national 
polity. Kita lkki, 'Nihon kaizo hoan taiko,' published in 1926 (first published in 1919), 
reprinted in Takahashi Masae ed., Gendaishi shiryo, Vol.5 (Misuzu shobo, 1964), p.11. 
170 Among targeted liberal internationalists, there were Makino Nobuaki, Hara Takashi 
and Inoue junnosuke. Hara Takashi (Prime Minister 1918-1921) was assassinated in 1921, 
and Inoue junnosukc (Minister of Finance in 1929-1931) in 1932. 
; 71 Two major ones occurred on 15May1932 and 26 February 1936. In the May 15th Incident, 
L'le Prime Minister was killed, and in the February 26th Incident, the Minister of 
Finance and the Minister of Home Affairs were killetl. The Emperor took a decisive 
position against the coup of February 26th. Nezu Masashi, Gendaishi llO da11111e11 -2.26 
jiken (Azekura shobo, 1992), pp.330-383. 
172 '12 gatsu 20 ka jiken ikensho,' in Takahashi Masae ed., Gendaislli sliiryo, Vol.23 
(Misuzu shobo, 1974), pp.384-386. 
173 ShihOsho kcijikyoku, 'Uyoku shiso hanzai jiken no sogoteki kenkyil,' published in 
1939, r. rinted in Imai Kiyoshi and Takahashi Masac eds., Gendaishi s/Jiryi5, Vol.4 
(Misuzu,-shobo, 1963), pp.24, 26 and 41. Yamamoto Hikosuke, "'Kokka shugi dantai no 
riron to seisaku" sho,' in Takahashi M. ed.,Gendaisl1i shiryo, Vol.23, PP· 53-56. 
174 Matsuo Takayoshi, Taisha demokurashl(lwanami shoten, 1994), PP· 37-39. 
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sentiment.175 The population, however, was conscious of the injustice of 
the present system dome::.iically and externally. The resulting discontent 
with the status quo was a significant factor in popular support for military 
intervention in China, and the weakness of the JCIPR in the society in 
general. 
This period was not only one of crisis, but also one of national 
mobilization, and a sense of external crisis contributed to the process of 
creating and strengthening national unity. The external crisis was 
strongly felt in the form of intense pressure from Euro-American powers 
especially from the mid-nineteenth century. This sense ,_.f crisis caused by 
these powers was one of the main reasons why the Meij: government 
urged the need to establish a strong nation-state. With ~rial and error, as 
Gluck argues, Meiji Japan developed the ideology of nationhood.176 In 
this process, the nation-state became an a-priori for most people. 
The need for strong nationhood was expressed not only by state 
administrntnr>', bnt also by many sections of the population. Probably the 
latter was reflecting the propaganda of the former rather than initiating 
the programs. Through the wide-spread use of words such as koku min 
[nation], slzakai [society],gimu [duty],jijo [self-help],jiclii [self-
government], kyoka [enlightenment], however, the population was taking 
part in building the concept of a strong and unified nationhood. Various 
groups of women, socialists and religious groups were mobilized into this 
discourse.177 
Government officials and public intellectuals coped with the external and 
domestic crisis as administrators.178 They believed that the nation-state 
had to be strong and unified to cope with the crisis. They put priority on 
175 Daily newspapers such as Osaka Mainiclli and Osaka Asahi reached more than a 
million circulation in 1924, and radio broadcasts started in 1925. 
176 Carol Glud<, Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), p.4. , 
177 Mula K., 'Senryaku to shite no onna: Meiji Taisho no 'onna no gensetsu' o megutte, 
Sliiso, No.812 (February, 1992), pp.211-230. 178 For an interpretation of the public man in eris.is, se~ Andrew E. Barshay, s.tate and 
/ntellectual in Imperial Japan: The Public Man 111 Crisis (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1938), pp. 24-25. 
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the state over the welfare of the population, and in this sense, they were 
statist, rather than nationalist. The welfare of individuals ranked lower 
than the strength and unity of the nation-state.179 Most JCIPR members 
were drawn from amongst these public intellectuals or state 
administrators, and their activities as internationalists ha,:e to be 
understood in this context. 
b) Asianism: Challenging the 'International Order' 
While there were various streams, Asianism as the ideology to challenge 
the international status quo was articulated by Konoe FumimarolBO (1890-
1945, and Pr;rne Minister in 1937-1939, and 1940-1941), who declared a 
New Order in East Asia [Too slzi11c/1its11jo] in 1938. Although born into a 
family closely related to the emperor, Konoe developed a sceptical attitude 
to the existing system from an early age.181 At Iclziko(the First Higher 
School) which was the most prestigious public school,182 Konoe discussed 
179 Probably the issue of tenko, ideological apostasy, might be looked at from this 
perspective. Tsurumi criticizes 'liberals' who joined the authority to suppress their 
principles, arguing that there wc>'c alternative choices, including the death. Tsurumi 
Shunsuke, Tenko kenkya (Chikuma shobO, 1976), p.H-15. Takeuchi Yoshimi questions 
the existence of alternatives in the 1930s, and emphasizes the ambiguity between 
resistance and submission. Takeuchi Y., 'Kindai no chokoku' (first published in 1959), 
reprinted in Yoshimoto Takaaki ed., Nasilonarizwnu (Chikuma shobo, 1964), pp.384, 
394, 398, 402, 405 and 407. Barshay suggests explorinl limitati"" of total war. A. E. 
Barshay, State and Intellectual, pp.29 and 31-32. While the importance o( individual 
freedom and right should not be undermined, 'individualism' and 'freedom' contained 
elements of conservatism, and 'state' and 'society' implied progressiveness in the 1930s. 
180 In the official biography of Konoe by Yabe Teiji, Konoe's first name was Ayamaro, not 
Fumimaro. In this thesis, I use Fumimaro because it is con»fntionally used in academic 
and popular lilerature. 181 Konoe felt alienated from ordinary students by being treated as a prince. He became 
sceptical of people and society in general, and was uncomfortable with the aristocratic 
strata he belonged to. Yabe Teiji, Konoe A)'a.111aro (Fumimaro), Vol. 1(Kobundi5,1952), 
pp.28-29. Tsurumi Shunsuke points out the' official' nature of Yabe's biography, 
especially on the details of Konoe's family. Tsurumi S., Tenko kenkya, p.243. 
182 High schools were numbered from the order of establishment. In the late Meiji period 
of the 18 ',Os, Jcldkobecame the preparatory school for the Tokyo Imperial University, 
which produced national elite. The sense of mission of leading the future Japan was 
implanted among the students. Donald Roden, Sclioo/days in Imperial Japan: A Study in 
tlie Culture of a Student Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp.31-41. 
Nakayama Shigeru, Teikoku daigaku no tanjo: Kokusai liikaku no nakadeno todai 
(Chfl~ 1<oronsha, 1978), Chapters Three and Four. 
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literature, religion and social issues with his friends.J83 Unlike other 
friends who went on to Tokyo Imperial University, he transferred to 
Kyoto Imperial University, and studied with Kawakami Hajime, o. Marxist 
economisl, and Nishida Kitaro, a philosopher famous for his work the 
Study of the Good (1911). In 1914, while still at university, Kunoe 
translated Oscar Wilde's 'The Soul of Man under Socialism'. This was 
published in the journal Shin slzicho,184 but that issue was banned. 
Whether his socialist sympathy was profound or shallow,1ss Konoe lived 
in a time when socialism captivated idealistic and conscientious minds.186 
Konoe questioned not only the domestic but also the international status 
quo. Before leaving for the Paris Peace Conference as a jun;.or member i.•·, 
the delegation (he was twenty-eight years old), his article, 'Eibei honi no 
heiwa shugi o haisu', [Overcome pacifism which favours Britain and 
America] was published at N ihon oyobi n ilzonjin Uapan and Japanese] in 
December 1918. In it, he wrote: 
Democracy and humanitarianism are based on the sense of 
equality among people. This is represented domestically by the call 
for the democratic rights [min ken jiya ron] and internationally, by 
insistence on equal living rights [seizon ken] among nations .... 
The pacifism of Britain and America is a convenient peace-at-any-
price principle for tho:.c who want to preserve the status quo and it 
has nothing to do with social justice. If Japanese intellectuals were 
conscious of social j•1stice and Japan's position, they should be 
challenging this status quo. Instead, being indulged by the 
beautiful words and influenced by pacifism which is convenient 
for Britain and America, they desire the League of Nations as if it 
were a naturally given gospel. This attitude is very servile and 
should be denounced from the point of social justice .... At the 
coming Peace Conference, Japan would join the League, but it 
should insist on the exclusion of economic imperialism and 
183 Yabe T., Ko11oe, Vol. 1, p.54. 
184 The journal was sympathetic to the Modernism movement. Akutagawa Ryilllosuke and 
Kikuchi Hiroshi were representative figures. 
185 Yabe po:..1ts out Konoe's sympathy with socialism, but Fujiwara d~nies any profou~d 
influence of socialism in Konoe's thought. Fujiwara Akira, Tenn(l;e1 to Guntai (Aokt 
shoten, 1978), p.204. . . d 186 Henry Dewitt Smith II, Japan's First Student Radicals (Cambndge, Mass: I-Iarvar 
University Press, 1972), Chapter Two. 
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discriminatory treatment between whH1; and yellow races. It is not 
only militarism which harms social justice .. .J87 
At this stage, he was still hopeful that the League had a potential for the 
new order, by which economic and racial equality might be achieved. At 
Versailles he was quickly disillusioned: 'I saw that the hope of many 
people for the reform of the world based on justice was clearly betrayed at 
the beginning of the conference', and he concluded: 'Power still rules the 
world' .J88 His view was widely shared by the popular media. As a result, 
a majority of Japanese saw the faults of the Leagile and were discontented 
with it from the very beginnin~.189 
Although Konoe' s argument articulated the logic behind a challenge to 
the League system, he did not support Realpolitik. In fact, it was his 
criticism of Realpolitik which made him a harsh critic of the League. He 
saw the significance of the original spirit which produced the League. 
Along with international cooperationists, he promoted the cause of the 
League as one of the council members of the League of Nations 
Association in Japan. Based on his experience at Paris, Konoe urged the 
public to have knowledge of world affairs, and attacked militarism and 
fanatical patriotism.J 90 He applied his critique of Euro-A tnerican imperial 
expansion to the Japanese case. Konoe's A5ianism was, therefore, the 
logical consequence of Wilsonian ideas. 
Like many others at the Paris Peace Conference, Konoe felt the need to 
reform diplomatic dealings and institutions,191 and shared similar ideas 
with Wilsonians. He particularly noted the importance of the media, 
arguing for the establishment of a propaganda organization and a strong 
national agency for overseas news. He also emphasized the need to 
recruit talent from outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as 
military officers, businessmen and academics, who had expert knowledge 
187 ao Takeshi ed., Ko11oekoseida11 rok11 (Chikurna shobO. 1937), pp.231--41, cited in Miwa 
Kirnitada, Matsuoka Yos11ke: 50110 11i11gc11 to gaiko (Chilo koronsha, 1971), pp.60-61. 
188 Yabe T., Ko11oe, Vol.1, pp.89-90. 
189 J. Nish, Japan's Struggle, p.14. 
190 Yabe T., Konoe, Vol. 1, pp.111-113. 
191 See Chapter One, Section One. 
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on certain issues.192 He implem' ,,1 ,d these ideas later in organizations 
such as Showa kenkyakai (a brah<> trust or0;inization ior !<..Jnoe founded 
in 1936), to be discussed below. 
Konoe, who ciefined the t!':eoretical backbone of Asianism against 
international c:1operationism, sl:ared this acute awareness of the ne": 
forces of democracy with Wilsonians in the USA and Britain. The~­
Wilsonians became central in the internationalist movement of their 
countries, the same movement which was promoted by international 
cooperationists in J'-pan. These British and ,Americans recognized the 
importance of public opinion and expert knowledge in foreign policy.193 
Konoe' s view on the reform of the internationai •::der was, howP.ver, 
shared by some of these Wilsonians. Colonel House, for example, 
published 'The Need for an International New Deal' in Liberty in 
September 1935. As Konoe argued in 1918, House urged the need to 
reform the international order.194 
Konoe's criticism of fanatical patriotism did not mean that he denied the 
national polity. He questioned the international and domestic status quo, 
but his position was anti-socialist. His sense of the need for rP.form 
originated from his desire to preserve the national polity. It was the fear 
of revoluf:m which made him more aware of the need to cope with 
popular discontent.195 Despite his weakness in resisting military 
pressure,196 closeness to the imperial family g;;ve him charismatic power, 
and the expectation mounted that he would lead domestic and 
international reforms. Later he became a leader of kakuslzinha to which 
younger JCIPR members were closely associated. 
192 Yabe T., Ko11oe, Vol.1, pp.90-91. 
193 British and Americans established foreign policy organizations outside the 
govcrnmenl5, such as the RllA in London and the CFR in New Yo,,_, although the 
complete independence of !he Ri!A from the government was questioned. Professor Heinz 
Arndt, Interview, Canberra, 17 March, 1994. In contrast, reforms of the diploma''· 
machinery in Japan w'"· mostly confined in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
194 Yabe T., Konoe, Vol.1, pp.312-313. 195 Tsurumi argues that Konoe's position of counter-sr,cialist revolution was clearer after 
1940. Tsurumi S., ".'enki5 Kenky a, pp. 231-232. 
l 96 Shoda TaLsuo, JIB/Jin tac/Ji 110 Showas/Ji, Vol. 2 (Bungei shunjil, 1981), p. 77. 
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Asianism in Konoe's thesis of 1918 w<:s the logical consequence of his 
doubts about the 'international order'. His Asianism muf.t have been 
influenced by hi5 father, a strong advocate of Asian solidarity and Sino-
Japanese alliance from the late 1890s, who promoted student exchange 
schemes and friendship associations between Japan and China.197 Race 
was the core concept of Asianism, and this idea of foe solidarity of' Asian 
races' against the European powers, inspired Su~·, Yat-sen, an advocate of 
Greater Asian;sm.198 The idea also moved activists in Asia to hold the 
Pan-Asiatic - :ingress at Nagasaki in August 1926.1'"9 
Although his father opposed discriminatory attitudes to China, it is 
uncertain whether Konoe saw China as an equal partn~r. While 
demanding equal statns for Japan with Euro-American powers, a majority 
ofJapanese accepted Jap<m's supreme position in Asia. Often, the stronger 
t!ie desire for equality with Euro-American powers, the more they tended 
to be contemptuous of China and Korea. These attitudes W·c:re common 
among international cooperationists as well as militarists, although there 
were exceptions in both camps)OO Asianists, therefore, argued that Japan 
should lead Asian solidarity against European powers. Leaving aside the 
197 Yabc T., Ko11oe, Vol.1, pp.10-11. 
198 Yabc T., Konoe, Vol.1, p.83. They actually met at Shanghai on Konoc's way to the 
Paris Conference. 
199 On this conference, sec Grant Goodman, 'The Pan-Asiatic Conference of 192€ at 
Nagasaki,' UNESCO, Fukuoka, No.8, 1973, pp.21-29. Sec also Chapter One, Section 
Thrc~. 200 Matsumoto Shigeharu (1899-1989), a journalist and promoter of the US-Japan 
relationship, was involved in the JCJPR from 1929. Although his main interest was in 
the USA, he also maintained the belief that China was an important partner for Ja::ian. 
In his memoirs, he stated that there were very few who understood the Chinese 
nationalist movement in the inter-war period. MaL~umoto S., S/1owaslli 110 ichish0ge11 
(Mainichi shimbunsha, 1986), p.21. Yoshino Sakuz0 (1878-1933), Ishibashi Tanzan, and 
Ozaki Hotsumi were among a few who took an anti-imperialist stance and supported 
natioualism in Korea and China. Mitani Taichiro, Taisho de111okuras/1(ro11: Yo5hi110 
Sak11zo 110 jidai to so11ago (Chilo koronsha, 1984), pp.191-197, Ishibashi T., 'Chintao wa 
danjite ryoyil subekarazu,' and 'Chasen oodo ni taisuru rikai,' reprinted in Ishibashi 
Tanzan /1yoran sensha, pp.162-164 and 186--189. T5urumi 5., Te11ki5 kenkyo. pp.191-193. 
As for a military camp, Ishihara Kanji's proposal for the TiSa renmei assumed relative 
equclity between Japan and China, although the concept of me is/Ju assumed a 
leadership by Japan. Some of his supporters supported the independence of Korea. After 
the government criticized this movement in 1941, progressive clements were gradually 
lost. On the analysis of the Tea renrnei, sec Jkiobe Makoto, 'TiSa rcnmei no kihontcki 
seikaku,' Ajia KenkyO. Vol. 22, No. 1(April,1975), pp.22-58. 
ambiguity of the nature of this leadership, Konoe' s thesis provided a 
powerful logic to justify military expansion. In short, Asianism 
challenged the international order, and had great potential support in 
Japan. 
iii) The Institutional Characteristics of International Cooperationists 
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The institutional background of internationalist movements in Japan 
helps to clarify the characteristics of Japanese international cooperationists 
and JCIPR members. They were in favour of preserving the status quo. In 
contrast to their A uslralian counterparts, the distinct characteristic of 
Japanese internationalist movements were: the active commitment of the 
government, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; strong business 
interest in the early stages; the importance of American missionaries and 
Christians in Japan; the centrality of the US-Japan relationship, especially 
the immigration issue; and the role cf charismatic figures and the 
connections centred upon them.201 While sympathisers of labour 
movements were relatively numerous among Australian 
internationalists, they were inconspicuous on the Japanese side. 
The categories of internationalism used in the previ"US chapters can apply 
to the Japanese case in the 1920s, with the obvious exception of British 
imperialism. Socialist internationalism was isolated from the rest of the 
inte:nationalist movements because of the 'conservative' nature of the 
movements, to be discussed shortly. While the League supporters became 
the core of the internationalist movements in the 1920s, as already 
suggested, they were not necessarily supporters of Wilsonian ideals. 
Along with League supporters, international cooperationists (or liberal 
internationalists) drew 011 Christian groups, women's associations and 
business groups. These internationalist organizations included the 
Lei\gue of Nations Associations, the YMCA and YWCA, the Women's 
International Peace Association [J11jin kokusai /1ciwa kyokai], Chambers of 
Commerce and the Banking Club. 
201 As for the last point, sec Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai,' p.111, and Ogata 
S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.316-317. 
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Th first internationalist organization contained the basic characteristics of 
the internationalist organizations to follow. It was the Greater Japan Peace 
Association [Dai nippon lzeiwa kyokai] (founded in 1906).202 Its aims were 
to improve inter-racial and inter-national relations, to make efforts to 
solve international conflicts by peaceful means if possible, and to 
maintain peace.203 It did not, therefore, deny the use of war as a means to 
achieve peace, and in this sense, it was not a pacifist organization.204 
Maintaining the peace m~ant preserving the existing international order. 
Two main elements cf internationalist movements, business and 
Christianity, were soon included in the association. Two central figures of 
the internationalist movement represented these elements: Shibusawa 
Eiichi (1840-1931), a philanthropic businessman: and Nitobe Inazo (1862-
1933), a Christian, educator, colonial administrator and academic.205 Both 
were soon to play a crucial part at the JCIPR. They emphasized the moral 
aspect of internationalist movements, and disc..:ssed morality in terms of 
public service to the society and the state. 
As an official of the Tokugawa bakufu and the Meiji gc 'ernment, and a 
successful businessman, Shibusawa pursued the ideal of public service. 
He argued that business people should pursue private profits which 
would contribute to public profit [kocki]. This view was the basis of his 
strategy of professionalization and status-promotion of business people 
whose position in society had been low in the Tokugawa period.2°
6 
He 
was the first chairman of the Tokyo Cb amber of Commerce (founded in 
1891), and used it to promote the business status and international 
activities.207 
202 Ogata 5., 'Ko!msai shugi dantai,' pp. 308-309. 
203 Dai nippon hciwa kyokai kaisoku, [Regulations of the Greater japan Peace 
Association] SEDS, Vol. 35, p.493. 204 As for the definition of 'pacifism' in this thesis, sec the Introduction, note 19. 
205 Ko Sakatani shishaku kincn jigyokai ed., Sakata11i Yos/Jirode11 (Ko Sakatani 
shishaku kincn jigyokai, 1951), p. 585. 
206 Kimura Masato, Shibusawa Eiic/Ji: Minka11 keizai gaikono sosliislia (Chiio koronsha, 
1991), pp.17-19. 
207 Ibid., pp.20-22. 
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This sense of public service formed the basis of his philanthropic activities 
after his retirement in 1909 (he was then 69). He was inspired by 
American philanthropists such as Rockefeller and Carnegie, and was 
particularly impressed by the Carnegie Pee:._~ Endowment. Although he 
was initially sceptical of the peace movement which he saw as a part of 
socialism, Carnegie's activities and the persuasion of people who were 
involved in the Greater Japan Peace Association convinced him of its 
importance.208 His commitment to the association began in 1912, and he 
remained a most vocal and influential supporter of the internationalist 
movements until his death in 1931. 
His speech, 'Peace from the Point of View of the Business World', at the 
association's meeting in June 1912, articulated his ideas. He praised 
Carnegie as a great man, and refuted the argument that war made business 
prosper. Business needed international morality, he continued, and peace 
was the ultimate goal of civilization.209 He shared with Wilsonians the 
belief that good will and high morality would make the world peaceful. It 
is unclear whether he envisaged an international community with a 
'universal' ethical code, but his concept of 'international' morality was an 
extension of 'public service' to the nation-state. The government regarded 
Shibusawa as the leader of the business world and when they needed the 
support, officials made use of his influence. His beliefs, resources, 
connections and relations with the government gave 'respectability' and 
acceptil.nce to the initial internationalist movement. As a result, major 
internationalist organizations at first enjoyed good funding and 
patronage. 
While the role of Nitobe will be discussed later in detail, the strength of 
the influence of Christian circles in the international movement should 
briefly be mentioned here. American missionaries as well as Japanese 
Christians played an important role in the movement. The Greater Japan 
Peace Association was initiated by an American missionary, Gilbert 
208 Note of Tomiyama Setsuz.O, 1May,1936, in SEDS, Vol.35, pp.497-498. In March, 
Shibusawa contributed 500 yen to the association. 
209 Shibusawa E., 'jitsugyokai yori mitaru hciwa,' Ryumv11 zasslli, reprinted in SEDS, 
Vo!. 35, pp.501-506. 
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Bowles, and their influence is indicated by the large number of foreigners 
(84) among the 562 members in 1912.210 
There were two aspects of the meaning of Christian organizations in 
Japan, social prestige and social justice. Reflecting the Euro-American 
orientation of a small but influential elite in Meiji Japan, contacts with 
Europeans and Americans, mainly diplomats, missionaries, business 
people or teachers, were often considered prestigious. Friendship societies 
to promote good will with these countries developed around these 
networks, and they comprised an important part of the internationalist 
movement.211 As well as these associations, major Christian 
organizations such as the YMCA gained acceptance and respec. :-J.iility. The 
YMCA became an office for the IPR before the formation of the JCl?R in 
1926, and its .:lose contacts with influential figures was an important 
element defining the nature of the JCIPR. 
Ti1e role of Christian circles in promoting a soda! movement based on 
social justice should not be underestimated. Private Christian 
universities and other Christian associations were a minority, but 
contributed to various social movements including the peace 
movement.212 Particularly noteworthy was the involvement of Christian 
women's associations and educators. Founders of prominent Christiar. 
women's schools and universities were largely female. They were active 
in movements to improve women's conditions, and as in other countries, 
this social awareness led them to an interest in various issues, such as the 
210 Daihciwa kyokai ichiran, [Summary of the Greater japan Peace Association] February 
1912, SEDS, Vol. 35, p.496. 
211 Shiuusawa and his son-in-law, Sakatani Yoshiro, were involved in friendship 
associations to rromolc good will with countries such as France, Russia, Australia and 
the USA. 212 Christian socictic~ were, howcv~r, reluctant to deal with social problems as opposed 
to personal problems. Although the Union Church started a department of social issues 
in 1919, the real commitment to social movement of the Christian Association 
(established in 1923) was only from 1927. ll declared 'social belief' [sliakai slii11ji5), 
which included disarmament, realization of the world without war, human rights and 
equal opportunity. Except for the very few, however, Christian organizations supported 
Japanese military expansion in China. Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.314--316 and 
333. Sec also Doshisha daigaku jinbun kagaku kcnkyo.sho, Se11jika teiko 110 ke11kya, 
Vol.2 (Misuzu shobO, 1969). 
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franchise, temperance and peace.213 Reflecting women's interest in peace, 
eleven members in the Great Japan Peace Association were female, 
although they may have been foreigners. 
The association illustrated another crucial character of internationalist 
organizations: its role was to represent a national voice to the world. The 
association aimed to enlighten people not only in Japan, but also abroad. 
Its journal was published in Japanese (1912-1917) and later in English, so 
that: 'it could contribute to mak;ri:; our national character understood 
correctly and convincing the countries of the world that Japanese were not 
bellicose' .214 From the very beginning of the movement, its institutiL,1 
took on not only a public duty in relation to the nation-state, but also a 
coherent national character. 
Another distinctive characteristic of the internationalist movement in 
Japan was the centrality of the race issue and the US-Japan relationship. 
These international cooperationists were concerned not only with peace, 
which meant no opposition to the international order, but with racial 
discrimination. The anti-Japanese movement in California, they thought, 
was the biggest threat to inter~1ational peace.215 This concern explains the 
centrality of US-Japan relations in internationalist organizations. The 
Japanese American Relations Committee (JARC), which was set up to 
discuss the problem in 1916, became a centre of later internationalist 
movements. The JARC's appeal against anti-Japanese immigration 
policies gained the support of Americans whose centres were the Chamber 
of Cr .,nerce in San Francisco and the Japan Society in New York.
216 
While the main contacts were through business, the JARC included 
academics who were knowledgeable about the USA, such as Nitobe and 
213 Kishimoto Hideo and Kaigo Muneomi ed., Nic/Jibei b1111ka koslios/Ji, Vol. 3, (Yoyosha, 
1956), pp.131-136. 
214 Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen ji.:;yokai ed., Sakata11i Yoshirodcn, p.SB!i 1phasis 
added). 
215 Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.309 
216 See Chapter One, Section Three. 
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Takagi Yasaka217 (1889-1984), both pioneers of American studies in Japan. 
These academics added the practice of study and discussion on current 
issues to the activities of internationalists. This practice represented a 
major shift from socially-oriented friendship societies toward something 
resembling' unofficial' foreign expert bodies. These 'expert' type members 
of the JARC became the core of the League of Nations Association (LNA) 
(1920) and the JCIPR (1926). 
Officicl involvement with the internationalist movement was not 
extensive in tht! beginning. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
hosted functions of the Greater Japan Peace Association and the JARC, 
funding came largely from business connections. Government support 
for internationalist organizations, however, soon increased and remained 
steady in the 1920s. The LNA, into which the Greater Japan Peace 
Association was merged in 1925, was founded in 1920 as a branch of the 
LNA headquarters in Brussels. The LNA had the full support of Prime 
Minister Hara. Hara urged business contributions, and as a result, the 
initial contribution to the LNA mainly came from big business.218 In 
1923, however, 20,000 yen from the National Treasury was recorded.219 
Government support peaked in 1924, with 100,000 yen.220 The Tanaka 
Cabinet (1927-29) was also supportive, acknowledging the importance of 
the Association's activities and sparing 70,000 yen in 1927 and 1928.221 The 
amount was reduced, but still in 1931 under the Wakatsuki Cabinet with 
Shidehara as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the government gave 50,000 yen 
out of the entire donations of 80,000 yen.222 
217 Although Takagi is listed as Takaki in the IPR documents, scholars such as Saito 
Makoto use Takagi, not Takaki. I followed the convention. 
218 Rijikai, [Minutes of the Council meeting! 20 February, 1921, SEDS, Vol.36, p.419. 
219 Private contributions were almost 27,000 yen. Kaikei hokoku, [Fiscal report! April lo 
September, 1923, SEDS, Vol.36, p.522. The LNA budgeted private contributions around 
37,000 yen in 1924. 1924, Yosan, [Budget! SEDS, Vol.36, p.565. 
220 Ogata S., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.312. 221 Tanaka to LNA, 2 May, 1927, and 24 May, 1928, SEDS, Vol.37, pp.132-133 and 212-213. 
222 Kaimu hokoku, [Report of affairs of the association! 1931, SEDS, Vol.37, p.356. 
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Government support reflected its favourable attitude to international 
cooperationists.223 Official support gave political and social respectability 
to these organizations, and the involvement of influential people such as 
Shibusawa further strengthened this aspect. uue to this ~trong official 
backing, however, their activities were restrained from contradicting 
national interests, and concentrated on generating an officially-acceptable 
correct understanding among the people inside and outside Japan. 
Members emphasized the compatibility of 'nationalism' [kokumin slzugi] 
or more precisely 'statism' [kokka slwgi] and 'internationalism' [kokusai 
slmgi]. At a meeting of League su;;porters, Sawayanagi Masataro (1865-
1927), elucationalist and leader of the JCIPR for the first IPR conference, 
stated: 'In order to complete kokka slmgi [statism], we have to incorporate 
internationalism'. This compatibility was supported by other participants. 
Sakatani Yoshiro (1863-1941), the son-in-law of Shibusawa, and Zumoto 
Motosada, an influential journalist, emphasized that the League spirit and 
military preparation did not conflict.224 In the same manner, other 
League supporters defined 'internationalism' as based on the nation-state, 
and argued that it should not be confused with cosmopolitanism or the 
world federatior. ''· vement.225 
While other in terr.;: ,1<!list organizations addressed their appeals mainly 
to influential figures i.1 Tokyo, the LNA did so to aw: audience. Its 
aim was to promote the cause o! the League, its metho~-~ were propaganda 
and education, and its scope encompassec, iural communities. It focused 
first on metropc·litan cities in the Kansai arl:!a. EUCh as Kyoto, Osaka and 
223 Even after japan's withdrawal from the League in 1933, the cmrnection with the 
League wa.s maintained. japan sent official and unofficial ~ommittee m~mbers. All of 
these communications stopped in 1938 when the League decided to co~m1t to. the . . . 
sanctions against japan. Momose Takashi, fit en S/Jowa senzenki 110 N1/1011: Srnlo to 1itta1 
(Yoshikawa kobunkan, 1990), p.174. 
224 Kondankai, (Gathering for informal information exchang•d 17 June, 1926, SEDS, Vol.37, 
pp.9S-96. ' • ,. ' . 
225 Fujisawa C., 'Kokusai shugi no kiso kannen, p.24, and Yamamoto !Ono, Kokumm 
shugi oyobi kokusai shugi no saiginmi,' Gaikoji/10, Vol.76, No.740 (1October,1935), 
p.126. Yasutomi M., 'Taiheiyo kaigi nyoze ga"a",' Gaikoji/Jo, Vol.52, No.601 (15 
December, 1929), p.57. 
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Kobe, then on local cities.226 By 1926, local branches were established in at 
least 11 prefectures outside Tokyo.227 
As for pr0paganda, the LNA used journals and lectures. It had two 
journals, Kokusai chishiki [International knowledge] and Sekai to warera 
[The World and us], addressed mainly to intellectuals. For a wider appeal, 
it used lectures. Nitobe and Ishii Kikujiro (1866-1945) (Minister of Foreign 
Affairs in 1915) went on many lecture tours to cities all over Japan.228 The 
LNA also organized study meetings for educationalists to teach the cause 
and spirit of the League in schools, and asked newspaper owners to 
publicize them. It used other mass media, such as pamphlets and movies, 
and started to use radio around 1926.229 
Probably due to its idealistic aspect, the LNA won reasonable support 
among students and women in metropolitan and local communities. 
Although, in 1926, Shibusawa regretted that total membership was only 
5,000, which was a hundredth of that in Britai11, students' branches 
accounted for more than 20 among 40 branches.230 Membership increased 
to 11,771in1932, of which 5,652 were students and 556 women. Forty-
226 ChihO senden kakuci1'5 iinkai, [Local promotion committee] 26 March, 1924, SEDS, 
Vol.36, p.564. 
:27 These prefecture3 arc chime, Kagawa, Shimane, Tottori, Kobe, Kyoto, Ibaragi, Osaka, 
Gifu, Nagasaki, and Wakayama. Except for lbuagi and Gifu, they were all west of 
Osaka. Prol· •ly the LNA wanted to have a strong representation in the K?'1Sai · 'istrict, 
which direct. ,n eventually rc<,CJ!ted in the promotion of the LNA in the above 
prefoctures. Still the Jack of the branches in Hiroshima and Fukuoka, other big local 
centres, is curious. Zenkoku shibuchO kaigi gijiyoroku, [Summary of the meeting of 
presidents of local branches] 8 May 1926, SEDS, Vol.37, p.76. 
228 Nitobe was reported to have lectured at 150 places in Japan in December 1924 to 
February 1925. Sawada Setsuze, 'Nihon ni okew heiwa shisi5 no hattcn,' Kokusai 
Cliisliiki, Vol.5, No.11(November,1925), p.2C 
229 Shibusawa E., 'Heiwa kinembi ni tsuite,' 11November1926, SEDS, Vol.37, p.111. 
230 Ibid., p.113. 
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eight universities had branches of the LNA,231 and the women's section 
became large enough to be independent in 1930.232 
Unlike' expert' type internationalist organizations such as the J ARC and 
the JCIPR, the LNA penetrated society. Although the membership was 
still relatively limited in social backgrourid, this supports the argument 
that there was potential for peace and disarmament movements both in 
metropolitan and rural areas.233 On the other hand, there was a strong 
national mobilization process at the same time. The complex nature of 
these social movements, especially the roles of women, students, and 
socialist orgc 1izations, in rural areas, in terms of national mobilization 
and internationalism has not yet been fully examined. 
However Euro-American oriented these organizations were, membtrs did 
not ignore the importance of Asia, especially China. They promoted 
friendship associations and financial aid for Chinese students. Shibusawa 
especially saw China as a crucial business opportunity.234 The Nikka 
gakkai Uapan-China Study Association] was founded in 1918 with 
Shibusawa' s help not only to assist Chinese students studying in Japan, 
but also to foster a 'correct' understanding and good will towards the 
Japanese people.235 The Ministry of Education .:ontribuied to this 
organization from 1921. In 1923, the government enacted legislation 
which created a special account for cultural activities between Japan and 
China. The official contribution, mainly consisting of the aid for Chinese 
231 The first student branch of the LNA was established at Waseda University, Tokyo, in 
1924. Following L'iis, universities, colleges and women's colleges, not only in the Tokyo 
area, but also in other areas, established branches. Each branch had 100-300 
membership, and in Noveml:r?r 1924 they organized the confederation of the student 
branches of the LNA [Nihon renmei kyokai gakusei shibu]. Sawada 5., 'Nilwn ni okcru 
hei wa,' pp.19-20. 232 Ogata 5., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' p.312. Shibusawa pnmoted women's peace 
movement, arguing that peace could not be achieved only by men. Kate i s Ii i11 i5, Vol.859, 
reprinted in SEDS, Vol.37, p.146. . 233 Anti-tax increase movement was against military expansion. Matsuo T., Taisho 
demokuras/1(, pp.63--65. Kiyoz~wa Kiyoshi (1890-1945) a.ri;ued against the military 
expansion on the base of the welfare of the society. Mita.r '.Taisho de111okurashfro11, 
pp.UB-252. 
234 Kimura M., Sliibusawa, p.95 . 
. 35 Sunada Minoru ed., N ikka gakkai 11 ij iillCll shi, (Twenty years of the japan-China Study 
Association] (1939), SEDS, Vol.36, pp.99-102. 
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students, accounted for the large sum of 285,692 yen in 1921-1937.236 The 
LNA not only focused on European issues, but also tried to cooperate with 
student counterpar•s in China.237 As well as China, Sakatani and 
Shibusawa were involved in friendship associations between Japan and 
KNea, Afghanistan and India.238 
Without questioning Japan's status as an imperial power in Asia, but 
rather in order to strengthen Japan's imperial order, international 
cooperationists emphasized' enlightened' imperial rule in the colonies. In 
1919, Sakatani, for example, proposed to reform the militaristic imperial 
rule in Korea, and argued in favour of respect for Korean culture and 
language and of giving more opportunity for Koreans to fill positions in 
the administration. This was to appt..:ise the independence movement in 
Korea, which he saw as a crucial strategic position for future imperial 
development.239 Compared with other JCIPR members such as 
Sawayanagi, who placed greater emphasis on the assimilation of colonial 
people to 'Japanese culture',240 Sakatani showed much sympathy to 
indigenous elements. The aim of both, however, was strengthening the 
imperial power, and in this aspect, they differed only in m;inner, not in 
essence, from the militaristic imperialists they criticised. 
iv) The JCIPR: the Orient and the Pacific 
The Pacific was an uncertain element in the 'new' international order. 
Major countries in the Pacific, the USA and the USSR were outside the 
League. The Washington Treaty pardully resolved these problems. It was 
considered to complement the Leagu system in the region, yet it dhi not 
provide any rermanent machinery for diplomatic dialogue. Even 
236 Ibid., p.117. 
237 Kaimu hokoku, No. 29, 1925, SEDS, Vol.36, p.652. 
238 Sakatani was sympathetic with the Korean independence movement in 1919 and sent a 
letter to the Governor-General in Korea to urge the importance of recognizing Korea'r 
own culture, and to reform the militaristic rule in Korea. Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen 
jigyokai ed., Sakatani Yosliiroden, pp.589--591. 
239 Ko Sakatani shishaku kinen jigyokai ed., Sakatani Yosliirorlen, pp.587-591. 
240 Ozawa Ynsaku, 'Sawayanagi Masataro no shokuminchi kyoikukan,' in Sawayanagi 
M, Sawayanagi Masataro zensli a Supplement (Kokudosha, 1979), pp.205-212 
~~---------------..... 
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international cooperationists ielt that there was a degree of ignorance of 
the region in this largely European organization,.241 and questioned the 
relevance of the League outside Europe.242 Shibusawa stated in 1926 the 
need to pay more atte!1tion to the Paciric. 
Whi.le things are stabilized in Europe partly due to the League of 
Nations, 1 · ,w about the Pacific? The attention of the world has 
come e?. ;~ward. It seems the future issue lies in the Pacific. Japan 
as the major empire in the East should take it seriously that the 
urgent issue has now shifted into the East.243 
The JCIPR reflected this particular sense of the Pacific centrality. In 
Australia. to see the Pacific as a centre and an independent entity was 
considered potentially subversive, and \merica1. regional initiatives 
.:aused much scepticism. Although strong scepticism of Wilsonian 
attitudes existed among high officials, accepting the USA as a dominant 
Pacific power was not difficult in Japan. This was partially because of the 
absence of insntul!~mal or sentimental ties with Europe, but more 
importantly, because from the mid-nineteenth century, the USA had been 
the major Pacific power with which Japan hacl had to deal. 
The IPR represented an active American initiative to lead a new order in 
the Pacific, a mood symbolized by the <erm the Pacific Age. Those who 
were attracted to the IPR in Japan recognized the opportunities of this 
Pacific Age. While it involved two kinds of regionalism (Pan-Asianism 
and Pan-Americanism), international cooperationists in Japan accepted a. 
more American perception of the Pacific-centred-world. They rejected the 
Asianist arg11ment for Japan's involvement in Asia in opposition to the 
European powers.244 
241 Kanzaki K., 'Taiheiyo mondai to kokusai renmei: Renmei wa oshU renmei taru 
bekarazu; Kokusai cliisll iki, Vol.6, No.6 (June, 1926), pp.51-57. 
242 Inoue's speech and the response, Kokusai cllisliiki (March 1926), reprinted in SEDS, 
Vol.37, p.13. 243 Shibusawa E., 'Heiwa IJnembi ni tsuite; "·November, 1926, SEDS, Vol.37, p.113: . 
Interestingly in the English translation of this speech, the part referring lo the Pac1hc 
was cut, Ibid., pp.114-116. 
244 See Chapter One, Sectio11 Three. 
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American visions of the Pacifi.: prevailed among major JCIPR members, 
who were pro-American and pro-New Diplomacy,245 although various 
other elements existeC. • the JCIPR.246 ?ro-American attitudes were based 
on attraction to the v~\ues and socir.cy which the USA embodied in their 
minds. The ideas of the USA a~ d dominant power and an ideal c01: . r;r 
were closely related. Nitobe, who studied at Johns Hopkins in 1884-1886, 
was one of the first Japanese scholars to predict the dominance of the USA 
in post WWI interr.ational politics as early as in 1904.247 He was also a 
pioneer of American studies in Japan.248 
The image uf the USA as an embodiment of democracy was powerful 
among JCIPR members. In 1919 Nitobe wrote 'Heimindo which was a 
commoners' version of 'Bushido. While the latter discussed Japanese 
mode of morality for warrior cldsses [bushi]. equivalent to chivalry in 
Europe, the former extended the virtue and moralily to commoners, and 
discussed the Japanese style of democracy based on this mo:al system. 
Takagi Yasaka, ~nother pioneer of American studies in Japan and an 
active JCIPR ri..::mber, also saw the USA as an ideal democracy. How to 
adapt this system tr Japan, therefore, .vas their main interest.249 Merle 
Davis, the first general secretary of the IPR, visited Japan in May, 1926 and 
reported the importance of this fa itlz in AmP.rin. 
I was impressed with the faith in the goodwill and justice of the 
United '.Jtates tc wh;ch many of the Japanese leaders still cling. 
America was tl:e source of their idealism, and to her they still feel 
that they owe their trainint;. their point of view anc' .. much of their 
245 Nak<>. ' M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chOsakai,' p.107. On Ni to be and Wilsoniur.~ ... 1 and 
pro-Amer;canism, sec Mitani T., Tais/1,, "· ·11okuras/1fro11, pp.13B-141. 
245 Davis noted that 'reactionary' mcml, • .;uch as the head of 'Black Dragon Society', 
Uchida Ryohci, and Editor of 'Kokumin', Tokutomi I., were also involved in the 
formation of the )CIPR in 1926. Davis to Wilbur, 11M~y,1926, E-12b/29, AUH. 
247 Mitani T., Taisho demoku•as/ifron, pp.128-129. 
248 Saito Makoto, 'Sosciki Amcrika kcnkyU no mokutcki is".;ki: Nitobc lnaz0 to "beikoku 
kcnkyU",' in Hosoya C. and Saito M. eds., Wasliinton taisei to 11ic11ibei kankei (Tokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.577. for the meaning of American culture in the Taisho 
democracy movcmcn~ sec Mitani T., Taisho demokurasillron, pp.122-154. . 
249 Saito M., 'Si5sciki Amcrika kcnkyU,' pp.582-583, and Saito M. ct al eds., Amerika 
seisliin o motmnete: Takagi Yasaka 110 sh0gai (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.133. 
cultJ.re. America had been for many years a "Star of :-lope" to 
these men.250 
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This belief explains why they took the American anti-Japanese 
Immigration Act of 1924 so seriously. The law betrayed their idrals and 
expectations of the USA, and 'the "Star of Hope" was totally extinguished 
by the Exclusion Act' .25! The ideal democracy denied equality. Once again, 
believers in liberal ideas were disillusioned, following on from the denial 
of racial equality in the Covenant of the Leag11.e.252 
Did this disillusion lead them to question the nature of racial politics, 
internalize the consequences in their attitudes to Korea or China, and take 
action? This racial aspect of international politics contained the potential 
to challenge the international order, just as did Konoe's thesis of 1918. To 
an extent, at thr first IPR conference, they took action. They demanded, 
however, not 'racial' eqt:ality, but 'national equality', and claimed equality 
with Euro-Americans, and superiority to other Asians. The latter point 
was clearly demonstrated in the JCIPR's strong opposition to Korean 
representation at the IPR. For them, Korea was a part of Greater Japan.253 
JCIPR members felt humiliated not because of the ill-treatment of Asian 
immigrants in general, but because the Ja1 nese were treated like other 
Asians.254 The notion that Japan belonged to the 'V . st', no; to the Orient 
was strong among JCIPR members,255 and this basic c.nderstanding did not 
lead them to the Asianist thinkiri1; ;,,f Konoe's thesis. Konoe's thesis did 
not comment on the nature of the relations between Japan and other 
Asian ccuntries, yet identified Japan with the Odent, and challenged the 
order which he perceived was ruled by the 'West'. 
250 Davis to Wilbur, 26 May, 1926, E-12b/29, AUH. 
251 Ibid. 252 '.'or JCIPR members, this act was !lke a bomb. Those who believed the USA as the 
country of social justice were very disappointed. Ni lobe and Shibusawa were also 
deeply wounded. Nitobe decided not to go to the USA, until the law would be repealed. 
Ogata ~ ., 'Kokusai shugi dantai,' pp.320-321. 
2';:; Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosal<',i,' p.109, and Katagiri Nobuo, 'Taineiyo 
mondai chOsakai (IPR) to ChOsen 1·. • .. oken mondai: Chosengwilpu no dattai, 1925-
1931/ H ogaku kenkya, Vol.59, No.• . il, 1986), pp.45-76. 
2.54 o~vis to Wilbur, 26 May, ;·;~6, E-12b/ ''. AIJH. 
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When the anti-Japanese immigration law was passed, betraying their 
hopes that the USA embodied their ideas, why did the JCIPR members 
still think the IPR would be important and useful? They thought there 
was still a possibility that the law could be repealed if Americans 
understood the situation correctly. They also thought that it was not the 
real USA which passed the law. Shibusawa expressed this view: 
We owe too much to America, we honour her and love her too 
much to strike back .... The America that we know has not acted. It 
is another America, not the real America. We must be patient and 
give our friend time to reassert her best self and make right in her 
own time and her own way what seems to us to be an unjust and 
unreasonable act.256 
It is striking to see this faith in the USA, and the personification of a 
nation. The complexities of the nation-state, or the diversities of the 
society are ignored. Shibusawa's America consisted of pro-Ju pan bi.._:,1ess 
people, diplomats and intellectuals, and it was the same for JCIPR 
members. The image was constructed from contact with the Americans 
they dealt with, who were middle class white Anglo-Saxon P;-.,testant, not 
new immigrants, blacks, Native Americans or the working classes.'"
7 
Official involvement with the JCIPR was strong from the beginning. ·1 .. s 
was initially the result of the American approach rather than of Japanese 
official policy. Frnnk Atherton, a prominent businessman in Hawaii and 
a major organizer of the first IPR conference, contacted the Japanese 
Ambassador in Hawaii and Shibusawa in mid-1924. He explained that the 
conference was to consider human relation~ in the Pacific and urged Japan 
to send a delegation of 'influential and leading men' .208 The biggest 
agenda item of this conference was the anti-Japanese immigracion act of 
1924. Atherton, a member of the JARC in Honolulu, knew Shibusawa 
and Hanihara through the movement. against this act. 
256 Ibid. 257 Saito M., 'Nihon ni <>keru kokusaigaku no senkush~ "!.:Takagi Yasaka,' Kok11saigak11 
kenkya No.1 (1987), No.19, pp.29-30. ,.~ .. 258 Atherton to H~nihara, and Atherton to Shibusawa, both dated 24 July 192~, ·"' D~, 
Vol.37, pp.458-160. 
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The conduct of the Honolulu office (which beca;ne the International 
Secretariat of the IPR, the ISIPR, after the first conference) in using official 
channels to correspond with the Japanese branch was very peculiar.259 It 
was unusual because normally it used the office of the local YMCA 
headquarters and then Nation,>! Councils after they were formed. This 
approach was probably a result of the JARC connection, as well as a 
reflection of the charact~r of Merle Davis, the first Gener;il Secretary of the 
ISIPR, and his familiarity with the Japanese officials. While Davis was 
eager to g~t favourable official support from various governments,260 he 
was particularly familiar with Japanese high officials. As a member of an 
influential American missionary family who contributed to the Japanese 
educational system, he understood the system in Japan and was also a 
welI<espected figure amongst high officials and other influential 
circles.261 
In response, the reaction of the Japanese government to the first IPR 
conference was enthusiastic. This was a marked contrast to the scepticism 
of the Australian government, which did not favour discussing the 
immigration issue at an international conference. It was informed that 
the conference was unofficial, and therefore, decided not to be involved 
with the conference.262 In Japan, on the contrary, the issue was recognized 
as acute anct important. The government took prompt steps to organize 
the delegation for the conference. In March 1925, an official visited 
Shibusawa to deliver Foreign Minister Shidehara's wish that Shibusawa 
would organize the matters related to this IPR conference.263 The 
government hosted farewell and welcome parties for the delegations to 
259 This was not limited to the matters of the conference arrangements. When the IS IPR 
wanted to recruit one Japanese and one Chinese, the arrangement was done through the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First the ISIPR tried unofficial contacts, but when they 
proved to be unsucccssfu!, it contacted government officials. Dcbuchi to Inoue, 21 
February, 1927, Dcbuct.i to Tana .. -~. 4 May, i928, Akamatsu to Tanaka, 28 March, 1929, 
Yoshida to Inoue, 30 April, 1929, Saito to Yamasaki, 8 May, 1929. TMCK, Vol. 1, GS. 
260 J. A. M. Elder to PM (Australia), 12 May, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA. 
261 John B. Condliffc, Re111i11isce11ces of t/Je l11:0tiwte of Pacific Relations (V<mcouvcr, B. C.: 
Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia, 1981), p.19. After Davis's 
r.?signation in 1929, no ducumcnt suggests that key administr~tors of the IPR, J. Greene, 
Chairman of the ACIPR, and E. Carter, General Sccrclarv of the ISIPR, used official 
channels lo rnmmunicnlc with the ]Cll'R. TMCK, Vol. 5-9, GS. 
262 Sec the previous section on Australia. 
263 [Note of the visit), 31March,1925, SEDS, Vol.37, p.478. 
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the first IPR conference and donated money to support the travel of these 
delegates.264 
Official involvement witr the JCIPR reached a peak at the time of the 
third IPR conference in Kyoto in 1929, The conference was prepared while 
the Tanaka cabir.v ,.:3eiyiikai) was in power, and conducted under the 
auspices of the Hamaguchi cabinet (Minseito), and both administrations 
were supportive and involved. Besides funding 30,000 yen out of 100,000 
yen budget,265 the government provided the participants from other 
countries with custom service and railway tickets in Japan, Manchuria 
and Korea. This was the practice, however, not only for the IPR 
conference, but for other international conferences such as the Pan-Pacific 
Sdence Congresses (Tokyo in 1926). It was not peculiar to the Japanese 
government either, since the Australian government gave similar travel 
concessions for the participants to the Pan-Pacific Science Congress in 
Australia in 1923.266 
The IPR conference in Kyoto involved phenomenal official mobilization. 
Because the main issue of the conference was Manchuria, the 
government's stake was great. It collected reports through embassies and 
councils on preparatory proceedings in China, as well as the newspaper 
articles on the conference in the USA and China. Authorities in the 
prefectures where the ports were located reported the comings and goings 
of participants from other countries. After landhg, their activities were 
strictly checked and reported. During the conference, reports were sent on 
the details of the proceedings. The JCIPR, correspondingly, consulted with 
the officials about the research agenda beforehand.267 The in-•oivement 
264 Out of 30,0<hl yen of the budget for the first IPR conference in 1925, the Ministry of 
Foreign t '(airs paid 20,000 yen, Mitsui and Iwasaki 5,000 yen, Shibusawa 1,000 yen. 
The rest o! ~.000 yen was aliocaled to eight members of the ]ARC. M.-~uda Meiroku 
nisshi, [Diary of M~suda Meiroku] 12 May, 1925, SEDS, Vol.37, p.485. 
265 Inoue to YoshidJ, 8 May, 1929, TMCI<, Vol.2, GS. 
266 The Pan-Pacific Science Congress (PPSC), which started from 1920 did not propose lo be 
unofficial. Invitation, organization ;rnd finance of PPSC were all done through official 
channels. Arrangements of the PPSCs i· 1923 and 19Z6 were all through the government, 
A981; Conf 256, and A981; Conf 7.62, AA. 267 For example, Inoue to Yoshid<.., 19 jun!!, 1929, Uchi •ma to Shi<.!~hara, 22july, 1929, 
Takagi to Yoshida, 25 July, 1929, Nitobc to Gaimusho [Minb try or Foreign Affairs!, 31 
July, 1929, Yoshida lo Nitobe, 15 August, 1929, TMCI<, Vul.2, GS. 
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continued, although to a lesser extent, in th L1ext IPR conference in China 
in 1931, where the Manchurian issue was again the central topic. The 
government collected reports on the movements in China through 
embassies and councils.268 The documents concerning the IPR at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs decreased sharply after 1932, although its active 
involvemPnt continued at least until 1938.269 
v) The JCIPR and Social Reform 
Internationalist organizations supported the international status quo, 
which coincided with the government foreign policy in the 1920s. But 
this was a fragile position and much opposition existed. The racial issue 
in particular suggested '.he potential problem of this status quo. What sort 
of position, then, did JCIPR members hold on the domestic issues, and 
how did it affect their perception of the international order? 
a) Supporting the Domestic Status Quo 
Like other internationalists, JCIPR members initially supported the status 
quo of domestic politics. Reflecting this' conservative' position, they had 
anti-populist attitudes. While the:' recognized the importance of public 
opinion [yoron], their duty was to 'educate' and lead 'intelligent and 
healthy' [somei kenzenna] opinion.27° Nakami argues that JCIPR 
members had stronger anti-ma~5 attitudes than other internationalists. 
One JCIPR member denounced the LNA's method of enlightenment of 
the masses, and emphasized the importance of producing a strong 
268 Among many reports were, for example, Yano to Shidehara, 28 January, 1931, Yoncuchi 
to Shidchara, 18 June, 1931, Morishima to Shidehara, 7 June, 1931, Kamimura lo 
Shidehara, 14 September, 1931, and Murai to Shidehara, 24 September, 1931, TMCK, 
Vol.6--7, GS. 269 The last record of the government contribution was in December 1938. 5,000 yen was 
provided to help the travel of Takagi Yasaka tc .ttend the IPR meeting. The 
government also paid 2,000 yen for the JCIPR's contribution to the IPR international 
headquarters. Note of ji5hi5bu dai ikka shukan, 5 December, 1938 and Wakasugi to Arita, 
22 December, 1938, TMCK, Vol.9, GS. In 1939 and 1940, the government was informed about the 
Il'R, especially on the issue of the )Cll'R's withdrawal from the Il'R project, the Inquiry. 
270 Sawada S., 'Nihon ni okeru hciwa,' pp.15-17. 
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academic core group of foreign affairs experts.271 The annual membership 
fee for the JCIPR was ten yen (in contrast to four yen for the LNA), which 
further limited membership.272 The JCIPR was not unusual in its anti-
mass attitude when compared with other organizations which aspired to 
become foreign affairs' expert' bodies such as other National Councils of 
the IPR, the RIIA in London and the CFR in New York. Alfred Zimmern, 
a member of the RIIA, pointed out this danger of the expert groups of 
becoming anti-democratic forces.273 
As a result, membership of the JCIPR was mainly confined to academics 
and government administrators, .;md this direction became stronger after 
Shibusawa's death. Academic orientation reflected the policy of the IPR 
headquarters, as well as the JCIPR's initiative: the focus on producing 
scientific data papers. The aim of the JCIPR was to do academic and 
practical researclz on issues relate :i. to the Pacific,274 and it was based on 
the philosophy of the founders of the H';Z: if people know the 'facts', then 
they will have no prejudice or misunderscanding and be able to solve 
problems. 
This academic orientation could have enhanced the JCIPR's independence 
from the government. But as the following argument suggests, the 
organization attracted a certain type of academic and public administrator, 
who sought an intermecl.iatory role between academia and officialdom, as 
an 'expert' on foreign affairs. This' expert' orientation made the JC!PR 
inept as far as the propagation of their ideas and activities in the wider 
society was concerned. It demonstrated, therefore, the same problem as 
organizations in Australia, the USA and Britain had.275 In contrast to 
internationalist organizations, the Japanese government took more 
initiative in public relations activities through radio, the tourist bureau, 
271 Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai,' p.117. 
272 Kaisoku, [Regulations] SEDS, Vol.37, p.531. 
273 Alfred Zimmcrn, 'Democracy and the Expert,' Political Quarterly, Vol.1 (1930), pp.13 
and 24-25. 
274 Kaisoku, SEDS, Vol.37, p.531. 
275 For the ineffectiveness of the similar organizations in the USA, sec Cohen. He docs 
not, however, single out that elitism was the main weakness. W. Cohen,' Ajia mondai lo 
Amcrika minkan dantai,' in Hosoya C. ct al eds., Nicliibei kaisen ni itaru jilnen, pp.418-
~19. 
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and various agencies and used the JCIPR as a publicist organization, not 
for the audience in Japan, but for those in the 'international community', 
especially after its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933.276 
The position of the JCIPR member'; in domestic politks reflected the 
background of JCIPR members, who belonged to the upper strata of 
society. When the JCIPR was founded on 6 April, 1926, Merle Davis, who 
was visiting Japan, was pleased to see the Council included prominent 
figures. It was, he wrote: 
well balanced, with several of their greatest publicists, religionists, 
business men and scientists included ..... Baron Sakatani, Dr 
Sawayanagi, Dr. J. Soyeda, Dr Anezaki are outstanding national 
leaders in their own spheres. There is a group of very active 
younger leaders on the Council .... The choice of Mr. J. Inoue, as 
Chairman of the Executive Committee, alone, insures the success 
... 277 
Inoue Junnosuke (1867-1932) and Shibusawa piayed similar roles as 
channels between the JCIPR and the government. Inoue was President of 
the Bank of Japan in 1919-1923 and 1927-1928, and Minister of Finance in 
1923 and 1929-1931. He had been actively involved with previous 
internationalist organizations. The Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs often communicated with Inoue on IPR matters.278 Inoue 
resigned from the chair of the JCIPR in 1929, when he was uppointed as 
Minister of Finance, following the practice of the Chairman of the IPR 
executive body in order to respect the IPR's 'unofficial' character. 
Although there was almost thirty years' age diffen~nce between them, 
Shibusawa (1840-1931) and Inoue (1867-1932) repn ::ented the first 
generation of internationalists at the JCIPR: rr.cmbers of the Meiji elite 
with first-hand experience in foreign countrieG. They had contributed to 
Meiji-state building, especially its financial system, and their sense of 
276 Okubo Genji emphasizes JClPR's role as a publicist organization, especially after 1933. 
Okubo G., 'Mokuji [Contents],' reprinted by). Dower, 'Mikan no ajcnda,' in Yui Daizaburo 
ct al eds., Tsuiso Okubo Genji (Shitbido, 1987), pp.89-90. 
277 Davis to Wilbur, 11May,1926, E-12b/29, AUH. 
278 For example, Debuchi to Inoue, 2 February, 1927, 21 July, 1927, 16 April, 1928, and 30 
May, 1928, Tt.'CK, Vol. 1-2, GS. 
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public mission was very strong. They were outspoken, given their calibre 
and achievements. A "strong man", as a contemporary newspaper called 
him, Inoue was not afraid of the government or reactionary groups in 
expressing his opinions.279 Their understanding of the international 
community was distinctively economic in character. Their vision of the 
international syst;::m focused on currency, banking and trading. 
International politics, especially for Shibusawa, was not elaborate or 
complicated. There was no incompatibility between peace and a strong 
nation-state, and good will should resolve conflicts. The loss of 
Shibusawa in 1931 and Inoue (by assassination) in 1932 not only reflected 
the deteriorating political environment, but also meant the loss of 
influential contacts for the JCIPR with the government and business 
world. Leaders equivalent to Shibusawa or Inoue who had s'. · · ngth to 
stand up against official policies did not re-appear.280 
JCIPR members, however, were not necessarily hereditary member.rof the 
upper strata of society. They achieved influential positions mainly by 
merit and education.281 They were mostly graduates from Iclziki5 [the 
First Higher Schoolj282 and Tokyo Imperial University,283 which produced 
279 Yoshida Toshihiko, Rekidai Ni/ion ginkososai roll (Mainichi shimbunsha, 1976), 
~p.147-148. 28 E. Carter, Secretary of the American Council of the IPR, visited japan in 1928, and 
recorded the dominance of academics within the JCIPR, cited in Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo 
mondai chi5sakai,' p.106. 
281 By means such as adoption, extended kinship tics or scholarships, there were ways for 
bright boys to have good education in the first two decades of the twentieth century. To 
study at Icliiko, students, ~ed to pay a one-yen fee for the entrance examination and a 
yearly tuition of twenty yen in 1886. Roden argues that these rates were not 
extraordinary in comparison with the private colleges. Numbered high schools drew 
students from 'a wider spectrum of the rural and urban middle classes,' but were 'beyond 
the reach of working-class families'. D. Roden, Scliooli!ays, pp.51-52. But good money 
or background alone did not necessarily guarantee the elite education. The examination 
was competitive and difficult. Furthermore, there were many drop outs at higher 
schools. 282 There were eight numbered national high schools and between 1919 and 1923, 17 high 
sr'>ools (not numbered) were added. Local public schools and private schools only started 
from 1918. Momose T., Showa se11ze11ki 110 Nilio11, p.387. 
283 There were seven imperial universities in Japan before WWII. Tokyo University was 
founded first in 1886, succeeded by Kyoto in 1897, Tohoku in 1907, Kyushu in 1910, 
Hokkaido in 1918, Osaka in 1931, and Nagoya in 1939. Momose T., Showa senzenki 110 
Niho11, p.393. 
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much of the national elite.284 Ichikois particularly important to an 
understanding of the background of the JCIPR members and 
internationalists in general. It was the place where they obtained their 
inspiration and formed life-long beliefs and social ties. While women 
mingled into this system through marriage and friendship, they were 
excluded from the national elite. Because the new generation of the JCIPR 
was produced through these institutions, unlike the case of the LNA, 
women were largely excluded from the JCIPR. 
b) Nitobe as a Reformer 
Nitobe Inazc, who became a central figure of the JCIPR, occupied a 
transitional position between the older and younger generations of the 
JCIPR. He influenced younger generations of the JCIPR through 
institutions such as Ichiko and T. ,cyo Imperial University. Nakami 
point<; out his influence in terms of Wilsonian idealism.285 Nitobe 
worked a:.> Under-Secretary at the League in Geneva in 1920-1927 and 
promoted the League to the public not only in Japan, but also throughout 
the world.286 But his distinctive notion of the "Christian gentleman", as a 
reformed version of the Meiji elite, also influenced the younger 
generation of the JCIPR (and internationalists in general) to have a strong 
reformist inclination. 
84 Al first Tokyo Imperial University put more emphasis on producing 1mginccrs for the 
construction of infrastruclurc in Meiji japan. This emphasis was shifle j lo the training of 
government burcaucrals with a good knowledge of law. Ambitious you~g men began lo sec 
the law degree from Tokyo Imperial University as a common elite coul'sc. Nakayama S., 
Teikoku daigaku no tanjo, Chapter Three. Accordingly, high schools changed their 
characlcr and I ell ikO, especially, became a preparatory school for the Tokyo Imperial 
University. In contrast lo the early emphasis on practical studies LJits11gak11] in early 
Meiji, the school shifted more towards producing 'gentlemen'. Under Minister of 
Education, Mori Arinori, in 1885-1889, the 'national' aspect was stressed. By the end of 
the nineteenth century, lcliiko became a place for future national elite. D. Roden, 
Sc/loo/days in Imperial Japan, Chapter Two. 
285 Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chOsakai,' p.106. 
286 Nitobc was though• to be the best spokesman of the League to inspire ils importance to 
the world. T. Burg•· n, 'Nitobc InazCi as Under-Secretary General of the League of 
Nations, 1920-1926,' Tlze /ournal of International Studies (lnslilulc of International 
Relations, Sophia University, Tokyo), No.14 Qanuary, 1985), p.82. Nitobe took this jo.i 
as his vocation, which all his previous experience prepared him for. Nitobc to Chase, 
12 August, 1919, cited in G. Oshiro, Nitobe /nazi5, p.173. 
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He first pursued the reform of the 'national' elite when he was principal 
of Iclziko(1906-1913) by cultivating social manners. His aim was to 
present an alternative model of a mannerec' gentleman. Before his 
arrival, the mentality of masculine barbarism [ba11kara] prevailed at the 
school, especially in the athletic clubs. Against this mentality, Nitobe tried 
\\1 build a hygienic, cultural community, following the model of character-
building at British public schools.287 
Opposition was strong. Some students rebelled against Nitobe's reform in 
1909, accusing him of promoting sociality [slzakosei] as a disguised form of 
egalitarianism, and arguing that 'the Western custom of showing respect 
to women at the expense of masculinity' would lead them down 'the path 
to degeneration' .288 As Roden argues, however, Nitobe's sociality was far 
from egalitarianism. It was based on a lirm sense of social rank. He aimed 
at the reform of the manners, not the essence, of the Meiji elite, and the 
rebellion suggests that even this superficial reform caused much 
opposition. 
Beside manners, his concept of 'sociality' implied a strong element of 
social reform as public duty. Ni to be often used the words 'sociality' 
[slzakaisei] and 'social service' [slzakai hoslzi], but as one of his ~tudents 
recorded, the word s/zakai was not commonly used, and was even 
forbidden among certain conservative groups.289 The concept slzakai 
[society) bridged laissez-faire liberalism and New Liberalism.290 Although 
his emphasis was on the individual self as the basis of a collective, rather 
than on the collective itself, he was particularly aware of the need for 
287 llefcre he took up principalship at lcliiki5, Nitobc asked the Minister of Education to 
send him to Britain to study British public schools such as Eton, Rugby and Harrow. His 
favourite author was Carlyle and he wanted to be rer. ·embered among students as Dr 
Arnold. Yanaihara Tadao, Yo 110 so11keisuru ji111bi1tsu, (Iwanami shoten, 19-10), pp.199 
and 219, and D. Roden, Sc/Jool Days, p.207. 
288 D. Roden, Sc/Jooldays, pp.206-207. 
··•9 Horikiri Zenjiro rep. ed., Maeda Tam011: 50110 uUll so110 /Jito (Maeda Tamon kankokai, 
1963), p.15. . " 290 The opening speech of Nitobe for the third IPR conference suggests the influence of r. 
H. Green on his concept of the society. Nitobe I., 'Kaishiki no ji,' in Nitobe I. ed., 
T. iii e iy i5 momlai: 1929 11e11 Kyoto kaigi (Taiheiyo mondai chosakai, 1930), p.85. 
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service to the society.291 This position was different from that of other 
JCIPR members of his generation such as Ishii Kikujiro, pro-Anglo-
American diplomat. In Ishii's opinion, self-help Uijo] was most 
important, and he had little sense of social service.292 Nitobe' s position 
was also different from others w~o argued that the collective nation was 
absolute and that individuals were sub dinate to it.293 
Nitobe' s sense of the' social' came mainly from two sources: Christic.n 
humanitarianism based on his Quaker belief; and the traditio·. of the 
Meiji elite (but a 'civilized' version of gentlemen as opposed to a 
masculine and militant elite). Nitobe cultivated the idea of the Christian 
gentleman amongst his studerits, but independently from Nitobe's 
influence, a Christian sense of social justice and service was strong at the 
JCIPR due to the important position of Christianity in the international 
movement. 
lbuka Kajinosuke (1854-1940), an early member of the JCIPR, contributed 
to the development of Christianity in the Meiji period. He wrote on the 
future cf social improvement [slrnkai kairyo] in the mid-1890s. He 
opposed conservatism which, he argued, was fostered by the retrogre~sive 
[tai/wteki] Sinologist school [kangaku slmgi or sliina slwgi], and argued 
that progressive thoughts should prevail instead. He particularly argued 
the need to reform the marital relationship.294 Nagao Hanpei (1865-1936) 
was also involved with the JCIPR through the YMCA, although he 
became close to Nitobe while they were both in Taiwan as colonial 
administrators. Nagao's main contribution was to the temperance 
rnovement.295 Christian principles made all these individuals commit 
themselves to various rncial movements. By criticizing patriarchal values 
which contributed to jingoistic mertality, they must have indirectly 
modified that mentality. On the other hand, they did not challenge the 
291 Nitobe Inaz.O, Ji~ei rok11: Kokoro 110 mocllikata \Kodansha, 1982), Chapter 17. 
292 Ishii Kikujiro, Ga iko yorok11 (Iwanami shoten, · 930), pp.22 and 25. 
293 This ambiguous position of Nitobe caused much controversy and criticism by scholars 
later. Yanaihara T., Yo 110 so11keis11ru ji111b11ts11, p.210. 
294 Ibuka Kajinosuke to sono jidai kankO iinkai ed., Jbuka kaji11osuke to su110 jidai, Vol .2 
(Sangodi5, 1970), pp.393-398. 
295 Ishii Mitsuru, Na,vao Hampei de11 (Kyobunkan, 1937), Chapter 16. 
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imperial framework, and these Christian movements tended to treat 
issues as personal rather than as social. They, therefore, did r.ot match the 
urgent need of the desperate or the poor for a large scale help and reform. 
Another element of Nitobe's sense of 'social' came from being a 
government administrator. He believed in the Emperor system and the 
social order of the time, including the idea of "Greater Japan" and its 
power to serve the backward countries. He promoted these ideas at Ic/1iko 
a1·,d Tokyo Imperial University where he became Professor of colonial 
policy in 1913.296 While cultivating social manners and democratic ideals, 
he supported the existing system, and moulded national and colonial 
administrators. 
The ir,fluence of Goto Shimpei (1857-1929, and Minister for Home Affairs 
in 1916-1918 and 192? 1924) on Nitobe and other JCIPR members as a 
colonial administra•or and social reformer should also be mentioned. 
Politically Goto sided with those who wished to challenge the existing 
international order. He urged the need to ally with Russia to balance 
American aggression in China, and took a more military interventionist 
policy. The as~ociation between Goto and Nilobe began when Goto 
recruited Nitobe a> a colonial administrator in Taiwan in 1901. They both 
came from Iwate pi fecture, which provided an initial link, and later they 
became close triend~. On the surface it was r,n odd match, but on is~ues of 
social reform and cc. onial ad'l'linistration, t!ley had much in common. 
GotO was very concerned with the social welfare system, especially health 
and hygiene, and this awareness led him closer to some social 
movements, includil1g Christi<1n movements.297 Social Darwinism 
296 Nitobe lectured at Tokyo Imperial University a few times a week when he was 
principle of /ch iki5. He resigned from I clliko in 1913, and became Professor at the 
University. 
297 Nagao Hampei was said to be the meditator between the YMCA and Goto, u•lde~ 
wham Nagao worked in Taiwan. Ishii M., Nagao Ham.vei den, p.210. Guti5 became 
in•/ulved with the YMCA, and through this connection, he bec..1me acquainted with and 
admired John Molt, the leader of the Y.\1CA internationalist n1-wement. Tsurnmi 
Yosukc, Goto Sllimpei, Vol.3 (Goto Shimr.ei dcnki hensankai, 1937), pp.357:-3 '2. !fa. 
attraction to the USSR could b~ explai .•.ed by its socialist system as well as 1t.; potential 
role as a balancing force against the USA. 
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played a great role in Goto's thought. He saw the nation as a natural and 
biological being, and based on this idea, he planned a social welfare policy 
involving health insurance, city planning and colo11ial administration.298 
It was an administrator's social welfar;.; scheme, whose an .. was to 
strengthen the individual body in order to provide human industrial and 
milita1y resources for the state. Goto w2.s involved with the careers of the 
second generation of the JCIPR, many of whom were Nitobc's students. 
The tradition of state administrat:on as well as that of academia wa!'. 
strong in these JCIPR members. 
Ni to be put his ideas of the 'social' and the 'public spirit' into practice by 
being a publicisi. He wrote for many journals and newspapers and gave 
public lectures. He realized the importance of addressing the public. 
Fame, power, srmse of mission or duty may have been the ntotivation. 
For a semi-official figure, a publicist role involves the risk of becoming a 
governm~nt spokesman, rather than an independent thinker.299 On the 
other hand, it showed a certain appreciation of the public, :athr; : :.an 
distrust. 
Takagi Yasa~, one c~ the students of Nitobe, who also became a JC!PR 
member, was uncomfortable with being a publicist.300 Personality, not 
only social or political position, there.fore, could also determined the role 
of each me7~ber of the JCIPf-. 
c) Stronger Social Consciousness 
In contrast to Takagi, the other younger member:> of the JCIPR who were 
influenced by Nitobe and Goto had a stronger orientation toward~ state 
administration and publicist activities. They were Tsurumi Yilsuke, 
!v1aeda Tamon and Iwanaga YUkichi, a!l of whor:n started as state 
298 This theory s~ems to be based on biological Danvinism. Tsurumi Y., Goto Sliimrci. 
Vol.1 (Goto Shimp2i dcnki hensankai, i 937), pp.359-366. 
299 While Yoshino Sakuzo, Kiyozawa Kiyoshi and Ishibashi Ta•· zan, as academic or 
journalist, consistently critidzed military expansion to the continent, the semi-0Cficial 
status of Nitobc and. the JCIPR members made them compromise on their international 
coooerat:onist position. Nakami M., 'T~iheiyo monc!ai chosakai,' p.118. 
300 s'..ito M. et ai ed., Amerika seisilin o motomete, pp.25 and 80. 
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administrators. Maeda (1884-1962) was a public servant and a delegate for 
the ILO in 1923. He was fascinated by Nitobe's speeches ~nd, with 
Tsurumi, became the most enthusiastic follower. Maeda described how 
Nitobe told him to become a social educationalist [shakai kyoikuka], and 
this idea directed his life.301 
Tsurumi (1885-1973), an author and politician, was also an enthusiastic 
follower of Nitobe, who also helped his marriage to a daughter oi Goto 
Shimpei. T~urumi was fascinated by Wilsonian ideals, and formed the 
Uirnson k11rabu [Wilson Club] in 1915. The core of this club consisted of 
st1!dents and old boys from the Debating Club of Ic/z iko,302 and it included 
many later m~mbers of the JCIPR. Tsurumi was a born publicist. From 
his Ic!ziko days onward, his eloquence was famous. He h~d confidence 
and mannerisms which enabled him to socialize wlih Americans and 
British at over:;eas occasions including IPR conferences. He made a speech 
on contemporary Japan at the Institute of Politics at \'Villiamstown in 
1924, participated in IPR conferences in 1925-1936, and delivered public 
lectures in the USA, Britain and Australia. His relaxed manner, however, 
did not guarantee trust in the 1930s when he was seen more as a 
governmental spokesman than as an independent thinker.303 
His proposal of New Liberalism [s/zin jiyaslmgi] in 1924 represents a 
transition:il position of international cooperationists in their attituc'.cs to 
social reform, nation and the international order. B,::;ed on this principle, 
he formed a new political party called Meiseito 304 and the New Liberalism 
301 iforikoshi Z. rep. ed., Maeda Ta111011, p.14 
302 The spenkers included politicians suc,1 ~s Matsuoka Yosuke and Ashida Hitoshi, 
businessmen such as Inoue junnosuke and Kuroka\•.'a Shinjiro, novelists such as Arishima 
Takeo and ~him;:zaki Toson, journalists such as Iwanaga Yilkkhi ;rnd Tokutomi Soho 
and academics. T11e members and speakers included JCIPI'. mc;nbers such as Inoue, 
Iwanaga, Nagao am! Royama Masamichi (still a high school student in 1915). This duo 
lasted al least until 1929. Kitaoka Toshiaki, 'Tsurumi Yi!Suke san nc- omoide: Kayokai o 
chib:ln toshite,' in Kitaoka T. ed., Yii}o 110 /Jito T:;1mmli Yc;;uke se11sei (Kamakura 
insatsu, 1975), pp.60-65. 303 Interview with Bill Holland, at Amherst, Mass, 19 March, 1993. 
304 Tsurumi Yusuke Papers include the cb:wncnts on Meiseito, but were no• available in 
time for refcrenr.~ for this thesis. I tl.a1~k Prnfcssor Tsurumi Kazuko lei \Ji vi"j m~ 
permission to look at tile document, ;)lid Professor Ito Takashi who showed me the 
contents of \he documents. 
.--·. 
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Association [Shin jiya slmgi kyokai] (1928-), of which Nib.he became a 
chairman. He urged the need to establish lib•2ralism as a middle road 
ideology betv•een conservativ'" and communist forces. His liberalism was 
not the old laissez-faire iiberalism, but the New Liberalism of T. H. 
Green.305 He argued the importance of the individual personality, but 
insisted that it should also contribute to society as .i ·wlzo!e.306 He 
admitted that in accepti:-ig the importance of state in'.2rvention to protect 
working class interests, New Liberalism was close to socialism,307 and 
argued that this new development had occurred because of the emergii:'.g 
politicai consciousness among working classes and women. He saw that 
this new force was partially embodied by the universal male franchise.308 
Tsurumi sensed not only the positive side of these movements, but also 
the danger. He thought that social reform was needed to protect and 
strengthen the na,ion-state against these movements.309 
Reforms reflecting the needs of the society are the best way to 
protect the nation. A healthy movement to challenge the status 
quo is the only way to preserve the liie of the nation. The [recent] 
prevailing mentality in Japan to challenge the status quo is the 
e:,Fression of the self defence instinct of the Japanese nation.31° 
Th~ influence of Goto's idea of the nation-state as a biological being is 
strong in this argument which Tsurumi wrote in 1928. This was the year 
of the first general election based on the universal male franchise, in 
which he was elected as a Diet member.311 
305 Tsurumi Y., 'Shin jiyil shugi no tachiba yori,' Kaizo, Vol.10, No.5 (May, 1928), p.26. 
306 Tsurumi Y. C/1 il:l o o ay1111111 kokoro, (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.86-87. 
307 Ibid., p 105. 
308 Ibid., p.277. 309 Tsurumi argued fer universal female franchise because he thought that the half of the 
population of the nation were women and that franchise would make women's national 
sense stronger and clearer. Tsurumi Y., 'Joshi kllminkcn fuyo ni tsuite,' Toslzi 
mondai, Vol.7, No.3 (September, 1928), pp.13-14. 
310 Ibid., p.279. , . . .. 311 He campaigned for the election in 1926--1928, and also promoted Ethics m Poht1cs 
Movement' with Goto, Sawayanagi, Nagao and others. Nempyo [Chronicle], in Kitaoka 
T. ed., Yiijo no liito, p.370. 
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The principles of New Liberalism led Tsurumi to question the 
international status quo, and to become closer to Asianism. He applied 
the principle to international politics and stated that big powers should 
not oppress small countries.31 2 He saw inequality between 'Caucasian' 
races and coloured races,31 3 and argued that peace for Britain, the USA. the 
USSR and France was to preserve their benefits, but that 'real' peace v •. ' · 
not come until Japan achieved 'justice' by abolishing these countries' 
racial discrimination and unfair tariffs.314 Here, Tsurumi' s perspective, 
based on awareness of the new forces in the domestic and intP.rnational 
context, moves very close to Konoe's thesis of 1918. 
Iwanaga YUkichi (1883-1939) was another international cooperationist, 
who eventually contributed to strong national institution building. 
Iwanaga's involvement with internationalists started in his Iclziko days 
through his association with Tsurumi, Maeda and later Nitobe. After 
working under Goto Shimpei in the South Manchurian Railway 
Company and the Ministry of Railways, Iwanaga became aware of the 
need to establish a national news agency.315 The idea was based on the 
recognition of the importance of the public opinion and the media,316 and 
strengthened by observations of the ways that Japanese policies and anti-
J apanese movements in the USA were reported. He felt the need to 
change the domination of foreigners in reporting the events overseas in 
Japan, and JapanP.se events overseas. The establishment of a Pational 
news agency became his obsession. 
Born in a very wealthy family, money does not seem to have been the 
main object of this business. He lost substantial sums, and his property 
was reduced to pay off the debt. Probably his sense of public service to the 
312 Tsurum; Y., C' -.1;; o ~yu11111 kokoro, p.89. 
313 Ibid., p.329. 
314 Tsurumi Y., 'Ko,.·.1s .• heiwa to kokumin sci),.;,' Toyokcizai shimpi5, No.1553 Oune, 
1933 ), p.21. 
315 Toshino Inosuke ed., /wanaga Yak1clii kun (Iwanaga Yi!kichi kun denki hensan iinkai, 
19-11), pp.163-166 and 242. Overseas news had been controlled by British Reuters, _and 
Japanese news agencies had to pay substantial sums of money to Reuters to get foreign 
news. Iwanaga fought for a more equal deal with Reuters, and was convinced of the need 
for a strong national agency, based on the model of American Associated Press. 
,-6 /b.d ··6--9 ~.. I ., PP·"' :>. 
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'nation' played the most important part in this movement. It was 
seconded by the government policy of media control, which inevitably 
oppressed individual freedom of expression. Eager to publicize a' correct' 
understanding of Tapan, Iwanaga did not see the danger of totalitarian 
control of the media.317 
Social reform consciousness became much stronger amongst the next 
generation in the JCIPR and was expressed particularly strongly by Royama 
Masarnichi (1895-1965). He was ten years junior to Tsururni, but they 
were acquainted through the Debating Club of lcl1iko, where old boys 
socialized extensively with current students. Also through this club, he 
was involved with the Shi11ji11kai [the New Men's Society] (founded in 
1918). He was more inspired by English social democracy than Marx-
Leninism, which was predominant in Shi11ji11kai in the 1920s.318 His 
concept of social reform originated from his awareness of the new forces 
of dernocracy,319 but as an elite academic of public policy Royama, saw 
reform from the administrator's point of view. It was anti-socialist 
revolution,320 and this reformism led him dos·~ to Kanae. 
The actual connection between Royama and Kanae was established in 
1934 when Iwanaga suggested that Royama and Ushiba Tomohiko (1901-
1990) acc>mpany Kanae on a pr,\•ate trip to the USA. Iwanaga was 
convinced that they could help Konoe with their expert knowledge.321 By 
then, younger JCIPR members such as Royama, Ushiba and Matsumoto 
Shigeharu (1099-1989), had been working on Manchurian issues at Tokyo 
seiji keizai ke11kyii5/10 [Tokyo political and economic research centre] 
(fom:ded in 1930). This organization later became the core of the Showa 
Resean.:h Association, a brains trust of Konoe.322 
17 He worked for the consolidation of newspapers and agencies. He was surprised to sec 
the strong opposition frcm local newspapers. Ibid., p.21.\--218. 
318 H. D. Smith II, Japan's First Student Radical;, pp.74 .ind265. 
319 Roya!lla Masamichi, Ni/ion seiji doki5ro11 (Koyo shoin, 1933), pp.1-7. 
320 W. M. Fletcher lll, The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar 
/,;pan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp.15, 18, 23 and 36. 
321 Ogata S., 'Kokusai shub>i dantai,' p.399. 
322 The nature of Showa kenky a<a i was complicated. It contained not only reformists who ~:med at national socialLl scheme,, but also many others of different interests. Sakai 
Saburo, 'Showa kenkyiikai no higeki,' B1111gei slnmja (October, 1964), p.237. 
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The influence of the Association indicates the degree of the sense of crisis 
in the last half of the 1930s. It was a policy advisory body of' experts' of the 
sort, which Zimmern advocated for international organizatic,11s. Konoe 
felt the need of such a body, which was free from the everyday routine of 
bureaucrats. The bureaucrats protested strongly against Konoe's move to 
rely on these expert bodies, but the influence of such bodies, especially the 
Showa Research Association on Konoe's policies was t!vident in 1938-
1940.323 
The schemes the association proposed were national socialistic in many 
ways. Its economic section suggested the need for a state controlled 
economy and a strong sense of 'public responsibility' by private companies 
in the time of a 'crisis'.324 After 1937 when Japan embarked on the total 
war with China, this 'crisis' meant the war. Royama worked on political 
reform schemes. Inspired by guild socialism and Fascist schemes in 
Germany and Italy, he argued that in a time of political and social crisis, 
society needed a strong central state power for reform325 His ideas were 
reflected in the formation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association 
[Taisei yokusankai] in Konoe's New Order [Shin taisei] movement. 
Royama's arguments downplayed the imporlr.nce of individual treedom 
and the political ability of the people. 
Members of the Showa Research Association did not think their 
'revolutionary' reform proposals would challenge the national polity, 
which they interpreted as the emperor system. Their schemes were 
promoted not only by Konoe, but kakus/zin bureaucrats. They were 
opposed by business and certain military sections,326 and failed in the end 
of 1940.327 
323 Ibid., p.108. 
324 Nakamura Takafusa, 'Ryii Shin taro to tosei kcizai,' Ch iio koro11: Rekislli to ji11/mtsu 
(April, 1974), p.71-72. 
325 W. M. Fletcher Ill, The Search for a New Order, pp.35, 52, 57 and 86-137. 
326 Business circles accused Ryil's schemes as being communist because the schemes 
suggested separation of capital and management and restrictiun of profit. Nakamura T., 
'l' - Sl · t .- ' 73 Certain ri••ht-witw factions also alleged that the fo•;;ialion of the one 
,yu 1111 ato, P· · · " 0 · r · l 
l
·t· I . ·t 111 by tli" New Order movement would 111 nngc t 1e suprcm•' party po 1 tea sy~ c ~ 
207 
This demonstrates that more social reform orientation meant a stronger 
national, or more precisely, state orientation. Conscious of tl,e problem of 
balancing the welfare of individuals and the strength of the nation-state, 
nevertheless they adopted a strategy of reform favouring government 
needs ahead of the population's needs. In this sense, they were statist, 
rather than nationalist. Their reforms were more likely to produce a 
totalitarian government and society than a social democratic one. The 
crucial dividing line between these two modes was the balance of the 
emphasis between the state and individuals. The balance was decided by 
the magnitude of a sense of crisis. But it was this sense of great crisis that 
brought younger JCIPR members into policy maki 'g positions. Those 
identified with the state as members of the national elite felt the need to 
create a strong nation in order to prf)tect the 'nation' against domestic 
democratic forces and against othP.r imperial forces, but this strong 
'nation', in turn, suppressed individual human rights both in Japan and 
in Asia. A few members, such as Takagi Yasaka, remained uncomfortable 
with this strong reform-orientation at the JCIPR.328 These less reform-
oriented JCiPR members remained ineffective in mobilizing social 
movements or influencing policy makers. 
d) Reform of the International Order 
On external issues, Royama did not simply attack the existing 
international order. Instead, he emphasized regional pMticularity, not 
because of the nature of the region, but because of the' crisis'. In the crisis 
of democracy, he argued, particular adaptations were needed for particular 
right of the emperor, and therefore would be against the Meiji Constitution. Ito T., 'Shin 
taisci undo to wa nanika,' C/J ao ki5ro11: Ifrkis/Ji to ji11b11ts11 (April, 1974), p.4~. 
327 The Showa Research Association was suppressed and d:isolvcd. Tsurumi S., Te11ki5 
kenkyiL p.174. and W. M. Fletcher Ill, Tile Searc/J for a New Order, p.151-153. On the 
suppression of socialist clement at the Showa Research Association, sec Chalmers 
Johnson, All /nstai:ce of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and t11e Sorge Spy .Ring (Stanford: 
Stanford Univc1sity Press, 1990, first published in 1964). 
328 Although Takagi felt the need to tackle domestic issues, r.1thcr than international 
issues in the mid-1930s, hew.;~ not actively involved with S l;nwa kenkyiika i because of 
his dishl.c of the orientation of reformers. Saito M. ct al ed., /w1erika seisliin c 
motomete, p.80. 
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regions.329 He took two steps to reach the theory of the New Order in 
Eastern Asia: First, he argued that the particularity of the region was 
compatible with the existing international order: Second, he emphasized 
that the particularity of the region could become universal, and therefore, 
challenge the existing order. 
The first view was represented by a recommendation to the Lytton 
Commission on Manchuria (1932), in which Royama pointed out the 
limits of the existing international system for dealing with issues in 
Eastern Asia. He argued that: 'international law assumed modern na .ion-
states, therefore, had limits in application', and that 'in order to fill this 
gap, a new international law was needed' .330 The new system was 
regional law, and based on this argument, he proposed regional 
diplomatic machinery for the 'Far East', a regional League of Nations. The 
argument sought to justHy the position of Japan in Manchuria, yet to be 
compatible with and complementary to the League. 
His second view was presented in his book, Tea to sekai [Eastern Asia and 
the world] (published in 1941). Extending the geopolitical argument of 
1932, his proposals now challenged the existing internal'.onal order.331 
This argument provided the theoretical backbone for the New Order in 
Eastern Asia. Roy am a' s arguments were deliberately differentiated from 
those of Asianism, which had a stronger racial emphasis:332 firsc, he 
denied Japan's cultural and racial identity with the rest of Asia; second, he 
opposed the nationalist movement in China.333 Instead, he emphasized 
universality and scientific objectivity, by clarifying that regional 
particularity existed not only in East Asia, but also in other parts of the 
world. In East Asia, Japan had to establish a new order which would be 
based on a regional community and transcend nationalism (Chinese 
nationalism and European imperialism). 
329 Royama M .. Ni/ion seiji di'koron, p.6-7. 
330 Milani T., Taisho demokurasllfron, p.237. 
331 l/Jid., p.256. 332 Miwa Kimitada, Ni/ion; 1945 11e11 110 sl1ite11 (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 198!\), 
pp.155-158. 
333 MilaniT., Taisho der11ok11rasl1lro11, pp.256-257. 
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Unlike Royama, Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) used race/ culture as a key for an 
ideology for the New Order in East Asia.334 Much later than JCIPR 
members, Miki was recruitec! to Showa Kenkyiikai in 1938 to lead a 
cultural study group. The group was founded to cor . .;truct a universal 
theory which would transcend capitalism, communism and 
totalitarianism.335 
Miki's arguments for Japan to identify with the Orient [Toyo] in opposition 
to the 'West' can be categorized as Asianist. This concept of the Orient :i.0d 
the Oriental Century [Toyo no seiki] contrasted markedly with Arr.erkan 
invention of the Pacif'c and the Pacific Age, as a synthesis of 'East' and 
'West'. Arguing the need to add histo1 :al meaning to a concept in order 
to make it work,336 he gave new meaning to the terms "Orient", 
"Japanism" [Nilzon shugi] and "cooperative body"337 [kyodotai]. In this re-
inventirn, historically specific intellectual trends, such as anti-
in. lism and anti-materiaiism, also common in either countries, 
we _ •• efined as' essentially Japanese' ,338 While appropriating European 
scl.J:ars' arguments,339 in his work on New Japan [shin Ni/1on], he 
defined the current problems such as class conflict, disastrous capitalism 
and selfish liberalism, as created by Europeans. He emphasized the 
334 Miki is more often described as a Ma· ;ist who died in prison, but he was also an 
architect of the new order in Eastern Asia. In the time when silence was the only means 
of resistance against the war involvement, he was 'contemptuous of those silent people'. 
By taking a 'positive' action, Miki was resisting against the war. Shimizu lkutaro, 
'Miki Kiy<>shi to Showa kcnkyilkai,' Ch ai5 ki5ro11: I<ckislii to ji111b11ts11 (April. 1974), p.63. 
335 Ibid., p.59. 
336 Miki Kiyoshi, 'Shin Nihon no shiso genri, Zokuhcn,' in Miki Kiyoshi, Miki Kiyosld 
ze11>li;:;, Vol.17 (lwanami shuten, 1968),pp.535-536. 
337 Naji ta and Harootunian use the translation "cooperativism" for ky i5d i5 slrngi. T. 
Najita and H. D. Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt against the West: Political and 
Cultural Criticism in the Twentieth Century,' in I'. Du us ed., Tiie Cambridge I listory of 
,Tapa11, Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, first published in 1988), 
p.738. Because Miki's kyi5di5tdi was a synthesis of gemcinshaft and gesellshaft, I use 
the translation of "coopr>rative body" for kyodotai. 
338 Shimizu I, 'Miki Kiyoshi to Showa kcnkyilkai,' p.63. Similarly, intellectuals of the 
Kyotu school did not create the ideology to support mi!il"ry expansion and domesti~ 
fascist orientation, but they reflected the general pul:hc mental trend, sec Takeuchi Y., 
'Kindai no chokoku', p.412. A similar trend in making 'japancs' 1css' was seen in 
literature. Ibid., pp.387, 409-Hl and 421-122. 
339 They included Ferdinand Tocnnies and Alfred Rocco. 
superiority of the Orient over Europe,340 and argued the arrival of an 
"Oriental Century" in which the Orient should pursue a new order, 
transcending these problems.341 The Orient should unite in order to 
achieve this new order,342 and Japan had a special mission to lead the 
order.:43 
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The new order was ba~.;d on the 'Oriental' concept of" cooperativism" 
[kyOdoshugi]. In this argument, the contrast between the individua! and 
the whole VJas sha12ly drawn. Miki condemned 'liberalism' which he 
interpreted as individualism and selfishness.344 But he argued that 
"cooperativism" did not deny individual freedom. The national polity 
was also seen as the basis of, rather than as an obstacle to, cooperativism. 
A sense of public benefit [k 0eki] was the key to achieving the crucial 
balance between the whole [zen tai] and individuals, and between the 
international community and nation.345 His cooperativism, in many 
senses, had much in common with New Liberalism. 
Miki differed from JCIPR members at Showa Kenky iikat in his strong 
identification with the Orient. While Miki's works were read by many 
JC IPR members,346 and the influence of Miki' s concept of kyOd otai 
[cooperative body] was evident in Royama's concept of a regional 
community, JCIPR members were ambiguous in their position towards 
the Orient. Their scope was more focused on il Euro-American audience. 
Syl'lbolically Miki remained outside of the JCIPR. 
Miki's Asianism, however, did not differ much from visions of 
international cooperationists in its failure to see the exploitive 
relationship between Japan and other countries in Asia. Miki argued that 
a cooperative body in the Orient could be achieved only by th'~ realization 
of comr:1onality of J.1panP$<: and Chinese culture, and that Japan should 
340 Miki~(., 'Shin Ni. >n no shisi5 gcnri,' in Miki K., Miki Kiyoslii ze11s/1a, Vol.17 
l!wanami shotcn, bua), pp.514 -516. 
:;4l Ibid., pp.512-513. 
342 Ibid., p.509. 
343 Ibid. pp.528-529 and :..~-0-~33. 
344 Ibid. p.52-1. 
345 Ibid. p.520. 346 Miki K., 'Shina jihcn no sckaishitcki igi,' dated August 19'.''\, TYB, 57 / 43, ACTU. 
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not obstruct the Chinese movement to unite China.347 The point paid 
scant regard to reality. Miki must have known that China had not 
accepted Japanese leadership in the region and had been fighting against it. 
Like Konoe's thesis of 1918, Miki's Asianist argument was ambiguous 
about the nature of 'leadership'. By dismissing Chinese resistance and not 
questioning Japanese s11periority, Miki ultimately provided a logic to 
support the imperialistic war. 
vi) Continuity 
Japan's withdrawal from the League did not change the nature of the 
activities of the international cooperationists. In 1933, the League of 
Nations Association was renamed as Japan International Association (JIA) 
[Nihon kokusai kyokai]. In order to strengthen internationalist bodies as 
Iwanaga insisted, the JCIPR became a part of the JIA in 1935. The JIA 
continued cooperation with the international Lea .. ~..ie oi !'fotions 
Associations, and JCIPR members maintained th~:r link with the IPR. 
IPR conferences became increasingly important as stages for their publicity 
especially after Japan's withdrawal from the League. The duty of JCIPR 
members wa::. to inform the world of the 'Japanese perspective' and 
'correct' world understanding of the Japanese position and Japanese 
culture. They were involved with other international-oriented publicist 
associations, such as the I:1tern,,tional Culture Promotion Association 
[Kokusai bunka s!:inkokai] and the Japan Institute [Nihon bzrnka kaikan]. 
The latter was founded at the Rockefeller Centre in New York in 1938 in 
order to deal with the worsening public opinion in the USA.348 Maeda 
Tamon became Director, and brought 20,000 books on Japan with him. He 
remained in New York until he was detained at Ellis Island in 1941. 
Mainly through IPR connections Maeda tried to cultivate Japanese studies 
with a focus on 'culture'. Public hostility against Japanese adion, 
347 !.1iki K., 'Shin Nihon no shiso genri,' pp.510 and 518. 
348 Maeda recorded that the model of this institute was the British Council ai.d its aim 
wa;; to provide materials for serious Japanese studies, not for propa<;ation. Horikiri Z. 
rep. ed., Maeda Tam011, pA7. 
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however, was strong.349 Reflecting this general hostility in the USA, the 
ISIPR also took a stronger stance advocating anti-Japanese intervention in 
China. The JC.IPR withdrew from IPR' s international activities in 1939,350 
and did not return until the 1950s. 
Although the nature c,f their activities did not change after 1933, their 
emphasis was increasingly on the region, not on the international 
community. At the time of rhe merge between the LNA and the JCIPR, 
Ishii Kikujiri5, Chairman of the JIA, emphasized the importance of the 
Pacific region in international politics.351 The emphasis of the JCIPR was 
apparent at IPR conferences. A reform of the League system b;ised on an 
argument similar to Royama's was presented by the JCIPR members as a 
paper, 'A Security Pact for the Pacific Area', at the IPR conference at Banff 
in 1933.352 
Although presenting the theoreticnl biickbone of the Greater East Asia Co-
prosperity Sphere, most JCIPR members remained uncomfortable with 
tri.::'r identification with the Orient. Their focuses remained m1 Europe 
and the :..TSA, and their publicist activities continued until 1942. Even in 
1941, Takagi tried to bring about peace negotiatk>nS between Konoe and 
Roosevelt.353 Many pre-war members of the JCIPR coof•?rated with the 
war-time administraticn, and were purged from public office in 1947-1950 
for their activities. Soon after the purge was lifted, they resumed their 
'international' activities, working for the !LO, UNESCO and the United 
349 Horikiri z. rep. ed., Maeda Tam on, pp.47-19, Saito M. cl. al. eds., Amerika seisliin o 
motomctc, pp.lB-79, and W. Cohen, Hirai Alsuko Irons.,' Ajia mondai to Amcrika 
minkan danlai,' in Hosoya C. cl al eds., Nicliibei ka11kei slli: Kaisen 111 itaru junen, 
Vol.3, pp.421-122. 
350 See Chapter Six for the discussion of this incident. 
351 Ishii K., ''iaiheiyo mondai chOsakai lono gappei ni tsuite,' Knk11sai clzislliki, Vol.15, 
No.12 (Dr.ember, 1935), p.80. 
352 The draft was wrillcn by Takayanagi Kenzo. Takagi Yasaka and Yokota Kisaburo, 'A 
Security Pact for the Pacific Arca', in 13runo Lasker anu \'./. L. Holland eds., Problems of 
tlie Pacific, 1933: Economic Co11flict and C.mtrnl (Landan: Oxford University Press, 1934), 
pp.441-450. 
353 T<ikagi recorded that the plan faiicd because of •he opposition of the Slate 
Department of the USA. Saito M. ct al ed., :\merika scislzin o motomctc, pp.8~3. 
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N r 354 th · · 
' a 10ns, or ey agam contnbuted to promoting Japanese-American 
relations.355 While the JCIPR began to endorse Asian nationalism after 
WWII, most of these p:.>war members had withdrawn from the JCIPR by 
that time. 
354 Royama was purged in 1947-1950, and started to work for UNESCO in 1952. Maeda 
was also purged in 1946-1950, and the.n worked for the !LO from 1950 and UNESCO from 
1952. Nasu Shiroshi (1886-1982) was purged in 1947-1950, but started to work for the 
!LO, UNESCO and the United Nations from 1951. 
355 Matsumoto ShigehaT'~ was purged until 1950. His contribution to promute japai.esi:-
American relations was noted by his efforts to establish the International House in 
Tokyo and various other activities. Takagi contributed to Japanese American relations 
by promoting American studies. As part of these activities, he also wrote Towards 
I11ternaticf'11U11dersta11di11gin1953. 
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Chapter Four: Opening: The Experiment of the IPR in 1925-1927 
While the previous two chapters focuseci on the National Councils of the 
IPR in the USA, Australia and Japan intellectually and institutionally, the 
next three chapters will examine the process of institutionalization of the 
IPR as the first International Non-Governmental Organizations (!NGO) in 
the Pacific. The theme of these chapters is to demonstrate the historicity 
of the main concepts of these organizations, 'international' and 'non-
governmental'. The main questions in the following chapters, therefore, 
are: What was meant by 'international' and 'non-governmental' when 
those involved in the IPR used these terms?; and how did these ideas 
affect the institutionalization of the IPR? 
The first half of this chapter focuses on the conferences as experimr1ntal 
'laboratories', and the second half examines the process of the 
institutionalization of the IPR. The chapter demonstrates the new 
opportunities of the Pacific Age, and suggests the problems of its 
'internationality' and 'non-governmentality' inherent in the IPR's 
original setting. The final two chupters will then focus on visions and 
policies of a few key figures of the International Secretariat of the IPR 
(ISIPR). Their interpretations of 'international', 'non-governmental' and 
the 'Pacific' were debated within the IPR, and these ideas ultimately 
shaped the Institute's prewar operations. 
1) The Experiment of the First Two Conferences 
i) Ideals 
Around three o'clock on 30 June, 1925, the opening session of the first IPR 
conference started at a lecture theatre of the Punahou School in Honolulu. 
Frank Atherton addressed a crowd of over 100. The audience came from 
Australia, China, Canada, K>rea, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines and 
the USA. Return travel by ship to Honolulu from Yokohama, Sydney or 
San Francisco took almost two weeks, and the conference itself lasted two 
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weeks. The audience was, therefore, drawn from the minority of the 
society who could afford time and money. Another distinct feature of the 
people at the Punahou School was that they were not official 
representatives from the govemm2nts. They were 'a small select group of 
people of influence in fornung pt!t;!: ·~;-'.;.'.,. t'.1 
To these people, Atherton stated his view af the 'international 
community': 
There must be a growing consciousness of responsibility for the 
progress and welfare of all nations. Those living in a community 
ha1:2 come to recognize tilat each man has his contribution to 
make to the whole .... Thus it seems logical to maintain that each 
nation has its contribution to make to the family of nations and 
each should take <:n active and constructive part in working out 
that plan which shall be for the welfare of all. 2 (emphasis added) 
The emphasized words show Atherton's basic understanding of the world: 
the world as the family of nations; and duty of the component parts to 
contribuid•the welfare of the world as a whole. Like Woodrow Wilson, 
Atherton extended the idea of the welfore of society as a whole beyond 
national boundaries, and promoted th~· welfare of the 'international 
community'. In his statement, almost no distinction was made between 
individual components and national components. Each man and each 
nation should contribute to the welfare c;f the whole. 
Atherton emphasized particularly the public duty of individuals, and 
argued that it should not be confined to public servants or the 
government officials. 
More and more we have come t.:> recognize that public office is a 
public trust, and that service for the welfare of the city, state or 
nation is paramount to personal power or aggrandizement.3 
1 'History and Org:mization,' in [The IPR ed.], I11stitute of Pacific Relatio11s: Ho1iol11/11 
Session, ]1111e 30-Juiy 14, 1925 (Honolulu: the IPR, 1925), p.12. . 
2 F. Atherton, 'The Purpose of the Institute of Pacific Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], Institute 
of Pacific Relatio11s, 1925, p.55. 
3 Ibid. 
. 
\ 
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At the second IPR conference in 1927, a similar idea of public service for 
human welfare, not national welfare, was expressed by Ray Wilbur, 
President of Stanford University and Chairman of the Pacific Council: 
I think it is fair to say that the ultimate aim of the American 
people, viewed as a whole, is not to accumulate mere wealth and 
power to exploit the world in the development of a great 
imperialistic design, but to offer some form of world-service as its 
contribution to human welfare.4 
This was the backbone of the thinking of key figures at the IPR. While 
there was a diversity of the opinions among participants and members of 
the IPR from various countries, this idealism prevailed at the first two 
conferences. Wilson had voiced these ideas in the formation of the 
Leag'-le of Nations. A majority of participants were, therefore, Wilsonians 
in th~ sense that they shared Wilson's principle of international moral 
codes, and supported the League of Nations, although some Americans 
had reservations about American membership in the League. Idealist 
thinking was also strong among the major American contributors to the 
IPR, such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for 
Peace, and various philanthropic busines5 people.s 
As Chapter One demonstrated, these W' .. ::mians were not immune tot\-. · 
old diplomacy or Realpolitik. What they .;aw in Honolulu in 1925 and 
1927 was the possibility of new ways of operating international affairs, not 
a challenge to the existing system. They did not question the basic 
framework of colonialism or national sovereignty, but they felt the need 
~or a new way of operation witlzin it. They felt the need to reform the 
operation of foreign affairs, by c11Itivati11g pLblic opinions. Their 
weakness, as well as strength, lay in the very nature of their reformist 
stance. 
4 R. L. Wilbur,' An Interpretation of America in Pacific Relations,' in J.B. Condliffe ed., 
Problems of the Pacific: Proceedings of Ilic Second Conference of tl1c Institute of Pacific 
Relations, Honol11lu, Hawaii, ]11/y 15 to 29, 1927 (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1928), p.61. 
5 Besides Atherton, Thomas Lamont of Morgan Bank, Bernard Baruch, who was the sole 
donator for the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, and other wealthy people 
contribi•ted to the IPR. 
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ii) The Pacific Community 
The first two IPR cc;1ferences promoted the ideas of the Pacific Age, the 
Pacific community and a Pacific-centred world-view. The map attached to 
the proceedings of the second conference embodied the new perspective: 
the Pacific-centred view of the world.6 The Pacific was surrounded by tl.1e 
rim countries, and Japan and China were located not in the 'Far East', but 
in the West. Europe was too far away to appear. 
Herbert Croly, edit::ir of New Republic, who had been involved with the 
foundation of the IPR, articulated the view in 1927. The Pacific-centred 
view was the result of the power shift from Europe to the USA. 
The World War brought to an end the efficacy and the authority of 
European domination in the Atlantic .... It is profoundly 
significant that the Washington Conference of 1921, which, by 
dividing sea power between the British Empire and the United 
States, destroyed the physical basis of the traditional conception of 
the Atlantic Ocean as a liquid extension of Europe, looked in the 
direction also of a new conception of the Pacific.7 
The Pacific, as a r.~sult of this power shift, emerged as a coherent unity of 
politics and economics. 
The Washington Conference treated the Pacific, for the first time, 
as a somewhat independent political and economic area. It even 
out.lined a sketch of a Pacific regional community, which, if it 
could be realized and developed, would neutralize the Pacific 
highway as an instrument of predatory politics .... The peoples of 
the Pacific are particularly protected in theory against any further 
aggression, and in this sense they are by way of forming a 
community of political equals which are obligated to consult one 
another about their common political and economic difficulties 
and policies.B (emphasis added) 
The distinctive featare of Croly's 'Pacific society of nations' is its strategic 
orientation. Economy was mentioned a few times, but the main concern 
6 See Map I 
7 H. Croly, 'The Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' in J.B. Condliffc ed., Problems of the 
Pacific, 1927, p.580-581. 
8 Ibid., p.582-583. 
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of Croly was political association. The notion of political equals rather 
than one central hegemonic power is noteworthy. While he meant, of 
course, political equals amongst the Pacific powers, excluding colonies, 
this possibility of consultation among' equals' mirrors a similar argument 
in the literature in the post Cold War period.9 The imagined community 
of those gathered at the IPR conference was that of the Pacific powers of 
Japan, China, Russia and the USA., with the British Dominions on the 
periphery. And Croly argued that the IPR could transform this 
community from visio1 to reality: 
[The IPR']s object is to give reality to the vision of the Pacific as an 
area of positive politic~! association among the inhabitants of its 
shores, and in this respect it is, as I have said, a political novelty. It 
is not only attempting to bring into existence a new political 
community bound together by an internationalized body of water 
[The Pacific], but it is forced by its own nature to invoke for its 
purposes a method exclusively of inquiry, study, consultation 
which heretofore has never been employed successfully in order to 
create a going political concern.JO 
Although expressing the excitement at the new era of the Pacific and 
stronger sense of independence, participants from the Dominions 
remained cautious. They had to make sure that participation in this 
conference did not mean that they sought a new affiliation with a new 
Pacific power, the USA.11 They feared that the British government saw 
their activities as disloyal to the British Empire. The Dominions did not 
have discretion on foreign affairs, and Austrnlians and New Zealanders, 
feeling that they could not comment on concrete policy issues 
independently, strongly proposed that British participation in the 
conference would be crucia!.12 Their definition of the Pacific community 
was also slightly different from that of political equals defined by Croly. 
9 Works on 'middle power' in regional politics seem lo reflect this paradigm of the post-
hegemonic era. Sec, for example, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossa!, 
Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a C11u11gi11g World Order 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993). 
10 H. Croly, 'The Hi..man Potential in Pacific Politics,' p.583. . . . . 
11 j. B. Condliffe, 'New Zealand's Outlook,' in [The IPR ed.], Institute of Pac1f1c Relations, 
1925, p.91. F. Eggleston, 'The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs,' in). B. 
Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific, 192;. pA. 
12 Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA, and). B. Condliffo, 'New 
Zealand's Outlook,' p.91. 
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While the latter focused on the Orient with power, the former was equally 
concerned with the Pacific islands, some of which were Australian 
mandated territory.13 
Nevertheless, participants agreed on the need to establish regional 
diplomatic machinery, because the current system was inadequate. There 
were advantages in the region: distance from old politics of Europe. They 
argued that the existing system was inadequate because the League of 
Nations was not efficient due to the absence of two major Pacific powers, 
the USSR and the USA, and hostile attitudes in China; the Washington 
Treaty was limited in its application and function; the Dominions lacked 
discretion in foreign affairs;14 and the barrier of language and social 
organizations between 'East' and 'West' prevented better und2rstanding.1s 
Regional diplomatic machinery which could provide occasions for 
continuing negotiation and discussion at intervals was desired, and many 
felt the IPR could play the role . 
The majority felt, however, that the proposed machinery sl1ould be 
achieved within the framework of the international system, which was 
interpreted as the League of Nations. They argued that: 'There is no 
possibility of isolating the Pacific as a region for specific agreement out of 
relation to general international affairs' .1 6 The IPR sought the 
cooperation of the League, and the League also regarded the IPR positively 
and cooperated with it.17 Regional arrangements within the framework 
were, however, not a simple task. While focusing on the particularity of 
the region and the entity of the regional community, they had be 
accommodate..i in the 'universal' codes of the wider framework of the 
international system. 
13 F. Eggleston, 'The Viewpoint of Australia on Pacific Affairs,' p.8. 
14 'The Governmental Organi7.alion of Each of the Pacific Countries with Special 
Reference to Its Machinery for Handling International Affairs,' in [The IPR ed.], 
/11stit11te of Pacific Relations, 1925, p.204. 
15 On discussions concerning diplomatic machinery in the Pacif:c, sec 'Co-operation amonf; 
Pacific Countries,' in [The IPR ed.], /11stit11te of Pacific Relations, 1925, pp.136-1.38, and 
'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' in J.B. Condliffc ed .. Problems of tlze Pacific, 1927, 
pp.162-181. 
16 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' p.171. . . . . 
17 Note h E. Drummond, 6 April, 1927, Paper of Huntmgion Gilchris(, Library of Congress. 
( I owe thb document to Mr frank Moorhouse. 
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iii) The Orient 
In the Pacific community, the Oriental powers, namely China and Japan, 
were seen as' equal' partners. Probably, the IPR was one of the first 
attempts by the Americans lo deal with the Orient on an equal footing. 
The term Orient was used with various meanings. In the IPR context, it 
meant either the race, rrgion, or culture of East Asia. While Said argues 
that a certain discourse existed bet ween Euro-Americans and the others 
for the domination of the former over the latter,18 this discourse assumes 
the hierarchy of strong 'West' and weak 'East'. The argument does not 
allow for different relations such as those between Euro-American powers 
and the others with great power, among Euro-Americans with and 
without power, or mong the others with and without power. In the 
excitement of a new era, some sought new attitudes to Oriental powers, 
especially Japan. The IPR conferences became a laboratory for this 
experiment, and the documents show a much more complicated discourse 
than a simple rhetoric of Euro-American domination. 
It was Amer:cans, not Europeans, who were ahead in this expPriment. 
They were, first of all, far ahead in their curiosity. Eggleston was 
impressed with American interest in the Orient, which he felt lacking in 
Australia: 
The growing body of thought [in America] is directed to mutual 
understanding of their respective mentalities and problems .... 
This was fostered b~· heavy tourist traffic from America to Eastern 
ports. Every boat brought large parties of thinking American 
people genuinely interested in the East. There were also 
interchanges of educationalists, such as professors of economics 
and students of politics between the countries.19 
The Japanese also saw an opportunity in the Pacific Age, which the IPR, 
they thought, embodied: an opportunity to solve the prnblems of racial 
18 E. Said, Orie11ta/is111: Westem Co11ceJ1tiv11s of the Orient (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1980, first published in 1978), p.3. 
19 F. Eggleston, 'Trade in the East,' The [ Me/11v11me] Age, 12 December, 1929. I owe the 
cu pies uf this series of newspaper articles lo Dr Warren Osmond. 
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discrimination. Takagi Yasaka, a Professor of American Studies at Tokyo 
Imperial University, t:~lieved that the most important factor of the Pacific 
Age was the new trend of racial consciousness, and he saw a re:il 
possibility of a solution in the IPR. He wrote after the first conference 
with excitement: 
The Institute might be a natural product of modern civilization 
called the Pacific Age .... We have to recoEUize the .rery fact of the 
awakening of racial consciousness all over the world. We have to 
deal with it with justice and wisdom. Some called the Institute 
one of the greatest adventures of humankind. For the success of 
the Institute, one neecis ideals and courage .... I am one who 
believes that the aim of the Institute is that of the greatest 
enterprise at present, and that the Institute will make the most 
useful contribution to the human civilization at the most 
appropriate time.20 
What he had in mind was the Oriental race, especially the Japanese race, 
and what troubled him most was anti-Japanese immigration acts. Vhen 
Merle Davis, first General Secretary of the IPR (J 926-1930), was organizing 
the first conference in late 1924 and early 1925, amendment or even repeal 
of the immigration act of the USA of 1924 Has seen as a possible goal for 
the conference.21 This political aspect was, however, totally abandoned at 
the conference. The objective of the conference was to 'bring together 
accurate information' on the conditions v ~.ich would mould r pinion and 
feelir.g toward other people, and to discuss them, so that it would 'point 
the way to right actions' leading to 'unde~standing and peace in the 
Pacific' .22 And research, not political activities, on the issues of race and 
culture was given priority. 
Orientalist discourse was dominant amon:: participants in the sense that 
they saw the world in terms of an 'East' vs 'West' dichotomy. At another 
level, however, the conferences provided one of a very few occasions 
where Euro-Americans met people from the Orient and vice versa. The 
participants had a chance to deconstruct pre-conceptions and stereotypes 
20 Takagi Yasaka, 'Taiheiyo kankei chosakai no seiritsu 1•ituite,' Gaikoji/Jo, Vol 42, No. 
501 (October, 1925), p.67. 
21 Sec Chapter Two. 
22 'History and Organization,' p.14. 
through the physical environment of the conference itself, not only 
through the knowledge they gained at discussions and lei.:tures. 
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The laboratory of the personal contacts was the Punahou School, lccated at 
Manoa Valley, only five minutes by car from Waikiki Beach. The School 
had seventy acres of campus, and its equipment-dormitories, dining 
room, assembly halls, and sports facilities--was made available for the 
conference. Participants stayed in the dormitories during the two weeks of 
the conference. A participant recorded fondly that life at the School 
during the conference was like that of students. Then; was a bell around 
seven o'clock to gel up, and they went to the dining rGOT!l to eat breakfast 
around half pas~. seven. They were encouraged to sit next to someone they 
had not yet met.23 The quality of service, however, v.ras rather more than 
students could expect. They received the service of D•"osengers, 
aut0mobiles, fresh flowers and daily newspapers in each room, and 
entertainments were generously provided.24 
They mixed and talked at discussions, meals or ex~ursions around the 
island. These personal contacts with people from different countries 
excited participants. Jap<:nese participants noted the encounters 
particularly with Australians and New Zealanders, because otherwise they 
never met them.25 Although the mental paradigm of East vs West 
persisted, these contacts forced them to abandon old images and create 
new ones. Through the .:ont.:cts, the image of Japanese was re-defined 
and re-constructed. Harada Tasuku, former president of Doshisha 
University in Kyoto and Professor of Japanese History and Literature of 
the University of Hawaii,26 pJrticipated at the first two conferences, nd 
later described the atmosphere at the first conference. 
23 Hoshino Aiko, 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai ni shusseki shile,' F11sc11, (October, 1927), 
p.6. 24 J.M. Davis,' An Inside Story of the Institute' [The report of the first IPR conference], 
Wilbur Papers, 40/5, HI. 
25 Hoshino I , 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai ni shussekishite,' p.'/, Tsurumi Ynsuke, 
'Taiheiyo k<iigi chokakan,' in Inoue J unnosuke ed., Ta i/Jeiyo mondai (Ni hon hyoronsha, 
1927), p.55. Zumoto M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai ni tsuile,' Ga iko ji/Ji5, Vol.SI, No.594 
(1 September, 1929), p.53. 
26 Doshisha University had close contact with people involved al the IPR. The parents of 
Merle Davis were involved in the establishment of the university. Doshisha also had a 
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An Australian at the conference told me later that he never had 
spoken to Japanese people frankly before the conference. He had 
though~ that the Orientals had a totally different mentah:y from 
the Occidentals, but found after frank talks with them that there 
was not much difference and that they were the same human 
beings with the same mentality. There were some differences 
because they were Orientals, he said, but their kindness and 
courtesy was greater than that of Australians. From then, he had a 
totally different sentiment towards the Japanese.27 
Frederic Eggleston, leader of the Australian group at the second 
conference, recorded a similar experience with Japane-:;e. Battling with 
chopsticks and being embarrassed with a hole in his sock at a Japanese 
restaurant, Eggleston had meals with them and developed a liking for 
them: 'They don't at all give one the impression of a conquering militant 
race .... Some of the nicest and most gentlemanly members of the 
conference are Japanese'.28 
At the conferences, participants constructed images of a nation, not of 
individuals. The liberal aspects of Japanese society and politics was 
emphasized by the Japanese participants. They argued that militarism was 
dying, and that liberalism and the democratic movement was the trend. 
I have already referred to the growth of a strong, liberal tendency 
in the educational world of Japan. Such a tendency, however, is by 
no means confined to ec:ucational circles; it is observable in all 
close contact with the "Mid-Pacific Institute", a private secondary school in Honolulu, 
which was founded by the Atherton family. The contact was through "Christian 
international friendship" activities, and Harada Tasuku (1863-1940), then President of 
Doshisha, initially came lo Honolulu through this connc'Ction. Harada was invited to 
become the first chair of the Depart:nenl of Oriental Studies al the University of 
Hawaii in 1919. He moved to Honolulu in 1920. Like Atherton, he was involved with 
the Japanese American Relations Committee around 1923. Harada became active at the 
IPR in Honolulu. G. E. Allen, Bridge Builders: T/Je Stary of T/Jeadare and Mary Atl1erta11 
Ricl:ards (Honolulu: publisher unknown, 1970), pp.130 and 1+1--145. Harada Ken ed., 
Harada Tas11k11 (Ahoku insatsu, 1971), pp.498-499. 
27 Harada Tasuku, 'Taiheiyo kaigi no seishitsu,' O;aka gi11ko tsU;lli11rak11, No. 386 
(October, 1929), pp.28-29. Harada does not specify the gender of this Australian, and in 
Japanese, gender is not obvious. The Australiar members at the 1925 ccmfere~ce numb.ered 
six, including one female. judging from the fac~ he did not refer lo gender, it seems nght 
to assume that this person was male. 
28 Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. 
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fields of activity. In politics, for instance, universal manhood 
suffrage bill was passed finally this spring after twe!lty years of 
hard and constant fighting. As regards our foreign affairs, a new 
generation of diplomats with a fresh and broader outlook on the 
requirements of international life is rapidly coming to the front. 
c:>n all _hands, I 11otice unmistakable signs of the triumph of 
hberahsm over the forces of reactionary conservatism.29 
It was effective image-making. An Australian was particularly impressed 
with the liberal trend in Japan.JO However, some with intimate 
knowledge of the situation in Japan had a cautiou5 attitude to this 
oplimistic image. Merle Davis was born and brought up in Kyc'.o, and had 
spent much of his life in Japan before he b-=came involved wi\h the IPR. 
Davis warned the first Research Secretary of the IPR, J chn Condliffe, a 
New Zealand economist: 
that there were other currents of Japanese tho•1ght that were 
hostile and unapproachable-the military and naval groups and 
the great mass of nationalists. We are dealing only with a small 
English-speaking group of scholars, merchants, bankers and 
officials, most of whom had been educated in England and 
America. They were for the time bei11e; in power but were aware of 
their precarious situation and anxio· . .- rhat we should not 
misunderstand it or press them too hard.31 
Despite this awareness, a common image promoted at the IPR was of a 
liberal Japan, and of,, very clear division between liberal and reactionary 
factions. Detailed a,talysis of Japanese internationalists in Chapter Three, 
Section Two showed that the reality was much more complicated, with 
grey areas between these two camps. While participants from other 
countries soon realized that these 'liberal' Japanese were not exactly 
representative of the dominant forces, these Japanese continued to play a 
role of mediator between] a pan and Euro-American powers. 
29 Sawayanagi M., 'Japanese View of Pacific Relations,' in J.B. Condliffe ed., Problems of 
the Pacific, 1927, p.79. . . . . . . , . 
30 H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Chanb<ing East: Chinese Natwnahsm and L1berahsm 1~ Japan, m 
H. Duncan-Hall and J. n. Condliffe, What's of the Pacific?: A Searchligl1t 011 its 
Problems (Honolulu, 1925), p.8, A981; Org93, AA. 
31 J.B. Condliffc, Remii:i<rmces of the /11stit11te of Pacific Relatio11s (Vancouver, B. C.: 
University of British Columbia, 1981), p.19. 
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National groups created a particular image of their nation as a whole. 
This national image making was practiced not only by the Japanese. Ray 
Wilbur presented an image of a USA confident in its national system: 
There is a faith in the democratic ideal and a faith that the 
American form of government and general education will lead 
other countries to those advances which have meant so much in 
the life of America.32 
Those i.om the Dominions saw the cpportunity lo construct new images 
of nationhood at IPR conferences. Stephen Roberts, lecturer at the 
University of Melbourne in 1925, pronounced the emergence of the new 
Australia with a stronger sense of independence. Thuse who were 
attracted to the IPR and attended the conferences were more ready to see 
the importance of regional awareness than the rest of the society.33 
As well as constructing the images of the 'other', participants were 
defini 'b the 'self'. Significantly, the key element in this identification was 
always the 11atio11, nut the individual. It is important, therefore, to 
examine what kind. of people operated as mediators of this discu. •0 e. 
Various photos taken at the conferences show striking commonality 
among, the participants regardless of gender, race or nationality. Thdr 
clothes indicated certain social classes. Men wore single breasted summer 
linen jackets and small nea! collars, often accompanied by Panama hats. 
They probably brough' dinner jackets in their trunks for formal •..:ceptions 
and dinners. While some Japanese women wore kimonos, others wore 
the similar low waisted summer dresses, popular in the 1920s, as did 
Americans ar,d Australians. Tht·se photos seem to tell how much they 
had in common even before they left home. 
The comr .0nality in social background was also observed in 1927. 
Frederic Eggleston wrote of the sop/listication of manners and styles of the 
Oriental participants. 
32 R. L. Wilbur,' An Interprc!Jtion of America in Pacific Relations,' p~.SB a~c. 61. . 
33 They admitted, however, that interest in the Pacific was not great l~ thc1·: coun'!lcs. 5. 
Roberts,' Australian v;ew oi Facific Rek1tiuns,' in The IPR ed.), /11st1tut·: of Pacific 
Relations, 1925, p.64 -<55, ;ind). Condliffc, 'New Zealand's Outlook up.in Pacific 
Problems,' p.91. 
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They were, of cour~e, well to do. Their behaviour was perfect and 
they looked very mce people ... they conversed with the visitors in 
quite a well bred way.34 
it was a genteel co:nmunity. In the 1920s, th~ IPR was seen as a 'capitalist 
and imperialist organization' .35 Business interests were well represented 
in the early stages. Traders, ship owners and bankers shared an 
enthusiasm to promote internationalism for economic purposes. The 
American steamship owner, Robert Dollar, told Davis that 'the Institute 
worked on the same principle as his company did,' such as promoting 
better understanding and peace in the region.36 Jerome Greene, trustee of 
the Rockddlc: Foundation, executive member of the American Council 
of the IPR, and a Wall Street banker, presented a paper on 'The Role of the 
Banker in International Relations' at the second conference. 
the wide distribution of bonds representing legitimate investment 
in foreign countries tends to promote a better understanding 
between peoples, and ... a more liberal and sympathetic attitude 
toward each other's national characteristics and aspirations.37 
The IPR, however, did not exclude Labour interests. In selecting 
participants for the second conference, Edward Carter, Secretary of the 
American Council of the IPR, made it a clear policy to recruit participants 
with interests as diverse as possible, including 'capital and labor'.3B When 
British participation was decided, Carter demanded that participants 
should include Lilbour Party sympathizers.39 Accordingly, representatives 
34 Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. 
35 S. Carpenter, 'Honolulu lnst:~·i•e of Pacific Relations,' Tire Pan-Pacific Worker , 1 May, 
1928, p.8, and 15 May, 1928, pp.!Hl. Although the following Japanese article wao not 
written particularly from a socialist standroint, it described the IPR as social functions 
of 'leisured cla~s'. Watabiki Misao, 'Taiheiyo kaigi yori dattaiscyo,' Ni/ion oyobi 
Ni!tonjin, No. 226 (lune, 1931), pp.28-29. 
36 Davis lo Atherton, H October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH. 
37 j. Greene, 'The Role of the Banker in lnternati<'nal Relations,' in). B. Condliffe ed., 
Problems of tire Pacific, 1927, p.450. . 
38 Carter wrote: 'capital and labor, East and West, North and South, Jew vnd Ge:-1ttle, 
Catholic and Protestant, Universities, large national organizations interested"' . 
international affairs, together with men and women who have expert knowledge :--:1th 
reference to cultural, trade, political and missionary interests in the different Pacific 
countries'. Carter to Curtis, 2 February, 1927, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU. 
39 Carte:.· to Curtis, 11May,1927, Cf'R Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU. 
I 
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of Jabour organizations were invited to the conferences. Notable were 
Paul Scharrenberg, Secretary and Treasurer of the California State 
Federation of Labor, and Suzuki Bunji, President of the General 
Federation of Labor in Japan. They represented, however, not the socialist 
international movement, but the middle-of-the-road Jabour movement. 
The IPR inherited the line of the League of Nations, and its affiliated body, 
the International Labor Org<:onization, which provided materials on 
immigration and Jabour issues, and sent observers to the conferences. 
Although after WWII some suspected the IPR connection with the 
socialist international movement of the USSR, the IPR remained <1 
patrician organization funded mainly by big business and philanthropic 
foundations. Interest in the USSR was, indeed, expressed enthusiastically 
at the IPR from the beginning, and key figures visited the USSR to 
negotiate its involvement with the IPR (Frank Atherton in 1927, Merle 
Davis at the end of 1927, and Edward Carter in 1934 and 1936). Although 
the Soviet experiment captured intellectual fascination in various 
countries including the USA in the 1920s, and many progressive liberals 
and some communists were involved with the IPR, the IPR never took a 
Co mintern line. On the contrary, labour groups saw it as a plot of 
capitalism and imperialism. On a visit to Moscow in J 9?.8, Davis recorded 
that: 'the labor group ... pointed out certain contradictions between the 
principles of the IPR and the Third International, while the Foreign Office 
(of the USSR] people ... seemed favonrable to the idea of Russian 
participation in the IPR' .40 
Participants at IPR conferences regarded the USSR as a Pacific power, and 
did not doubt that it was important to have the USSR represented at 
conferences, so that they could discuss issues from various points of view 
with accurate information. The move to involve the USSR was pursued 
by Edward Carter, as will be discussed in the final chapter. 
At the first two IPR conferences, the main aim of some labour leaders was 
to defend the interests of national labours against foreign ones. 
40 Davis to Gilchrist, 26 April, 1928, Paper of Huntington Gilchrist, Library of Congress. 
Scharrenberg, for example, strongly defended the ar.ti-Oriental 
immigration legislation. His mission was to protect Californian labo:ir 
interests against foreign ex2loitation, rather than to promote labour 
interests beyond national boundaries. 
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Another distinct feature of the participants at the IPR conference was a 
relatively large representation of women. This was also inherited from 
the League, and differed from other foreign experts' 01ganizations such as 
: he Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International 
.\ ifairs, or other international conferences on foreign affairs such as the 
Institute of Politics at Williamstown, which were more like gentlemen's 
clubs. Some women at the IPR conferences were wives, and played 
mainly social roles. Probably the custom of accompanying one's spouse 
was due to the character of the conference: half business, half holiday, and 
also the strength of the American economy.41 Australians who paid their 
own fees mostly did not bring their spouses. Three couples were included 
among the twenty Japanese participants at the first conference, and 
eighteen at the second.42 Their husbands' fees were paid by government, 
and they probably paid a certain amount for their spouses. It was a new 
custom to bring spouses to conferences, and these women had certain 
aptitudes and interests. 
Women participants, whether attending as wives or on their own, were 
largely active in the female franchise movement and the peace 
movement.13 The two movements often joined in each country. The IPR 
41 For the second conference, Wilbur, Carter, Shotwell and Blakeslee, for example, 
brought their wives. 42 Those who came to the first conference with their spouses were lbuka Kajinosuke, 
Chairman of the National Committee of the YMCA of Japan, Tsurumi, and Takayanagi 
Kenz.O, Professor of Law at Tokyo Imperial University. For the second conference, 
Tsurumi, Takayanagi and Royama Masamichi, Professor of Politics at Tokyo Imperial 
University came with their spouses. . 43 Well known women activists were drawn to the second conference, especially from the 
USA. A"''"l ih<rn w<r"- Grace Abbott, Chief of the Children's Bureau of United States 
Department of Labor, Carrie C. Catt, Chairman of Conference on the Cause and Cure of 
War (New York), Ada Comsock, president of Radcliffe College, Mabel Cratty, General 
"ccretary of National Board of the YWCA, Mrs William G. Hibbard, .(:egional Director 
,Chicago) oi National League of Women Voters, Marry E. Wooley, President of Mount 
Holyoke College (Mass). 
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in Australia, Japan and the USA received favourable and enthusiastic 
support from these women's organizations. IPR members often addressed 
these organizations, which promoted peace, democracy and social justice. 
Male participants i11 general sympathized with women's issues such as 
female franchise. 44 Saito Soichi, secretary of thP. Japanese Council of the 
IPR and of the national committee of the YMCA, commented on the 
importance of the IPR regarding women's issues.45 
This feminist element waned from the third conference, because the 
topics alienated women participants. Women participants at the first two 
conferences felt that the issues of women were not sufficiently discussed. 
There was no paper specifically focusing on women's issues. They felt it 
important that women's issues were discussed for better und€rstanding 
and peace in the region. To achieve the goal, they organized the Pan-
Pacific Women's Conference in 1928. The first few conferences were 
organized under the Pan-Pacific Union, and later they became 
independent. Relations with the IPR remained cordial. Merle Davis gave 
a warm opening statement at the first conference in Honolulu in 1928.46 
The importance of women's participation in international affairs was 
argued at the Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1930,47 and this 
conference continues to the present day. While women members 
continued to participate in conferences and contribute to research and 
administrative works after 1928, the IPR largely bst its feminist element. 
Did a distinct internationalism emerge from business, labour or female 
representation, linking the common interests of class or gender, and 
44 Tsurumi Y., 'Joshi keminkcn fuyo nilsutc,' Toshi Mo11dai, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September, 1928), 
pp.11-16. His argument, however, was based more on the duty of service for the state 
rather than on basic individual rights. 
45 Saito S., 'Taiheivo kaigi to fujin,' F11ji11110 tomo (October, 1927), pp.6-9. 
46 M. Davis, 'The Opportunities, Limitations and Problems of the International 
Conference,' Wo111e11 of the Pacific (I-lonolulu, 1928), pp.24-25. . . 
47 Georgina Sweet, 'Women and International Relations,' Wo111e11 of the Pac1f1c, 1930 
(Honolulu: 1930), pp.335-342. Study on this Pan-Padfic Won:icn's Confcre.nce would show 
an interesting dimension of the relations of race, gender, .nat10~-~ta~c, region~~~ .. 
international community. Currently the only work on this topic is I. I-looper, 1 cm1m.sm 
in the Pacific: The Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women's Association,' The Pac1f1c 
Historia11, Vol.20, NoA (Winter, 1976), pp.367-377. Australian official documents on 
Pan-Pacific Women's Conference in 1927-1937 arc in the file of A981; Conf 232, AA. 
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overcoming nation-state boundaries or Orientalist discourse? Although 
the interests of the participants varied widely at the first two conferences, 
they tended to push a similar middle-of-the- road line, rather than 
developing distinct identity groups. This might have been the result of 
lhe selection method. Edward Carter, Secretary of the American Council 
of the IPR, argued that important criteria for the selection of participants 
V1ere not tht:ir specif.~ ideology or background, but their temperament 
and manner. Participants should be non-confrontational and able to carry 
on logical discussion.48 
Another element restricted the type of participants: language. In contrast 
to the eloquence of the Chinese, the poor English of the Japanese was 
noted.49 This was also noticed at other international conferences such as 
the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Conforence.50 Probably 
Tsurumi was almost the only one who felt totally coniident. Although 
his English was not particularly good,51 as an ex-member of the Debating 
Club at Iclziko, the most prestigious high school in Japan, he had the 
aptitude, confidence and the manner required for the occasion overseas.5: 
Others were more reserved, less confident or less comfortable in using 
English. 
Those who could operate in a foreign language environment were very 
few in Japan, and they were much in demand. 
[T]here are comparatively few men in Japan equipped to fill posts 
which have to do with [the] conduct of relations with toreign 
48 Carter was convinced that this conference method would work. He noted: 'The whole 
technique o! the discussion cultivated the frank expression of varying points of view, 
induced an altitude of search and inquiry and a common pooling of all possible resources 
of foci ~nd opinion'. Carter to Rockefeller, 26 August, 1926, LSRM/lll-2-N/ 47 /376, RA. 
49 Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Changing East,' p.7. 
50 Matsuoka Yosuke, a diplomat, was deeply disappointed by the poor language skills of 
the Japanese delegation al Paris Peace Conference. Miwa Kimilada, Matuoka Yosuke 
(Chra kOronsha, 1971), p.56-57. Shibusawa Eiichi also regretted that there was no 
Japanese delegate at the Washington Conference, who could correspond to the 
counterparts of other countries with good English. Shibusawa Masahide, Taiheiyo ni 
kakeru /1ashi: Sllibusawa Eiiclli no shegai (Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1970), p.388. 
51 Matsumoto Shigeharu, S/J owaslli 110 icllishegen ;Mainichi shinbumsha, 1986), p.24. 
52 His record on the second conferences shows his conlidence. Tsurumi Y., C/J ill o o ay11111u 
kokoro (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.497-199. 
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co~ntries. Naturally such men are required for various positions 
o~ importance and very high treatments are accorded to them (sic) 
either as.gov~rnment officials or as representatives of private 
corporat10ns.03 
A Japa!lese participant at the second conference noted not only the 
disadvantage of those who were not eloquent in English at the conference, 
but also the type of people who operated in the medium of English. 
The existence in China, rough! y speaking, of these two sets of 
leaders, one communicating with Japanese leaders in the Chinese 
or Japanese language, and the other coming in contact with the 
rest of the powers through the medium of English is a plain fact; 
but this fact should not be overlooked, for it sometimes implies a 
great deal more than the simple difference in the medium of 
expression; it involves two sets of philosophies and perhaps two 
different lines of approach to their national problems.54 
The conference language was English, and this was a distinct feature of 
IPR conferences in comparison with other Pacific-oriented multinational 
conferences, such as the Pan-Pacific Science Congress (PPSC). At the PPSC, 
a debate existed whether French should also be considered as conference 
language.SS The dominance of English at the IPR was probably because of 
the American initiative of the IPR, the influence of American 
missionaries among the participants from the region, and the initial Jack 
of participation from continental European powers and their colonies. 
The League of Nations, located in the middle of Continental Europe, 
operated both in English and French and the priority of the latter was 
much greater th<m at the IPR. At any rate, in both conferences of a 
regional focus, not to mention the League, the use of other language:; such 
as Chinese never came into consideration. 
S3 Komatsu lo Davis, 31August,1928, E-13/10, AUH. 
S4 'Diplomatic Relations in the Pacific,' p.167. . . 
SS A. P. Elkin, Pacific Science Association: Its History and Role rn Intematwnal 
Cooperation (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1961), p.30. It is interesting lo note that ~n 
adamant supporter for making English a conference language was the Japanese, Sakurai 
Jaji, Vice-President of the National Research Council of japan a.nd a Member of th<; 
House of Peers. This was interpreted as his quest for the estabhshmenl of the dominance 
of Japanese scientists who were eaucate? at ~ritis~ .universities .. U.ntil then,, Germ~n 
educated scientists were more dominant m universities and assoaal1ons of sciences m 
Japan. James R. Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan (London: Yale 
University Press, 1989), pp.254-263. 
A Japanese participant felt that the dominance of English contributed to 
the Orientalist discourse. 
The phenomena of China as seen by us are diverse. We are 
inclined to think that they are often unduly simplified by our 
Western friends to correspond with their preconceived ideas.56 
While the object of this statement was to justify Japanese intervention in 
China, it still shows '.hat over-simplification, or in other words negative 
or exotic stereot)'}'es, existed in the medium of English. 
In the genteel community of men and women at the IPR conferences, 
commonality was not limited to manners or style, but extended to 
perceptionf. of the world and the methods employed to deal with the 
issues. As demonstrated already, the perception of a new Pacific Age 
dominated the first few conferences. Another dominant perception was 
the belief in scientific methods, and optimism about the solution of 
problems by scientific methods. Hessel Duncan-Hall, an Australian, 
report~d this optimism in 1925: 
[The] biggest cc;i.tribution of the IPR is discovering that the most 
controversial qtc.t.!stions of international relations in the Pacific can 
be discussed fruitfully by people of the most diverse races. They 
can unite together in scientific inquiry as to what the facts really 
were.57 
Participants expressed the importance of tinding the facts and the scimtific 
and objective analysis. On the one hand, belief in science strengthened 
the optimism and idealism of participants. On the other hand, it clashed 
with the religious tone of the first conference and the YMCA influence. 
The former force overwhelmed the latter. a situation which will be 
discussed later. 
How did this commonality in manners, perspective and values affect 
discussions at the conferences, especially in terms of the Orientalist 
56 'Diplomatic ReJ:;tions in the Pacific,' pp.167-168. 
57 Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org ~3, AA. 
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discourse? Cc.·nference documents reveal that the Orient vs Occident 
dichotomy was re-enforced, rather than challenged. There was no move 
to question the terminology of Far East, East, West, Occident or Orient. 
Certain values were attached to the West or Occident, which implied that 
these values were absent from the East or Orient. Anezaki Masaharu 
(1873-1949), Professor of Religion at Tokyo Imperial University, 
emphasized this point in 1925 in his paper, 'Eastern and Western 
Civilizations'. 
In the present time the West represents the progressive side of 
humanity. The western people are active and aggressive. The 
chief banner of the West is" Progress" .... The Occidentals find 
expression in movement and take pleasure in making speed. The 
Orientals are changing many of their ways and adopting things 
from the West, but still their attitude toward life is one of 
contemplation.SB 
Within this dichotomy, however, Anezaki diu not see these values as 
ahistorical. He said the idea and word 'progress' only began to be used in 
the eighteenth century. He also did not see the difference between 'East' 
and 'West' as essential. He pointed out that 'the Buddhist attitude of 
renunciation, the Confucian morality and the Christian Way of the Cross 
were three ways of expressing the same thing,' and that 'in the last analysis 
the antagonism between the West and the East, between activity and 
passivity, is not fundamentaJ'. 59 
For another Japanese participant, Sawayanagi, the 'East' vs 'West' 
dichotomy was unquestionable, but Japanese civilization did not belong to 
one or the other: 'Modern Japan is a child whose grandfather was the 
Eastern civilization,' and 'whose father was the Western civilization'. 
Elaborating this position, he argued that Japan could: 
create a richer and more balanced civilization by harmoniously 
combining the best of the two civilizations, spiritual and material. 
58 Anczaki Masaharu, 'Eastern and Western Civilizations,' in [The IPR e~ ], /11stitute of 
Pacific Relatio11s, 1925, pp.100-101. 
59 Ibid., p.102. 
This is and must remain the real mission of Japan as a Pacific 
power, and herein lie Japan's cultural aspirations.60 
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Through formal and informal talks with Japanese, Duncan-Hall felt that 
Japanese insisted on being perceived as Occidental, not Oriental.61 This 
was an assertion of the power of Japan. The ambiguity of Japan in the 
'East' vs 'West' dichotomy reflected a dilemma between its past heritage, 
and its future quest as a modern power. An observation of the Japanese 
dilemma by an Australian, although the document was written after the 
third IPR conference in 1929, is quoted here: 
East and West have met and profound changes are taking place .... 
Will change destroy [Eastern culture] ? .... Will the characteristic 
excellence of the East, its handicrafts, its philosophy, and culture 
mean anything in new era? .... The best place in which to study the 
impact of the mechanical civilization of the West on an Eastern 
race is Japan. Japan is the most changed and the most 
industrialized country in the East .... But the study of Western 
methods was made by Japanese students, and they were applied to 
Japan by Japanese statesmen, and the whole framework of Japan, 
however changed, remains Japanese .... I do not think that Japan is 
a mere copyist. But the question remains: Has she lost her 
essential culture-the wonderful sense of beauty, her 
craftsmanship, her decorative sense, her tradition?62 
This is a simplistic and lineal conceptualization of East, West, Occident, 
Orient, and the assumption of a national culture is striking. In these 
writings, however, there is not much nuance of imposition, 
condescension or contempt from the powerful to the powerless. More 
evident is sympathetic respect for the different, the other. 
Related to this respect for the other and evident in the documents is an 
attitude of self-criticism towards the Western system, and of admiration 
towards the East's success in conquering its difficulties. While Eggleston 
detailed the beauty and courtesy of Oriental women, and was unimpressed 
by Oriental women's_·. itation of Western hair styles, he admired the way 
60 Sawayanagi M., 'The General Features of Pacific Relations as Viewed by Japan,' in J.B. 
Condliffe ed., Problems of the Pacific, 1927, p.31. 
61 Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA. 
62 F. Eggleston,' Australia and the Pacific,' Tiie [Melbourne] Herald, 23 December, 1929. 
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the government and society in Japan tackled the difficulties of population 
and industrialization.63 His respect for the other, within the Orientalist 
discourse, was strengthened by his visit to Japan and China for the third 
conft!rence in 1929. Instead of blindly praising Western values and 
systems, he turned critical eye to them. 
To hear the foreigner in Shanghai talking, one would think that 
there was no political incompetence in the West, no corruption i11 
Chicago, no hold-ups in Melbourne. [T]he foreigner in Shanghai 
has only a limited interest in China. In most cases its culture has 
little meaning for him ... 64 
After meeting Japanese and Chinese and experiencing their situations, 
Eggleston felt that the foreigners who talked about the reforms in China 
passionately had a very simplistic and one-dimec1sional understanding of 
a complex situation. His understanding of the complexity of the problems 
and appreciation of their efforts to combat the problems in China and 
Japan made him criticize Australians' ignorant attitudes to events in the 
region. 
What has Australia to say to all this change [in the East] .... I have 
no suggestion to make as to any change in our White Australian 
Policy, or our policy of building up our industry .... But there is no 
excuse for our ignorance, and our lack of interest in a great world 
movement which is going so close to us, which has so many 
possibilities of danger to us, and so many possibility (sic) of benefit. 
65 
Eggleston's ddence of the White Australian Policy suggests that danger 
rather than benefit was paramount in his mind. He was fearful as well as 
respectful of these new Oriental powers. The respect led him to 
emphasize the 'difference' between his own 'culture' and 'their culture', 
and this sense of' difference' ,,. .:..: the basis for his defence of the White 
Australi<Jn Policy. His experience in Japan and China, therefore, made 
him realize the need to reform certain aspects of the current system and to 
63 Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. 
64 F. Eggleston, 'Canton's Ideal of Ten Cents Daily,' The [Melbourne} Herald, 25 January, 
1930. 
65 Ibid. 
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create a new and stronger Australia, but this new nation was one which 
did not accommodate Orientals or Aboriginals. 
Self-critical attitudes towards economic development were also in 
evidence. After stating the importance of the Orient as a market and raw 
materials supplier, Charles Batchelder, former US Trade Commissioner to 
India, did not propose the model of the Occident as an ideal one to the 
Orient. In fact, he thought it was important that the Orient must: 
not make the mistakes of the Occident, and must avoid the sweat 
shop and the slum, long hours, and the exploitation of women 
and children, of the weak and the poor, u"r\erfeeding, bad housing 
anti working conditions.66 
Instead of imagining an ideal model, he saw the faults of the existing 
system and suggested a modified capitalism as a better way of managing 
the economy of the Orient. After pointing out the deficiencies of the 
capitalistic system where workers have little power, he argued: 
r.-:-perative production and distribution may be more successful 
·.' t • '·Orient than Europe, and the satisfactory results of the 
cuoperative associations ... in the United St«Les may cause the 
thinkers of Asia to insist upon the substitution of similar methods 
for unmodified capitalism.67 
The attitude of non-imposition or non-self-righteousness represented by 
Anezaki, Eggleston and Batchelder reflected their doubts about the model 
of progress and capitalism which they saw in Britain and the USA. 
Anezaki did not praise Western values uncritically, and like Batchelder, 
he was cautious about the direction of this progress. Their reservations 
and doubts about current progress and capitalism allowed them to seek 
alternative paths. 
Although he did not wish to impose a particular model for economic 
development, Batchelder was adam~nt about control of the economy. 
66 Charles Batchelder, 'The Far Reaching Eff :els of Industrialization,' in The IPR ed.], 
Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925, p.123. 
67 Ibid. 
------·· .• , ... -----
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If the processes of evolution [in the Orient] are not carried out 
properly and intelligently, there will be the shar::iest kind of 
international competition, the unsettlement of our existing 
econo::lic organization and wide-spread unemployment in many 
la~ds, which will be resented by the labouring classes and may lead 
no~ inly to a serious economic crisis, but to political char.ges of the 
gre~test importance. 68 
The position of Batchelder summarizes that of American liberals at the 
first two conferences. Although within the intellectual paradigm of 'East' 
vs 'West' dichotomy, he did not impose the 'right' system, but 
accommodated different systems. He even saw alternative paths for 
·xonomic development. What was needed most was not a single 'right' 
system, but a grand plan to coordinate and control the process toward the 
harmony of the whole. 
At the conferences, two processes of myth deconstruction and myth re-
enforcement occurred side by side. At one level, scientific researches, such 
as those carried out by the "Race Relations Survey", challenged the 
stereotype that Orientals did not assimilate the democratic system of 
Western values.69 Although Sawayanagi argued that the basis of 
discriminatory immigration acts against Asiatics was a se11.se of racial 
superiority of the 'White' race,7° arguments based on racial superiority 
was perceived 'incorrect' 'Ai the conferences. Instead, the arguments for 
anti-Asiatic immigration were defended on the grounds of Jiving 
standards and 'traditional' national cultures. In the latter argument, the 
differences of value, culture, language and tradition implied the 
impossibility of assimilation: the very view which some research tried to 
discredit. 
National culture making, in this context, was a tool to defend anti-Asian 
immigration policies in the Dominion countries, which had recently 
acquired a more independent status and i .eeded 'natica1al' identity. For 
this purpose, speakers from Australia, New Zealand and Canada spent 
68 Ibid. 
69 E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., Tlze Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp.316-317. 
70 Sawayanagi M., 'The General Features of Pacific Relations as Viewed by Japan,' p ~;i. 
much time describing the history of their countries, and emphasizing 
their Anglo-European 'tradition'. While those from Australia and New 
Zealand concentrated on the threat of Oriental cheap labour to eccnomic 
standards, those from Canada argued for maintenance of a national 
culture and tradition. They emphasized the importance of building a 
national character, which had not yet emer6ed, and pointed out that 
Oriental immigration threatened this process. 
Canada is forced to proceed [in immigration] with caution because 
in addition to the lack of a national background of considerable 
age, her basic population is not homogeneous, and her national 
type not standardized .... The Canadian attitude is one of anxiety 
that the influx of Orientals shall never reach proportions that will 
endanger the national type which they are seeking to establish in 
the Dominion.71 (emphasis added) 
This was stated by John Nelson in 1925, and Arthur Currie expres5ed the 
same concern in 1927.72 Here, the process not only of maintaining, but 
also of creating nation al culture is evident. The issue of the Orient was 
not merely an issue of race or culture as participants at the first conference 
thought. It was also an issue of nation-building and national sovereig;;;y, 
dnd therefore, inevitably political. 
iv) Nation-state 
If the border between the Orient and Occident was relatively easy to 
transcend for the participants at the conferences because of their 
C'.Jmmonality of background and interests, the borders of nation-states 
were much harder to cross. The nation-state was the basis of the 
international order of the lime. Nevertheless, some questioned the 
absoluteness of the order. Takayanagi Kenzo argued the historicity of the 
concept: 
[I]f we conceive of sovereignty as absolute and unlimited, just as 
eighteenth and nineteenth century jurists thought of private 
71 John Nelson, 'Canadian View of Padfic Relations,' in [The IPR ed.], Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1925, pp.66--67. 
72Arthur Currie, 'Canada and Pacific Relations,' in J.B. CondliffP ed., Problems of t/Je 
Pacific, 1927, p.14. 
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property as absolute and · ': imited, international life would 
h:;::;}me unbearable and no sound internati anal cooperation in the 
cause of world civilization would be pos~ible.73 
Tsurumi YUsuke also argued that absolute national soY~reignty was at 
odds with the world trends, criticizing the speech given by Eggleston, 
which argued for discriminatory immigration and tariff pol:cies as the 
basis of democracy in Australia. Tsurumi went on to point out that like 
domestic political and social transformati in in France in the eighteenth 
century and in Britain in the nin-eteenth, the core of the new movement 
af the twentieth century was: 
[T]o make the privileged positions monopolized with force by a 
minority of modern nations and races available for common 
welfare of humankind as a whole, anci ~o establish the 
international principles for achieving this goal, based on the might 
of justice anti r<:ason, not force.74 (emphasis adO.ed) 
While Eggleston and other Dominion speakers emphasized the welfare of 
t.he nation-state as a whole, Tsurumi, who called himself a promoter of 
New Liberalism in Japan,75 argued for the welfare of the world as a whole. 
Sawayanagi and Takayanagi also shared this priority, and argur.d that this 
welfare should be achieved even at the expense of national sovereignty 
Did this approach appeal to the audience, who were supporters of 
Wilsonian principles and the League of Nations, and who passionately 
discussed the I'act to outlaw war? Even an ardent Wilsonian, Duncan-
Hall, who was mer.1ber of the League of Nations Union and later himself 
worked for the League, recorded that Takayanagi's poinl was most 
interesting, as if he would not have thought in the same way before.76 To 
put the welfare of the world above that of a nation-state was not accepted 
among the participants who otherwise, as Frank Atherton did in the 
opening of the first conference, argued for the duty of' nation' and 
individuals to serve the welfare of the world as a whole. 
73 Takayan%'1 Kenzo, 'A Suggestion for More Enlightened ImmigTation and Emigration 
Policies,' in [The IPR ed.], /11stit11te of Pacific Relations, 1925, p.111. 
74 Tsurumi Y., Cli iiloo ayw111< kokoro, p.443. 
75 See Chapter Three, Section Two. 
76 Duncan-Hall to Amery, 3 August, 1925, A 981; Org93, AA. 
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The debate was, however, not an academic debate over national 
sovereignty. While the ideas of Japanese participants might have 
contained the possibility of a new way of dealing with international 
affairs, these issues were put forward for the specific purpose of 
denouncing discriminatory immigration policies, namely the American 
immigration act of 1924.77 They argued for the welfare of the 
international community at the expen::;e of other countries without 
questioning Japan's own sovereignty. JCIPR members were not starry-
eyed utopians, but aware that the rhetoric could be used for bargaining in 
the be:;t interests of Japan.78 
Furthermore, the Japanese participants' claim did not apply to the Oriental 
races in generai, but specifically to the Jap:mese, the Oriental race with 
power. The coiunlai assumption was so dominant that 'Orientals without 
power' were not allowed to come to the conferences. The exceptions were 
the Korean and Filipino groups, probably because of the strength of the 
YMCA movement in these countries. The Japanese group refused to 
accept the Korean group as an independent group,79 so that it was banned 
from the third until the eighth conference in 1942.80 
With these limitations, how far could the concept of 'racial' equality and 
welfare of the world be implemenied? Duncan-Hall recorded that the 
Japanese did not want to interfere with domestic policies, but insisted on 
77 Duncan-Hall recorded that Japanese and Chinese were only interested in American 
immigration policy. Ibid. 
78 Saito Makoto, a scholar of American studies and the US-Japan relations, interviewed 
and wrote . .- Takagi Yasaka. Saito points out that although Takagi pursued his ideals, 
he was never naive orignorant about Realpolitik. Interview with Saito M., Tokyo, 20 
June 1994. 
79 Zumoto M., 'Kyoto kaigi no atoshimatrn,' Ga iko ji/1l'. Vol.53, No.602 (1January,1930), 
pp.293-296. Soejima Michimasa, 'Futatabi taiheiyo kaigi ni tsuite,' Gaikojiho, Vol.52, 
No.599 (15 November, 1929), pp.86--87. 
BO As for the issue of Korean participation, see Nakami M., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai to 
l'1ihon no ch;shikijin,' Sltiso, No. 728 (February, 1985), pp.109-110, and Katagiri N., 
'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai to Chosen daihyoken mondai: Chosen gurupu no dattai, 
1925-1931,' H ogaku kenkyfl. Vol.59, No.4 (April, 1986), op.45-76. 
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the reform of the method of administration.Bl Takayanagi accepted the 
framework of national sovereignty, but demanded an 'enlightened' 
administration of law so that 'the feelings and sensibilities of other 
nations or races would not be unduly injured by too vigorous assertion of 
the so-cnlled "sovereign right"' .s2 Japanese participants pushed the limits 
of national sovereignty, but operated within its framework. 
In contrast to the Koreans, the Filipino group, another 'Orient without 
power', participated in all conferences except for the tentl: at Stratford on 
Avon. This reflected different attitudes to the 'colonies' amongst Japanese 
and American participants. While Japanese members did not accept the 
independence of Korea, Americans tended to support self-government for 
the Philippines.83 Jerome Greene, Chairman of the American Council of 
the IPR (ACIPR) in 1929-1932, explained r.1ther awkwardly to Japanese 
members that Korean case and Filipino case were different: 'Korea was an 
integral part of the Japanese empire, and the Philippines were possessions 
of the USA, but the people did not hold its citizenship' .84 
Filipino participants at the IPR did not voice anti-colonialist views. A 
speech by a Filipino in 1925 was pro-indep·ndence, but also praised 
American institutions and heritage in the Philippines. In contrast, a 
speech of 1927 which was given by an American administrator in the 
Philippines, was bluntly anti-independence.BS Filipino voices faded away 
in later conferences. While in 1929 and 1930, more emphasis was put on 
81 H. Duncan-Hall, 'The Searchlight on Immigration Legislation,' in H. Duncan-Hall and 
J.B. Condliffe, W/Jat's of Ille Pacific?, p.9. 
82 Takayanagi K., 'A Suggestion for more Enlightened Immigration and Emigration 
Policies,' p.111. 83 Atherton, Davis and Charles Loomis from Honolulu IPR office rn2l Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of Stale, and discussed. the issue of the independent pailicipation of the 
Filipino i,>roup al the IPR in Honolulu on 14 March, 1929. Stim:;u,. supported self-
government, nol independence, of the Philippines. I-12 had no tbjection lo its independent 
parlicip.ilion, and felt that it was a valuable thing. Stimson's opinion seems to have 
represented the general view among American members of the IPR. Notes on a 
conversation bei.we.en Stimson, Atherton, Davis and Loomis, 14 March, 1929, Wilbur 
Papers, 40/5, HI. 
84 Greene to Niiobe, 24 January, 1931, E-17 /17, AUH. 
85 Conrado Benitez, 'The View Point of the Philippines,' in [The IPR ed.], Institute of 
Pacific Relations, 1925, pp.82-87, and Fred C. Fisher, 'Present-day Problems of the 
Philippines,' in J. B. Condliffe ed., Problems of t/Je Pacific, 1927, pp.44-54. 
the indigenous heritage, rather than American institutions, of Filipino 
society, their speeches remained marginal. Probably the political 
irrelevance of the Philippines as v;ell as the attitudes of American 
members enabl~d their participation to continue. 
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The Filipino case nonetheless influenced the content of the constitution 
to include non-independent countries. The constitution stated that the 
Institute included: 
any sovereign or autonomous state lying within or bordering the 
Pacific Ocean or having dominions, colonies, dependencies, 
territories, mandated or otherwise, in the Pacific area, subject to its 
bei11g approved and admitted to membership, by the Pacific 
Council .... With the approval of the Pacific Council, independent 
Local Groups may be organized in an eligible country which has 
not created a National CounciJ.86 (emphasis added) 
And then there was Section Three of this article. 
To encourage at Conferences of the Institute the fullest self-
expression of distinct racial or territorial groups existing within an 
eligible country as defined in Section 2 of this Article, the Pacific 
Council and the S.:cretariat may, witlz the assent of the National 
Council of such cou11try, eule1 into direct relations with such 
groups ... 
This opened the door to participants to colonies. The practice to extend 
the membership not only to independent nation-states but also to colonies 
was unusual amongst INGOs in this period.87 On the other hand, the 
same article made it possible for 'colonial' European powers to become the 
IPR memb~rs. Accordingly the British joined the IPR from 1927, followed 
by the French and Dutch from 1933.88 
86 Appendix Ill: 'Constitution of the IPR,' Article Ill, in J.B. Condliffe ed., Problems of Ille 
Pacific, 1927, p.607. 87 The !NGOs which followed this practice were only a few, such as 'Women's 
International League for Peace and freedom'. L. C. White, Tiie Structure of Private 
International Organizations (Philadelphia, Penn: George 5. Ferguson Company, 1933), 
p.220. 88 Greene argued for the participation both of a colonial power and a colony based on this 
constitution. Greene to Loomis, 7 July, 1930, E-17 /5, AUI-1. 
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The discussion at the Yale Club and the intent of the first IPR conference 
emphasized the individual capacity of participants. Efforts were made to 
enhance this unofficial character at the first conference. Words 5uch as 
'delegates' were avoided because they implied 'national' representation.89 
The unofficial character was important in order to avoid defensive 
arguments for 'national' policies among participants, and to encourage 
individual discussion, as free as possible from official or national 
constraints. Key figures at the IPR represented this view strongly. Jerome 
Greene, Treasurer of the American Council of the IPR, who had been born 
and brought up in Japan, felt the Japanese members were under 
governmental pressure and did not want to discuss issues concerning 
national policies. Greene wrote to Carter that the third conference in 
Kyoto would be a great opportunity to show the government that 
discussions free from governmental pressures on important issues were 
not only harmless, but profitable.90 Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific 
Council, shared the view. Following his principles, Wilbur resigned as 
Chairman of the Pacific Council, when he was appointed Secretary of State 
in 1929. 
The unofficial character of the Institute, however, was ambiguous from 
the beginning. Greene's point was to avoid, not discussion of official 
(national) policies, but discussions by official representatives. While 
participants were not governmental (official) representatives, they were 
seen as 'national' representatives. Differences of opinion about the nature 
of 'unofficial' national representative existed. Some JCIPR members 
thought that even 'unofficial' national representatives should not criticise 
national (governmental) policy at international conferences,91 while other 
JCIPR members argued that it would be suicidal for the IPR if participants 
only justified governmental policies uncritically.92 The latter position, a 
dominant position held by IPR founders, remained ambiguous because of 
89 Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyo kankci chosakai,' p.62. 
90 Greene to Carter, 20 November, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
91 Soejima M., 'Taiheiyo kaigi ni tsuite Takagi kyoju ni kotau,' Gaiko jilto, Vol.53, No.603 
(10" January, 1930), pp."j9-170. 
92 Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyo .;aigi no seiseki no hihan,' Gaikoji/10, Vol.53, No.602 (1 January, 
1930), p.272. 
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the strong assumption of the nation-state and the strong identification of 
participants with their nations. 
The ambiguity of the terms 'official' and 'unofficial' was reinforced by the 
structure of the IPR. This structure was based on National Councils. The 
proximity between the National Council and the government differed 
from country to country, therefore it is difficult to generalize about the 
official character of National Councils. Nevertheless, the basic unit of 
orF1nization was based on the nation-state, as was common among other 
INGOs at the time.93 The constitution of the IPR, which was drafted at the 
second conference, makes this point clearly. Article III says: 
1. Subject to the provisions hereof the Institute of Pacific Relations 
is constituted by the national units the name of whose 
representatives are appended to this Constitution ... 
2. A national unit ... shall be a National Council organized for the 
purpose of the Institute, or organization of similar purposes .... 
Each constituent country shall have one National Council or 
equivalent organization ... 94 (emphasis added) 
There was, in fact, no emphasis on the unofficial nature in the 
constitution, although it was assumed. One had to be a 'representative' of 
a nation, and reside in the nation represented. This was not convenient 
for expatriates or those who mainly lived overseas.95 While the British 
group insisted ~hat the membership of a national group should be limited 
to its own nationality,96 the IPR was relatively loose regarding nationality 
in national groups from 1925 to 1931. Chinese, Japanese and Koreans 
resident in Honolulu participated"1n ih'~first conference as their country's 
members, and a few American missionaries resident in Japan as Japanese 
members.97 Duncan-Hall participated as an Australian member in 1927 
while he Wi!S at Syracuse University. Harada Tasuku (1863-1940), 
Professor or Oriental Studies at University of Hawaii from 1919, became an 
93 L. C. White, Private International Organizations, pp.31and34--36. 
94 Appendix III: 'Constitution of the IPR,' in). B. Condliffe ed., Problems of t/Je Pacific, 
1927, p.607. 
95 Hinder to Eggleston, 8 January, 1931, MS 423/ 14, NLA. 
96 Macadam memo, 28 February, 1934, AIIA file, LCH. 
97 'Membership,' in [The IPR ed.), Institute of Pacific Relations, 1925, pp.35-10. 
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unusual member of the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) who lived 
outside of Japan. He participated in ih~first two IPR conferences as a 
Japanese member, and the third as an American member, before he went 
back to Japan in 1932. Probably Jue to language skills, the JCIPR had 
conference secretaries with English names at the conferences of 1929 and 
1931, while the Chinese seem to have managed themselves. After 1933, 
national groups consisted more of those with both nationality and 
residency than before. 
The conferences and machinery of the IPR operated on the assumption of 
national units, assuming a national coherence. The conference of 1925 
started with opening statements by the leaders of national groups, 
presenting, for example, an Australian view or a Canadian view. As seen 
earlier in this chapter, national culture was also assumed and re-
constructed at conferences. This assumption, which existed from the 
beginning, contained a danger. Explaining the situation, and giving 
'insider' knowledge of a nation did not have to be a justification of 
governmental policies, but because governmental policies were 'national' 
policies, there was a possibility that national representatives would 
voluntarily defend their governments' policies. Although scholars and 
contemporaries argued that the IPR shifted its orientation from culture to 
politics around 1929, the assumption of the national unit as the basis of 
the organization encouraged this reorientation. 
Not only the administration, but also research programs and conference 
preparation, were based on national units, rather than on issues or fields. 
This was, however, not only because of political intentions or the 
intellectual context of that time, but also because of the practical necessities 
of carrying out institutional functions at a multinational level. The 
alternative method based on units of issues or fields was impractical for 
organizing the research program as well as the administration. I shitll 
return to this issue in the next chapter. 
The assumption of the nation-state was strengthened by the manner of 
personifying natio;1-states. It became common to deal with a nation-state 
as if it were a person. The expression 'Japan did, thought, or accepted' was 
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very common in papers and discussions. In this type of discourse, the 
complexity and diversity of a nation tended to be ignored or undermined. 
The name of a nation-state referred mostly to the national government, 
and the complexity of the composition and mechanisms of government 
tended to be ignored. National character, like personal character, was 
assurr1ed in this practii:e, and indi,lidual or sectional differences were 
often overlooked. 
The practice of personifying nation-states gave users of the term a sense of 
power. It gave them a sense of excitement and importance in discussing 
issues on a national level, which was the privilege only of a very few high 
officials. It enhanced the quasi-diplomatic atmosphere. Herbert Croly 
commented on the dangers inherent in this temptation. 
[The IPR' s] members will constantly be tempted to believe that it is 
capable of some salutary intervention in a critical dilemma .... 
Sooner or later it will probably yield to one of these temptations or 
solicitations and undertake to place its authority as a research 
institute behind some piece of practical political advice. But I hope 
not. If it does commit itself to particular po!iciPs it ::an hardly fail 
to become propagandist, and it will measurably disqualify itself for 
the more permanently important task which no other organized 
body is in a position to perform.98 
What he saw as significant in the IPR was its experimental nature in 
intelk.::ual discourse. He thought that it would be of greater long-term 
benefit to the world than the activities of think tank type organizations. A 
Japanese participant agreed on this importance of 'unofficial' discussions 
at the IPR: 'It is like a zadankai [round table discussion] where one can 
discuss various issues without reservation and try to understand others' 
points of view'. It was useful, as he continued, only if this type of 
discussion was not carried out by professionals such as diplomats.99 It was 
acknowledged that IPR discussions would contribute to psychological 
98 H. Croly, 'Human Potential in Pacific Politics,' p.588. 
99 Matsuoka Y., 'Taiheiyo chosa kai1,>i no gyoscki,' Gaiko jiho, Vol.53, No.602 (1 January, 
1930), pp.283-285. 
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disarmament, which might not influence policy-making immediately, but 
might do so in a long run.JOO 
Croly, however, sensed that the real danger for the IPR was the temptation 
for power. While some were more ,'l.cademically orier.t<:d, a majority of 
th::! participanls were close to pov•er, or aspired to be in power, either to 
implement their ideals or simply for self-promotion. This tendency was 
almost inevitable given the selection of participants for conferences. The 
IPR addressed the influential few, not the thinking majority. The trend 
towards a political orientation in the IPR was not caused by any sudden 
shift to focus on l:'olitical issues. Rather it lay in the very nature of the 
people who gathered at the IPR conferences and its national councils, as 
well as in the assur...;Jtions of a structure based on the colonial system and 
national sovereign~y. 
v) Public Impact 
The first two IPR conferences achieved success in the limited, but 
influential circles which the IPR targeted. The organization gained 
favourable support among the participants and press, and this was 
ultimately reported to officials. Reports on the IPR were not front page 
news, but were relatively widely covered by publications. From August to 
October 1925, more than 350 papers, m?gazines and journals carried 
articles relating to the Institute in the USA. These publications included 
those of labour unions, Chambers of Commerce, educational institutions, 
women's organizations, scientific societies, business associations and 
religious bodies. In the same period, 195 public addresses on the IPR, 
delivered by American participants, were reported to the headquarters of 
the IPR in Honolulu.JOI 
Exhaustive examination of the newspapers which had particular interests 
in the IPR is hard to conduct. Newspaper articles collected at the Ministry 
100 Yasutomi M., 'Taiheiyo kaigi nyozc gakan,' Gaiko ji/io, Vol.52, No.601 (15 December, 
1929), pp.58-59. 
101 This rcporte was titled 'For information from Commissioner for Australia in the USA,' 
n. d. [in 1926], A981; Org n. AA. 
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of Foreign Affairs of Japan, however, give a good indication of publicity in 
the USA. The number of the articles collected reflected the degree of 
official interest rather than absolute numbers in the press. For 1927, the 
file on the IPR included only a few major newspapers, such as the Sa11 
Francisco Clzro11 icle and Los Angeles Times. The file on the third 
conference at Kyoto W3S more encompassing, because the Tanaka 
government had a stake in the ivianchurian issues, a major topic at the 
conference. The principal papers collected were the New York Times, 
Herald Tribu11e, Clzristia11 Science Mo11itor, Waslzington Post, and local 
new~' papers ill Honolulu, Seattle, Oakland and Portland. Considering 
reports of the embassies in the USA on press coverage in 1927, it seems 
likely that the same newspapers maintained an interest in the IPR 
throughout the period from 1927 to 1929, ratiler than that they suddenly 
paid attention to it in 1929. 
The prominence of press coverage was determined by the prominence of 
the participants at the conferences. Articles in the San Francisco Cltro11icle 
in 1927 were written by Chester Rowell, a distinguished Republican 
commentator from Berkeley. Rowell, heavily involved in the IPR, 
emphasized its importance. This positive image was reinforced by 
Wilbur, another Californian notable.102 The Herald Tribune reported in 
1929 under the title, 'Pacific Institute in Japan Draws World Leaders', 
although the size of the article was modest.103 These articles were detailed 
and supportive of the IPR. As reported by the New York Sun in 1927, the 
IPR was seen as a positive new type of organization.104 After conferences, 
these positive images were promoted by participants through public 
lectures as well as articles in journals. 
Publicity was carried in the same manner in Japan. Newspapers such as 
Osaka Asahi, Osaka Mainiclli and Tokyo Asalzi reported on IPR 
conferences. While American papers reported not only the issues, but 
also thz functions and methods of the IPR, Japanese papers tended to focus 
102 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 August, 1927. 
103 Herald Trib1111e, 25 October, 1929. 
104 New York Sun, 10 June, 1927. 
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only on issues.IDS The promotion of the IPR's functions and aims were 
left to participants and members of the JCIPR. Takagi Yasaka, Saito Soichi, 
and other participants wrote .::~dcles, and talked at public lectures. These 
articles appeared in journals for the ~fanufacturers' Club [kogijo k11rab11], 
diplomatic circles, acader,1ic circles and women's associations.106 
Members also gave public talks to these circles. In this way, they reached 
the audience they targeted, while mo,;t of society was left uninformed. 
Press coverage in Australia was much h"5 evident, and the penetration of 
the information seems less profound thar. ;n the USA. A few articles 
appeared in papers and the journal oft\,,, tivfCA, but the space was 
unspectacular. Except for a series of :~r:irts by Eggleston from Japan and 
China with photos and illustrations in the [Melbourne] Herald and Age 
in 1929, articles did not capture great space. V/hile a small number of 
experts discussed the IPR issues in the major cities in the 1920s, the 
functions and aims of the Institute, and the effects of the conferences were 
unknown to the broader society. 
Governments and diplomats were better informed about the Institute 
because they received the reports from the USA. In Japan, diplomats 
reported on IPR conferences and emphasized the importance of the 
lnstitute.107 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained close ties with 
105 For example, Q;aka Asahi, 1November,1929, Tokyo Asahi, 9 November, 1929, and 
Q;aka Mainic/Ji, 8 November, 1929. 
106 Aoki S., 'Taiheiyo mondai chOsakai: Dainikai Honoruru taikai o miru,' Kokusai 
ch isliiki, Vol.7, No.9 (September, 1927), Saito SOichi, 'Taiheiyo jidai no torai to suno 
shomondai,' B <X!ki, Vol. 28, No.7 (July, 1928), Saito S., 'Taiheiyo kaigi to fujin,' F11ji111w 
to1110 (October, 1927), Saito 5., 'Taiheiyo mondai chosakai no seiritsu to daisankai 
taikai no igi,' Gaiko jil1i5, Vol.51, No.2 (October, 1929), Takagi Y., "'Institute of Pilcific 
Relations" ni tsuite,' Kokka gakkai zasslii, Vol.39, No.12 (December, 1925), Takagi Y., 
'Kokusai shugi ni taisuru ichikOken: Taiheiyo kankei chosakai no kanso,' C/J ao koron, 
No.40 (December, 1925), Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyo kaigi no sciseki no hihan,' Gaikoji/Jo, 
Vol.53, No.2 (January, 1930), Takagi Y., 'Taiheiyo kankei chOsakai,' Takayanagi K., 
'Konsh!l no taiheiyo kaigi,' Cir ao koro11, No.44 (October, 1929), Zumoto M., 'Kyoto kaigi 
no kOka ikan,' Gaiko jiho, Vol.52, No.601 (15 December, 1929) and Zumoto M., 'Taiheiyo 
mondai chosakai ni !suite,' Ga iko ji/10, Vol.51, No.594 (1 September, 1929). 
I 07 Debuchi, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Tanaka Cabinet, was 
posted as special envoy to Washington D. C. in October 1928. In Washington, he told 
250 
the he;,dquarters of the JCIPR in Tokyo from the beginning. This included 
many meetings with government officials, social functions and 
discussions for the details of the activities and conferences. Furthermore 
sutstantial funds were donated by the Ministry.1J8 
In Australia, Duncan-Hall reported to the g,overnment that the IPR 
conference in 1925 .,·;:,'one of the most importam incidents after the 
Washington Conference'. 109 The Prime Minister's Department was 
sceptical about the Pacific as a political entity and feared the IPR 
conferences' effect er 'mmigration policies and imperial arrangements, 
therefore they maint' ~d a policy of non-involvement with the IPR. 
Nevertheless, officials .. t the Department were pot totally negative. They 
were informed about IPR activities by reports and a few interviews with 
key members, including John CondEffe, Research Secretary of the IPR.110 
Probably the Department received mon: information about the IPR than 
any other individual or group in Australia, except for a few key members 
of the IPR in major cities. 
How much did the IPR activities at conferences or at National Councils 
influence government policy making? This is hard to evaluate, because it 
depended on the situation in each country. Furthermore, even if the 
influence existed, it could have been in the domain of perception, and the 
impact was not necessarily immediate. As Chapter Three suggested, 
government involvement was stronger in the JCIPR than in its 
counterpart in Australia (the AIIA from 1932), but this does not 
necessarily mean the JCIPR had stronger influence on the government. 
The JCIPR reflected the government agenda and was mo!e a national 
pubiicist b;dy, while the AIIA before WWII initiated c. new agenda for the 
government and society, although L: influence w:::s limited. 
2) Institutionalizing the IPR: the first INGO in the Pacific 
Davis that the Japanese government saw the importance of the IPR. Davis lo Atherton, 
21November,1928, E-13/12, AUH. 
108 Sec Chapter Three, Section Two. 
109 Duno:..n-Hall lo Amery, 3 August, 1925, A981; Org 93, AA. 
110 Note of Henderson, 29 May, 1929, A981; Ori,'93, AA. 
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Various strea!TIS of internatlonaiism operated at the first t~·ro conferences, 
,uch i:;iernation2lisn as based on \Nilsr,aian idealism, Christian 
humanism and business interests. These streams were not totally 
independent, but inter-woven. Socialist and feminist interests were a).so 
represented, but the former did not promote its interest beyond nation-
state boundaries, and the latter interest was inadequately addressed. As a 
result, class and gender did m' .nate:rialize as alternative forms of id~ntity 
transcending nation-state bou11J.iries, and therefort did not f'romote 
alternative streams of internationalism at the IPR conferences. 
Behind the optimistic excitement of the Pacific Age and the Pacific 
communit~. ·;,ras the making of the first INGO in the regior.. In 1925--1927, 
two major incidents highlighted the domir,ant elements in 
institutionalizing the IPR. The first was the withJrawal of the l'MC.\ 
group frum control of the IPR conference. The second was the entry of the 
British group. These incidents strengthened the muve to make the L 3. 
into an organization of regional affairs experts, rather than a 
philanthropic association to promote good wi\l. 
i) Withdrawal of the YMCA 
Davis's organization of the first confe;ence in late 1924 in New York had 
already led to a substantial reducti0n of the YMCA element in order to 
gain the support of 'influential' circles.111 The first conference, however, 
illustrated the time lag between the central committee and each national 
group. National groups for the first conference were organized by 
national YMCA headquarters in each country, while National Councils 
were established mostly after the first conference. National YMCA 
headquarters had operated on materials which had been sent from the 
central comm~ttee several months earlier. As the result, two distinct 
camps existed in every national group at the firs< conference: one of 
members of the religious professions with YMCA conneciions; and 
another of experts on Asia and · · ·. Pacific b:ands, who were academics, 
businessmen or public servants. 
111 See Chapter Two. 
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Australian and New Zealand groups were selected by the respective 
national secretariats of the YMCA, and were therefore dominated by the 
YMCA camp. Expert rnembers were few: John Condliffe among eleven 
New Zealanders, and H. Duncan-Hall i\nd Stephen Roberts among six 
Australians. The dominance of the YMCA in these groups, which arrived 
first at Honolulu .. led to the introduction of a prayer after breakfast at the 
Punahou ScilooL The other national groups who arrived later had to 
follow this practice, which created scepticism among expert groups. The 
confli:'t was ~·ettled by creating a "Meditation Period" in which texts of 
different religions were read, followed by ten minutes of meditation. 
Davis noted: 'nany found common ground for religious idealism and the 
inspiration of aniting in a recognition of the Deity as preparation for the 
work of the dcy'.11 2 The practice was, however, abolished after the first 
conference. 
Actual leadership of the discussion was given to the experts at the first 
conference. The YMCA camp resented this tendency as well as the general 
directions of the central ·. ,1mmittee. The trend was strengthened by the 
arrival of the American mainland group, which contained a substantial 
number of experts. Major figures in this group complained to Davis that 
the strong religi.:ms undertone was unexpected, and if they had known 
that this could be prevalent, they would no: .. :,ave come.113 
Conflict between the two camps developed not only over religion, but also 
over the power to control the conference. Although the YMCA put much 
into the setting up of the first conference by making use of extensive 
organizational networks in Asia, it yielded to experts in organizing the 
proceedings.Jl4 The program was r~-organi?ed by George Bl:ikeslee, a 'Far 
East' expert at Clark University. Blakeslee had been a leading figure at 
annual summer meetings of the Institute of Politics at Williamstown for 
the preceding four years. In Honolulu, he established the pattern of the 
IPR conferences, following those of the Institute of Politics, and shaped the 
112 J.M. Davis,' An Inside Story rf the Institute,' pp.7-8, '."lilbur Papers, 40/5, HI. 
113 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
114 Ibid., p.10. 
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major structure of the conferences. The conferences consisted of forums 
for general discussion, a Round Table of a smaller number of experts on 
specific issues and public addresses. 
Secularization of the institution as the result of the withdrawal of the 
YMCA groups was reflected in the content of the conference. At the first 
conference, religion accounted for 6 out of 27 discussion topics, among 
which the main themes were immigration, race and diplomatic 
relations. 11 5 Although one topic on foreign missions survived at the 
second conference, religious issues were totally dropped from the third 
conference. This reflected the ideas of key figures who felt it important to 
overcome the image of a Christian organization and to portray the IPR as 
modern and scientific.J 16 
This secularization, however, did not mean the decline of Christian faith 
among major figures of the IPR. While the number of participants with a 
YMCA background was substantially reduced at the second conference, the 
tradition of missionary families was still strong among the key figures in 
the USA. Christian faith was reflected in their sense of mission and social 
justice, which did not diminish much even in later years. Among 
participants from Asia, Christianity was also strongly represented, if c ,e 
considers the percentage of Christians in the entire population. It was 
especially notic~able amongst the Chinese participants. Eggleston recorded 
in 1927 that all the delegates from China were Christian.117 To a lesser 
extent, this was the case among Japanese participants. It was probably 
because Christians in Japan and China were more exposed to foreigners, 
and their customs and language as well as their values and beliefs. 
Furthermore, they often studied in the USA or about the USA, and 
therefore their fluency in English was greater than that of the rest of the 
society. In these groups, a sense of social justice arising from Christian 
faith was strong, and did not conflict with lhe emphasis on science. What 
bothered key figures, who were themselves often Christians or from 
missionary families, was, however, the philanthropic generalist outlook, 
115 See Appendix A. 
116 Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. 
117 Note of Conversation with Eggleston [in 1927], MS 2629/6, NLA. 
which lacked the 'scientific' credibility to appeal to the 'influential', 
including major foundations. 
ii) British Participation and Institutionalizing the IPR 
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At the first conference, British participation wz.s strongly requested by 
participants from the Dominions, who found it hard to discuss diplomatic 
issues. As the request was accepted, the institutionalization of the IPR and 
the process of British involvement happened at the same time. 
During the first conference, the structure of the Institute was discussed. A 
Committee on Permanent Organization was appointed during the first 
conference in order to create ?. Pacific Council (the executive body of the 
IPR), establish a headquarters, employ a secretariat, raise funds, and 
prepare for a second conference. This committee held three meetings, two 
at the end of the first conference and the third in San Francisco in October 
1925, and the basic structure was shaped between the first two conferences. 
Already by January 1926, British participation was accepted at the IPR 
without raising any concern or objection. At the same time other 
decisions were mad!" ~o: 1) make Honolulu the headquarters for the next 
five year period; 2) appoint J.M. Davis General Secretary and Charles 
Loomis Associate General Secretary; 3) raise a budget of $90,000 for 1926 in 
order to hold the second conference in Honolulu in 1927; 4) have the 
secretariat visit the participating countries for preparation; and 5) secure a 
research secretary as soon as feasible.1 18 
Besid2s the decision on British participation, this document indicates a 
few distinct aspects of the IPR: the temporary status of Honolulu as 
headquarters; the emphasis on persr· :ial contacts in organizing national 
councils; and the emphasis on the research aspect of the Institute. The last 
point is important not only for the definition of the nature of the IPR, but 
also for the method of gaining funds and control over funds, to be 
discussed later. 
118 J.M. Davis, 'Report of Committee on Permanent Organization,' in}. B. Condliffe ed., 
Problems of tile Pacific, 1927, p.591. 
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The Pacific Council was established as an executive body, after the central 
committee was abolished. Its members were nominated, but were to be 
the representatives of National Councils once they were organized. R. L. 
Wilbur became Chairman of the Pacific Cc.,1.mcil, F. Atherton, Treasurer, 
Inoue J1!1mosuke of Japan, first Vice-Chairman, and David Yui of China, 
second Vice-Chairman. The other members were Mungo MacCallum, 
Australia, Robert Boden, Canada, and James Allen, New Zealand. Despite 
American dominance in staff, membership and funding, this 
multinational representation was a major reason why the IPR was seen as 
an INGO, not an American organization. While the American voice 
tended to be dominant, consultation with National Councils was not 
neglected. Meetings of the Pacific Council, held just before the biennial 
conferences,119 decided on the major issues of the IPR. 
Administration was conducted by the ISIPR in Honolulu. The YMCA 
element was strong among the original nine staff. Davis and Loomis were 
YMCA men. Frank Atherton, Treasurer of the Pacific Council and the 
ISIPR, and his family had long been patrons of local YMCA activities. 
Administrative expenditure of the ISIPR was US$ 24,500 in 1926 and 
stayed at a similar level until 1933, except for an expansion in 1929-1930 
due to the enlargement of the staff in this period.12.D 
The responsibilities of the ISIPR were: to prepare and conduct the 
conferences; to promote research; to exchange information; and to liaise 
between National Councils.121 Communication and coordination, not 
policy-making for the IPR, wc:·e the main functions, and were carried out 
through letters, cables and visits. The IPR recognized the special 
importance of personal contacts in making this multinational operation 
work. Its whole operation, indeed, was based on the philosophy of 
119 The IPR conferences between 1925 lo 1933 look place every two years. llelwcen ~933 and 
1945, they were held every three years. 
120 'Statement Showing the Receipts and Disbursements of the lnslilule of Pacifir 
Relations for the Years 1925-1935, and the first Six Months of 1936, Compared with the 
Budget for 1936,' in the IPR, Report of t/Je l11ternatio11al Secretariat to Ille Pacific 
Council, 1933-1936 ([New York]: the IPR, 1936), p.173. 
121 J.M. Davis, 'Foreword,' inJ. B. Condliffe ed., Problems of t/J~ i'acific, 1927, p.vi. 
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meeting and cultivating influential people of good will. This emphasis 
on visits was innovative then, and was enthusiastically supported by the 
staff, but required large amounts of money and time. 
Davis, the first General Secretary (1926-1930), and Edward Carter the 
second (1933-1946), both visited National Councils after their 
appointments, and promoted the cause of the IPR. Davis spent almost 
half of the year out of Honolulu in each year of his term. In April to 
August 1926, he visited Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand, 
meeting prominent people, promoting the causes of the IPR, and 
reporting on the National Councils to the ISIPR.122 In late November 
1927, he took off to Europe, visiting Paris, Geneva, Moscow, Germany, 
Holland and London, and in mid 1928 he was off to Tokyo and China for a 
few months to organize t!°!" conference. Between these overseas trips, he 
travelled constantly on the .'.nai.'lland of the USA and Canada. He had 
meetings in major cities by clay, and travelled by train at night between 
New York and San Francisc;. 
The practict was followed by other staff. Having complained of the 
expense of Davis's trips,123 Carter himself followed this practice after 
appointment as General Secretary. Other staff, such as the Assistant 
Secretary, Research Secretary and Treasurer, also took long trips for 
organizing and coordinating research and conferences. It was an 
expensive operation, but before jet planes or fax,124 probably the only and 
most effective one. 
The practice had a by-product. It constructed a life-style for what is now 
termed the 'international public servant': those who work for the United 
Nations and its affiliated bodies. While diplomats received salaries from 
their government, 'international public servants' are paid by the 
'international' bodies. While the IPR was non-governmental and its 
salary scheme was not as well developed as that of .hE T.eague of Nations, 
122 Davis to Wilbur, 11 May, and 26 May, 1926, E-12b/29, and Davis to Atherton, 11 
August, 1926, E-12b/32, AUH. 
123 Carter to Greene, 1October,1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
124 The administration mainly used letters and telegrams for communicating National 
Councils, not telephones, in the inter-war period. 
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it made its officers accustomed to a certain life-style. It was hard for the 
families of these office-bearers. At times, they took their spouses for 
company or children as secretaries, and the IPR paid expenses of spouses 
on the occasions of major office-bearers' long trips.J25 Davis took his wife 
to Europe in 1927-1928. Carter also took his wife on a trip, but also used 
his children as secretaries. His son, William, learned sJiorthand, took a 
year off from Harvard, and attended the Kyoto Conference as a recorder.126 
These occasions were, however, rare and families were generally left 
behind while the officers were on long trips. Children were in some cases 
put into boarding schools. Carter's son did not remember much time 
together with his father. In some cases, it made children decide not to 
follow a similar career, but in others, it ma.de them more prepared and 
attracted to the life-style and help< , them to develop connection to 
similar social circles. For example, Carter's son took a job at UNESCO, and 
commented fondly of their life style: 'This reflects the times we live in; a 
family on the run'.127 
Key figures at the IPR felt the importance of these overseas visits. Davis 
and Carter both believed that one had to visit and experience countries in 
order to understand them, especially in the Orient.128 Although the 
Pacific Council decided in 1929 that 'it was no longer desirable for senior 
secretaries to visit national units ... for the purpose of promotion,' it still 
recognized the necessity of these officers' keeping close touch with 
members in various countries.J29 Loomis, Condliffe and William 
Holland, Research Assistant at the ISIPR, went to Japan and China, not 
only for the coordination of conferences and ,·?search programs, but also 
to acquire a feel for the countries. DO First hand experience and reports on 
the latest situation in the Orient were valued 1.Jecause of their scarcity. 
When very few had this information and experience, it was the biggest 
selling point of the IPR. 
125 Carter lo Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU. 
126 William Carter, 'Some Memories of Edward C. Carter by His Son,' (unpublished), 17 
April, 1986, pp.3-t I owe this document lo Carter's grandson, Paul Carter, and also 
Prc''''ssor Mark Elvin for ma <ing this contact possible. 
127 \, Carter,'Some memories,' pp.2 and 9. 
128 Carter to Greene, 15 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/ J. Greene, BLCU. 
129 Pacific Council Minutes, 9 Novr 1ber, 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH. 
130 Davis to A lherton, 24 Oclo~r 27, E-13 I 6, A UH. 
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This practice of long trips was both a strength and a weakness of the IPR. 
It was possible because of the small nur.1ber of staff and lack of 
bureaucratic complications at the ISIPR, but it increased the extent of 
fluidity. Less staff also may have meant that the IPR was vulnerable to the 
influence of a few office-bearers on policy matters. 
British participation added a new dimension to this institutional context. 
The invitation of a British group to the second IPR conference was 
organized through Canadian members. This was a decis.on of the IPR.131 
John Nelson, a journalist in Montreal, was selected to be in charge.132 t' 
the first conference, he was nominated as a Canadian representative of a 
temporary executive committee, and therefore responsible for inviting the 
British group. Canadian members were not unanimous about the idea, 
but Nelson favoured it. Backed up by the IPR's committee, he sent an 
invitation to the Honorary Secretary of the British Institute of 
International Affairs (BIIA/RIIA) on 12 March 1926, stating that the 
British should have representatives at the next meeting.1 33 The choice of 
the RIIA is not surprising given its publicity in IPR circles and its 
connection with similar foreign affairs experts' organizations in the USA 
such as the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and the Institute 
of Politics in Williamstown. The move not only involved the dynamics 
from new British imperialism, but also strengthened the element of 
foreign affairs experts' organization within the IPR. 
An interesting by·-product of this process was the promotion of the 
formation of a Canadian national branch of the RIIA. As in Australia, 
membership of local branches (: E the RIIA and the IPR in Canada 
131 J.M. Davis, 'Rcpurt of Commillee on Permanent Organization,' p.591. 
132 Before November 1925, Nelson published the Daily World in Vancouver where 
Oriental immigration was a big issue. It is most likely that he was involved in the 
public debate concerning the issue. Probably its reputation and also his active 
involvement in the YMCA movement brought him to the first IPR conference. P. Hooper 
ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations: Tire Memoirs of William Holland 
(Rynkei shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, p.9. Page numbering is based on the semi 
draft version of the book. The draft is divided into two parls: Part One: pp.1-79, and 
Part Two: pp.1--87. 133 Nelson lo Cathome-Hardy, 12 March, 1926, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU. 
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overlapped extensively and when they organized a national headquarters, 
the two were merged. Unlike the situation in Australia, suspicion against 
the IPR as a propaganda body of American hegemony was almost absent. 
Major members of the IPR favoured British representation mainly in 
order to make higher level discussion possible. In a report sent to the 
RIIA, strong support for British participation among the key IPR members 
was confirmed.1 34 Then Curtis, who showed great interest in the IPR 
enterprise, and who had been an ardent promoter of Anglo-American 
cooperation, wrote to Blakeslee privately, stating that the RIIA had taken a 
step to secure one or two participants for the second conference. At this 
stage, Curtis was still not sure about the position of the IPR. Curtis asked 
Blakeslee if it could send a final and definite invitation.135 
It is strange that the ISIPR left the matter to the Canadian members, and 
that formal correspondence between the RIIA and the ISIPR did not occur 
at this early stage. Curtis's private connection provided the channel 
between the IPR and the RIIA. Curtis contacted his old friend, Edward 
Carter, who was then secretary of the \CIPR in New York. 
Carter's connection with Curtis went back to the time when he was a 
secretary of the YMCA in India in 1902-1908 and 1911-1917. When Carter 
was stationed as : YMCA officer in France during WWI and in London 
soon after WWI, ti-> ··stayed i1: close touch. Their ties became stronger 
when Carter's seen .yin France married Curtis. Around the time of the 
IPR organization in 1924 and 1925, however, Carter was not involved to 
any great extent in discussion on the matter with Curtis. Carter was more 
enthusiastic about his own project of the Inquiry, a YMCA related project. 
As the National Council of the USA, the ACIPR ;:.;ways held a special 
position in the IPR. Especially when the existence of the Pacific Council 
and the ISIPR as an 'international' body was somewhat visionary, that of 
the ACIPR appeared more solid in the minds of some members. Often the 
134 Report of Wilson Harris, 24 May, 1926, CPR, Box108/Curli5 3, BLCU, Nole of Joseph 
Flavell, 18 May, 1926, M::. 2.629/6, Nl .. A. 
135 Curtis to Blakeslee, 16 July, 1926, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU. 
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IPR was identified with the ACIPR, not with the headquarters of the ISIPR 
in Honolulu. For example, the RUA used the ACIPR in New York, not 
the ISIPR in Honolulu, as a channel to communicate with the imagined 
'IPR'. This was probably due to the familiarity of Curtis with members of 
the ACIPR, such as Carter and Jerome Greene, and also due to the 
suspicious attitude of Curtis to the quality of the ISIPR. 
As in other countries, however, the formation of a national council 
involved much imagination. While local branches of the IPR were 
formed in various places in the USA, the national council was in no 
position to control or coordinate all the activities at each branch. The 
ACIPR was more like a regional office in New York in this sense. But it 
was the region with power in terms of money, personnel, institutions and 
political influence. The-documents on the formation of the ACIPR are 
not available, but fragments of letters suggest that the ACIPR was founded 
with the help of Davis and Wilbur after the first conference. In an effort 
to make it more national than regional, the executive board replaced three 
East Coast members with non East Coast members in mid-1926.136 
British participation was formalized after the second conference. The 
Pacific Council invited the RIIA to become a national unit for Britain 
which would send a representative to tr· · · ... 'ic Council. This process 
was delayec'I. due to Curtis's discontent wilh the 'composition' of the ISIPR. 
Ironically this was because Curtis recognized the potential and promise of 
the experiment of the IPR.137 He was one of the very few at the RIIA who 
had a great interest in the region. He felt it import3.nt for the RIIA to 
become a national unit of the TPF He organized the Far Eastern Group in 
the RUA, which dealt with IPR mqtters. Finally, in January 1928, Curtis 
sent a note to Carter, telling him that the RIIA had decided to ratify the 
Constitution. 
[W]e might take our courage in our hand and join, and as full 
members exercise such influence from inside as belongs to a 
136 Edmund Gay, Grafton Wilson, and Blakeslee, as well as Carter and Loomis were 
involved in this re-organization. Carter to Greene, 20 June, 1916, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, 
13LCU. 137 Curtis to Carter, 23 janua• , 1928, CPR, 13ox108/Curtis 2, 13LCU. 
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member in helping on the creation of a Secretariat with the 
qualifications and experience which in our view is needed for so 
delicate and responsible a task. 138 
Ratification was completed soon afterwards, and Curtis became a member 
of the Pacific Council. Until he became preoccupied with the idea of 
Shanbhai Municipal reform, he devoted his energy to re· .;;ganizing the 
IS IPR. 
iii) Effects of British Participation 
Did the British bring a different dynamic to the conference? Certainly, 
they brought with them not only their interests and perspectives, but also 
institutional characteristics of the RIIA. The interests of the British group 
(the 'Far Eastern group' in the RHA), which were mainly focused on 
China, influenced the program. Pla,,ned programs were abandoned, and 
the China issue was put into the primary position beside food and 
popula tion.139 
Beyond this, a Japanese participant, Tsurumi YUsuke, felt that the British 
brought a political element into the conference. 
What I fa!!, when the nature of the conference changed, was the 
political skill of British participants .... Only by adding the British, 
the nature of the conference changed. It is because although the 
USA is a gre:it power, it still is relativP.ly unused to international 
conferences, and tends to prefer academic discussion to politics. 
On the contrary, Britain is skilled in international negotiations, 
and its way of thinki'1g is completely political. Britain selected 
participants only with political inclinations, and at the conference, 
their dealings are political and their interests in discussion were in 
politics. The international tradition of the Gre:it British Empire 
gave them a superior position [al the conference].1 40 
The statement is coloured by Tsurumi's grand generalizations and grand 
words. It is, however, an interesting observation on the dynamism which 
l38 Ibid. 
139 Tsurumi Yosukc, 'Taiheiyo kaigi c'iokakan,' Inoue Junnosukc ed., Ta ilieiyo 111011dai 
bNihon hyoronsha, 1927), pp.43-1-1. 
14 Ibid., pp.4-1--15 
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the British brought to the conference. Rather than being alarmed, he was 
excited by the change. Lionel Curtis impressed Tsurumi, not only with his 
manner, but also with his reputation as an influential man in British 
foreign policy amor.g American participants.141 
In contrast, a critical observation was made by the Australian, Eggleston. 
He thought that while American participants mingled with those from 
Asian countries with ease, the British had no idea how to communicate 
with them, and did not even try to do so. 
There is no doubt ... that the Americans have an art of getting it 
over with Eastern races that the British have not .... Americans 
have superior ability, [and are] socially miles ahead. [They are] 
witty and charming .... British make friends with nobody, Chinese, 
Japanese, New Zealanders, or Australians. They don't entertain 
them.142 
The crucial defect of the British, as Eggleston observed of them in Japan 
and China at the next conference two years later, was their i. ·.ck of interest 
in the Orient. 
The cardinal defect of the British psvchology towards Eastl!rn races 
is a lack of real interest in them. Tr~ days when the Westerner 
could come to the East, and rule ic the better because he was 
indifferent to local quarrels and movements, are gone. At Hong 
Kong, the average Britisher is as ignorant of and indifferent to 
events in China as we are in Melbourne. All he wants to do is to 
make it a little bit of England. But the East is self-conscious, 
jealous, and moving with a premonition of vast power in the 
future. She demands attention c.nd study.143 
Eggleston, who knew Curtis during WWI and at the Paris Con~erence, was 
also one of the original members of the RUA when it was inaugurated in 
London in 1920. Curtis, however, did not put much effort in renewing 
old ties with Eggleston, or anyone from the Dominions in Honolulu.144 
141 Tsurumi Y., Cli iil o o ayumu kokoro , p.463. 
142 Eggleston, Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. 
143 F. Eggleston,' Australia and ti'e Pacific,' Tl•e [Melbourne/ Herald, 23 December, 1929. 
144 Eggleston Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NLA. 
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Eggleston respected Curtis's determination and inspiration for a new for.n 
of imperial ti<~, but was critical of his Ang!:;. 2ntricity. 
Th..: British group also brought the practices of the RIIA into the 
conference. Most important among them was the op~ osition to publicity. 
According to the RIIA constitution, the contents of talks and names of 
speakers at meetings were to be kept secret from the press, and the 
minutes recorded speakers anonymously. Curtis insisted on this practice 
and objected to publicity at the IPR conferences, while the American 
members argued for it. The dispute was fierce. Eggleston recorded: 
'Evening was stormy as Curtis objected to publicity'.115 As a result, the 
second confer,.,nce had much stricter regulation on the press, and this 
tende.. .cy increased in the next conference in ~.yoto. An American 
journalist complained about this closed nature of the IPR. He argued for 
the importance of cooperation between the IPR and 'truth seeking' 
reporters in order to make the conference successful. He blamed the 
British for this problem. 
Americans want to deal openly, b•1t British won't let them. At the 
1929 Kyoto conference, British didn't care a damn whether the 
conference was reported or not. British were narrow and selfish .... 
The American press is still disposed to treat the Institute with 
interested sympathy .... [But] you must realize that l'.ter all •.he 
conferences of the Institute are not "must" news .... It is easy to 
alienate ... if reporters continue to undergo the experience of the 
last two conferences .... You m1, t get alor. !!' with us and treat us as 
friend, not enemy,146 
This elitist element of restricting all the informatior. l<' sdec~ed experts 
and of scepticism towards •he popl!!ar press was not peculiar to the RIIA, 
but had always been latent within the IP 0 It aimed lo oe an elite 
organizatio,1. Along with research, tw ·' .1ctions of the Institute- wide 
and impartial publicity, and eduL;:tion of the society through publicil:-
however, were given priority at the first conference.1 47 The meetbg at 
the second conference concluded that the IPR was a research organization, 
145 rid. 
146 Babb to Loomis, 19 November, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA 
147 For information from Commissioner for Australia in the USA, n. d. [in 1926], A981; Org 
93, AA. 
, 
264 
not a;. unofficial diplomatic organization or an educatiomil 
organization.148 While the emphasis on education was not totally 
abandoned, it seems fair to conclude that the elitist and secretive nature of 
tr.e IPR conferences was acceleratrd by British participation. 
Opposition to publicity was, however, not only the expression of elitist 
attittides, but also that of relativist attitudes to fact. While a staff ffi(mber 
of the ISIPR defined the two functions of the IPR as getting the facts, and 
presenting t:' e facts to the people, a British particiy ~ argued: 
What are the facts? This is the first question. In my view, it is 
essential that .i-.is Conference should concentrate on enabling us to 
get a better knowledge of the foct than wt: .:ould have without it; 
but 1 also hold it is the function of this institute to deal with the 
meaning of the facts. The next question is whethe1 this institute is 
go'.:-1g to t~ke <he function of saying 'This is the rig/it meaning of 
the facts, and it is up to us to get the people to believe this" .... If we 
try to insist that these are the righ~ things we are headed for 
disaster .... We must be a body that includes every poirit of view. A 
body must b2 devoted to research 0r it must be devoted to 
propaganda.149 (emphasis ad<led; 
Against this statement, an American participant argued tre need for a 
great deal of -ropaganda to stimulate people's minrls i!l relation to 
international affairs, especially in the USA where tL: general publk were 
so far uninterested. This discussion resulted in a decision that the 
Institute would collect the facts, interpret them, but avoid offering 
solutions. In this way, the results of II'R conferer.ces would no~ su3t::est 
concrete policies for the government. 
The above statement by a I!ritb;, participant (probably Curtis) is significant 
: ' .. , wo respects. First, it was sceplical about the ab!::iluteness of those 'facts' 
i« which many participants believed. Secc,nd, it tlied to clarify the 
boundary b.-:'ween publicity and propaganda in the materi<1l issued by the 
conference partidp;ints. Curtis was opposed to the IPR' s defining . he 
'ri~ht' perspective and imposing it on the others. 
148 Tsurumi Y., Cir !1/o o ay1111111 kokoro, pp.t,92-193. , .. 
149 'The Future of the Institute,' in J.B. C•Jndliffe ed., Problems a, tlie Pacific, 1927, p.20J.. 
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Curtis felt the need for an institution at which leaders of public opinion 
studied and analysed ever-c1':.nging foreign relations. This was his main 
idea when he founded the RIIA, and the idea had not changed in 1925: 
T~e world is ... over-equipped with machinery for propagating 
views. [C]ooperate effort should. now be concentrated on making it 
possiL:~ for those who mould public L pinion to follow the ever 
shifting facts of international relations, a!ld for thinking out 
together what those facts mean before they write and speak. In the 
last resort the public must judge ... 1so 
The clear distinction between publicity and propaganda, however, was 
blurred Ly the nature of the conference participants. They were not 
officials, but public men and women, who committed 'private' time and 
money to 'public' muses. Being 'public' fig·ures, their lectures and writings 
had the potential to influence and 'educate' publk opinion. If propaganda 
meant the imposition of what they believed to be 'good' and 'right', as 
Curtis claimed, their lectures and articles fulfilled this function. 
Two alternative orientations of publir•.y (or propaganda) were possible. 
One direction was to become a pur'. academic research organization 
without much input to society. A 1other was to become a think tank type 
organization with exclusive inp· .. t to the government, but not much to 
society. Curtis's idea was to pr< duce materials on certain issues for policy 
maker:>:.. d public through rest arch and analysis, and was closer to a 
think tank type or:_, .. nizatiun. T.1e IPR after the second conference, 
increased its research emphasis, 1·emaining ambJv;._l:,,; about its official or 
11,uvernmental orientation. 
Certain new at~itudes to the Orient were !><:l'n in the first two conferences. 
While the dichotomy of 'East' and 'West' was not questioned, a sense of 
geographical and moral centrality among participants was not ~vident. 
They dealt with the current pressing issues through a logic of difference 
rather than thill of a hierarchy. In other words, the difference between 
'East' and 'West' was not used by Europeans, Americans or Australians as 
150 Curtis to Babcock, 9 November, 1925, CPR, Box 108/Curlis 2, BLCU . 
... 
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a means to dominate the 'East'. At the same time, the colonial framework 
anci the nation-state framework were taken for granted. This approach, 
coupled with the participation of Britain, a European power outside the 
Pacific, meant that the future directions of the IPR were already becoming 
clear by the time of the second conference. 
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Chapter Five: From the Pacific to the At-lantic, 1927-1933 
This chapter focuses on the ideas of 'internationality' held by key figures 
in the IPR. The first half of this chapter examines the re-organization plan 
of Lionel Curtis, which triggered the resignation of the first General 
Secretary, Davis. ·rnternational' meant for Curtis a federation of nations 
on a world scale. The incident signified a clearer direction for the IPR, 
towards a foreign affairs experts' organization with an influence wider 
than the Pacific. The frameworks inherent in the original setting, the 
nation-state system and the colonial system, were strengthened by this 
incident. The last half of the chapter argues that the administration of 
Greene in 1930-1932 was transitional, and that the IPR was moving 
toward a world-wide oriented organization rather than a regional one. 
While acknowledging the importance of the 'unofficial' capacity of the 
IPR, key figures endeavoured to make the IPR a more governmental type 
of international organization modelled on the League of Nations, rather 
than an alternative non-governmental type. 
1) Re-organization: Curtis' reform plan 
British participation brought a new dynamic to the IPR, and caused some 
changes at the second conference. The biggest challenge from Lionel 
Curtis appeared, however, after the second conference. !n brief, Curtis 
wanted to make the IPR an organization similar to the League of Nations. 
In other words, he wanted the IPR to be global-oriented, not cor,fined to 
the region, and to be more official-oriented than it had been. His letter to 
Carter in January 1928 makes these points clear. He felt that the IPR had a 
world-wide potential, which was not realized by its present condition. 
This was because: 
[The ISIPR] was dependent on YMCA staff which ... has not the 
exact kind of training which fits them for work which has more in 
--J-----·.-------· 
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common with that of the Secretariat of the League of Nations than 
that to which the staff of the YMCA are accustomed.! 
He felt the need to get a 'world' class general secretary for the International 
Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR), and believed that Davis fell short of this 
calibre.2 
The following is a story of the shift of the IPR from the Pacific to the world 
as an organization and in terms of perceptions among the key figures. In 
this process, the regional dynamism, expressed in the term Pacific Age was 
lost, and an attempt to seek new attitudes to the Orient failed. Curtis did 
not manipulate this shift, but he at least triggered it. 
Curtis's plan of re-organization was neither consistent nor persuasive, and 
was not adopted in the ac<ual process of the institutionalizing of the IPR. 
His plan did, however, raise questions about the 'intern;itionality' and 
'non-governmentality' of the IPR. In contrast to Curtis's· co"Ilment on the 
staff of the international YMCA as somewhat improperly trained or 
professionally inferior to those at the League of Nations, others evaluated 
the YMCA highly. \.Vhite describes the World Alliance of YMCA as 'the 
first true international non-governmental organization to be established 
in the modern movement' .3 How, then, did key figures at the IPR 
respond to Curtis's re-org;:mizing plan, especially to his interpretations of 
'international' and 'non-governmental'? 
i) The Meaning of Being 'International' 
I Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. 
2 Curtis to Carter, 24 July, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU . .\therton lo Davis, 9 
Ai.;gust, 1927, E-13/ 4, AUH. 
3 While continued as follows: 'From the date of its foundation in 1855, [it] was truly 
international with member associations from Belgium, England, France, Germany, 
Ho:Iand, Scotland, Switzerland, and the United Stales'. The World Alliance of YMCA 
originated in Europe, and was called 'truly internal.. nal' by Whit~. His lack of 
attention to non Euro-American organizations, or the lack of the ex1slc.nce 1f these 
org'lilizations outside of Europe :,ind North America is noteworthy. L ·.While, 
/11 tematio11al No11-Governmental orga11izatio11s . heir Purpose, Methe <, a11d 
Acco111plish111e11ts (New Brunswick. N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 195 • ), p.4. 
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Beside the issue of the 'improper' qualification of the staff at the ISIPR, 
Curtis questioned the 'international' quality of the IPR. In a letter of 
November 1928 to Jerome Greene, Treasurer of the American Council of 
the IPR (ACIPR), Curtis defined 'internationality' and the meaning of an 
international secretariat. He had three points, of which the first was 
funding. He argued that American dominance of funding for research 
meant American control over the projects, and would diminish the 
'international' quality of research, and therefore that of the Institute. 
Second,. the Institute should put its primary effort to set conferences on a 
permanent footing, not research programs. The latter should, he argued, 
be left to each National Council. Third, the size and expense of the IS IPR 
should be reduced. He proposed that rather than having a permanent 
location, the ISIPR should be shifted every two years to the location of the 
coming conference.4 Ir> short, Curtis proposed his ideas of 'international' 
in terms of personnel, funds, place and function. 
This plan also suggests a more government-oriented nature for the IPR. 
Curtis's idea of a new IPR was a confer':!nce-centred organization, where a 
small number of influential experts would meet and discuss issues. In 
this plan, data papers would be prepared by National Councils, not by an 
international research committee of the IPR. Curtis had, therefore, a blue 
print for more informal gatherings of diplomats. 
Curtis's re-organization plan was known on'y to a few at the ACIPR in the 
early stages. General Secretary Davis only ledrned of it in early 1929. In 
hindsight, the ostracized Davis and J. Condliffe, the Research Secretary of 
the IS IPR, felt that there was a conspiracy between the British group and 
the ACIPR in New York, mi\inly Carter, against the ISIPR in Honolulu. 
As shown in the following, however, the documents do not support this. 
They not only demonstrate the role of the ACIPR as an independent body 
rather than an Anglophile follower of Curtis's idea, but also reveal a 
serious effort on the ACIPR's part to understand what it meant to be truly 
in tern at iona/. 
Curtis to Greene, 7-13 November, 1928, A·l/PC 1929, AUH. 
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Greene, as Treasurer of the ACIPR and recipient of the letter from Curtis, 
took the initiative to respond. Curtis's letter on re-organization was 
writte.~ · J Greene to communicate his impressions of the ACIPR meeting 
in New York, which Curtis had attended. The matter was mainly dealt 
with by Greene and Carter, and to a lesser extent Charles Howland and 
James Shotwell, both resident in New York and involved with the 
research committee of the IPR. Carter and Greene felt it important to deal 
with the matter in a small group, and only then to let Wilbur know.5 
Greene was, however, uncomfortable at putting the ACIPR into a position 
of secretive negotiations. He wrote to Curtis: 
[A]ny suggestions from London looking toward the alteration d 
the policies of the Institute and destined for consideration by che 
other groups wov.ld; erhaps better be sent directly, either formally 
to Wilbur or informally to him and the various constituent 
groups, including ourselves, rather than to use us, another Anglo 
Saxon group, as a channel for getting your ideas before the others.6 
The ISIPR does not appear in this statement as a headquarters of liaison. 
Instead, the Pacific Council was referred for this function. The Pacific 
Council, however, was an imagined committee, the members of which 
lived in different countries and only came together at the time of 
conference. Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council, therefore often 
became the Pacific Council by himself. Probably the by-passing of the 
IS IPR was due to the topic of discussion (the ISIPR), and Greene's 
consideration of the delicate position of Davis. In any event, the ISIPR 
was left out from these proceedings. 
Greene consulted only Carter, Shotwell and Howland. The response to 
Curtis's plan from them was not favourable. While seeing the letter as 
valuable for future consideration, Carter disagreed strongly with Curtis. 
He pointed out the mistakes in Curtis's understanding of the budget 
increase, and then moved on to his argumePt on 'internationality' in 
research. 
5 Greene to Carter, 12 December, 1928, and Carter to Greene, 15 December, 1928, CPR, 13ox 
112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
6 Greene to Curlis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, 13ox 112/J. Greene, 13LCU. 
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"Yhile .we may no~ be able to achieve international mutuality in 
fmancmg, I do believe that we may be able to achieve a high 
measure of international mutuality in the conduct of research if 
the American Council continues to be willing to place American 
funds fully at the disposal of the Institute for its international 
research program .... To [Curtis] the Carnegie Endowment's money 
is in the strict sense of the term internationalized .... I can see no 
difference at all between the degree of internationalisation of the 
Carnegie money and that of money raised in this country for the 
specific purposes of int2rnational peace in the Pacific which is 
raised by Americans and then handed over completely to the 
Pacific Council to spend. 
Then Carter emphasized the 'international' character of the Paci"c 
Council and the IPR as a whole. 
The aims of the Pacific Council are clearly as international as those 
of the Carnegie Endowment, and the personnel of the Pacific 
Council and of the whole Institute is certainly far more 
international than the trustees of the Carnegie Endowment or the 
personality of the late Mr Carnegie, who appears to Curtis as an 
.;nternational figure rather than an American by reason of his 
Scotch (sic) ancestry.? 
Greene was more concerned than Carter with the danger of American 
control. In the letter to Curtis, he wr'.1te: 'Carter differs with you more or 
less radically' and 'my own position is sympathetic w;th yours in 
principle, and I am thinking chief! y of the practical question of the re-
organization or re-direction of the activities involved' .8 After reading 
Curtis's plan many times, Greene wrote to him, and presented his idea of 
'internationality', arguing that American interests were not dominant in 
the American foundations, and stressing the importance of h"ving no1.-
Americans, especially Orientals, among the staff of the ISIPR. 
Greene proposed dividing the budget of the IPR into two independent 
categories; one for the administration of the ISIPR, and one for research. 
He pointed out the mistake of Curtis in seeing the major increase of the 
budget as the result of research requirements. Jt was not due to the 
7 Carter to Greene, 10 December, 1928, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
B Greene to Curtis, 13 December, 1925, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
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research program, but to the administration of the ISIPR, including two 
new appointments of Associate Secretaries (a Japanese and a Chinese). 
The internationality of the secretariat, as Greene argued, could be attained 
not by alternating its locations between the Orient a 'd Occident as Curtis 
suggested, but by recruiting people of diverse backgrounds at the 
secretariat. Greene thought that a real rather than a token addition of 
Orientals was necessary for the ISIPR. He argued that this addition would 
secure substantial contributions from these countries for th 2 
administration of the ISIPR. 
Up to this time, [the staff at the ISIPR] has been wholly Anglo 
Saxon, and with the exception of Condliffe, wholly American. At 
best we have a heavy handicap of racial bias to overcome in the 
history of the inception of the Institute, its American leadership ... 
and in its financial support. The only feasible way to lessen this 
bias is to add Japanese and Chinese secretaries and to make that 
addition as a real one, not mere "scenery". The men selected must 
be of such calibre as to make them a real factor in the wor.r< of the 
Secretariat and to inspire the confidence of the oriental members 
of th' Institute.9 
Against Curtis's idea of the General Secretory living out of a suitcase, 
Greene argued for the importance of haYing a strong headquarters: 'The 
integrity of the Secretariat as an international instrument is the sine qua 
non of its usefulness'. In order to strengthen this integrity anc~ retain its 
international character, Greene proposed to allocate a quota of the budget 
of the ISIPR to each National Council. 
Unlike Curtis who emphasized conferences and a quasi-diplomatic 
function for th1~ IPR, Greene felt strongly that the research on the 'Far 
East', which had been neglected, was valuable for international relations, 
and that it shout , be the priority. While Curtis worried about the 
dominance of American resources and control over the research program, 
Greene refuted the point. Like Carter, Greene argued that the funds of 
foundations such as the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, the Laura 
Spelman Rockef1:1:er Memorial JO and the Social Science Research Council 
9 Greene to Curtis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
10 As noted in Cha :itcr Two, note 18, Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial became the 
Rockefeller Foundation in 1929, and the thesis is using the term the Rockefeller 
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(New York) were international because their purpose was to 'promote the 
well-being of mankind throughout the world'.11 The Ruckefeller 
Foundation recognized the IPR as: 
an international body of a character and competence which make 
~t an appropriate agency for undertaking rPsearch on certain 
important topics within the Pacific area.12 temphasis added) 
Therefore, Greene concluded: 'it makes comparatively little difference 
where the money comes from',13 For him the important thing was net to 
have each nation proportionally contributing to the research budget, but 
to have an efficient and competent Research Committee to supervise 
unprejudiced objectivity with useful results. 
In contrast, Curtis's idea '- · internationality' was based on a strong sense of 
the nation-state. 'Internat>unal' research had to be based on national 
institutions with funds coming from within the nation . .In a letter to the 
Carnegie Endowment for Peace in 1925, Curtis stated: 
My belief ... is that independent enquiry would lead your trustees 
to our own view that efforts to eradicate the causes of war will 
accomplish little unless they are based on continuous study 
conducted through research institutions which must be national 
in character, but with international relations with like institutions 
.... My own conviction is that if such institutes are really to be 
national, the bulk of their funds must also be national.14 
(emphasis added) 
Even the Carnegie Foundation money, as Curtis continued, would 
'undermine the national character' c.f the RiIA. In his mind, each 
national unit should carry out independent research, and cooperate with 
others in other countries, rather than one inte: r~: .. tional research 
institution having national branches as its sub-structure. !his idea of 
national institutions for national research was based on his strong sense of 
Foundation both for the Rockefeller Found<1tion and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Memorial unless otherwise specified. 
11 Greene to Curtis, 3 January, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Curlis to Babcock, 9 November, 1925, CPR Box108/Curtis 2, BLCU. 
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national security, the thinking which probably reflected the mentality in 
the Foreign Office: 
Citizens of all views from one country can speak together with a 
frankness which becomes impossible if that gathering [is] open to 
people of all views from a number of other countries. The 
discussions of a cosmopolitan gathering become unreal.JS 
Curtis's stance against the international research scheme, his insistence on 
putting research strictly in the domain of each National Council, and his 
opposition to any enlargement of the ISIPR, implied not only the 
abolition of the international research program at the IPR, but also the 
dismissal of the International Research Secretary, Condliffe. Curtis's plan, 
therefore, put the method and organization of international rese:irch 
schemes under scrutiny. 
Research had been a major function of the IPR from the beginning, based 
on the philosophy that the' facts' would contribute to the solution of 
problems in the Pacific. Condliffe was recruited from New Zealand to 
organize the international research programs. Condliffe was Professor of 
Economics at Canterbury University College at Christchurch, New 
Zealand. His activities at the first conference impressed many 
participants, and he led the organization of the IPR in New Zealand after 
the conferenr.e. Davis offered him the job of Research Secretary in lat-
1926. Without knowing the prospects and against friends' worries, he 
accepted the offer, and arrived in Honolulu in February 1927.16 
Organizing a multinational research program from scratch was no small 
task. His fir5t duty was to go to the USA to report to Wilbur, and consult 
with scholars in the USA who were interested in the Pacific. It was his 
first trip to the mainland USA, starting in California where Davis had 
contacts through the "Race Relations Survey". The trip then continued to 
Oregon, Washington, Chicago and New York. 
JS //1id. . 
16 He was thirty-four year-old, then. J.B. Condliffe, Re111i11iscc11ccs of tlze ~11st1tute.o[ 
Pacific Relations (Vancouver, B. C.: Institute of Asian Research, Umvers1ty of llnt1sh 
Columbia, 1981), p.8. 
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Condliffe' s perspective coming from a small country in the Pacific, 
contributed to a relatively impartial position regarding the research 
program. He felt that most American Far East specialists at the first 
conference were pro-China and sceptical of Japan and Britain, so he 
wanted to 'ind others with different perspectives.I' However, this 
position, probabiy coupled with his rather arrogant attitudes, due to his 
youth, enthusiasm and his casual manner, created tension between him 
and Carter, Secretary of the ACIPR.18 They did not get on. 
Condliffe thought Carter ambitious, eager, self-sacrificing and seldom 
relaxed enough to try the obvious simple course.1 9 Although Condliffe's 
evaluation of Carter seems to have been coloured by their personal clash 
and later bitter experience, it seems pertinenc to point to the manipulative 
element in Carter's use of letters. Rather than stating incidents or asking 
opinions, Carter seems to have had strong opinions framed beforehani; 
and •o have tried to convince ,he others of his ov.·n ·riews. 
· The clash was also over the control of research funds. Control over 
research funds virtually meant control over the IPR itself. The 
documents at the Rockefelle. Arc!-ives reveal the importance of research 
programs for the IPR grant applications. More than any other functions, 
the Foundation valued the IPR' s original contribution to research and to 
the creation of' mutual-understanding' in the Pacific area in the inter-war 
period.20 Reliance on this major source for the IPR funding 'lot only 
determined the nature of the IPR activities, but a!.;o gave t: ~ who 
controlled the grant application the power to control the IPR. 
Major figures at the ACIPR were involved with the foundations as 
trustees or officers. Jerome Greene was a trustee of the Rockefeller 
17 ibid.,p.13. 
18 J. 13. Condliffc gave an arrogant impression to Wilbur, Shotwell, and Curtis as well as 
Carter. Atherton to Davis, 16 August, 1927, E-13/ 5, AUH. 
19 J.B. c, 'iffe, Re111i11isce11ces, p.12. 
20 The Fou . .Jation had been the major source ;,f the !PR from 1925, and its support remained 
in the inter-war period. In 1931, the Foundatior. described the IPR as follows: 'The value 
of the work of the Institute and its importance both as a research organization and as an 
instrument for promoting international good will cannot be qur:!ioned'. [Re>. · c·tion], 22 
May, 1931, RFnA/1.1/200/350/4171, RA. 
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Foundation in 1913-1917, and again in 1928-39, and James Shotwell was 
involved with the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Social Science 
Research Council. They socialized often at alumni clubs or social clubs 
which were concentrated in a small area of Manhattan. Cc:nmunications 
were easy by telephone, mail, personal visits, or me; is at clubs. These 
:'Jrmal and informal ties were important for successft.! applications, and 
the .4.( ?R made efforts to maintain cordial relations with officers of these 
foundations. 
Although Condliffe suspected that Carter wa;. · :m scholars to 
control the research pre ;rrams, as a re~11.\~ 0f the mi:-, . ith officers at 
the Rockefeller Foundation, Condliffe gained control of the research 
grant.21 He was, however, very aware of the power of those whc had 
access to funds. 
The almost unconscious assumption of superiority by ~o ma11y in 
the United States who had access to funds was to be c. constar.t 
problem in organizing a truly effective research :;1ogram.22 
Lack of control over funds, Condliffe argued, was the weakness of Davis.23 
This was true, but the role of fund-re-' .• ag from the l:eginning was very 
much left to the ACIPR in !'Iew Yor1c, not to the ISIPR. Davis did not 
include fund-raising as one of main functions of the ISIPR in 1927.24 
Atherton, a loyal supporter of Davis, did not realize the imp!ications of 
this omission, and proposed to leave the fund-raising to Carter and 
Greene, while Davis could concentrate on other issues such as 
conferences.25 Therefore, it was not only Carter's push, but also i.:1e 
original setting of the Institutr itself that made Davis's position 
vulnerable. The location of the ISIPR did not help. Being in New York 
was crucial for fund raising at the foundations. 
21 j. B. Conc;.iffe, Reminiscences, p.11. 
22 Ibid., p.15. 
23 Ibid., p.39. 
24 j. M. Davis, 'Foreword,' in). B. Condliffe ed., Problems of tire Pacific, 1927, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1928), p.vi. 
25 Atherton to Davis, 5 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH. 
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In Condliffe' s organization of the international research program, 
American dominance was r.:1t evident in terms of agents, methods or 
agenda. Condliffe promoted the initiativ~ of Japanese and Chinese 
members in research projects and data papers for the conference in 1929, 
and he did so in a consultative manner rather than i1nposing his ideas to 
them. 
The organization of research projects and data papers in Japan was carried 
out through the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) in Tokyo. It was 
relatively easy because of its centralized nature. Almost all academics on 
the research committee were from Tokyo Imperial Ur,ivercity. Condliffe 
found tl1t prestige of the IPR high in Japan mainly becau~~ :...i the 
prominence of the people involved, and also the respect earned by Davis 
and Greene. He was lodged in the Imperial. Hotel and invited to various 
functions. 
His strategy of the research program was influenced by his experience in 
Japan. He recorded: 'I was also being educated in the values of Japanese 
society', and realized that he had to be sensitive to the delicate relationship 
between Japan and China 
Almost anxious in their courteous hospitality, sensitive and yet 
eager. to display the beauty of land and the simplicity of their 
cusioms, they let it be known these graces were the marl: of an old 
and tough civilization ... I grew not only to respect the Japanef 
character but to be a little afraid of what might come if it were 
not be understood abroad. 26 
Not only JCIPR members, but also members of the Chinese Council 
influenced the research projects as well as the agenda of the conference in 
1929. The mi:mbers of the JCIPR told Condliffe that Manchuria shc.uld 
not be a topic at the next conference in Kyoto, and Condliffe should 
convey this message to Chinese counterparts. Against the wish of 
Japanese scholars, however, the Chinese thought that the only 
worth;vhile subject 3t the Kyoto conferen :e was Manchuria, and that it 
should be well-researched. 
26 J.B. Condliffc, Reminiscences, pp.19-20. 
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While bei11g sensitive to tl'>e JCIPR and ruling out research on Korea 
because of the concerns of the JCIPR, Condliffe did not follow the requests 
of the JCE'R blindly. After coming back to Shanghai, Condliffe met 
Matsuoka Yosuke, General Manager of the South Manchurian Railway, in 
Dairen in Manchuria, and told him that the Chinese group would prepare 
papers on political.- legal and economic aspects of Manchuria for the 
comirr; IPR conference .. 1atsuoka responded positively that 'he could 
handle them'. Back in Japan, Condliffe sensed a much more negative 
reaction by JCIPR members, but the Chairman of the JCIPR, Inoue 
Junnosuke (1869-1932), took a similar confident attitude to Matsuoka. 
Condliffe recorded that: 
Inoue listened to my report quietly and to the mingled relief and 
dismay of the professors decided to accept the challenge, but he 
asked me to work with the Japanese committee on a research 
program to outdo the Chinese. This I did and at the same time 
prepared a long report on my whole trip for Merle Da'.:. ~7 
This decision of the JCIPR to take on the Manchurian issue at the IPR 
conference reinforced the cocperation between the Japanese government 
and the JCIPR. From then. '<chol.o:<; such as Royama Masamichi (1895-
1965), worked on the study on \1anchuria with government cooperation. 
This study group became the core of the younger generation of the JCIPR. 
On the dher hand, it wa::> a brave decision of Inoue to agree to the 
proposal. Inoue, then General Director of the Bank of Japan, became 
Minister of Finance just before the Kyoto conference. To clarify the 
'unofficial' status of the JCIPR, he resigned from the chairn<anship of the 
JCIPR at the same t:;;:.~. He was assassinated in 1932, and with him, the 
JCIPR lost a figure, strong and influential enough to criticize 
governmental policies. 
Condliffe' s orgaTlizadon of research projec ; and data papers can be 
criticized. Tht: research was heavily focused on Japan and China, and 
probably due to h:s background, economic topics prevailed. He provided, 
how~ver, initiative and independence for Japanese and Chinese scholars. 
27 ibid., pp.32-33. 
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As a result of his trip to j. :··an and China, various works were produced by 
Japanese and Chinese as well as American and British scholars. These 
works included :·-lasu Shiroshi's work on land use, Inoue Junnosuke's 
work on ~conomy and finance in Japan,28 and John Lossing Buck's 
Chinese Farm Economy (1930), and Land Utilization in Clzina (1937). One 
uf the major goals of the program was to initiate research on Japon and 
China. Condliffe did not claim exclusive credit for the research products, 
and often launched research projects in cooperation with other 
institutions. Vari0us research works were initially promoted by a grant 
from the IPR allocated by Condliffe, and carried out in cooperation with 
various institutions. 
Collaboration with other local institutions was particularly important in 
China. In contrast to the centralized JCIPR, the groups of the Chinese 
Council of the IPR were geographically far apart. They were mainly under 
the control of the YMCA, and many of the members were educated 
abroad. Through these YMCA contacts, Condliffe travelled extensively 
and organized research projects both by foreign-edu::::ted Chinese 
academics and foreign researchers resident in China. He, for example, 
travelled to Tientsin, and allocated some research funds to Na11 l,3i 
University, where young Chinese economists were Engaged in primary 
studies on prices and industrializatio11.29 
Condliffe's approach showed that even if projects were fundEd by 
American money, this did not necessarily mean American dominance of 
their content. Condliffe proved, therefore, that Curtis's criticism of 
American domination and undermining the internationality of projects 
was not really valid. 
Without knowing much about Condliffe's efforts in late 1927 and early 
1928 ill Japan and China, Curtis insisted on making all the research 
schemes the property of N<1tional Councils, and abolishing the 
international progrnm. and therefore th;.! Research Secretary at the ISIPR. 
28 This work is H. G. Moulton, Japan: An Er..1110111ic and Financial Appraisal ('r'v';,;hini;ton: 
Brookings In,tilulion, 1931). 
29 These econ0:11isl5 were Franklin Ho, Li Choh-ming anci H. r1. Fong. 
280 
Curtis pursued this plan, backed by the RIIA, at the Kyoto Conference in 
late 1929. As Condliffe recordEd: 'A few weeks before the conference, the 
RIIA submitted a proposal to reduce the [ISIPR] in view of the deficit (then 
about $170,000) by eliminating practically all the staff, including the 
Research Secretary' .30 Cc, .. ,'.1bined with the stock market crash in New 
York soon aft.er the conference started, which made the raising of funds 
for the increasP.d staff impussible, this plan caused the resignation of 
Davis. 
2) The Resignation '1r Davis 
Curtis's criticism of Davis, the ISIPR1 and the IPR in general was based on 
his vision of an ideal 'international' organization. By 'international' 
Curtis also meant world class. He wanted the IPR to be a 'world-class' 
organization, and wanted 'world-class' men to head the IPR. For Curtis, 
world-class meant possessing a high reputation across the world, which 
was a euphemism for Europe. He expressed his discontent with the ISIPR 
fi;·~t on the ship from Honolulu to San Francisco after the second 
conference. On board were Gr~ene, Carter, Atherton and Wilbur. 
Atherton wa" up~~t by C:~~r~s's insult to his close colleague, Davis. He 
later wrote to Davis: 
[Curtis] takes IPR seriously .... What Curtis wants [is] a superman. 
We will look a long time before we find any such man .... You 
don't need to be disturbed.31 
Davis contemplated resignation, but, encouraged by the -.vords of Atherton 
and Wilbur, he decided to stay on for the next two years.32 After meeting 
people at the League in Geneva, Atherton was convinced that Curtis's 
judgement was often unsound. He felt strongly against Curtis's push to 
turn the Institute into a quasi-diplomatic body. 
I do not think it would be right for us to allow the English 
influenc•;, ... as some of the delegates clearly state they are 
30 J.B. Condliffe, Re111i11isce11ces,, p.37. 
31 Atherton to Davis, 9 August, 1927, E-13/ 4, AUH. 
32 Davis to Atherton, 16 September, 1927, E-13/ 5, AUH. 
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primarily interested in the political aspect of the Institute .... I feel 
that much of the strength of the Institute is due to the fact that we 
have not emphasized the political side of many of our Pacific 
problems .... As I view the Institute from this distance [in Geneva], 
I feel personally more convinced that we have proceeded in the 
right way, and that because of the attitude and spirit shown by the 
secretariat ... we have won the respect and confidence of the 
various national groups .... I should be very loath to see any 
change along the lines that Mr Curtis recommends.33 
The criticism made Davis more consc:i· · than ever of the implications of 
the IPR experiment. He realized: 
perhaps for the first time, the wid.er out-reach and political 
implication and influence which the Institute possesses .... The 
Institute is proving to be a bigger enterprise with larger 
possibilities and influence than any of us probably realized at first. 
A gathering of people of good will with a regional scope was being made 
into a serious political debatiP.g machine with a global scope. For this 
Davis was little prepared. However, like Atherton, Davis felt the need to 
maintain the original regional dynamism. 
[I]t would not be the part of wisdom for us, at this early stage, to 
give up the point of view and philosophy of international 
relations that are really responsible for making the Institute the 
success it has become.34 
Until early 1929, Davis did not know about Curtis's plan and his 
correspondence with the ACIPR. From late 1927 to early 1929, he worked 
enthusiast:c ~ly, pursuing what he thought right to do as General 
Secretary. He sailed to the USA, worked on promotion and organization 
of branches, published the proceedings through Chicago U11iversity Press, 
ard worked on raising funding in New York. Then h1. ,:. ossed the 
Atlantic and visited Europe, mainly Geneva and London. In London, 
Curtis and the RUA entertained him and his wife. Curtis told Carter that 
his impre!'Sion of Davis improved a lot, but that Davis was still 
inadequate as General Secretary.35 
33 Atherton to Davis, 5 October, 1927, E-13/6, AUH. 
34 Davis to Atherton, 2-1October,1927, E-13/6, AUH. 
35 Curtis to Carter, 23 January, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. 
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Davis resented the fact that the proceedings of re-organization entirely 
ignored him as General Secretary. He did not think Curtis understood the 
philosophy of the IPR. He thought that Curtis was to re-organize the IPR 
completely, its conference techniques, research, information exchanges, 
publicity and emphasis. 'He was out to build a new kind of 
organization' .36 
Davis followed his idea of 'internationalization' of the ISIPR by recruiting 
two Associate Secretaries from Japan and China. The negotiation 
involved much energy and delicate care. Terminology was important to 
recruit a person of substance. Davis first used the t:erm, Deputy Secretary, 
but this was replaced by Associate Secretary because he learned that in 
Chinese 'Deputy' meant inferior.37 It was not an easy task. In Japan, the 
selection involved the JCIPR and the Ministry of :::oreign Affairs. Finally 
an ex-ambassador, Yamasaki Keiichi, was selected. Davis worried about 
the official pressure behind the selection, but this suspicion was denied by 
the JCIPR.38 Already before the Kyoto Conference, these associate 
secretaries had started work at the ISIPR. 
The move to internationalize the ISIPR was supported by Greene and 
Wilbur.39 Greene in particular felt that this recruitment was very 
important, and promised ta raise the funds. He was then still hopeful, 
aLhough he was also aware that the task was formidable. Carter did not 
oppose Davis's plan, either. Greene and Carter were determined to raise 
the funds required to employ the additional staff at the ISIPR, but did not 
oredict the stock market craGh. 
' 
The third conference opened in Kyoto on 23 October 1929. It was the most 
discussed issue on the Pacific Coast:~- the USA in the su:nmer as John 
Tilley, British Ambassador to japan, recorded when he attended a few 
36 Davis to Wilbur, 15 February, 1929, A-1/PC 1929, AUH. 
37 Davis to Loomis, 18 AUb'USI, 1928, E-13/9, AUH. 
38 Saito to Davis, 15 April, 1929, E-13/15, AUH. 
39 Davis to Atherton, 12 March, 1928, E-13/6, 12 October, 1928, E-13/11, and 17 October, 
1928, E-13 /11, A UH. 
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meetings in California.40 Despite the anti-publicity policy of the IPR, 
newspapers in Japan, the USA and even Australia reported the details of 
the conference in favourable tones. Almost a week after the opening of 
this conference, however, on 29 October, the New York stock market 
crashed, and blew away all hopes for raisin!', ~unds for new apr.Jintments. 
Having already recruited two "~sociate secretaries from Japan and China, 
Davis lost face. He had to dismiss those in whose appointment he 
invested much energy.41 Humiliated, frustrated and feeling powerless, 
Davis submitted his resignation to the Pacific Cour.dl. On a motion by 
Curtis, seconded by Greene, it was voted that Davis would hold office 
until his successor be appointed, and that Greene and three others (one 
American and two Canadians) be appointed as a committee to seek 
candidates for the post of General Secretary.42 
3) Reaction and Meaning: Loss of the "Pacific Sense" 
Davis's resignation symbolized the future .direction of the IPR. The 
resignation was caused by the elements inherent in the original setting, 
but aggravated and strengthened not only by key figures at the IPR, but 
also by the events of the day. The IPR was now defined as a 
organization of foreign affairs experts. In the process, it became clear that 
the hope and possibility of. t;K Pacific-centred perspective, and of 
establishing new attitudes towards the Orient, were lost. This sense of a 
loss of the original perspective and dynamism was recorded in the 
documents. 
Just before his departure to take up a position at the League of Nations in 
Geneva in July 1930, Davis wrote to Greene, giving the reasons for his 
resignation. He listed three reasons: the change of the emphasis from 
cultural and economic topics to political ones, the lack of support from the 
Pacific Council, and the lack of the control over finances. Davis thought 
the original objectives of the IPR were in danger of failure. 
40 Tillcv lo Cushendun, 18 October, 1928, A981; Org 93, AA. 
41 Davis lo Greene, 18 July, 1930, E-17 /6, AUi-i. 
42 Minutes of Pacific Council, 7 November, 1929, A-I/PC 1929, AUH. 
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It may profitably be borne in mind that the cornerstone of this 
whole enterprise consists of neither speed nor technique nor 
money, ... but of mutual confidence and respect, and that these 
have been the most elusive of all the values which East and West 
have been building together in their contacts during the last 
hundred years.43 
Davis felt that these problems were brought in from outside the Pacific, 
implying British influence, and hoped that the IPR would not become 'an 
Atlantic Institute of Pacific Relations'. 
Men of the Pacific area formed this Institute to put into practice 
their ideals and to solve their peculinr problems ... [I]f the Councils 
of the institute are dominated by the point of view of the old order 
they cannot succeed in meeting the needs of the new community 
of the Pacifi1 · .44 
Davis's view was shared by Eggleston, who wrote to Greene that there was 
a danger in shifting emphasis from culture to politics, and of control from 
New York.45 Greene and Curtis dismissed the claim of Davis and 
Eggleston. For Greene, the shift from culture to politics was not deliberate 
nor avoidable. 
[T)hey were both as wrong as they can b~. Matters of political 
controversy endangering international relations are subjects for 
study and discussion par excellence. The whole point is that we 
are supposed to approach these subjects in a mood of scientific 
inquiry.46 
Curtis agreed: 
What a silly lett':!r [of Davis's] that was ... Vie British were not a: 
the conference at Honolulu if the conference was meant to confine 
itself to cultural relations ... 47 
43 Davis to Greene, 18 July, 1930, E-17 /6, AUI-1. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Eggleston to Greene, 18 September, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA. 
46 Greene to Curtis, 21 August, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL. 
47 Curtis to Greene, 20 September, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL. 
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In the initial organization process, Davis had reduced the influence of the 
YMCA and tried to present the IPR as something similar to the Institute of 
Politics at Williamstown. Although following the dominant opinion of 
that time, he was often unsure whether he was going in the right 
direction. Davis's vision of the IPR remained based on good-will and 
brotherhood, which was increasingly in conflict with the views that the 
IPR should become a more 'professional' organization of foreign affairs 
experts. 
Davis's main weakness was his lack of control over funds. Carter's 
application fur the grant from the Rocl~efeller Foundation was clearer in 
points which were significant for the foundation.48 Davis's idea of 
financing the IPR was also problematic. He relied entirely on the wealthy. 
Greene was finding (his method more and more limited. 
It is proving to be extraordinarily difficult to paint the picture of 
the institute to the rich man in the [Wall] Street in such a way as to 
win anything better than his indulgent approval of what he 
regards as a well meant but somewhat visionary enterprise.49 
Despite these faults, Davis embodied the original dynamism of the Pacific-
centred community in which the Oriental powers would have equal 
standing. Davis was not alone in this thinking. Eggleston also feared the 
loss of the regional sense which Davis embodied. 
We go further to say that delegates from regions which do not 
border on the Pacific, should be particularly careful to understand 
the point of view of those who do. They may possess interests, 
but not understand. I have always ... [been] keen on preserving the 
character of the Institute ... well defined by Mr Davis.so 
Not only the regional sense, but the experimentation with new attitudes 
to the Orient was felt to be failing. As Ian Allen, a New Zealander, wrote: 
43 The style of Davis's application tended to be more descriptive, while that of Carter 
was more business like and more relevant to the requirements of the foundation. 
Compare, for examFle, Davis lo Cuthwaite, 2 December, 1925, and Carter to Rum!, 11 
June, 1926, LSRM/54/582/IPR 1925-1926, RA. 
49 Greene to Fosdick, 7 August, 1929, LSRM/54/5l~: 'IPR 1929. RA. 
50 Eggleston to Greene, 18 September, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA. 
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Is there any possible development by American and British 
members which would be likely to create feeling between East and 
West? Should this be so, I feel the main principle of the institute 
would be jeopardized.51 
Allen thought one c:>f the reasons for Davis's resignation was Davis's 
sympathy with the Japanese and Chinese which may not have b~en 
appreciated by some groups, such as the British. Like Allen, Eggleston 
worried about the danger of the emergence of undesirablP. blocs at the IPR. 
[T]he Australian groups would deprecate any political or national 
grouping of the members such as Sri\ish bloc or Anglo-Saxon 
bloc.52 
These observations show that the experiment of establishing the new 
discourc:e with the Orient was making progress at the conferences, but that 
it was impeded by the series of incidents which culminated in Davis's 
resignation. In the following years, the direction of the IPR was to 
become, not region-wide, but a more world-wide organization, which 
meant more European involvement. A few regional plans were 
submitted to the conferences against this direction, but never captured 
major support or even interest. 
Eggleston enthusiastically proposed a regional disarmament plan at the 
Kyoto c'Jnference. He argued that it was easier to a~hieve disarmament in 
th~ Pacific because of its spaciousness and because there was less imperial 
competition here than in Europe. But he faih i:attract much support. 
This tendency to a regicnal consideration of Pacific problems was 
resisted by certain sections of the conference [in 1929]. The 
representatives from Great Britain in particular were very much 
afraid of it, and put their weight against any regional 
considera~ion, or regional conference. They operate in the Pacific 
... but it is too far from the Far East to have any appreciable effect 
on the situation.53 
--------··---
51 Allen to Greene, 10 April, 1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, HLCU. 
52 Eggleston to Greene, 18 c,.ptember, 1930, MS 423/ 1.J, NLA. 
53 F. Eggleston, 'Australi;i 11d the Pacific,' The I Melbourne} Herald, 30 Dt·:ember, 1929. 
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The lack of attention to or enthusiasm for his regional plan was not only 
due to the resistance of British participants. He pointed out that there had 
been no major debate on regional arrangements at the conference because 
of 'the disinclination of both British and American representatives' .54 
British reluctance can be explained easily. As Chapter Three, Section Two 
showed, seeing the Pacific as an independent entity was thought 
dangerous by the British and Australian governments because it implied 
the challenge to its imperial order. Probably, American reluctance was not 
so much because of the 'regional' aspect of the proposal, as because of the 
'multilateral' nature of collective security. The IPR, born of regional 
dynamism, failed to achieve any kind of regional arrangement, or even to 
discuss seriously any regional proposals. 
Probably only small powers in the Pacific, such as Australia, saw the Pacific 
from this regional perspective as opposed to a' global' perspective. Such a 
regional perspective implied a certain challenge to the wider framework, 
and the perception and the institution which had been constructed by the 
great world power. Davis was well aware of the role of small regional 
powers at the IPR. 
I hope that the Australian Branch of the IPR will continue to stand 
for the importance of Pacific leadership in the Enterprise .... Your 
group with NZ, held the balance of power in the Pacific Council on 
the important matters of policy.SS 
In contrast to these reactions, Japanese members did not see profound 
implications in Davis's resignation. Japanese members did not take this 
incident as a major change in the nature or direction of the IPR. No letter 
from the JCIPR to either the ISIPR, the Pacific Council, or the ACIPR exists 
in the archives in regards to this incident. They did not perceive the 
failure of new attitudes to the Orient or the loss of the Pacific-centred 
f';rspective. 
The JC IPR' s perception of the IPR' s role differed from those of the 
Europeans, Americans and Australians. The IPR was certainly seen as 
54 Ibid. 
55 Davis to Eggleston, 30 July, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA. 
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having elements of a new regional experiment, but much stronger 
expectations lay in its publicist function as an informal means to achieve 
pro-Japanese attitudes in the major countries of the Pacific. The priority of 
the JCIPR was to cultivate new attitudes, not to the Orien~ in general, but 
to Japan. Even after they realized that nothing could be done tc •~;;<"cl lh:; 
American immigration act of 1924, the IPR was still CJ useful stage on 
which to publicize the image of a Hberal Japan. Davis's resignation and 
the subsequent direction of the IPR made little impression in JCIPR circles. 
Eggleston, Davis, Allen ancl Atherton were Orientalists in a sense that 
they did not question the East vs West dichotomy, which was the 
dominant intellectual paradigm of the period. In many ways, they were 
more conscious of the difference of culture, and re-enforced this 
dichotomy strongly. This strong sense of 'difference' made some, such ;;s 
Eggleston, re~pect the 'East'. Importantly, their Orientalist discourse was 
not for domination Thci! i!ttitudes were at times paternalistic, but hardly 
condescending or cc•..temptuous. At another level, however, the same 
attitudes of' difference' contributed to the defence of anti-Asian 
immigration policies of their countries. 
Their dealings at IPR conferences demonstrate that Orientalist discourse 
was more complex than a simple imposition of views by a strong 'West' 
on a weak 'East'. By only focusinr; on this discourse's stereotypes and 
pr,'judices, which were constructed by power relationships at a given 
historical moment, the complexity of the discourse is lost. Actual 
discourse was never one-sided nor static, and was as diverse as were its 
operators. An attitude of accommodating difference without making 
judgement or bei!lg condescending existed in the first few IPR conferences, 
and this relativist approach was only possible when there was no strong 
sense of centre. This was soon to be lost when a stronger sense of centre 
appeared. 
Egr;leston summarized his position on the Orient J.nd its implication in 
the Pacific: 
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Something is needed which gives Pacific nations the feeling .hat 
they are meeting and discussing their own problems and deciding 
them free from the dominance of Western ideas an.· interests. I 
know that I will be met by the parrot cry that these problems are 
world problems, and they cannot be settled on a regional basis. I 
will admit that they are world problems, but I will confidently 
predict that they will never c::> settled unless a regional approach is 
made to them. Then~ is certainly n phase of centralization of all 
world problems. But every tendency to centralization must be 
balanced by decentralization.56 (emphasis added) 
While the majority at IPR conferences felt it important to fit the regional 
arrangement into the League of Nations order, tht: relations between the 
regional organization and the world organization were never clearly 
articulated at IPR conferences. The wider framework of the world system 
did not exist '011t tllere' as concrete institutions. The main concerns of the 
League were on Europe 'n matters, and it wac. inadequate in dealing with 
issues arising in the Pacific. While asserting the particularity of the region 
in cuitural, racial, economic and strategic terms, p<.rticipants were lorn 
between a hope of finding univ·~rsal elements of the international 
community and the need to establish specific codes and institutions which 
were relatively independent from th~ League system. This problem of the 
relationship between 'regi.:m' and the international order became clearer 
after Japanese intervention in Ncrth China in 1931, an issue lo be 
discussed in the final chapter. 
4) Greene's Adminislralion 1930-1932 
i) Greene's Administration 
After Davis announced his resignation in November 1929, actual 
administration fell to Greene. Davis's secretaryship continued in 
principle until November 1930, and Charl~s Loomis, who had been 
Associate Genera) Secretary, became Acting General Secretary. But 
Greene, as Chairman of the .Pacific Council, conducted major policy issues 
of !.he IPR: consulting with National Councils on future plans; taking 
56 F. Eggleston,' At•stralin and the Pacific,' JU December, 1929. 
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initiatives in selecting the successor of Davis; and organizing the fourth 
conference in China in 1931. Until he took up the Woodrow Wilson chair 
of International Relations at the University College of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, in September 1932, through Curtis's connection,57 he 
conducted IPR matters mainly from his office of Lee and Higginson in 
Manhattan. He was a partner of this investment bank, which suffered 
substantially from the stock market crash of 1929. Greene, therefore, 
juggled two demanding jobs probably with littl~ money from the IPR. 
Greene's administration of 1929-1932 was transitional. The ISIPR and IPR 
conferences certainly lost their original enthusiasm for the region and the 
Orient, but they retained some ler;acies. The journal of the IPR, Pacific 
Affairs,5B was still edited at the Honolulu ofiice and did not lose the input 
of views from the 'East'. The researches in China and Japan initiated by 
Condliffe began to materialize, and Chinese and Japanese scholars kept up 
their contributions. Charles Loomis, as Acting General Secretary and 
conference secretary, spent much time in China organizing the fourth 
conference, which was first planned in Hangchow, but due to the political 
consideration, eventually was held in Shanghai. In these respects, the 
lines set in 1925 were still followed. 
However, Greene also initiated changes. His approach was not autocratic, 
but involved consultation with the members of the Pacific Council in 
each country. None of thes·~ cnanges actually followed the lines of Curtis's 
reorganization plan. Condliffe' s claim that Carter influenced the decision-
making of the IPR greatly in this period is not evident in the documents.5
9 
Greene had his own convictions. He believed that contemporary urgent 
issues should be discussed at the next conference in China, despite the 
criticism of Eggleston and Davis that the IPR was becomi' .• g 'too political'. 
Greene's faith in the IPR activities and internationalism was strong, and 
57 Greene recorded how Curtis got Greene for the position in 1932. Greene lo Curtis, -1 
February, 1950, MS Curtis 60, BL. 
58 The previous journal of the IPR was monthly [IPR] News Bulletin, which started prior 
to the second conference in 1927. This was renamed Pacific Affairs in May 1928. 
59 j. B. Condliffe, Reminiscences, p.-11. 
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he had supporters at the Rockefeller Foundation.60 He poured much 
energy and money (an annual contribution of US$ 5,000) into the IPR and 
the fourth conference, and the extent of his commitment and leadership 
was widely acknowledged.61 Charles Loomis, at the ISIPR in Honolulu, 
provided support in the practical arrangements of coordination and the 
conference. 
Greene tackled two major issues: the conference and the financial 
problem. First, he wrote to members of the Pacific Council to ask their 
opinions on the last conference at Kyoto, for preparation of the fourth 
conference, and about the timing of the conference.62 The conference was 
prepared in this consultative manner throughout. A meeting of the 
Program Committee at New York on 29-30 November, 1930, was attended 
by representatives from Canada, China, Britain, Japan and Australia c.nd 
the USA,63 and the report was sent to the members of the Pacific Council 
or secretaries of National Councils.64 
Greene initiated changes in finance, as the ISIPR had a big deficit. The first 
target was the IPR journal Pacific Affairs. The journal evolved from a 
newsletter to its 1930 style in mid-1927, and subscriptions increased from 
1,200 in 1927 to 2,000 in 1929. In 1930, the subscription fee was two US 
dollars, and publication costs did not justify its monthly style. Greene 
asked the members of the Pacific Council whether Pacific Affairs should be 
quarterly until they resolved financial problems.65 
Greene followed his own ideas in dividing the budget into two categories: 
one for research, and the other for administration of the ISIPR in 
60 Greene noted: '[T]he thing we are trying to accomplish is so vastly worth accomplishing 
that any money given to us from whatever source will be amply justified as a contribution 
to world peace'. Greene to Fosdick, 7 August, 1929. Fosdick agreed with Gree •e, Fosdick 
to Day, 10 August, 1929, LSRM/54/584/IPR 1929, RA. 
61 Carter to Eggleston, 10 February, 1931, CPR, Box 110/Eggleston, BLCU, and Saito 
Makoto et al eds., Amerika seislli11 o motomete: Takagi Yasaka 110 shogai (Tokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.68. 
62 Greene to Eggleston, 30January, 1930, MS423/14, NLA. 
63 They included Carter, Shotwell, Howland, Loomis, Greene and Condliffe (New 
Zealander). 
64 Loomis to Eggleston, 6 December, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA. 
65 Greene to the members of the Pacific Council, 3 April, 1930 MS 423/14, NLA. 
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Honolulu. The research section was rather well-off due to the grant from 
the Rockefeller Foundation. The problem was the administration budget. 
Greene had already showed disapproval of the Honolulu office's method 
of using research funds to cover deficits in administration. He thought 
the cost should be covered by contributions from National Councils, and 
in this way the 'international' character of the IPR headquarters would be 
mair,fained. 
The contributions, other than those from American sources, however, 
remained at a very low level as a proportion of the administrative costs. 
In 1929, against the American contribution (US$ 55,275 from the mainland 
and US$ 13,200 from Hawaii), the pledged quota for each country was US$ 
5,000 for Canada, US$ 20,000 for Japan,£ 1,000 (US$ 5,000) for Britain,£ 250 
(US$ 1,250) for Australia, and£ 100 (US$ 500) for New Zealand.66 The 
quota for Japan was big due to the cost of the conference in the year, but 
other quot:1s were extremely small. In 1932, the contribution from the 
USA was US$ 27,525 ($ 22,000 from the mainland and$ 5,525 from 
Hawaii), and others were$ 4,778 from Canada,$ 3,550 from Britain, $ 2,500 
from Japan,$ 1202 from China,$ 500 from the Philippines, and$ 42 from 
New z,~aland.67 Except tor the doubled Chinese contribution in ~933, non-
Ame! ican contributions did not increase much. Later the situation got 
worse, and attempts to raise quotas from these countries failed. 
Atherton, as Treasurer of the ISIPR and the Pacific Council, had to borrow 
from a bank in Honolulu US$ 50,000 annually in 1929-1931 on his own 
account. It was the time of the depression. In reply to Atherton's claim, 
Eggleston had to explain Australian economic conditions and point out 
the difficulty of paying its quota of 1 % of the entire budget. As the 
contributions from National Councils did not increase after a few years, 
Atherton started to wonder why they were so low, especially compared to 
that from Hawaii on its own, and he quei::tioned whether it reflected the 
66 The method of how these amounts were decided is not known, but correspondence 
suggests that members of National Councils expressed the most likely amount of money 
they could expect from their councils, and the Pacific Council decided according to these 
suggestions. 67 Appendix VI, in 13. Lasker and W. Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1933 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1934), p.478. 
appreciation and evaluation of the IPR activities.68 By January 1931, 
before the fourth conference, the deficit had became US$ 10,75Q.69 
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In order to overcome this problem, four approaches were possible: to 
further cut staff at the ISIPR: to raise more funds in the USA: to ask 
National Councils to increase their contributions by increasing donations, 
by membership or by increasing membership fees and subscription fees. 
Greene did not pursue these alternatives, except for consulting members 
of the Pacific Council about possible changes t·J the journal, and the actual 
schemes for reconstruction were carried in Carter's period. 
The only incident related to the reconstruction of the IPR in Greene's 
period was the resignation of the Research Sc:retary of the International 
Research Program, John Condliffe. This was a result of Condliffe's seeking 
a safer position, rather than Greene's instructions to cut staff. In his 
memoirs, Condliffe recorded that he felt !1is po~ition was threatened by 
the Curtis's re-organization plan presented at the third conference. After 
the conference, in his travels to organize research programs in Europe and 
the USSR, he was invited to write the first World Economic Surveys for 
the League of Nations in the manner of Arnold Toynbee's annual Survey 
of International Affairs. Condliffe's mind was already made up then. 
Rather than fight for his position at the ISIPR, he decided to accept the 
position.70 He made a transitional one year arrangement with the 
University of Michigan, spending one third of his time on IPR work.71 
Greene regretted this decision, but he had to admit that the IPR did not 
have resources to keep Condliffe.72 Atherton, as much as Greene, also felt 
that there was no security as the Research Secretary's salary.73 A year later, 
Condliffe and his family left Honolulu for Geneva. 
The research programs of the IPR did not change immediately after 
Condliffe's departure. He was strongly against r\merican domination of 
68 Atherton to Carter, 12 January, 1931, E-lb/33, and 4 Dcccinbcr, 1935, E ·2/2V, AUi-i. 
69 Atherton to Eggleston, 14 January, 1931, MS 423/14, NLA. 
70 J.13. Condliffc, Reminiscenus, p.47. 
71 I bid., p.43. 
72 Greene to the members of the Pacific Council, 3 April, 1930, MS 423/14, NLA. 
73 Atherton to Eggleston, 31January,1931, MS 423/14, NLA. 
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the research programs, which, he thought, was Carter's intention. This 
stance of anti-American dominance did not vanish immediately. 
Programs initiated by him had a long-term scope, and were carried on 
independently by local researchers in China, Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada and the USA. A new research assistant to Condliffe, 
William Holland, followed the agencia set by Condliffe w",thout major 
changes. Holland was only twenty-one years old when he joined the 
ISIPR in 1928. Inspired by John Mott at Canterbury University College, 
Holland was interested in Asia and an enthusiastic member of the YMCA 
international student movement. He was one of the students of 
econon .• cs whom Condliffe taught at the college. Condliffe offered him 
an assistant's job at US$ 35 a week, because he wanted someone with 
university training but with a wage of an ordinary secretary. Holland 
jumped at the job, and borrowed the money to pay for the steamer to go to 
Honolulu.74 Holland states that Condliffe's opposition to American 
domination and promotion of initiatives by Asian scho1ars 'made deep 
impression on him ... and certainly influenced his own attitudes and 
actions after he himself became Research Secretary (1933-1943)' .75 
To summarize, Greene did not venture drastic changes, but carried the 
IPR in the direction he believed right. He tried to follow the two-budget 
policy for administration and research, sought to cut expenses on Pacific 
Affairs, put urgent political issues such as Manchuria on the agenda of the 
fourth conforence, and pursued these objectives through consultation. 
Since he did not touch on the issue of s' aff and the location of the ISIPR, 
his vision for post· Ca vis organizatk ·· is hard to discern. One issue, 
however, indicates the kind of organization Greene and other key figures 
had in mind: the list of candidates for the succeeding General Secretary of 
the IPR. 
ii) The Hunt for a Gen.:r:i.1 Secretary 
74 P. Hooper ed., Remembering tlie Institute of Pacific /{e/atio11s: Tiie Memoirs of William 
Holland (Ryiikei shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, pp.1-2. 
75 W. Holland, 'Preface' in j. B. Condliffc, Rcmi>1isce11ce$, pp.i-ii. 
295 
Candidates' names show the thinking of key figures of the IPR on the type 
of person suitable to head the IPR, and the type of organization they 
would lead. They were after a type similar to the Secretary General of the 
League of Nations. The lists of names appeared in correspondence in 
1930-1933, until Carter was appointed at the fifth conference at r mff in 
August 1933. They included names of ardent League supporters with 
established careers in Britain, Canada and the USA: Frederick Whyte 
(British former president of the National Indian Legislative Assembly), 
Arthur Salter, (British officer at the League, Director of the Economic and 
Finance Section, in 1919-1920 and 1922-1931), Dwight Morrow (American 
banker and diplomat), Henry Hodgkin (British educator with missionary 
experience in China), Vincent Massey (Canadian diplomat), Alanzo Tayler 
(American academic spedalizing in food and population at Stanford 
University), Robert Borden (Prime Minister of Canada in 1911-1920, and 
Chancellor of Queen's University in 1924-1930), Owen Lattimore 
(American business traveller and writer) and Jerome Greene. Although 
Greene looked for another career after the re-organization of his 
investment bank, he did not consider lite post at the IPR. Instead, he took 
up an academic position in Wales. Carter's name only appeared in April 
1933. 
Female candidates were never suggested despite the active and 
enthusiastic support for the IPR activities of women's organizations in 
each country. As is clear in this list, expert knowledge on and experience 
in countries in Asia and the Pacific islands were considered, but was not 
thought essential.76 Prestige and calibre were given greater weight. Also 
the type who could conduct good relations with governments was 
valued.77 
It is worth pointing out that, except for Maeda Tamon, there was no 
serious consideration of candidates from Japan, China, or even Hawaii, 
Australia or New Zealand. The names mentioned in the list were on the 
Atlantic side of Canada, the USA or Britain with a few exceptions such as 
Taylor at Stanford. This of course reflected the context of international 
76 Carter to Rockefeller 3rd, 1 September, 1932, RFmA/lll-2·Q/9/62, RA. 
77 Greene to Curtis, 15 March, 1932, MS Cuni,. 6, '.'L. 
11n WWWl!lllllll-ll!lil:DIRl!llll1 
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politics at the time. japan and China were in conflict, and Hawaii, 
Australia and New Zealand were seen as too far away by key figures such 
as Greene and Curtis. This loss of Pacific focus in the selection 
proceedings was only symbolic, but certainly reflected the thinking of l. ~y 
figures on the nature and direction of the IPR. 
The selection proceedings were secretive and only known to a very few in 
London and New York. Most members of the ISIPR and National 
Councils were not informed. This was also true even for members of the 
Pacific Council. As a member of the Pacific Council, Eggleston thought 
that the election would take place among the membt:rs of the Pacific 
Council in mid 1930. He wrote to o.n old friend, Herbert Brooks, 
Australian Commissioner-Gene:al to the USA,78 in case such an occasion 
should come up. He explained that the successful candidate should have 
expert knowledge of internatior:al affairs, organizing ability, and the 
capacity to appeal to the pt!.blic. Selection, or even nomination, however, 
was not easy. 
The secretiveness and difficulty of proceedings had reasons. First, 
negotiations for the appointment were very delicate because most of the 
candidates had well-established careers and current appointments, and did 
not want to mako:: the negotiations public. The interviews had to be 
handled in a secretive and informal manner, especially in the beginning. 
Second, not only did key figures in the IPR find it difficult to nominate a 
suitable person, but also many approached had commitments, or were 
reluctant to take up the position. By mid-1930, when Eggleston expected 
an election meeting in New York, the selection committee was not yet 
abk to line up candidates. 
Why were those approached reluctant to become head of the IPR? The 
only suggestion in the documents is financial. Persons who were 
approached were already establi J··pd and highly-paid. Eggleston thought 
78 Brooks was Commissioner-General to the USA and stationed in New York from 1929. 
His mission was to promote Australian musical, artistic, literary and economic 
achievements. 
• I< I .. " - _. ; ' I JI ' 
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that a suitable man would not be obtained without an adequate salary.79 
Greene estimated that a candidate such as Arthur Salter would be 
impossible to get without a salary of US$ 15,000 to 20,000.80 Furthermore 
the substantial deficit of the IPR would have been a great concern to any 
candidate. 
But was it only finance which deterred these prospective candidates? 
Probably other elements also played a role in their decisions: the structure 
<rnd credibility of the IPR, and lack of interest in or commitment to the 
issues of the Pacific. The structure of the ISIPR had been fluid from the 
beginning. Although there was the ISIPR office in Honoluh .. , staff were 
few, and always travelling. Coupled with financial problems, the IPR 
lacked a solid structure, which made it flexible but also rather insecure. 
Second, there was the issue of the credibility of the Institute. The Research 
output of the IPR was earning credibility, but only in limited circles of 
;:cademics and specialists. A:though the conference and data papers were 
highly regarded, the IPR was still developing its prestige. Last, interest in 
the region on which the IPR iocused was still very limited. Studies 
suggest that interest in 'Far Eastern' issues, not to mention knowledge of 
the region, was very limited in Europe and North America.Bl Those who 
were interested in foreign affairs were, to start with, very few, and among 
them those who were interested in contemporary Asia and the Pacific 
islands were in a minority in the USA and Europe. While Europe was 
advanced in certain areas of Oriental studies such as languages and 
history,82 Holland noted that there was very little interest in and 
79 Eggleston to Brooks, 15 April, 1930, MS ~23/14, NLA. 
80 Greene lo Curtis, 2 September, 1930, MS Curtis 3, BL. 
81 Cohen argues that Asian affairs was only a secondary importance for the peace 
movemo.nt in the USA before WWII, and therefore only attracted attention of a 
mltt"rily. W. Cohen, Hirai Atsuko trans.,' Ajia mondai to Amcrika mink.in dantai,' in 
I-losoya C. ct al eds., Nicliibei ka11kci slii: Kaise11 11i itaru jii11e11, Vol.3 (Tokyo daigaku 
shuppankai, 1971), pp.356. In the USA, there were very few academics specialized in 
Tar Eastern' studies, and only inadequate academic organizations of the fields in the 
intc
1
-Nar period. Paul Evans, Johll Fairba11k a11d the A111erica11 U11dersta11di11g of Modern 
Ch i11a (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp.62-63. 
82 H. Borton, Saito M. trans., 'Nihon kcnkyii no kaitakushatachi,' in J-losoya C. and Saito 
M. eds., Washi11to11 taisei to 11icliibei ka11l:ci, (Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1978), p.563. 
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knowledge of contemporary Asia at Cambridge University in 1934.83 
Curtis emphasized to RIIA members the importance of the IPR and 
Anglo-American cooperation, but he was in a minority.84 Furthermore, 
the interest at the RIIA was exclusively focused on China. Many men 
who were approached by Curtis or Greene were Europe-oriented in their 
activities and int,~rests. In this sense, accepting the headship of the IPR 
reflected general indifference to the region in this circle. Davis, Wilbur, 
Greene, Carter or Curtis were, no matter what their motivations or styles, 
not only interested in, but also committed to the issues in the region, and 
this sense of comm11:ment was rart among most of those who were 
approached. 
One minor, but symbolic episode supports the argument that the IPR was 
following the model of the League of Nations around the time of 1933. 
When Carter was appointed at a Pacific Council meeting at Banff in 1933, 
the Council wished him to use the term Secretary General, instead of 
General Secretary.85 Whether or not they followed the custom of the 
League is not clear, but it is a suggestive episode. 
The visions held by key figures in the IPR were contested, and in this 
process, the nature and structur~ of the IPR was negotiated and 
constructed. Davis's resignation symbolized the direction of the IPR. In 
1929-1933 the following tf'·!nds became clear: the failure to establish new 
attitudes towards the Orient; and the loss of the Pac:fic-centred 
perspectivP.. The failure to establish new attitudes to the Orient was due to 
the uncritical acceptance of the nation-state and the colonial framework 
inherent in the original setting of t!ie IPR. Based on this acceptance, the 
issue of principles of racial equality became concrete matters of 11atio11al 
sovereignty and 11atio11al culture. The nature of the membership-
consisting of influential public men and women-enhanced the strong 
sense of nation-state among participants. Members were close to the 
governments mentally and institutionally. IPR conferences also failed in 
83 P. [-looper ed., Re111e111beri11g the /PH, Part One, p.23. 
84 Even in 1933, there were very few who knew about the IPR, and many al the RllA 
criticized contributing money lo the IPR. Macadam to Rose, 6 January, 1933, 4/ Rose, 
LCH. 85 Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Boxl, BLCU. 
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initiating agendas for regional arrangemer.ts. This was because of the 
anti-regional attitudes of British and, to a l,~sser extent, American groups. 
Increasingly, key figures attempted to use the IPR as a means to integrate 
the region into the imagined' international order'. 
Chapter Six: Co-option: American, and World, organization, 
1933-1942 
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This chapter focuses on the bternational Secretariat of the IPR (the ISIPR). 
It argues that under Carter's administration,! the two existing trends 
within the IPR-the loss of the Pacific-centred perspective ard the failure 
to establish new attitudes to the Orient-were inte.-1sified, and that thes.:: 
trends were further reinforced during WWII. The Sino-Japanese conflict 
of the 1930s clarified the problems of the international order and the 
assumptions on which the IPR was based. The IPR as a whole did not 
question the nature of the international order. As it had been from the 
beginning, the IPR functi .v1ed on the basis of the colonial and the nation-
state system. While this base was strengthened at the IPR in the 1930s, it 
became the problem at the JCIPR because of Japan's position in the 
'international order'. 
Carter took the initiative in promoting the IPR as a 'think tank' for 
restoring international order in the Pacific. This move made the IPR 
more government-oriented. Although this official orientation was 
intensified by the Sino-Japanese conflict, it was also caused by a strong 
emphasis on the nation-state in the IPR' s operations. The official 
orientation was furthered during WWII. IPR gatherings served as 
unofficial forums of the Allied countries, attended by officials and 
supported by the governments, and their discussions contributed to the 
reconstruction plans after the war, including the United Nations. 
Carter aimed for a more world-oriented organization with a strong sense 
of centre on the East Coast of the USA. While he sought 'world-wide' 
prestige and reputation for the IPR as a regional affairs specialist 
organization, his 'world' meant Europe. Beside Britain, France and 
Holland joined the IPR, and participated in its conferences from 1933. 
Although at one level he macie the IPR more 'world' -oriented, Carter also 
made the IPR more American at another level. He pursued the policy of 
I Carter's administration was in 1933-1946, and the chapter mainly focuses on the period 
before WWII. 
. • •• . . ..> -
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strengthening the National Councils, as opposed to the ISIPR. This 
enhanced the significance of the ACIPR (the American Council of the 
IPR), which became almost identical to the ISIPR in terms of location and 
function in the eyes of many. This 'nationalization' did not contradict the 
original function of the IS!PR, which was to coordinate and to provide a 
forum for national units. For Carter, the Americanization of the ISIPR 
was not at odds wita the idea of making it a 'world' organization, either, 
because he was convinced that the USA haci to lead the world, especially 
in the Pacific, and that the IPR should play a significant role in this 
leadership. As argued in the following, for Carter, New York wa~ not only 
the centre of the USA or the region, but also of the world, and i:1 this 
' nse, he thought he was making a 'world' organization, not an Ameri-:an 
organization. The d-~facto headquarters of the IPR moved from the Pacific, 
and after 1936, conferences were held away from the Pacific Coast: at 
Virginia Beach in 1' r,_ Mont Tremblant in 1939, and Stratford upon 
Avon in 1942. 
The emergence of a strong centre outside the Pacific meant the loss of the 
Pacific persptrtive. This loss of P~·cific centrality also meant that the 
Orient in the IPR failed to become equal partners. This remained the case 
until the end of WWII. The emergence of a sense of strong : .::ntre 
aggravated the failure to establish new attitud~:; to the Orient. The Orient 
became more and more an 'object' to be studied, rather than an equal 
partn.~r in the enterpri.;e. Although China and the Philippines remained 
in the IPR project anol conferences after the Japanese withdrawal in 1939, 
their role in the Pacific at conferences became more that of' outsiders' than 
'insiders'. Only towards tr~ end of WWII did representatives from 
countries such as Ci1ina, !ndia and Bunaa, start to assert the need to 
abolish the colonial framework at IPR forums, and become equal partners. 
1) Carter's Appointrrent in 1933 
By the time of the fifth conference at Banff in 1933, the only names not yet 
eliminated from the c'!•idid«tes' list for General Secretary of the IPR were 
those of Owen Lattimore and Carter. Unlike other established figures in 
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the list, Lattimore was only thirty-three years old with no definite jnb at 
reputable institutions. But his works on Mongolia, Desert Road to 
Turkestan (1929), High Tartary (1930) and Manclwria: Cradle of Conflict 
(1932), all of which were based on his first hand experience, demonstrated 
his unusual language skills and insights on the political and economic 
situation in significant, but unknown, regions. Jy 1933, these works had 
earned him good reputation in Britain, and greatly impressed Curtis.2 
That his first success occurred in Britain, not in the USA, can be explained 
by his background. Although born t0 American parents in Washington D. 
C. in 1900, he was brought up in expatriate societies in China in 1901-1912, 
educated in England in 1914-1919, and worked f,..r a British trading 
company in Tientsin in the 1920s.3 He had, therefore, closer connection 
with British circles than with Americans. Tk·.iugh these connections, his 
first book was published by a British publisher, which brought him to the 
notice of British literary circles. 
Lattimore was Jr,oking for a job when he attended the Banff conference as 
an American member. Another participant at the conference, a British 
journalist resident in Shanghai, who knew Lattimore and though~ highly 
of his works, recommended him, not as General Secretary, but as Editor of 
Pacific Affairs.4 Probably with the strong support of Curtis, Lattimore was 
appointe1l as Editor. 
Carter's appointment seems to be explained, not by his power hunger, but 
by a simple reason: no suitable candidate had accepted the position :.1:· 
then. Carter's name first appeared only in April i 933, in a letter from 
Newton Baker.s Baker, an influential Democrat whose political career 
suffered aue lO his support for American involvement with the League of 
2 Curtis to Wilbur, 18 November, 1932, MS Curtis 8, and Curtis lo Greene, 18 M.•v, 1933, MS 
Curtis 9, BL 3 Owen Lattimore and Fujiko lsono, Clti11a Memoirs: O:mg Kai-sltek a11d the War against 
]apa11 (University of Tokyo Pres~, 1990), pp.3-34, ~nd l~obert P. ~ew~an, Owe11 
Lattimore a11d the "Loss" of CIJ11rn (Berkeley: University of Cahforma Press, 1992), 
pp.3-21. 
4 O. Lattimore and F. Isono, Chi11a Memoirs, p.34. 
5 Baker to Atherton, 4 April, 1933, E-2/4, .'\UH. 
·:PW·"' ,.•_ ·~ ' •. ·~: ,,. "-r 
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Nations,6 was then Chairman of the ACIPR, and a strong backer of Carter. 
While Lattimore wa!' regarded as a remarkable scholar, he was still young 
and his administrative skills were unknown. In contrast, as Secretary of 
the ACIPR in 1926-1933, Carter had proved to members of the IPR his 
excellence in administration, and the dec 'sion to appoint Carter was a 
popular one.7 His salary was fixed at US$ 12,000, lower than the 
anticipateu US$ 15,000 to 20,000, and almost equivalenl to the salary of the 
Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations.H 
In a letter to his wife after the appointment, Carter did nut show surprise 
or enthusi.ism. He said that he would see what nis wife and Newlon 
Baker thought before his decision.9 A British me1rber of the RIIA, who 
attended the conference, thought that Carter showed' considerable 
hesitation' in accepting the offer while the ISIPR was in the financial 
difficulties. iO Despite this lack of enthusiasm, however, Carter seems to 
have had a clear vision of the IPR, and was ready for the job. 
2) Carter's Administration, 1933-1942 
Carter's administration in the 1930s was a time of crisis both in domestic 
and external terms. The year, 1933, when he was appointed as Secretary 
General of the IPR was marked by significant incidP.nls in international 
and domesb: politics. Many countries were going through economic and 
political crises, and there was a general trend towards nalivnal-socialistic 
policies. The Depression c01:linued, and the seeming success of the Soviet 
experiment made those who were deeply discontented with the status quo 
see socialist revolution as a possible alternative. In this climate, 
government officials felt that the slate Lad lo be strengthened, and that 
counter-socialist schemes were necessary to absorb this discontent. In 
6 Douglas Craig, After Wilson: The Stmct11re far the lJei;:xratic /'arty, 1920-193•1 (Chapel 
llill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p.233. 
7 Rose to Malcolm, 10 /\ugust, 1933, Rose to M,1lcol111, 23 /\ugusl, 1933, and Macadam lo 
Curlis, 4 September, 1933, RII/\ !tic, LC\"!. 
8 Egon F. Ranshofen-Werthcimcr, Tire !;itematicmal Secretariat:,\ Great Exl'eri111e11t in 
l11tematiorn1l J\d111i11istratio11 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for lntern•::ional 
!'e;ice, 1945), p.295. 
9 Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 /\ugusl, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU, 
10 Power to Curlis, 4 September, 1933, 4/Curl, LCH 
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1933, Hitler's National Socialist Party won the election in Germany. ln the 
USA, Franklin Roosevelt won the election and started th2 New Deal 
scheme. In Britain, McDonald already had formed a national coalition 
government. In Japan, the May 15 Incident, a military coup de' etat in 
1932, ended the political party system. The 'national-unity [kyokoku icch i] 
government' was created, under which the power of the bureaucracy and 
the military was extended and national mobilization proceeded.11 
The popular perception of this period is that the intellectual paradigm 
shifted from internationalism towa::ds nationalism, culminating in 
WWII. From this perspective, the 1930s were a difficult time for the IPR 
and other internationalist organizations including the League of Nations, 
and they were forced to adjust to the situation. Indeed, the League was 
losing credibility as the emergency of domestic crises swept away the 
rhetoric of good-will and mutual understanding. What has been 
demonstrated in this thesis, however, was that inter-war internationali::;t 
organizations had always O<'en based on the nation-state system. As the 
speeches of Wilbur, Ch::· rm.m of the Pacific Council in 1926-1929, or 
Sawayanagi, leader of tl" jr.::i\1R in 1925 and 1927 at IPR conferences, 
showed, internationalist~~ ~t: ~he IPR firmly based their internationalism 
on the nation-state system.12 Internationali3ts did not, therefore, oppose 
nationalism in gen er al, but only the particular nationalisms which 
challenged the existing \nternational order.13 
Japanese military intervention in Manchuria in 1931 and its subsequent 
development was perceived as a challenge to the international status quo. 
Nish summarizes the difference of the perception between the challenger 
and the challenged. In Japan, it was seen as an incident which led to the 
establishment of Manchukuo in 1932, but in the 'West', lt was perceived as 
11 Gordon M. Berger, 'Politics and Mobilization in Japan, 1931-19-15,' in P. Duus ed., T/Je 
Cambridge History of Japan, Vol.6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
p.107-118. 12 Sec Chapter Four for Sawayanaboi, and Chapter Five for Wilbur. 
13 Thomo'.; work illuminatr.~ the criteria by which European and American 
internationalists judged conduct in pursuit of 'national' interests in international politic~. 
C. Thorne, Tile Um its of Foreig11 Policy: Tlte West, t/Je League a11d t/Je Far Eastern Cnsrs 
of 1931 -33 (New York: CajJricom Dooks, 1973), pp.-100-101. 
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a crisis of collective security of the League of Nations.14 Although Thorne 
uses the acc~pted term, "the Far Eastern Crisis", he is rather critical of the 
nJture of the international order, by ~··hich the 'vital interests' of the 
dominant powers were secured, but ]apdnese action was condemned 
because Japanese 'vital interests' challc:•c:d the order.JS 
The problem of this imagined order put members of the JCIPR in a 
difficult position. While earlier JCIPR members accepted and supported 
the order, reform-oriented younger members increasingly questioned it, 
and began to support Japan's new order, a challenge to the existing order.16 
Meanwhile, the ISIPR did not question the international order, but 
defended it. Carter wanted the IPR to be a think tank of regional affairs 
experts, which would contribute to restoring the international order in the 
Pacific. And Japanese action was a challenge to the order. Carter's push to 
conduct an investigative study, the "Inquiry", resulted in the JC IPR' s 
withdrawal from not only the Inquiry but also the IPR conferences after 
1936. 
Carter did not fundamentally change the nature of '.he operation of the 
IPR, but reinforced the existing elements: strengthening the Natiunal 
Councils, the sense of the nation-state and official-orientation; and 
moving away from the Pacif( to the Atlantic. The move signified his 
ambition to make tl-. IPR m01 ~significant in the world, and WWII 
helped hi!:- ambition to materialize. In this process, the IPR became more 
politicized and Americanized, which led to its decline after the war. The 
following sections examine Carter's visions of internationalism and 
international organization, and his policies as Secretary General of the IPR 
in 1933-1942. 
i) Carter's Visions and Policies 
14 I. Nish, Japan's Struggle wit/J Internationalism: Japan, China, and the League of 
Nations, 1931-1933 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993), p.vii. 
15 C. Thorne, The Limits of Foreign l'olicy, p.419. 
16 See Chapter Three, Section Two. 
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Carter's policies can be summarized as follows: 1) emphasizing the focus 
of the IPR not only on the region, but also in relation to the world; 2) 
working to involve the USSR in the IPR activities; 3) moving the 
headquarters from Honolulu to New York; 4) strengthening the National 
Councils; 5) making the ACIPR a more democratic organization in terms 
of its program and membership; and 6) taking a stance against Japanese 
action in China. 
A clear indication of his position was given in the preface of the 
proceedings of the Banff conference, probably written by Carter. It makes a 
point or the importance of a wider context. Focusing on the fact that the 
conference was the first held on the American continent, it argued: 
disturbances of helpful international relations in the Pacific ... 
have their origin as much in the western as in the eastern 
hemisphere .... [T]he setting of the conference made yet another 
valuable contribution to a more balanced understanding of the 
Pacific problems: the peace and beauty of the immediate scene 
invited attention to larger perspectives ... and larger problems of 
human welfare.17 (emphasis added) 
The preface contrasts the American Continent to Shanghai, therefore 
unlike many Americans who used 'western hemisphere' in contrast to 
European continent, it seems to be counterpoising 'western' to 'Far East'. 
The same new direction of widening perspectives is suggested for the new 
Pacific Affairs, which was to focus on the Pacific region, but 'in relation to 
world affairs' )B 
This reveals Carter's ambition for the IPR to have greater world-wide 
prestige as a regional affairs experts' organization. The format of the new 
Pacific Affairs, for example, suggests this direction. It resembled that of 
Foreign Affairs, an acclaimed journal among foreign affairs experts in 
many countries, published by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in 
New York. The old style of a newsletter section in Pacific Affairs, which 
reported happenings in countries in the region was lost, as was the section 
17 'Preface' in B. Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., Problems of tile Pacific, 1933 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1934), p.v. 
18 E. Carter, 'Institute Not~,' Pacific Affairs (November-December, 1933), p.617. 
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of "Views from East". Despite the claim of the editorial that it would aim 
at a wider public, the new Pacific Affairs presented itself mon· like a 
journal for experts in foreign relations. 
'World' -wide recognition and prestige as a regional affairs experts' 
organization was also sought by enlarging membership in Europe. The 
initial move to include more European involvement was proposed by 
Davis ·.vhen he visited Europe in early 1928,19 but it did not materialize. 
The movl! was carried further by Condliffc in mid-1930, and he obtained a 
favourable reply from the French.20 The preparation of other European 
groups was, therefore, in process before they actually participated in the 
IPR conference in 1933 and before Carter took over Secretary Generalship. 
Carter was, however, well known among European groups of foreign 
affairs experts,21 and he pushed the direction of European involvement 
enthusiastically. Additional European involvemr.nt from 1933 signifies 
the reinforcement of the colonial framework at the IPR, which was not 
challenged until the 1942 conference. 
Carter's eagerness to involve the USSR was related more to this ambition 
for world-wide prestige of . '"le IPR than to his attraction to Soviet-style 
internationalism. The atll:npt to draw the USSR into the IPR was not his 
initiative, either, but he pushed the move hard. The USSR was a major 
Pacific Power, and it was felt important to have its participation at IPR 
conferences. Merle Davis had visited Moscow in the end of 1927, and 
suggested the idea but without success. The USSR as well as labour 
organizations in various countries saw the IPR as an imperialistic 
capitalist organization. In 1930, Condliffe also tried to have the USSR 
participate in the IPR conference, and obtained a commitment.
22 
Carter 
was not much concerned with ideology. He believed that as long as 
participants discussed their different views in the right manner, they 
would reach some agreement, and the more diverse the opinions, 
19 Davis recorded that the Dutch showed great interest in the IPR and participation in 
the conference, but the French did not show much interest. Davis lo Atherton, 7 
February, 1928, E-13/6, AUH. 
20 Condliffe to Greene, 21June,1930, E-17 I 4, AUH. 
21 Loomis to Atherton, 2 September, 1928, Wilbur Papers, 40/5, HI. 
22 J.B. Condliffc, Reminiscences, p.44-46. 
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therefore, the better the conference. Furthermore, Sino-Japanese conflicts 
made the strategic position of the USSR more significant. 
Carter w;is determined to get the USSR involved ii• the IPR.23 He went to 
Moscow in 1934 with this mission, and as a res...:.lt of this trip, the Pacific 
Ocean Institute, a branch of the Soviet Academy oi Sciences, became the 
Soviet unit for the IPR. It was a government bureau, but Carter was 
satisfied. The USSR remained sceptic: .. ! to the IPR, and its contribution 
was minimal. It criticized the imperialistic nature of the Institute and 
Pacific Affairs, which, it argued, defended Japanese actions in China.24 In 
1935, the Soviet unit contributed an article to Pacific Affairs, which 
Lattimore, the Editor, described 'rank propaganda', although he felt that he 
was obliged to publish it to show Lhe non-partisan nature of the journaI.25 
In 1936, Carter visited the USSR again to push for its participation ''' the 
sixth IPR conference at Yosemite. As a result, the USSR sent two delegates 
to the conference, the first and only Soviet participation. After 1936, 
Soviet-involvement faded away. But Carter had at least extended the 
institutional base to the USSR, anu therefore taken one further step to 
make the IPR 'world-wide'. 
Was this shift from the Pacific to the 'world' related to British initiatives 
and Carter's connection with the British group, as somE' suspected at the 
time? Or did Carter want to get closer to the prestige of the CFR, a sister 
organization of the RIIA? As demonstrated in the following sections, the 
documents contradict the suggestion of a strong British influence, but not 
Carter's ambition for the IPR as a more globally recognized body of experts. 
It was his conviction that New York, not London, was the centre of the 
world, that directed his move. The nature of Carter's relations with the 
British group is examined below. 
ii) Carter's Relations with the British Group 
23 0. Lattimore and Jsono F., C/Ji11a Memoirs, p.37. 
24 R. Newman, Owen Lattimore,, p.28. 
25 Ibid., p.27. 
309 
Carter was born the son of a minister in Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1878. 
He went to Harvard College in 1900, where he was involved with YMCA 
student international activities. The activities ied him to become a 
Secretary of the YMCA in India in 1902. Carter visited Oxford before he 
went to India, and through a professor al Trinity College, 'he met what 
was to become the famous Round Table group' .26 The Round Table, 
founded in London in 1909, was a group of young men who discussed the 
new strategy of the British Empire. Major members included Lionel 
Curtis and Philipp Kerr, who also became the core of the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs (the RUA). Carter had mainti:ined close personal 
connections wit'l Curtis since then. 
Did this encounter with Round Table members influence the twenty-four 
year-old Edward Carter on the way to his first foreign mission in India? 
William Carter, Carter's son, thought so: 'E. C. C. [Edward Carter]'s 
discussions with this [Round Table] group had much influence on his 
later liberal approaches in India' .27 'Liberal' attitudes meant that Carter 
did not impose what he thought 'right' manners or customs on the 
Indians, but encouraged them to keep their own. Carter also, as William 
records, made efforts for Indians to be treated equally as British citizens. 
On one occasion, Edward Carter pleaded that Indian soldiers be awarded 
the King's Commission, not only the Viceroy's Commission, for their 
achievements during WWI. On another, Carter arranged for a Sikh 
member of the Royal Flying Corps to wear a turban during his service.
28 
These episodes demonstrate that Carter adopted certain 'liberal' attitudes 
particular to the Round Table: an acceptance of differences in order to 
make colonial subjects serve the common gooci, the empire; and a 
willingness to grant self-rule in order to strengthen the empire. Curtis, 
impressed by Carter's achievement in India, suggested to Philipp Kerr, 
Lloyd George's Secretary, in 1919 that Carter be atipointed Viceroy of Imlia, 
as he had most appropriate qualifications for the proposed .:onstitulional 
reforms to widen 
26 William Carter, 'Memories of Edward C. Carter by W. D. Carter: Addendum 1,' 
(unpublished manuscript) 8 May, 1986, p.3. 
27 Ibid. 28 W. Carter, 'Some Memories of Edward C. Carter by His Son,' (unpublished manuscript), 
17 April, 1986, p.5. 
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self-rule in India.29 Were these k.i'lds of 'liberal' attitud~s to non Euro-
Americans significant in Carter's policies towards the Orient at the IPR? 
Carter's attitudes to the Orient, h"··.vever, seem to have been determined 
not only by the association with ti~e Round Table, but also by his Christian 
belief. The latter was shown in his commitment to the project, the 
"Inquiry into the Christian Way of Life" (1922-1932). It was this project, 
and not the IPR, which paid Carter's salary during the time of his 
secretaryship of the ACIPR, and Carter put much work into it. Its aim was 
to seek ways of applying Christianity into the problems of modern life. A 
major focus of the project was race relations, and a method which the 
project promoted was the conference. By discussing different viewpoints, 
it was believed, a solution of problems would emerge.30 
While the project earned strong support from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
which evaluated it as innovative, fur.damental and honest,31 its 
documents do not reveal much about Carter's attitudes to the Orient or 
Orientals. A few letters on IPR matters, however, indicate his position. In 
1927, he wrote an enthusiastic letter to Greene on his attitudes towards 
Orientals: 
[The American group] need imagination in finding new trails for 
experimentation and discovery in human relations. We need a 
new quality and new standards for our research program .... We 
need to learn how to enter into such a full relationship of 
mutuality with the Chinese and the Japanese ... in research, in 
resource, in imagination, and avoid the danger of America's 
dominating the Chinese and Japanese Group by the sheer force of 
money and personnel .... Throughout our membership, it is 
necessary for us to discover how we can get away from our feeling 
that we have superior wisdom to contribute to the Orient and 
instead induce a genui.1e recognition of the fact that we are in a 
great need of Chine5e and Japanese help and that the deeper 
problems of the future can only be solved by joint study and 
effort.32 
29 W. Carter, 'Memories of Edward Carter,' 8 May 1986, p.3. James Shotwell, At tl1e Paris 
Peace Co11fere11ce (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p.159. 
30 Fosdick to Rockefeller, 22 January, 1924, LSRA/Jll-2-N I 47 /376, RA. 
31 Ibid. 32 Carter to C.rcene, 30 June, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Grn.cne, BLCU. 
311 
This seems to contradict Condliffe' s criticism that Carter wanted 
Americans to dominate research money and projects and was reluctant for 
initiatives to be left to the Orientals. When the ACIPR discussed the 
inclusion of black members in the American group for the Kyoto 
conference, Carter argued strongly for it. It was, he thought, important in 
dealing with Orientals: 
For several years, Chinese, Japanese, and Europeans have told me 
that they did not feel that Americans could adjust themselves to a 
full understanding of the American attitude to the Orient until 
they had a new attitude to the American Negro. Until we have, as 
a matter of course, a competent Negro entering into our American 
Council program and attending the biennial Conferences, I do not 
think that we are availing ourselv:-:s of the full data and experience 
that we need, if we wish to take a long time to look at the question 
of race implication and cultural conflict across the Pacifo::.33 
While his principles were shared by many, Carter's manner towards the 
older generations of Japanese and Chinese, however, was problematic. 
Younger Japanese, relatively fluent in English, such as Tsurumi Yasuke, 
admired Carter's efficiency,34 but Atherton heard many complaints from 
other Japanese and Chinese participants at conferences. 
I feel that [Carter] does not fully comprehend or appreciate the 
psychology of the Orientals. The Japanese, particularly the older 
ones and those who have not mixed a great deal with Americans, 
think slowly and desire ample time to weigh matters carefully 
before reaching a decision. One has to have great patience and tact 
in dealing with them. Mr Carter is so eager to see things 
accomplished that I have found at times he does not recognize this 
trait of the Ori~ntals and forces things through with the result that 
he hurts the feelings of many of them ... I know this; ~sonally 
from statements made to me directly in tJ-.e past by se• · .al of my 
Oriental friends.35 
Carter's forcefulness, however, did not seem to be directed only to Chinese 
or Japanese, but to everyone. Some admired his selfless devotion, and 
,3 Carter to Greene, 9 July, 1929, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
34 Tsurumi Y., Ch ii! i5 o ayu111u kokoro (Shinshakai, 1927), pp.478-179. 
35 ,'\therton lo Baker, 6 May 1933, E-2/ 4, AUi-i. 
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others were offended by his single-mindedness. Atherton himself had to 
fight this trait of Carter's over the location of the headquarters of the IPR. 
Although Carter was conscientious and enlightened about the racial issue, 
it is alsc• evident that he had a strong sense of fellowship with Anglo-
Saxons. In the same letter to Greene in 1927, he urged American 
participants to mingle with the Orientals, rather than' continuing to keep 
company with our own companies and our fellow Anglo-Saxons' .3f This 
was very much the way Curtis looked at Americans, as comrades to 
constitute the British-American Commonwealth with common values 
and beliefs. Frederic Eggleston and Ian Allen warned that this division 
between the Anglo-Saxon group and the Oriental group was jeopardizing 
the vision of the original IPR.37 
This Anglophile sentiment also existed among other members of the 
ACIPR on the East Coast. Personal connections were fostered through 
education, especially the Rhodes Scholarship, family and business ties, 
and geographical closeness. The RIIA had official connections with the 
CFR to which some ACIPR members also belonged. Jerome Greene, also a 
member of the CFR, knew Curtis from the time when he was stationed in 
London as American secretary to the Allied Maritime Transport Council, 
during the time of WWI.3B Among these members, terms such as 'this or 
that side' of the Atlantic were commonly used in their correspondence. 
Although Carroll Quigley suggests the importance of this Anglo-
American Establishment connection in the media and amongst policy-
makers, 39 even the close connection between the CFR and the RIIA did 
not mean the absolute support of British initiatives from American 
organizations. A founder of the CFR, who was a Rhodes scholar and 
whose wife was a friend of Mrs Curtis as well as a secretarj of the RUA, 
36 Carter to Greene, 30 June, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
37 See Chapter Five. . 3Bcarroll Quigley, The A11glo-America11 Establishment: From Rhodes to Cllvede11 (New 
York: Boolrs in Focus, 1981), pp.188-189. 
39 Ibid., pp.::27-310. 
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was an enthusiastic supporter of Curtb's idea of world government, but 
even he harboured reservations Jbout Anglo-American solidarity.40 
Sentimental Anglophile attachments did not play a big part in 
organizational 1.,sues at the ACIPR either. As already seen, Greene was 
cautious not to create a distinct Anglo-Saxon group in the IPR and asked 
Curtis not to use the ACIPR as the British group's channel. Carter did not 
support Curtis's reorganization plan, but criticized it, especially on 
financial issues. 
Both you [Greene] and I, who have lived several years in London, 
know how faulty Lionel's conception in this matter [finance] is.41 
Carter remained close to the British group, and against moves by the 
groups in Hawaii and San Francisco which wished to keef' the ISIPR in 
the Pacific, the British group along with oti., -- Americans, Canadian and 
European groups supported Carter's in· · · " . ~~ Atlantic.42 This did 
not mean, however, that C~rter was manipulated oy the.British group to 
move the headquarters to Briiain. Carter's supporters agreed that it was 
important for him to remain in New York for fund raising and research 
purposes. Carter shared a sense of a strong centre, both morally and 
geographically with Curtis. But his centre was located in r-<ew York, nut 
on 'the other' side of the Atlantic. 
1933 marked a significant, but often neglected, incident in relation to the 
influence of new British imperialism in the IPR, the foundation of the 
British Commonwealth Relations Conference (BCRC). The institutional 
base of the BCRC was the network of the RIIA and its Dominion branches. 
Lionel Curtis, a founder of the RL:A, perceived that the development of 
the RIIA in the Dominions symbolized that of the British 
Commonwealth.43 The B·~RC was, for him, an institutional embodiment 
of the British Commonwealth. 
40 Shepardson to Brandeis, 26 Sr.ptember, 1925, MS Eng Hist 872, BL. 
41 Carter to Greene, 31January,1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
~2 Anderson to Atherton, 21August,1936, E-3a/11, AUi-i. 
43 Curtis to Nelson, n. d. [late 1926 or early 1927], CPR, Box 108/Curtis 3, BLCU. 
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The BCRC was a by-product of the IPR conferenr:s. It emerged through 
the network and p1elhods which were developed 't IPR conferences.44 It 
took the san1e format as IPR conferences, that is an unofficial conference 
attended by 'leaders o1 public opinion'. Its main agenda was to survey and 
improve the system of the relations of the members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.4:L The first BCRC was held in Toronto soon 
after the Banff IPR conf~rence, which almost the same members from the 
Commonwealth participated in.46 
Did this result in a red'..lclion in enlh11siasm for Pacific issues among 
Commonwealth countries? To some extent il probably did. The BCRC 
provided them with an alternative forum in a more familiar 
environment for similar discussions. Certainly the energy and focus of 
the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) was more 
concentrated on the BCRC than the IPR.47 Research projects and 
personnel exchanges, however, were maintained between the AIIA and 
the ISIPR, and British Commonwealth countries continued to send 
delegates to IPR conferences. 
More importantly, the establishment of the BCRC implied a decline in the 
influence of the new British imperialism al the IPR, and therefore 
consequently enhanced stronger American initiatives. One idea behind 
44 Eggleston recorded that during the IPR conferences in 1927 and 1929, informal meetings 
ot participants from the British Commonwealth discussed the possibility of having 
conferences together. Eggleston Diary, 1927, MS 423/2, NL:\, and F. Eggleston,' Australia 
and the Pacific,' The/ Me/lwume/ l lerald, 19 December, 1929. Arnold Toynbee ed., 
British Cv111111011wealth Relativ11s: l'roceedi11gs vf t/1e first U11official Cv11ferwce at 
Tom11tv, 11-12 Septemlier 1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), pp.5--0. 
45 These countries included Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and 
Britain. A. Toynbee ed., llritisfl Cv111111v11wealth l\e/ativ11s, pp.3-5. 
46 Confused by the similarity, the leader of the British group read the opening speech for 
the BCRC al the IPR conference, causing pualemenl for participants from other 
countries. The leader was I lerberl Samuel, Leader of the British Liberal Party. I'. 
! looper ed., l\e11w111ieri11g the 111stit11te vf l'acific Relatio11s: The Nle11wirs of William 
//ol/a11d (Ryiikci shosha, forthcoming in 1995), Part One, p.26. 
47 While tl1e l\01111d Ta/Ile reported enlhisinolically the Il'R conferences in 1925-1933, 
there was no report on IPR conferences after 1933. For its positive reports, sec anonymous 
articles of 'Honolulu', The Ro1111d Ta/Ile, Vol.18 (December, 1927-Seplt>mber, 1928), 
pp.90-104, 'The Kyoto Conference,' Tl1e l\v1111d Tali/,:, Vol.20 (December, 1929-September, 
1930), especially pp.345-347, and 'Canada,' The l\v1111•: Table, Vol.24 (December, 1933-
Seplember, 1934), pp.183-202. 
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the new British imperialism was to achieve a British Commonwealth 
including the USA as the basis of the international community, and to use 
the IPR as a means to achieve that goal. Instead, through the BCRC, a 
stronger world-wide imperial bloc was discussed and pursued. The sense 
of a strong centre was again clear, and the Pacific and 'Orient' became an 
'object' rather than a' subject' participating in the imperial bloc. There 
were a few in Australia who argued the importance of the Orient as a 
'subject', a trade partner,48 and the ".!ictorian branch of the AIIA started to 
publish the Austral-Asiatic Bulletin in 1936. However, a majority of 
Australians saw the region, especially Japan, as a threat, rather than an 
opportunity of partnership, and perceived the region as an object to study, 
to fear, and eventually to fight.49 
Carter did, however, adopt one of Curtis's ideas: the notion of a travelling 
Secretary General without central headquarters. Curtis suggested that his 
ideal orgaP.ization would have a pr<'~'igious man as its head, who would 
travel between 'East' and 'West', anc.. be stationed at the location of the 
!lext conference.SO But Carter's choice of being a travelling head proved to 
be part of his tactics of moving the headquarters from Honolulu to New 
York. 
iii) Location of the Headquarters 
Carter gradually shifted the functions of the ISIPR from Honolulu to New 
York in 1933-1936. Two points are debatable about the shift. ,'/as it 
Americanization or not? And was it centralization or decentrarization? 
Probably there was an element both of Americanization and 
centralization. In 1933-1944, the ACIPR was almost identical to the ISIPR. 
The physical location of Secretary General and the ACIPR was the same, 
129 East 52nd Street, New York. Instead of ha,ring no fixed central 
headquarters, Cader cr.".ldu;::ted his work as Secretary General from this 
office in New York. It was his office from 1922 when he started the YMCA 
48 J. G. Cr,,wford, 'Australia as a Pacific Power,' in W. G. K. Dnncan ed., Australia's 
Foreign J.'olicy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1938), p.69-90. 
49 As for this strategic thinking, sec Map II. 
50 Curtis to Greene, 7-13 November, 1928, A-1/PC 1929, AUH. 
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related project, and became the office of the ACIPR from 1926 during his 
secretaryship at the ACIPR (1926-1933). It remained a virtual office of the 
ISIPR and the ACIPR until 1945 
Holland, the Rese'lrch Secretary in 1933-1943, argues in his memoirs that 
Cai ter made an effort tu draw a clear line between the American and 
international IPR, but he also admits that in practice, there was a great deal 
of overlap in personnel and work.51 The phrase 'joint proiects of thE. 
Pacific Council and the ACIPR' was used,52 but Carter de;o) v·ith the 
matters of the ACIPR and used the staff of the ACIPR for his ISIPR work, 
and vice versa. 
Although Carter insisted on having NJ central headquarters and 
strengthening the National Councils/'3 the actual functions of the ISIPR 
were gradually taken from Honolulu itnd centralized at his New York 
office. Was this a strengthening of the National Councils without a 
central office, and therefore decentralization, or was it a virtual 
centralization by Carter or the American Council? Wilbur, a major figure 
on the Pacific Coast, certainly felt that centralizatia:-< in New York was 
taking place, and he argued for the need for decentraliz~tion.54 
The s~1ift of the headquarters contributed to the loss of a Pacinc-centred 
perspective. For those, such as Davis, Atherton, Eggleston and Allen, who 
valued the original idea of 'promoting mutual understanding amoni; 
people and countries bordering the Pacific' and est.:blis(;ing new attitudes 
to the Orient, Honolulu had more than a mere geographical importance. 
Having the headquarters there meant that they would keep the original 
spirit and principle. This argument was convincingly, but without 
success, presented by Frank Atherton and to a lesser extent Wallace 
Alexander. Atherton was :·reasurer of the Pacific Council, and based in 
Honolulu. Alexander was head of the San Francisco Bay group of the 
ACIPR. Representing the sentiment of the Bay Region, he argued the 
51 P.1-!ooper ed., Remembering tile IPR, Part Two, pp.9-11. 
52 Field to Atherton, 15 November, 1934, E-2/12, AUi-i. 
53 E. Carter, 'Tentative Note,' [August, 1933] Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU 
54 E. E. Robinson and P. C. Edwards eds., Tl1e Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur 1875-1949 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1%0), p.6DB. 
impor;: ;1ce of keeping the headquarters on the Pacific Coast in order to 
retain its Pacific centrality. 
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Atherton and Alexander represented not only the Pacific perspective, but 
also a private element as opposed to the official element in the IPR. Most 
American companies which contributeJ. to the IPR were in California in 
1935.55 Hawaii had also contributed substantial amounts of money from 
the beginning. The shift of the centre of the IPR fro:r. the Pacific Coast to 
New York increased the official character of the orga;c;zc.~ion because of 
the loss of 'private' funding, and because of the physical proximity to the 
government. The shift <igainst the opinion of these groups reduced the 
incentive for private contributors in California and Hawaii. New York 
was of course closer to Wa~hington D. C. and physically it was easier to 
meet officials and exchangl :·nformation with them. 
Constitutionally, the location of the ISIPR was not ciecided. Honolulu was 
originally chosen due to its image of good racial relations, which was the 
main concern at the time of the foundation. It was a neutral meeting spot 
for people who travelled across the Pacific. In the documents, however, it 
was depicted as a temporary loi::ation,56 and many, including Carter and 
Curtis, deplored the inadequacy of the place for the IPR's more 
'professional' activities. Carter especially dill not care for the claim of 
Honolulu to be the "Geneva of the Pacific":''; doubt whether in our 
lifetime Honolulu will ever have the world nE:i/:; daily .... [T)he stimulus 
that comes through the almost daily visits of a':le minds from all over the 
world is something that will not be achieved in Honolulu in our 
lifetime' .57 
During Greene's administration, no attempt was made to change the 
location. Greene conducted IPR mattP.rs from his company in New York, 
but administrative work and conferen°.:e arrangement was done through 
55 Field to Walker, 10 Dcco!"!'DL. 1935, RFnA/ :.1/200/351/4174, RA. 
56 J.M. Davis, 'Report of Committee on Permanent Organization,' in). B. Condliffe ed., 
Problems of the Pacific, 1927, p.591. . . . 57 Carter to Curlis, 16 March, 1928, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. I-!tS altitude lo 
Honolulu was seen by his use of the phrase such as 'that lilUe small Lown'. Carter lo 
Greene, 4 April, 1930, CPR, Box 112/J. Gr~ene, BLCU. 
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Charles Loomis, Acting General Secretary, in Honolulu. Loomis travelled 
extensively for conference o ·ganization, spending a few months in China. 
Meanwhile, the idea of locating the headquarters in Asia constantly came 
up, and Tokyo and Shanghai were suggested.58 
The Pacific Council meeting, which appointed Carter as Secretary General, 
decided that -!onolulu would stay as the headquarters until the next 
conference. Most members of the Pacific Council assumed that Carter 
would move to Honolulu,59 and they quoted his moving costs US$ 
1,SOQ.60 Carter, however, had no intention of moving to Honolulu. He 
wanted to be a travelling secretary and visit Honolulu occasionally. His 
intention was shown in a letter to his wife soon after the appointment 
was made. He told her that there was no need to move furniture to 
Honolulu. His idea was to visit National Councils, and stay in a 
furnished cottage in Honolulu between their trips.61 Although he said 
that he would consult each National Council during h1s travels about the 
location of the headquarters, this was little more than a diplomatic 
statement. 
He seems to have carefully planned to minimize the importance of the 
Honolulu office. In the beginning he flattered Honolulu, using terms he 
disliked, such as Geneva of the Pacific,62 or put the term 'temporarily' 
before his office address in the letterhead.63 At the same time, he pursued 
the plan to make Honolulu a 'local' office. In his resolution as new 
Secretary General, Carter proposed a scheme to help 'making Hawaii a 
model community of race relations', and placed Loomis in charge of the 
scheme. He argued later that the Honolulu office increased its local 
SB Curlis suggested Shanghai, Curtis to Greene, 18 May, 1933, MS Curtis 9, BL. At Carter's 
visit in Tokyo, Japanese discussed the possibility of Tokyo, 'Carter's Visit in Tokyo in 
1934,' OC, B-7, LHU. 59 E. Scott, 'General Report on lhe Conference of lhe Institute of Pacific Relations held at 
Banff, Canada, August, 7-2.9, 1933,' p.3, Harrison Moore Paper, 11/3, AUM. 
60 Minutes of the Pacific Council meetings, 29 July, 1933, E-2/22, AUH. 
61 Carter to Mrs Carter, 10 August, 1933, Carter Papers, Box 1, BLCU. 
62 Carter to Atherton, 7 February, 1934, E-2/9, AUH. 
63 Carter to Atherton, 18 October, 1933, E-2/6, AUH. 
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emphasis from 1934, and that therefore it could not claim a budget as the 
headquarters as well as a salary for Charles Loomis as headquarters' staff.64 
Atherton resisted Carter's push. His criticism was twofold: the loss of the 
Pacific perspective, which had constituted the original spirit and principle 
of the IPR;65 and a lack of the publicity to appeal to a wider audience, 
which resulted in the lack of interest and donations to the central 
budget.66 The second point will be discussed later in relation to publicity 
and the democratic nature of the IPR. 
The opposition to losing Pacific centrality was strongly voiced not only by 
the Honolulu group, but also by the West Coast groups, especially the San 
Francisco group. Already at the time of Davis's resignation, members in 
Australia, New Zealand and Hawaii expressed their concern a'.Jout losing 
the original Pacific perspective with its potential for developing new 
attitades to the Orient. Similar views were held by those in California. 
These voices were not influential in the IPR despite the strong leadership 
on the Pacific Coast, which included such people as Wallace Alexander, 
Ray Wilbur and Chester Rowell. Leading figures on the Pacific Coast were 
not unorganized or unenthusiastic. Communication and trade across the 
Pacific were much denser on the Pacific Coast than the East Coast. Not 
only academics but also journalists and business people were interested in 
the IPR. Leading figures formed a regional centre in the Bay Region of 
San Francisco in 1928, of which the Chamber of Commerce in San 
Francisco was the core. They organized many meetings for IPR activities. 
Wilbur, Chairman of the Pacific Council in 1927-1929 and President of 
Stanford University, argued in 1929 that the headquarters should be on 
the Pacific Coast.67 
Despite all this, the weakness of the Pacific Coast can be explained by 
various factors: Carter's strategy of maintaining power in New York; the 
64 Carter to Atherton, 10 May 1935, E-2/15, AUi-i. 
65 Atherton to Baker, 27 January 1936, E-2/25, AUi-i. 
66 Atherton to Carter, 10 January, 1936, E-2/23, AUi-i. 
67 Wilbur to Greene, 30 January, 1929, CPR, Box 108/Curtis 2, BLCU. 
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Jack of full time staff; and, probably most importantly, the Jack of 
institutional strength including research centres, publishing companies 
and major social science foundations in contrast to the strength in these 
fields in New York. 
The problem of IPR groups on the Pacific Coast seems to have been based 
in the geographical distance of the headquarters of the ACIPR under 
whose control they were located, rather than the reluctance of the ACIPR 
headquarters. This control hierarchy was clear from the beginning. The 
Honolulu group was keen to strengthen the Pacific Coast group. Davis 
thought, since he had good contacts with the institutions there, it would 
be easy to exercise his direct control from Hawaii. Wilbur, as Chairman of 
the Pacific Council, reorganized the council of the ACIPR in mid-1926 in 
order to balance power between the East Coast and the Pacific Coast.68 He 
thought, however, that the Pacific Coast group should be under the 
ACIPR, not the ISIPR in Honolulu.69 But New York was far away, and the 
staff wrre busy. The New York office decided further in 1928 that action lo 
promote the IPR on the Pacific Coast should be postponed until 1929, the 
conference year, which would make fund raising easier.70 Atherton 
criticized Carter for his Jack of promotion of the IPR on the Pacific Coast 
still in 1933.71 Only in 1935, a serious fund raising campaign on the Pacific 
Coast was undert;;ken by Carter and Secretary of the ACIPR, Frederick 
Field. 
The weakness of the Pacific Coast group was also due to Jack of full time 
staff. Enthusiasm was strong, but they were all busy businessmen or 
journalists who had little time for fund raising or administration in their 
spare hours. In 1936, Charles Loomis was assigned the job of promoting 
the IPR in cities other than San Francisco on the Pacific Coast and of 
raising US$ 15,000 before the sixth confe:.!nce at Yosemit1 in the same 
year. Carter argued that Loomis's salary should be paid mostly by the Bay 
Region group, and this request was reluctantly accepted.72 Loomis 
68 Carter to Greene, 20 June, 1926, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
69 Carter to Greene, 19 August, 1927, CPR, Box 112/J. Greene, BLCU. 
70 Davis to Atherton, 20 January, 1930, E-lb/).7, AUH. 
71 Atherton to !laker, 6 May, 1933, E-2/4, AlJH. 
72 Alexander to Atherton, 17 January, 1936, E-2/24, AUH. 
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conducted fund raising successfully through prestigious social clubs, such 
as the Commonwealth Club and Bohemian Club, and Chambers of 
Commerce in Los Angeles, Portland and Seattle. The Say Region Group 
consulted Atherton and agreed that Lo0mis would be needed for 
strengthening the IPR on the Pacific Coast. It decided to have him for a 
few months from 1937, again without financial support from the 
headquarters.73 
Although as Treasurer Atherton strongly resisted almost every proposal 
from Carter by not approving the budget of the Pacific Council, Carter 
removed almost all the functions of the headquarters from Honolulu. 
The final straw was the transfer of the research fund account from 
Honolulu. Atherton then tendered his resignation as Treasurer.74 
Carter's strategy to make Honolulu a 'local' office succeeded. At the sixth 
conference at Yosemite in 1936, the Pacific Council decided to have no 
headquarters, and Honolulu lost the claim.75 This move was supported 
by British, Russian, French and Dutch members.76 Although Loomis 
remained on the staff of the ISIPR, his salary was shared by the Honolulu 
and San Francisco groups. While they agreed to decide the location of the 
headquarters at the next conference on the Pacific Coast, this never 
materialized. Carter remained in New York and conducted business from 
the same office as that of the ACIPR. 
The move to New York was not Carter's idea alone; many others 
supported it. Australian delegates felt that there was a strong consensus 
at the Council to fix the headquarters in New York. They thought it 
meant stronger influence for those outside the Pacific, such as Europeans, 
and therefore, opposed the move.77 But for a majority of executive 
members of the IPR, there was no question that New York was important 
73 Atherton to Loomis, 1June,1937, E-3a/20, AUi-i. 
74 Atherton to Carter, 4 December, 1935, E-2/20, AUi-i. 
75 'Appendix VI: Conference Organization and Administrative D.ecisions,' in W. Holland 
et al eds., Problerns of tlle Pacific, 1936(London: Oxford university Press, 1937), p.459. 
76 Anderson to Atherton, 21August,1936, E-3a/11, AUi-i. 
77 '[Report of Australian delegate of the] Institute of Pacific Relations, Sixth Conference 
al Yosemite, August 15th-29th, 1936,' A981/1/0rg95. 
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for raising funds because the major foundations, Carnegie, Rockefeller 
and the Social Science Research Council, were based there. Funds from 
the Rockefeller Foundation for research and administration accounted for 
almost half of the revenues.78 Carter mingled with its key officers 
through social clubs. Although the foundation was reluctant to be seen as 
an exclusive patron of the IPR, it had confidence in the work of the IPR. A 
sense almost of responsibility developed among certain officers at the 
foundation.79 Against Atherton's claim that Carter should stay in 
Honolulu, the Chairmen of the American Council and the Pacific Council 
were ad~mant that Carter's location in New York was necessary.so 
Besides the importance of New York for Carter and others, this move 
could also be explained by financial factors. The deficit of the ISIPR was 
more than US$ 10,000, and Carter had to cut expenses as well as raise more 
funds. Making the Honolulu and the Bay Region offices self-sufficient 
through the generous support of local funds was a practical way to cut 
expenses. 
Carter's principle of financial self-sufficiency for each unit was seen in his 
policy towards the National Councils. In 1933 he proposed to strengthen 
the National Councils in both activities and finances. The aim was to 
achieve their self-sufficiency without assistance from the ISIPR budget, 
and to draw greater contributions from the National Councils to the 
ISIPR. Carttr's visits to the National Councils, however, did not result in 
the increase of their donations to the ISIPR. In 1935, Britain contributed 
78 While it is hard to calculate the exact portion of the Foundation's contribution to the 
administrative cost for the !SIPR, the 1932-1933 financial report and the report of the 
Foundation in 1933 suggest this rough portion. 'Appendix VI: Summary of Revenues and 
Expenditures, 1932-3,' in B. Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., Problems of tlle Pacific, 1933, 
p.479. 79 The good terms between the ACIPR and the Foundation,,,.,; evident in the time of 
Greene's administration and Carter's administration. Sydnor Walker in particular had 
a high opinion of and commitment to the works of the IPR. She felt in 1940 that 'a good 
case should be made for the Inslitute's carrying on expanded research on problems of the 
Pacific' and that 'unless the RF lakes care of the Institute, it is not going to be taken care 
of. N~te ofJMP [Packard], 7 November, 1940, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4177, RA. This support 
was carried during the lime of WWII, and also in the difficult lime of the 1950s. 
[Resolution], 23 June, 1950, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA. 
80 Baker to Atherton, 11February,1936, E-2/26, and Tarr to Atherton, 2 May, 1936, E-3a/ 4, 
AUH. 
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US$ 3,000 (£600), Japan only US$ 850 (¥3,000), and Australia only US$ 600; 
a big contrast to the Hawaiian contribution of US$ 10,000.81 Nor is there 
much evidence that Carter urged the National Cour.cils to donate more. 
How, then, should his argument for strengthening the National Councils 
be interpreted? Did this mean that he wanted to make them more 
autonomous and the headquarters of the lPR more American, dominated 
by American funds? This leads 11s further to question what kind of 
international organization Carter had in mind. Regarding research 
projects, his idea was similar to Curtis's preference for a federation of 
strong National Councils with each council conducting its own research 
from a national point of view. However, while Curtis was wary of 
American domination of funding, Carter did not see much problem in the 
issue. What was his idea of internationality? 
iv) The 'Internationality' of the IPR under Carter 
Strengthening the National Councils was one of Carter's major goals. In a 
report to the Pacific Council in 1936, Carter st 0:;ed: 'there can be little 
permanent strength in an International Secretariat which represents weak 
National Councils. A principal task of the Secretariat has therefore been 
t0 aid in building up the chain of National Councils'.82 Here Carter's idea 
of internationality as an inter-national, rather than trans-national,83 
organization is evident, and the idea was very similar to that of Curtis. 
The domestic situations also supported the implementation of his policy 
to strengthen the National Councils. By 1933, most of the National 
Councils had established national headquarters,94 and administrative 
correspondence was exchanged between national secretaries and the ISIPR. 
81 The IPR, i\,port of t/1e /11ter11atio11al Secretariat to tlle Pacific Co1111cil, 1933-1936 
([New York]: the IPR, 1936), p.157. 
82 Ibid., p.8, (emphasis added). 
83 Transnational rclations•.,cdefincd as 'sets of direct interactions among sub-units of 
different governments that arc not controlled or close!·- ruidcd by the policies of the 
cabinets or chief executives of those governments'. Sec lnJoduction, note 22. . 
84 The Australian Institute of International Affairs, an amalgamated body of national 
branches of the IPR and the RIIA, resolved to form the federal headquarters in late 1932. 
What distinguished Carter's idea of the IPR as an international 
organization from that of Curtis was Carter's willingness to give more 
central power to the American Council. Carter maintained in 1936: 
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The American Council is the strongest of all the Councils formed 
for the regional study of the Pacific. It has served as a stimulus to 
most of the other Councils .... It is the only Council that has 
established the precedent of se~uring the servicP on its staff, for 
long periods, of scholars of other nationalities. lI the Secretariat of 
the American Council develops along this line, it may be that in 
addition to being a national centre for the study oi ~nternational 
affairs it will also become, in a modest way, an international centre 
of the study of international affairs.BS 
Although this letter is not about the Secretariat, but research, Carter's 
positive attitudes to accept the American Council's 'international' 
character should be noted. The boundaries of the American Council and 
the IS IPR in a pr;:ictic:,l sense overlapped substantially under Carter's 
administration. 
Carter saw locating major ISIPR staff in Asia as a part of the strengthening 
of the National Councils.86 Probably this was a part of the strategy of 
countering the centrality of Honolulu office and building a strong centre 
in New York. On the other hand, officers who were posted to Asia had a 
strong regional perspective, and wanted to locate their posts in the region, 
not in New York. This was most evident in the case of new editor of 
Pacific Affairs, Owen Lattimore. On his appointment, Lattimore requested 
as a condition of acceptance that he could edit Pacific Affairs from Peking 
by correspondence, so that he could maintain field work and research. 
This was accepted and he did so until 1937.87 
William Holland, Research Secretary in Carter's administration, followed 
the line of Condliffe, who had insisted on the importance of local 
initiatives, rather than a strong centre in the USA. A new series of 
projects of the IPR in 1933-1936 was largely initiated by the Chairman and 
85 The IPR, Report of tile /11ternatio11al Secretariat , p.30. 
86 Ibid., p.49. 
87 O. Lattimore and F. lsono, China Memoirs, p.34. 
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Secretary of the Research Committee, and the list of the programs seems 
to be well-balanced, rather than dominated by American interests, in 
terms of geography, themes and scholars who carried out the research.88 
Like Condliffe, Holland valued local perspectives. He had travelled and 
been stationed in China, when he was Research Assistant in 1928-1932. 
When he was appointed as Research Secre · 1ry in 1933, he requested Carter 
to move the office to Tokyo. Holland thought it would 'strengthen East-
West ties within the Institute' and that Tokyo had 'greater stability and 
better facilities ror printing than Shanghai', a contested alternative.89 The 
office opened in Spring 1934, and with the help of an American officer 
sent from New York, and the cooperation of the JCIPR members, Holland 
conducted his work as Research Secretary and Associate Editor of Pacific 
Affairs for almost a year. But then, he was asked by JCIPR members to 
leave: a request which he interpreted as resulting from government 
pressure.90 Subsequently a publications office of the IPR was established 
in Shanghai in early 1937.91 
After 1938, however, the office locations for these officers became more 
settled around New York. This was mainly a consequence of the difficulty 
of carrying out their duties in the war situation in China and Japan, rather 
than the result of Carter's instruction. Lattimore came back to the USA in 
1938, and had a job at Johns Hopkins, where he continued his editorial 
work for Pacific Affairs until he became an adviser !o Chiang Kai-shek in 
1941. Holland also worked at the New York office, except for a year in 
Berkeley in 1940-1941. 
A regional perspective wa~ emphasized in the joint editorial of the first 
issue of the new Pacific Affairs in 1934, probably written by Lattimore: 
[T]h~ Pacific ... is not a sufficiently well-integrated region to 
warrant exclusive regional consideration of its problems. _Yet a 
largf! part of the world still thinks of East and West, of Onent and 
88 Th~ IPR, Report of the /11ternatio11al Secretariat, pp.115-129. 
89 Ibid., p.27. 
90 Ibid., p.30. 91 P. Hooper ed., Remembering the IPR, Part One, p.33. 
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Occident, as natural antithesis, as if the world were in fact centr.:J 
on the Atlantic, and as if the Pacific and the farther East were mere 
horizons of expansion. Such a view of the world has a historic 
validity of its own, but nevertheless it must be called eccentric, for 
an even larger part of the world posits the continent of Asia as the 
centre of the universe, with the West as mere external shell 
pushing down upon it. Such concepts, and such antithesis can be 
largely corrected by intensifying Ol1r consciousness of the Pacific as 
the region from whiciz both the common interests and the mutual 
antipathies of two major zmiverses ... can best be zrnderstood.92 
(emphasis added) 
Lattimore had not only been brought up and worked in China, but was 
also fluent in Mongol and Chinese. He insisted on travelling like the 
locals without servants, and h~ communicated with local people, gaining 
their trust and perspective as well as information. His background was 
reflected in the above quotation. Evident here is a serious challenge to the 
prevailing assumptions such as the East-West dichotomy and European 
centricity. The editorial goes on to argue the importance of regional-wide, 
as opposed to world-wide or national-wide, arrangements, and the role of 
the IPR in them. 
Intem;:itional affairs can no longer be classified as concerning 
either the world as a whole or the restricted relations of definite 
national zones. They affect ... groups ... larger than the nations and 
smaller than the whole community of nations. The Institute of 
Pacific Relations is an outgrowth less of the instinct for creating 
international organs with arbitrary functions, than of the need for 
extra-national communication between national groups which 
have international interests. It is an organ for promoting 
information and understanding, not so much between nations as 
between groups or individuals within nations, and on a plane 
which is exactly international, but which transcends the national 
and does not attempt the universal.93 
This was almost ,., restatement of the original idea of the IPR, which seems 
to have been diluted by the direction of the ISIPR and conferences after 
1933. It stated the regional perspecti"e, the need for new attitudes to the 
Orient, and the individual, rather than official, capacity of the IPR, and 
9Z The Editors [O. Lallimorc and ct al], 'Comments and Opinion,' Pacific Affairs (March, 
1934 ), pp.83-84. 
93 I bid, p.84. 
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promoted the original line of being' scientific'. Fact finding was the most 
important functi.on and no political, social or economic doctrine should be 
expressed. 
It did, however, reveal the contradiction contained in these principles. 
Although this editorial emphasized individual inter-action in the Pacific, 
it assumed a nation-state framework. It said: 'What is required is ... a 
feeling for the imponderables of national psychology'. This p~ "!bly 
meant sensitivity in dealing with people with different backgr _, nds. 
Nevertheless, the assumption of national categories did lead articles to 
focus on national issues and national perspectives, rather than thematic 
perspective, and to discuss inter-national issues as inter-governmental 
ones. 
This assumption of 'national' units was the very base of the IPR structure 
which Carter furthered. By 1936, it was clear that this structure had caused 
a serious problem for Lattimore in editing Pa:ific Affairs. He pointed out 
that the National Council could act 'intermittently as a censor instead of as 
a source of supply' .94 He asked the question: 'Should the articles 
appearing in Pacific Affairs bC:' regarded purely as individual expressions of 
opinion or should each article before final acceptance by the editor be 
endorsed by the approval of a national council or be subject to the veto of 
a national council?'95 He warned that the structure based on the National 
Councils would lead Pacific Affairs to become a source of conflict, and he 
urged the Pacific Council to take a definite policy on editing. 
From his point of view, the idea of individual articles was not compatible 
with the existence of the National Councils which functioned as sub-
editors. The central editor should have independence to establish the 
journal as a free forum for opinions inch1ding criticism of the writers' 
own countries.96 On the other hand, he knew that this policy would be 
very difficult because collecting articles and contacting authors was 
impossible without the help of the National Councils and because there 
94 The IPR, Report of t/Je International Secretariat, p. 80. 
95 Ibid., p.81. 
96 Ibid., p.82. 
was a natural tendency to self-restriction of criticism of their own 
countries. 97 
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The alternative to t:1is policy was to continue the existing system of 
relying on the National Councils as the basic units. This would lead to .m 
'inevitable change in the whole character of Pacific Affairs', as Lattimore 
pointed out. 
In spite of the wordings which define the Institute of Pa::ific 
Relations as an international association of r .i :ional bodies, each 
of which is non-official in its own c:ountry an..i. is designed to 
express as many as possible of the elements or public opinion in its 
own country, but not official government opinion, such an 
arrangement would convert Pacific Affair~ int:J an organ for the 
expression of sE:mi-official views.98 
Althougn Lattimore used the word' convert', the original structure based 
on national units itself contained the danger which he pointed out here, 
and it was enhanced rather than c:lecreased as time went on. As Lattimore 
warm:d, Pacific Affairs was involved in bitter conflicts over gov1 :nmental 
policies. To prove its non-partisanship, he refrained from commenting 
on controversial articles and instead invited responses from readers.99 
While Carter did not give any specific instructions concerning the issues 
Lattimore raised in 1936, Carter's backing of Lattimore's conduct implies 
that he supported the direction of what Lattimore described as 
'conversion'. Lattimore records: 'Carter was always my strong backer; and 
he also discreetly lobbied for me among the national delegates, and I 
stayed on with a renewed mandate'.100 
While Lattimore felt the need for a stronger central editorial board to 
make the journal 'unofficial' anc 'individual' as opposed to 'national', 
Holland, as Research Secretary of the International Program, felt more 
need for attention to the interests of each National Council. Holland 
expressed the difficulty of strong central direction on two points. First, 
97 I Vid., p.83. 
98 Ibid., p.32. 
99 R. Newman, Owen Lattimore, pp.27-28, 42 and 44-15. 
JOO O. Lattimore and lsono F., China .Memoirs, p.36. 
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there was within research programs, especially in cultural fidd, an 
assumption 'on the part of many Western national coundls that Western 
civilization and economic organization were both dc-sirar•1t: and inevitable 
for the East'.101 But more pressingly, it was difficnlt rn get each National 
Council interested in a few common thematic !$Sue: initiated by the 
central committee and to persuade them of the implications of these 
issues beyond th·';- national borders. 'Quite naturally ·'nvestigators are 
often more cone,,, .1ed with local or national applirntions of their funding 
and are not anxious to distort studies to meet the needs of investigators in 
other countries', as Holland wrote.102 Perhaps 'distort' was not an 
appropriate word in this ccntext, but this shows the sensitivity of 
'international' research projects. He argued: 
it is impos!>ible to choose any one subject that will evokf ~he 
enthusiastic cooperation of all the groups .... An absolutely 
identical method of treatment is almost never possible without 
greatly impairing the local or national value of a given study.103 
Holland's opinion coincided with the general policy of Carter in 
strengthening the National Councils. Holland argued that the IPR should 
support the movement towards the National Councils' becoming the 
national 7.entres of international affairs in each country. He also believed 
that the IPR should concentrate more Jn its international research work 
in the National Councils rather than other research bodies.104 
His sensitivity to the National Councils and questions about the direction 
taken by the Research Committee reflect his relativist approach. This 
attitude, however, was convenient for those who wanted to justify 
national policies. National centralization of research centres could also 
easily become a mcanSof containing criticism of one's own national 
(governmental) policies. Up to 1936, research programs were maiuly in 
relatively uncontroversial economic fields with a small expansion into 
studies of media and public opinion. But in 1937 Carter came up with the 
idea of a study of Sino-Japanese conflicts. This proposal exposed the 
101 The IPR, Report of tire International Secretariat, p.122. 
102 Ibid., p.121. 
103 Ibid., p.133. 
104 Ibid., p.137. 
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problem of the structure of the international research program, based on 
the National Councils presenting national perspectives, rather than on 
independent research institutions investigating :ertain issues. And it 
resulted in the withdrawal of the Japanese Council from the project, an 
issue to be discussed later. 
At the IS IPR level, Carter's idea of 'internationality' was embodied in the 
scheme of staff interchange. He suggested this scheme in his initial plan 
to achieve 'truly international staff' .105 Here again Carter used the 
rhetoric of strengthening the National Councils, because this scheme was 
carried out, not at the ISIPR office in Honolulu, but between the American 
Council in New York and other councils. On his visit to Tokyo in 1934, 
Carter arranged for a few members of the JCIPR to be stationed at the New 
York office, and three JCIPR members came to New York in 1935,106 In a 
similar manner, young staff from other National Councils were sent to 
New York during Carter's period. The JCIPR continued this scheme at 
least until mid-1941, even after it had withdrawn from other IPR projects 
in 1939,107 
For Carter, this scheme contributed not only to the 'internationality' of the 
office, but also to its finances. He tended to employ young personnel, 
male and female, often soou after graduation. In this way, he provided 
not only a great opportunity for them, but also deployed enthusiastic 
talent at a relatively low cost. It was probably a necessary tactic for non-
profit organizations such as the IPR. Condliffe had already used this 
method in 1928 to secure young talent at a low cost. Holland was first 
employed at US$ 35 per week($ 1,900 per annum) when he was twenty-
one; the salary which was raised to$ 2,500 per annum in 1929.108 Greene 
contribr.ted a large sum to the Institute, rather than being paid for his 
Chairmanship of the Pacific Council and the ACIPR. In the 1930s, only a 
105 E. Cil!'ler, 'Tentative Nole,' [August, 1933] Carter Papers, llox 1, IJLCU. 
106 They were Takagi Yasaka, Uramalsu Samilaro and Matsukata Saburo. 'Carter's Visit 
to Japan, 1934,' OC, B-7, LHU. 
107 A Japanese staff member, Yasuo, was succeeded by others, Matsuo and Matsudaira, in 
September, 1940, and they probably worked until the break-out of the Pacific War in 
December in 1941. Carter to Cieeve, 25 September, 1940, CPR, llox 42/Rl!A 1939, BLCU. 
108 P. Hooper ed., Remembering tlie IPR, Part One, pp.6-7. 
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few major positions such as Secretary General, at around US$ 10,000 per 
year, the Editor of Pacific Affairs, at$ 6,500 to 7,000 per year, and the 
Research Secretary, at around$ 5,500 per year, were paid generously, but 
other clerical secretaries at the ISIPR were paid around$ 1,500 per year. 
This suggests the philanthropic rather than professional mentality of the 
Institute. The structure prevented bureaucratization, but the IPR 
remained a place of opportunity, rather than a place offering a secure 
career with a good income. The IPR still provided a great opportunity for 
quasi-diplomatic experience for aspiring young members both in the USA 
and other countries. The Rockefeller grants supported this scheme both 
directly and indirectly.109 
v) Education Schemes: Democratization and Americanization 
Like many other Carter policies, the educational schemes of t'1e IPR could 
also be explained by financial concerns, as one way to increa::.e IPR funding 
was to appeal to wider audiences. This meant more sales of IPR 
publications and journals, and more donations. Also as a part of this 
widening audience, the membership and subscription fees were increased 
<;ubstantially. The original constitution of the ACIPR restricted the 
membership to 600, in order to preserve 'quality'. In 1936, the constitution 
was amended,110 and membership increased from 475 in 1935 to 1,300 in 
1942. 
At the same time, Carter was under criticism that the IPR was oriented 
only to a smail circle of experts. Atherton accused the IPR of getting too 
academic and research-oriented and recommended that effort was 
required to make the results of IPR research serve a wider public.111 What 
Atherton had in mind was influential people in business and public 
109 Jack Shepherd, the national secretary of the Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, arranged in 1938 to station himself at the ACIPR to do his research partially 
supported by the grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Shepherd to Carter, 11 March 
1938, CPR, Box 11 I Australian Council, BLCU. 
110 F. Field, 'Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the American Council,' 
17 November, 1936, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4175, RA. 
111 Atherton to Carter, 10 January, 1936, E-2/23, AUH. 
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office, as opposecl to academics, and in this sense his vision was dose to 
that of Curtis in 1929. While Carter emphasizecl research, as Greene did, 
this in no sense conflicted with the search for influential people as 
conference goers and supporters. Atherton and Carter, therefore, did not 
differ much on this issue. 
Reaching a wider public was also achieved in Carter's period by promoting 
educational schemes. Significantly, this was exclusively an American 
project, carried out by the ACIPR. Adult and popular education was one 
of Carter's commitments before his involvement with the IPR, and one of 
his chief aims as Secretary General,112 Carter, on his first visit to Britain, 
may have initially been influenced by the Workers' Educational 
Movement. A number of educational schemes were promoted. One was 
to educate teachers at tertiary and secondary level to enable the knowledge 
obtained through IPR research to reach the wider public.113 Other 
schemes included workshops on 'Far Eastern' problems at universitiesl14 
and language schools (Russian from 1933, and Chinese from 1937).115 The 
movement became more active as the war fear deepened in the 1940s. 
In contrast to these efforts in the USA, public support for the IPR did not 
increase in other countries in the 1930s. Eggleston reported the failure of 
the Australii:n Council to get the public interested in IPR activities.11 6 
The situation was similar in other countries. This was due to the nalure 
of the organization. Membership '"l'aS restricted to expert circles and steps 
to expand membership for subscription were not realized.1 17 
International issues often remained too abstract and not immediate 
112 F. Field, From Rig/JI to Left: An Autograpliy (Westport, Conn: Lawrence Hill, 1983), p.83. 
'Interview of Walker and Stevens with Carter and Field, 4 October, 1934,' 
RFnA/1.1/200/350/4175, RA. 
113 'Report on Education, 1935,' included in the letter, Field to Mason, 12 November, 1935, 
RFnA/1.1/200/350/4174, RA. 
114 One of these workshops took place at Mills College in San Francisco. 
115 Annual meeting [of the ACIPR], 18 December, 1936, CPR, Box 1/ACIPR1936, BLCU. 
116 Eggleston to Carter, 15 July, 1935, CPR, Box 120/ Australian Council, BLCU. 
117 In order to increase th~ revenue for administration of the NSW branch of the 
Australian llA, two alternatives were considered: increase of subscription fee of 
members; and expansion of membership. The Council decided to take the fomicr choice. 
Minutes of the council meeting, 28 October, 1938, and 10 November, 1938, AIIA Papers, 
GC. 
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enough to divert attention from domestic political and economic crises. 
Furthermore, international links in the 1930s were often seen as suspect 
associations with socialists and communists, and the loyalties of members 
of organizations with international connections were questioned. 
Publicity was another method of outreaching to the wider public. This 
applied not so much to the activities of the National Councils, but rather 
to those of IPR conferences. The publicity of the conference as a whole 
was widened in 1936. The conference was broadcast through the NBC. 
Major news agencies, such as UP and AP, and papers from the U!::> ,'., Japan 
and China reported the conference extensively.llB 
At another level, however, there was a more c'•:.•:ed atmosphere. Round 
Table sessions were closed from the conference in 1927, and previous 
chapt:,•rs showed that this created disputes among r-.1rticipants as well as 
journalists. Carter follcwed this practice at Yosemite iri 1936, and the press 
was not allowed to attend Round Table sessions.119 A journalist from 
Honolulu noticed more governmental influence in the conference. 
Because of the prominence of national groups, he thought, the conference 
mainly conducted diplomatic discussions. Despite the wide coverage of 
the conference over all, the majority of internal politicking of the IPR 
occurred in the closed sessions.120 
The loss of publicity and the increasing official element went hand in 
hand at IPR conferences. The conference of 1936 was the last one open to 
publicity before WWII. The next conference in 1939 focused on strategic 
policies of various c-:mntries over Sino-Japanese conflicts, and the press 
was shut out. During WWII, the practice of secrecy and official-
orientation became stronger. 
vi) The "Inquiry" and the Japanese Withdrawal 
118 Loomis to Atherton, 21August,1936, E-3a/12, AUH. 
119 'Appendix VI: Conference Organization and Administrative Decisions,' in W. L. 
Holland ct al eds., Problems of t/Je Pacific, 1936, p.458. 
120 Riley Allen to Atherton, 1September,1936, E-3a/12, i\UH. 
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The Sino-Japanese conflicts did not change, but intensified the existing 
nature of the IPR. Already at the time of the third conierence at Kyoto in 
1929, tension between Japan and China over Manchuria was high 
following the assassination of Chang Tso-Jin, a powerful warlord, by the 
Japanese Kwantung arwy. The conference became a battle between 
Japanese and Chinese groups over the incident. Matsuoka Yosuke, then 
Deputy President of the South Manc!:·.;.rian Railway Company, rejected 
the Chinese claim that Chang Tso-Jin was assassi::-a~~d by the Japanese 
army.121 Participants defended or jus~ified their national policies, 
whether or not they were involved in actual foreign policy-making or 
military command. The practice was not new at IPR conferences, but only 
intensified as Sino-Japanese conflicts grew. Just before the fourth 
conference at Hangchow in 1931, Japan started military intervention in 
Manchuria, which was the beginning of the long lasting war leading to 
WWII. 
The conflicts did not change the nature or function of internationalists at 
the JCIPR, but did affect the extern<'! status quo of the Japanese 
government. From the time of the Hara Cabinet (1918-1921) at least until 
the Wakatsuki cabinet (April to December 1931) the Japanese government 
supported the status quo of the League of Nations and the Washington 
Treaty. But after the conflict of 1931, the government was less committed 
to the inter.-- :onal order. What the Japanese called the "Manchurian 
Incident" h to the creation of a puppet regime, Manchukuo, and the 
Japanese government rejected the intervention of a third party, the 
League of Nations, and decided to withdraw from the League.122 For 
other countries, that was a challenge to the status quo of the international 
order. JCIPR members did not criticize the government's acceptance of the 
incident, but instead they sought a way to c mbine two seemingly 
incompatible arguments: to justify Japanese policies in China, and yet to 
fit into the existing order. Although some have argued that Japan~ ~ 
internationalists' converted' from internationalism to nationalis. -iuring 
121 Eggleston among other participants believed Malsuoka's claim. F. Eggleston, 
'Australia and the Pacific,' The [Melbourne] Herald, 27 December, 1929. 
122 For., role played by members of the JClPR, sec I. Nish, ]apa11 's Struggle with 
l11ternatio11alis111 (London: Kcgan :-'".ul International, 1993), pp.181-182. 
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the "Manchurian Incident" ,123 the example of Royama, a member of the 
JCIPR, shown in Chapter Three, suggests that Japanese internationalists 
did not give up the attempt to fit into the existing order. In the new 
context, they sought a new explanation of their dual loyalty/ identity to the 
international community and their own nation. And this duality did not 
appear suddenly around 1933, but -:.·isted right from the beginning of the 
internationalist movement in Japan. 
JCIPR members did not give up their activities at the IPR. In fact, after the 
Japanese withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933, IPR conferences 
became more important because they were one of the very few 
international forums in which the Japanese government could attempt to 
'correct' misunderstandings of Japanese policies. After 1933, the Japanese 
government sought an alternative international order in the Pacific, and 
JCIPR members presented proposals for an alternative regional diplomatic 
machinery independent from the League at IPR conferences in 1933.12 1 
Governmental involvement in this plan was criticized by other 
participants, and failed to win their support.125 
The Sino-Japanese conflict highlighted the problems inherent in the 
international order and the original structure of the IPR based on that 
order. As suggested in Chapter Four, relations between the League of 
Nations and the regional arrangements remained ambivalent in the 
discussions of the IPR conferences of the 1920s. This problem was clarified 
by the Sino-Japanese conflicts and the subsequent action of the JCIPR. 
While the JCIPR emphasized regional independence from the League 
system, Carter wanted the IPR to play an important role in integrating the 
Pacific into the 'world' system. He maintained that the Sino-Japanese 
conflict had global implications, and proposed an investigative study, the 
123 This was a popular interpretation by contemporaries as well as scholars. Milani T. 
Ta islt o de111okurasldro11: Yoshino Sakuzo 110 jidai to sonogo (Chuo koronsha, 1984), p.236. 
124 Takagi Yasaka and Yokota Kisaburo, 'A Security Pact for the Pacific Arca,' in llruno 
Lasker and W. L. Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1933, pp.441--450. 
125 Saito Makolo cl al eds., Amerika sei . o motomete: Takagi Yasaka 110 sli;;gai (fokyo 
daigaku shuppankai, 1985), p.71. 
336 
"Inquiry". It was a study to examine the Sino-Japanese conflict from 
various point~ of view in order to prepare for a future peace conference. 
Carter was probably trying to do for the Pacific region what Colonel House 
had done in creating the "Inquiry" group for the Paris Peace Conference. 
As the Japanese government opposed the League's intervention, the 
JCIPR opposed Carter's Inquiry. Negotiations were carried on between 
Carter and the JCIPR in 1938 and 1939, but failed to reach agreement.126 
The JCIPR decided to withdraw from the Inquiry project, and to carry out 
an independent study series on the issue. The JCIPR did not, however, cut 
affiliation with the IPR. In fact, they felt that withdrawal from the project 
was the only way to continue that affiliation.127 
Although the JCIPR suspected an anti-Japanese bias at the ISIPR,128 it is 
difficult to say that it was based on individual 'prejudice' of certain 
officers. The anti-Japan stance of the ISIPR reflected not only Carter's 
position but the sentiment of members of the ACIPR and the general 
public in the USA. The IPR was founded in order to solve the anti-
Japanese immigration·: !'t·e, therefore it contained pro-Japan people, 
including Davis and Gr·· . At the same time, it included many 
missionary members wli, ~commitment and attachment to China was 
stronger lhan their symp .. '"11y towards Japan. Although t. ·· j not ha\'e 
missionary experience in Chir.a, Car•cr's attachment to Ch, .• a was great. 
He enthusiastically helped the mass education movement in China from 
1928. Compassion fo•: China among ACIPR memhErs grew as Japane,;e 
military actions intensified. Especially after reports of the Nanjing 
Massacre, even strong Japan-support ·s, such as Thomas Lamont and 
Jerome Greene, changed their attitudes.129 
126 Jessup to Carter, 24 August, 1939, CPR, Box 151/Japanese Council 2, BLCU. 
127 Ibid., and Ushiba to Carter, n. d. [late 1939], TYB, 94/39, ACTU. 
128 Saionji to Carter, 5 April, 1938, OC, A-4 /Pacific Council, 1938-39, LHU, and 
'Takayanagi Yasuho ryoshi yorino ri kaidan narabini sono torikime nikansuru shosai 
hokoku,' [Detailed report by Takayanagi and Yasuho on Lee conference •nd its 
resolutions], 23 August, 1938, TYB, 91/ 4, ACTU. 
P9 i!'m Chernow, Tlte House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and tlte Rise of 
Modem Finance (New York: Touchstone, 1990), pp.:043-3.15. W. F. Kuehl ed., 
Biographical Dictionary of Internationalist (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), p.299. 
Even already in 1933, G. Wickersham, who organized the movement against Japanese 
discrimination in 1924, was disheartened by the activities of the Japanese military in 
China: 'Japan had thrown away the good will which she built up among our people'. 
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If there was a fault on Carter's part, it was his autocratic manner of 
pursuing the 'Inquiry" project. By mid-1937, Carter already had the idea 
of the Inquiry project.130 However, in April 1938, a staff member at the 
JCIPR claimed that there had so far been no consultation with the 
JCIPR.131 On Carter's instructions, Holland actually travelled to Japan to 
notify the JCIPR of the project in late 1937. But Carter gave Holland only a 
general and sketchy account, and entrusted him with the difficult task of 
notifying the JCIPR in a way which would not 'alarm them or give too 
many details'.132 This created a frustration and mistrust on the part of the 
JCIPR which Holland could not help. JCIPR members also discovered that 
Carter had told the RIIA, which was cautious about the proposed project, 
that he had already received a favourable response from the JCIPR.133 A 
JCIPR delegate recorded in 1939 that he felt a lack of honesty on Carter's 
part in negotiations on the details.134 
The JCIPR argued against the project on the grounds that it betrayed 
'traditions' of IPR research. By 'traditions', it meant three main points: 
unofficial studies for IPR conferences; the allocation of the study of 
individual countries to the relevant National Couilcils; and control of thP 
Pacific Council over the project.135 The JCIPR's criticism claimed that the 
project was an 'official' study in preparation for a governmental 
conference, and that the ISIPR, which was by then almost identical to the 
ACIPR, held the : •wer of policy-making, not the executive body of 
national representatives. Although emphasizing the importance of tht 
private capacity of the study, Carter argued that the study was important 
Wickersham to Carter, 16 January, 1933, CPR, Box 115/Wickcrsham, BLCU. 
Wickersham was not involved in the IPR (sec Chapter Two), but the change of his 
attitude to Japan reflected the atmosphere among his co:tcagucs in New York at that 
lime. 
130 Carter to Ruth and Orrick, 16 August, 1937, Carter Papers, Box 5, BLCU. 
131 Saionji to Carter, 5 April, 1938, OC, A--l/Pacific Council, 1938-39, LHU. 
132 P. Hooper ed., Remembering tl1e IPR, Part One, pp.36--37. 
133 'Kata shi to chatamu ha usu no sccchu ni tsuite, 23 August, 1938,' [On negotiation 
between Carter and Chatham House], TYB, 91/2, ACTU. 
134 Takagi to Carter, 2 February, 1939, CPR, Box 33/Takagi, B .CU. 
135 Takagi Y., 'Re the International Secretariat Inquiry, December, 1938,' TYll, 95-2/13, 
ACTU. 
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for the government's use.136 Unlike Colonel House, who was given the 
instructions from President Wilson to form the 'expert' group outside the 
government for the Paris Conference, Carter took an initiative to promote 
the IPR to the same status without any instructions from Roose:velt. 
3) The War and the IPR 
WWII enhanced, • .ither than changed, the existing trends within the IPR, 
which were caused by its original setting and intensified in the 1930s. It 
bec~me even more national-oriented, government-oriented, secretive and 
Americanized. 
The ACIPR put greater emphasis on external issues concerned with 
American 'national interests' rather than those 'promoting mutual 
understanding between the countries'. Frederick Field, Secretary of the 
ACIPR in 1934-1940, stated in 1938: 
The American Council is intimately concerned wit'.1 one of the 
major areas of conflict, an area toward which American people 
have a particular interest and responsibility .... [T]he existence in 
the United States of an organization like an American Council, 
able continuously to interpret current events ... , makes it possible 
for the leading writers, educators, businessmen and officials to 
keep far better informed than would otherwise be possible.137 
From the beginning, the ACIPR always dealt with applications for grants 
both for the American Council and the Pacific Council. The above 
quotation was from an application for the former, and therefore its 
'national' emphasis is understandable. But previous applications had put 
greater emphasis on international activities, while after 1938 the rhetoric 
of national interests became much more distinct. 
The ISIPR and ACIPR became more indistinguishable, and the centrality 
of th1:: USA in IPR conferences became more evident. Carter was involved 
with several forums on" American policies in the Far East", organized by 
136 Carter to Dulles, 6 December, 1937, Carter Papers, Box 5, BLCU. 
137 Field to Walker, 21November,1938, RFnA/1.1/200/351/-1176, RA. 
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various branches of the American Council, and these forums became the 
basis for IPR gatherings in the early 1940s. 
For Carter, the most significant incident was not Pearl Harbour, but the 
Berlin Pact of 1936. He thought that the pact proved his long-held thesis: 
tht:: importance of the work of the IPR for the rest of the world. Carter 
argued th.:.t this pact made one realize 'the neglect of the Far East and the 
Pacific in the schools, universities, the press and research institutions' and 
it became 'plain that the two wars [in Europe and Asia] were inextricably 
linked'. 
This ignorance was the result of 'the tradition of looking at the Far Eastern 
problems through European glasses': 
Under these circumstances the Institute's work seems more 
essential to the American public today than ever before. The 
American Council's close affiliation with a group of national 
councils ... constitutes an added obligation to press forward with its 
essential task.138 
Here, the -:entrality of the American Council, and of American interests 
and responsibility is strikingly demonstrated. In 1946, the IPR changed its 
name to the American Institute of Pacific Relations; symbolizing the 
virtual '.Tlerger between the ISIPR and the ACIPR which had been in 
defacto existence from the mid 1930s. 
National interests always held priority over any other cause at the IPR, 
and in war time, this priority became much clearer than before. Just like 
JCIPR members, IPR members in other countries were also nationalist in 
this crisis. Immediately after the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbour, 
Ray Wilbur, Chairman of the American Council again, anr;ounced: 
[T]he American Councils of the Institute of Pacific Relations must 
define the course ... in the emergency .... [T]he war situation, far 
from negating the purpose of the Council, lends new and crucial 
importanc~ to its program of study and widespread discussion of 
the issues at stake .... ThP, immediate job of the American people is 
138 Carter to Fosdick, 20 November, 1940, RFnA/1.1/200/351/ 4177, RA. 
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the prosecution of war against the military imperialism of Japan 
and the other Axis powers .... In su:·.port of this aim the American 
Council pledges its full resources. It is making available to all 
agencies, public and private, its libraries, its publications, and the 
service of its st? ff in meeting the unprecedented need for reliable 
information? J analysis.139 
The War boosted ';he status of the IPR tremendously particularly in the 
USA, and to a les:a~r extent in other coui.tries. Recognition of and 
demand for IPR works increased substantially.14° Governments and the 
public realized the importance of its work on little known, but important 
are· s. and made the existence of the IPR ind ;pensab1e. At the same time, 
be ca o.ise of its significance, it was mobilized for official duties. Although 
some staff resisted the shift of the entire office to Washington D. C.,141 the 
IPR founded a branch office there in 1940. Many staff and members of the 
ISI?R and the ACIPR worked for the government, and it became very 
official in its functions and personnel.142 
The situation wa_ similar in other countrh.-. Som~ members of the 
Australian Institute of International Affairs, the merged body of the 
Australian branches of the RUA and the IPR, worked in intelligence 
u;:encies for the government.143 In Britain, the headquarters of the RUA 
was moved to Oxford for intelligence work with other government 
departments,144 and a government grant was given to the RIIA.145 
139 R. L. Wilbur, 'The American Council and ll:e War,' 17 December, 1941, 
lU'nA/l.1/200/351/4178, RI\. 
140 The Rockefeller Foundation recorded at the end of 1942: 'The events of today re-
emphasize the value of the IPR'. Sales of the ACll'R's p ·b!ic.:.lions have increased 140 
percent in 1942. The IPR was seen a sole 'competent agency· Lo provide 'information and a 
comprehensive analysis of lhe problems of the Pacific'. [Resolution], 2 December, 1S!2, 
IU'nA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA. 
141 F. Field, From Rig/it to Left, p.125. 
142 The IPR has 'responded to heavy demands from Washington for advice and 
assistance,' and the office in wa,;hinglon was for 'maintaining a close liaison with 
government agencies'. [Resoluli'l~). 2 December, 1Q42, RFnA/1.1/200/351/4179, RA. The 
Office of War Information recruited staff of the ISIPR, such as W. Holland and 0. 
Lattimore. 
143 William Forsyth, 'The Pre-war Melbourne Group of the Australian lnslilule of 
International Affairs: Some Per50nal Recollections,' Australian Outlook, Vol.28, No.1 
(April, 1978), p.44. 
144 Cleeve Lo Carter, 30 March, 1940, and 22 April, 1940, CPR, Box 42/RllA 1939, IJLCU. 
145 Carter to Clcevc, 6 May, 1940, CPR, !lox 42/RllA 1939, BLCU. 
Members of the JCIPR also ·orked as admiP.istrators at public posts, 
assisting the war effort. 
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IPR conferences between 1939 to 1945 became unoaicial forums for the 
Allied countries.146 The IPR conference in 1936 was the last at which the 
agenda focussed main!y on economic issues, in which Japanese members 
participated, which was held on the Pacific Coast, < :\d which maintained 
the rhetoric of the 'unofficial' status of participants. Hitler's attack on 
Poland in September 1939 made the ISIPR's contact with the iCIPR 
difficult, as Japan had signed the Axis Treaty with Germany. Coupled 
with the disagreements over the Inquiry series, th·~ JCIPR did not attend 
the 'conference' at Virginia Beach in 1939. Due to this unu«ual situation, 
the gathering was called a 'study meeting', The JCIPR sull held a veto 
power over the decision of the Pacific Council meeting according to the 
Constitution, therefr·~~ it was decided that no formal meeting should take 
place in 1939. The veto power of the JCIPR was eliminated at the next 
conference in 1942.147 Ail these elements enabled the IPR forums to serve 
the interests of the Allied countries. 
The conferences in 1939-1945 were distinct in the fu1lowing ways: they 
were all held away f~am the Pacific coast; they mainly discussed strategi". 
issues; and they were attended by officials.148 The 1939 'meeting' was 
:nuch mc~e he·:~-. Uy focused on European developments due to the 
.::rcumstances 0f the ctay.149 The official el2ment was already strong in 
1939, and the 1942 conference was explicitly a meeting of governmer. · 
officials.ISO h. '942 and] 945, the issues of post-war reconstruction in the 
146 On the discussion topics, sec Arpendix A. 
147 P. Hooper ed., Re111e111beri11g t/Je IPR, Part One, pp.40-ll. 
148 Ibid., pp.46 and 66. Sec the list of attendants. 'Part VI: C- ,i!fcrcncc Membership,' in 
[The IPR ed.], War and Peace i;; the Pacific (New York: The ISI!'l.l, 1943), pp.15+-152, 
and' Appendix Ill: Conference Membership,' in !The IPR cJ.], Sc.arity ill t/Je Pacific 
~N~w York: The ISIPR, 1945), pp.149-161. 
14 P. Hooper ed., Re111e111beri11g t/Je IPR, !•art One, p.41. 
150 It did cause concern about 'official nature' of the conferences in this period. Bul it 
became an accepted practice. In 1943, the NSW branch of the Australian IIA noted: 'il 
secs no reason to stress unduly the need for complete independence from reasonable 
government assistance in the case of future delegations. All the other delcgatiuns at ~he 
conference were frankly sponsored by the governments'. 'Report of the Council of the 
NSW Branch lo the 14th Annual Meeting for the Year Ending June 30th 1943,' 26, July, 
1943, AHA P.ipers, GC. 
•• - .. ~. ·~ ·:~ •••• 1.·\. 
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'Far East' and t1:1e United Nations were discussed, and the IPR network 
was thought important by diplomats in influencing decisions on these 
issues in Washington D. C.151 Furthermore, the conference documents 
were now secret and prepared for the government, and were not generally 
?.vailable to the public.152 This meant increased power for the IPR and its 
forums, but iror.ically led to its decline after the war. 
Outside of these conferences, however, the war propaganda by the ACIPR 
was oriented to the wider public in the USA, and adult education took this 
form. The ACIPR provided many booklets on countries in the region, 
which were read by members of military forces and in schools. As many 
as 200,000 war-time pamphlets were distributed to the army.153 Not only 
seeking to propagat; · ccrrect' knowledge of Asia, the ACIPR also aimed to 
cultivate strategic, economic and social relations with other Allied 
countries such as Australia and New Zealand. The latter line was purs .ed 
by a pamphlet called "Meet the ANZAC". 
While determining the nature oi the post-wa- i.nternationalism of 
various orgauizations, the ~PR forums in th'.s period sav· the beginn ng of 
anti-colonialism in Asia. In order to achieve victory for the Allied Fe. rces, 
the support of countries in Asia wa<: :-:;·cial. Reflecting that thinking, u:-:" 
official forum organized by ihe IPR in i '142 included members from 
China, India, Netherlands Eastern Indi'2s, and the Philippines, who voiced 
the importance of abolishing white supremacy in Asia.154 This was an 
assertion of opposition to European colonial rule, the very base of the 
international order in the inter-war period. American members joined 
the attack on European colonialism at the conference'> of 1942 and 1945, 
annoying and often angering members from Brhain, France and 
151 Watt notn::: 'the increasingly official character' of the IPR: 'By far the greatest value 
of these meetings ... is in the contacts I mak" ~he IPR in this country is now in close 
contact with all relevant Embassies and' . "'i<inS, which regard the IPR's work of 
sufficient importance to make it desirab. t some official representative should 
attend its meetings'. Watt to Hod~c.-n, 1 Decc ·ber, 1943, M1942; 6, AA. 
152 Wall tP. · .sluck, Z8 December, 1'J43, M1942., ·., · .. 
153 'T11e !Pf' in War Time; 11 Augm.t, 1942, RFnA/1.1/WJ/350/4179, RA. 1~ ·. ·;he f.~rum ·.1.:i~ cFJ'ed Prinr.eton Conference whir.h tt;ok place in 28 February to 1 March, 
1942, and was atte.1ded by fifty-eight governmr.tt officials. JBK to JHW, 3 March, 1942, 
RFnA/1.1/200/350/-1179, RA. 
343 
Holland.155 They considered withdrawal from the IPR, and Holland 
suspects that the resignation of Carter from Secretary General was caused 
by the pressure from these groups.156 Thus, during WWII the existing 
trends within the IPR intensified. At the same time, however, WWII 
provided the opportunity for challenging the colonial framework, one of 
the features of the international order which had been uncritically 
accepted at the IPR. Another feature, the nation-state, however, remained 
unchallenged. 
155 P. Ha~pcr ed., Remembering tlie IPR, Pait One, pp. 4$--16 and 66. 
156 Ibid., p.67. 
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Conclusion 
What has emerged from this thesis is a shift of perspective within the IPR 
from 'regionalism' to 'globalism'. Although the IPR pioneered the 
creation of a region-oriented and relativist organization, as the period 
progressed, key administrative figures in the USA tried to make the IPR a 
world-oriented and more universalist org.anization. The move reflected 
their strong sense of a centre outside the Pacific, namely on the East Coast 
of the USA, a perception which became dominant in the discourse of 
international politics after WWII. 
The IPR was born in a context where the sense of centre was ambiguous 
because of the perception of the decline of Europe and the rise of the USA 
and Japan. These elements contributed to creating the dynamism and 
potential symbolized by the term the "Pacific At,e". The initiative of 
defining this new age was taken by Americans. Their proposal for new 
attitudes to the 'Orient' and the foundation of the IPR were born of this 
dynamism. Overlooking the colonial framework, the terminology the 
"Pacific community'' suggested equal partnership in the region. With this 
pz.radigm, the IPR achieved certain success at the first few conferences. 
The key to this success was the lack of a sense of strong centre among 
pa1tidpants. A crucial characteristic was their scepticism towards 
modernity, industrialization, materialism and individualism, which 
reflected a general awareness of political and economic crises in their own 
societies. They were conscious of an East-West dichotomy, and in this 
sense, they were Orientalist. But their Orient.:ilism was based on a sense of 
'difference' which did not necessarily imply the moral superiority of the 
'West'. As a result, at the first few conferences participants of Euro-
American background did not attempt to impose certain values and 
systems on the 'others'. At the same time, however, this sense of 
'difference' enhanced a strong sense of self. This kind of Orientalism, 
based on 'difference/, therefore, was not exerc' .d for purposes of 
domination in external politics, but cuntdbuted to the strengthening 
monolithic defini~ions of 'national' char::icter in domestic politics. 
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This limited success was soon undermined by an inability to challenge the 
assumptions of the colonial and the nation-state framework, and by the 
emergence of a strong centre In New York. A clear distin:::tion existed 
between the Orient with and without power, and the imagined Pacific 
'ommunity was a community of powers. This power structure meant 
that the issues concerning the Orient were not dealt with as a matter of the 
general principle of racial equality, but as a matter of specific inter-
governmen ta! policies. 
At the s<1:·.,1e time, the IPR lost its sense of regional-centrality. Despite the 
excitement in the first two conferences, the IPR did not contribute to the 
institutionalization of, or even initiate an agenda for, a Pacific 
community. Proposals for regional arrangements, such as a regional 
disarmament plan by an Australian member or a regional diplomatic 
arrangement suggested as an alternative to the League of Nations by 
Japanese members, did not gain much support or attention either at 
conferences or at the International Secretariat of the IPR (ISIPR). 
Symbolically ti.le ISIPR was moved to New Y'lrk against the aspirations of 
those who wished to keep it in the Pacific. Physically sharing an office 
with the American Council of the IPR, the ISIPR strengthened its 
American-centrality. This American centrality was intensified at IPR 
conferencec. in the 1930s and during WWII, and was apparent in the 
discussions of strategic issues ;:ver 'Far Ea~tern' conflicts and post-war re-
constructions in the 'Far East'. American centrality became dominant in 
the discoursi:: of international politics after WWII. 
'Globalists' in the IPR, the more world-oriented members and strong 
Wilsonians, did not question the nature of the 'international order'. 
While E. H. Carr argued in 1939 that the ir.ternational order meant the 
preservation of the status quo set by the dominant powers, a majority of 
IPR members accepted that the order' existed out there', and saw their role 
as being to defend that order and the League of Nations. As the thesis has 
demonstrated, however, the power structure of the international order 
was problematized at the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR). For those 
wl'.O supported t'fie dominant power structure, only certain kinds of 
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'nationalism' were a challenge to the structure. While the result of the 
Tokyo Tribunal after WWII determined the guilty image of Japanese 
'nationalists', they were 'gur .y' not only for Japanese military aggression 
in Asia, but more irr-0rtantly for challenging the 'existing' international 
order. In the 1930s, JC!PR members did not 'convert' to 'nationalism' 
from' internationalism'. From the beginning of internationalist 
movements in Japan, the duty of internationalists was to make Euro-
American powers understand Japanese policies: what they called the 
'Japanese perspective'. The IPR was an important tool for them to achieve 
that goal, and its significance increased, especially after the Ji._.1anese 
withdrawal from the League of Nations. Some JCIPR members, however, 
started to question the rationale of preserving the international order. 
The more reform-oriented JCIPR members were, the more sceptical they 
became of the status quo domestically and externally. And this led them 
to support the new order in East Asia, which Euro-American powers saw 
as a challenge to the' existing' international order. 
While the strong nation-state assumption posed a 'problem' for the JCIPR, 
the whole IPR assumed the existence of the nation-state system, and 
incorporated this system into its institution. The second Secretary General 
pursued this incorporation with particular enthusiasm, but it was also 
evident from the very start. The institution was ba5ed on national units, 
National Councils. Conferences and research programs were organized 
through National Councils. Although research programs posed common 
themes, they did not create transnational alliances concerning common 
interests. Instead, research was carried out independently by national 
groups, and a 'national perspective' was not only expected, but 
emphasized a11d valued. 
To support this nation-state basis further, national unity was assumed in 
the discourse at the IPR. The nation was personified in discussions, and 
monolithic 'national' cultures were constructed and rr:mforced. The 
complexity of domestic politics was often underL_ ~imated as a result. A 
~ense of' national' representation was strong among po;1rticipants, and this 
was related to the concepts of intellectual elite of the timf!, anci .J their 
sense rJ 'public' duty. Being members of the elite, participants believed in 
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their public service to the community, and the ultimate object of this 
service was their nation-state. While presenting a 'national' view did not 
necessarily mean presenting a governmental view, the former was often 
perceived as identical to the latter. Rather than being free individuals 
representing their own views, they represented national interests, and 
more precisely their government. This made the 'discussion' at IPR 
conferences and in Pacific Affairs an exercise of justification or criticism of 
governmental policies. Some did this voluntarily, and others, such as 
JCIPR members, were under closer supervision from the govern1 }ent. It 
was difficult to express' free individual' opinion, not only because of 
governmental control, but also because of the assumptions of the nation-
state in the operation at the IPR. 
While' globalist' trends became increasingly dominant within the IPR, the 
thesis has also suggested the significance of the role of the IPR in 
pioneering 'regionalist' perspectives in the inter-war period. This 
dimension of the IPR attracted thinkers whose visions were ahead of the 
times in their respective countries. For example, some Australian 
members of the IPR voiced the need for closer relations with the region, 
especially for trade relations with Japan, which was far-sighted, and was 
eventuated only in the 1950s. The IPR pioneered 'contemporary' Asian 
studies in the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France and Holland, 
as it did American studies in Japan and probably in China. It was a time 
when not many knew about 'contempor.-.ry' Asia, and few were interested 
in the subject. Some of the regional specialists read the native languages 
and understood the political, economic and social contexts of these 
countries through native sources. To see things in the local context, not 
from some centre far away from the region, was something to which the 
IPR, unlike many other institutions at the thie, contributed. While the 
IPR reflected and contributed to the dominant assumption-making in 
international politics, at the same time, it also prepared the ground to 
question 'Western' domination, and inevitably the colonial framework. 
Furthermore, the thesis has illuminat:.'d the implications of .ie IPR 
experiment as a 'non-governmental foreign affairs expertr organ>l:ation'. 
The IPR aimed to influence public opinion, which IPR members believed 
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to play a greater role in foreign policy making after WWI. It did not, 
therefore, aim to be a part of policy-making at the government. Nor did it 
aim to be a part of social movements. It concentrated on a small number 
of leading public figures, and provided' scientific data' in a hope that this 
would create a 'correct' understanding of foreign affairs among the public. 
In this sense, the IPR fulfilled its objectives, but at the same time, its 
influence was limited as a result of these objectives. 
Was there a place for thinkers in public affairs, as a Wilsonian, Zimmern, 
had argued in 1930? Did the IPR enhance the position of non-official 
thinkers in public affairs? The thesis has shown that the IPR promoted 
the position of thinkers by making them closer intellectually and 
institutionally to officials. Beside those who were interested in the region, 
the IPR attracted the type of thinkers who w~re ambitious for influence 
over policy-making. But power meant proximity to the government, and 
the IPR encouraged this proximity by focusing on strategic issues relevant 
to government policy. The "Inquiry" of Colonel House for the Paris Peace 
Conference marked the beginning of the promotion of non-official 
thinkers into policy-making in the USA. The "Inquiry" by the IPR 
intended to do the same, but while this effort to influence' American' 
foreign policy-making enhanced the power of the organization, it was also 
a cause of its decline after W1NII. 
The move to 'professionalize' the IPR as an organization of non-
governmental foreign affairs experts was clear in every step it took. Like 
other new professional organizations, the IPR emphasized scientific 
methods and objectivity. In the process, however, it abandoned the 
possibilities of promoting an issue-oriented structure, which could have 
led to transnational alliances. Women, religious groups, natural 
scientists, labour movement leaders and business people re-directed their 
activities into other organizations, and the IPR became more and more 
dominated by a type of male foreign affairs expert who often pursned a 
career aa a high official. This enhanced the nation-oriented, as opposed to 
issue-oriented, structure of the F'1.. This may have been due not only to 
IPR policies, but also to the national IT.·"bilization process in the context of 
the political and economic crisis of c:te 1930s. Issues com:erning working 
classes, women, religion and business were often suppressed under 
'national' interests, not only at international conferences, but also in 
domestic contexts. 
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The National Councils of the IPR had achieved status as authoritative 
commentators on regional affairs by the late 1930s, although the degree of 
this authority differed from one country to another. In order to utilize 
their expertise outside of the universities, these non-official regional 
experts at tli.e IPR had to wait for the Pacific War. The strength of non-
official specialist5 and their organizations depended on the nature of the 
national official bureaucracy and the magnitude of the crisis. Some JCIPR 
members were recruited in the 1930s to what is now called a 'think tank', 
and played a crucial role in policy-making until the end of 1940. This was 
a response both to the strong initiative of political ~aders and to the 
perception of crisis. In other countries, the urgent sense of crisis only 
emerged at the time of the break out of WWII. In the USA, the official 
bureaucracy was relatively open to non-official specialists, which led to the. 
controversial influence of the IPR in the war time. Australian members 
of the IPR exercised influence both as non-official public fig'lres and 
government bureaucrats. Outside of the universities, the expertise of IPR 
members was utilized almcst exclusively by the government, not by 
private enterprises. 
Zimmern argued that there was greater need to create opportunities for 
thinkers to participate in public affairs in internation<' organizations than 
in domestic ones, because in the nation-state, estilblished organizations 
already existed. The problem of the bureaucracy of the United Nations 
suggests that the days when outside expert thinkers had much influence 
over a small bureaucracy have gone. The thesis has s1 _:gested, however, 
that the IPR contributed to training not only national public servants, but 
also international public servants who went to the Le:igue of Nations, and 
later the United Nations and various IGOs and INGCs. The IPR 
co.,structed;,,intellectual and institutional paradigm for these people, as 
well as establishin5 ·.he pattern of their life styles. The thesis has not only 
demonstrated the historicity of the dominunt assumptions in the 
discourse of international politics, but has also illustrated this 
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construction of the intellectual and institutional paradigm of non-
governmental multinational organizations in the inter-war period, and 
the problems created by this paradigm. 
The arguments of this thesis were based on the documents of three 
countries only, and may not be applicable beyond these three countries. A 
study of the Chinese Council of the IPR has yet to be carried out, and will 
be fascinating because of the contrast with Japan as another Oriental 
power, and because of China's position in relation to the League of 
Nations and the international order, its relations with the USA and its 
domestic political, economic and social conflicts. 
Further studies are also needed to examine the historical and 
contemporary contexts of foreign affairs experts in Asia; their social and 
intellectual background, their positions in society and government, the 
degree of national mobilization, their attitudes to and perception of the 
'international community' and their relations to multinational 
organizations. Analysis of such domestic historical, political, economic 
and social contexts are vital for evaluating the implications of various 
regional and global arrangements in the region. 
Wilsonian dilemma largely remains intact. The nation-state system still 
presents the significant problem to current International Governmental 
Org, .1izations and INGOs. No such organization can be free from 
domestic political constrainb. The system is still problematic in terms of 
the role of non-official thinkers in international affairs. These thinkers 
need proximity to power in order to exert influenc"', and 'power' in most 
cases means the government. This proximity to the government often 
decreases their ability to criticize and initiate agendas in opposition to it. 
A possible solution to this dilemma may lie in the deconstruction of the 
assumption of the monolithic nature of the nation-state. In the inter-war 
period, the nation-state was perceived as absolute, and even after WWII 
this assumption was not challenged. In this framework, people were 
assumed to identify themselves ultimately with the nation-state. This 
attitude was strengthened in times of crisis. But nationality is not the only 
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form of identity. At any one time any individual belongs to several 
identity categories, such as gender, class, age or religion. One's identity 
can, therefore, be multi-layered. Alternatives to nation-based 
identification are not only possible, but also could be a crucial starting 
point for creating issue-oriented multinational projects and organizations. 
This would help free participants of multinational projects from 
representing coherent 'national' interests. IGOs and INGOs could then 
become more issue-oriented, rather than nation-oriented, and they would 
be better able to address a variety of needs and interests rather than only 
'national' interests. 
While practicality is important in such reforms of the status quo, the 
rethinking of certain assumptions v:hich are seen as absolutes in the 
status quo is the essential first step. Although it might create other 
boundaries, this would push people beyond existing intellectual and 
physical frontiers. 
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Appendix A 
IPR Conferences 
The First Conference 1925, 30 June-14 July Honolulu (USA) 
M;;'.n agenda: Immigration and inter-racial problems 
Round Table Discussions I: Immigration, Inter-racial relations, 
The role of religion and missionaries in 
inter-racial and international relations. 
Industrialization in the Far East, Custom, tariff 
and foreign loans, National economic policies 
throughout the Pacific, The government 
diplomatic organizations in the Pacific 
countries 
The Second 1927, 15-29, July Honolulu (USA) 
Main agenda: China's foreign relation$, Food and population 
Round Table Discussions: Tariff autonomy in China, Extra-territoriality in 
China, Foreign Concessions and settlements in 
China, Foreign missions and Pacific relations, 
Population and food supply, Industnalizat:on 
and foreign investment, Immigration and 
emigration in the Pacific, Diplomatic relations in 
the Pacific, International education and 
communication, The Pacific mandates, 
The future of the Institute 
The Third 1929, 23 October-9 November 
Kyoto Gapan) 
Main agenda: China's foreign relations and the Manchuiian issue 
Round ":able Discussions: The m3chine age and traditional culture, Food 
and population in the Pacific, Industrialization 
in the Pacific countries, China's foreign relations, 
The financial reconstruction of China, 
The problems of Mar. :huria, 
Diplomatic relations in the Pacific 
1 Because the topics of the Round Tables and Forums for the first conferences account for 
twenty seven, this list is a summary of these topics. From the second conference, the 
topics arc listed as they arc in the !Jrocccdings unless specified. 
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The Fourth 1931, 21 October-2 November 
Hangchow and Shanghai 
(China) 
Ma:n agenda: Economic relations i.- the Pacific 
China's economic develop:-- ent 
Round Table Discussions: Economic re1at11.ms in the Pacific, China's economic 
development, Political relations in the Pacific, China's 
internationo.l relations, Cultural relations in the Pacif'. 
The Fifth 1933, 14-26 August Banff ('~anada) 
Main agenda: Economic conflict and control in the Pacific 
Round Table Discussions: Econe;mic conflict and control, Shipping in the Pacific, 
Instability of currency, Differences of standards of living, 
Differences in labour standards, Japanese expansion, the 
United States recovery program, China's reconstruction 
program, Ottawa: A cooperative attempt at recovery, 
Economic conflict and public opinion 
The Sixth 1936, 15-29, August Yosemite (USA) 
Main agenda: Aims and results of social and economic policies in Pacif' ..:ountries 
Round Table Discussions2: Trade and trade rivalry between t'be USA and Japan, 
Factors affecting the recer.t industrial development of 
Japan, The resources and economic development of 
the Soviet Far East, The reconstruction movement 
in China, The working of diplomatic machinery 
in the Pacific 
The Seventh 1939, 18 November-2 December 
(Study meeting for the proposed Inquiry series Virginia Bea.:h (USA) 
Main agenda: The Far Eastern conflict 
Round Table Discussions: The position of Japan and China, 
Third partie~: in the Far Eas!.ern conflict, 
Possibilities of adjustment in the Far East 
2 Because the proceeding of 1933 conference was summarized under the categories of, not 
i>sucs, but countries, the main papers' titles arc listed here lo indicate the contents of the 
RrJund Table dis~ussions. 
. .'!. 
:.~~ 
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The Eighth 1942, 4-14 December Mont Treml•!ant (Canad•) 
Main agenda: Wartime and post-war cooperation of the United Nations in tLe 
Pacific and the Far East 
Round Table Discussions: United Nations C.:mperation in the Pacific 
Political military problems, Military-political problems, 
Economic problems, Social and demographic problems, 
(mainly focused on China, japan, Southeast Asia, 
and India) 
=======~================================================= 
The NinL'1 1945, 6-17, Januar/ Hot Springs (USA) 
Main agenda: Security in the Pacific 
Round Table Discussions: The future of Japan, Economic recovery and progress 
in Pacific countries, Cultural and race relations, 
"he future of dependent areas, Collective security 
The Tenth 1947, 5-20, September Stratford-on-Avon (Britain) 
Main agenda: Problems of economic reconstruction in the Far East 
Round Table Discussions: Japan and Korea, China, Southeast Asia and 
the Southwest Pacific, Agricultural improvement, 
Industrial development, International economic 
problems, Education and technology 
The Elevenfr..3 1950, 3-15, October 
Main agenda: National sm in the Far East 
Lachnow (India) 
The T\ relfth 1954 September-8 October Kyoto (Japan) 
Main agenda: problems of the ...ievelopment of liYing standard in the Far Ea5t 
The Thirteenth 1958, 3-12 February Laholl (Pakistan) 
Main agenda: Problems uf foreign relations in South Asia and East Asia 
3 Details of the following con~,--cn.:rs arc based on the information in Yamaoka Michio, 
'Daisankai Taiheiyo ka\gi \~'1?.9 nen) lo Nihon no taio,' Kenkya sliiriz11, Vol.28 (May, 
11991), p.193. 
1 ':o' .. (' •,i.). ~ ' ~\> 
' ... "'rt . . . 
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AppendixB 
Participant Countries for the IPR Conferences 
Year/No. of participants1 (No. of women2/No. of women in secreta-riat*3) 
1925/140 (14) Austral'.a 6 (1), Canada 7 (2), China 14 (3), Hawaii 29 (7), 
Japan 20 (4), Korea 8, New Zealand 11 (1), Philippine 3, 
USA 39 (6) 
2 fr1J.n Yl\.1CA in England and Geneva, and 1 from England 
1927 /136 (25) Australia 5 (I), Britain 14 (4), Canada 15 (2), China 14 (3), 
Hawaii 15 (2), Japan 18 (4), Korea 3 (1), New Zealand 5, 
Philippine 3, USA 44 (8) 
Observer League of Nations (LN), International labour Organization 
(ILO) 
1929/212 (35/ 4*) Austra'.'~ 11 (4), Britain 17 (2), Cana:.!a 34 (4/1*), 
China 31 (6), Japan 56 (4/2*), New Zealand 7 (3), 
Philippine 8 (3), USA 48 (9I1 *) 
Observer LN, ILO, France, Netherlands, USSR, Mexico 
1931/156 (26/8*) 
Australia 9 (5), Britain 31 (4), Canada 14 (2/1*), 
China 37 (5/2*), Japan 21 (1/1 *),New Zealand 6 (1), 
Philippine 6 (1I1 *), USA 32 (7 I 3*) 
Observer LN, ILO, Netherlands 
1933/176 (35/21 *) Australia 4 (2), Britain 2•1 (4/3*), Canada 43 (3/1 *), 
China 19 (5/2*), France 2, Japan 23 (3/3*), Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies 4(1I1 *),New Zealand 6 (1), 
Philippine 7('J /1 *),USA 44 (15/10*) 
Observer LN, ILO, International Studies Confei·ence of LN 
1 This figure exc\U,:," the International Secretarial of the IPR and observers 
2 This is based on the lists of the conferenc~ participanis. Since not all first names were 
irl•.uUfied in the lists, the number is lhe minimum and can be bigg.,r. 
3 !:". 
1
925 and 1927, there was no cal•!,•·"Y of secretaries in the participants lists. Also, evPn 
after 1929, some groups did not h:l'lc secretaries. 
1936/177 (28/16*) Australia 9 (2), Britain 22 (3/1*), Canada 27 (3/1*), 
China 21 (2/2*), France 5, Japan 22 (2/2*), Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies 6, New Zealand 5 (1), 
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Philippine 3 (1/1*), USA 54 (13/8*), USSR 3 (1/1*) 
Observer LN, ILO, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation 
1939/48 (5/4*) Australia 4, Canada 11 (1/1*), China 13 (1/1*), 
New Zealand 1, Philippine 4 (1/1*), USA 15 (2/1*) 
Observer LN, ILO, Rockefeller Fo:.mdation, Geneva Research Centre, 
France. India 
1942/131 (16/14*) 
Australia 4 (1), Britain 20 (4/3*), Canada 18 (1/1*), 
China 18 (3/3*), (Fighting) France 4, India 10 (1/1 *), 
Korea l, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies 13 (l / l *), 
New Zealand 3 (1 / l *), Philippine$ 4, Th:i.iland 2, 
USA 34 (4/4*) 
Observer LN, ILO, Carnegie Corporation, Rockefeller Foundatior. 
======================~=================================== 
1945/157 (20/20*) 
Australia 7, Britain 22 (2/2*), Canada 15 (1/1'), 
Chi11a 25 (4/ 4*), France 13, India 5, Korea 3, Netherlar.L~s­
Netherl;inds Indies 14 (1 / l *), New Ze<'.1:ind 2, 
Philippines 4, Thailand 3, USA 44 (12/12*) 
Observer LN, ILO, Rockefeller Foundation, United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration 
1947 /73 (7 / 4*) Australia 4, Britain 2;: ').), Canada 11 (1I1 *), China 8, 
France 3, New Zealand 3, USA 22 (4/3') 
Observer United Nations, Rockefeller Foundation, Burma, India, 
Korea, Netherlands-Netherlands Indies, Siam 
App~ntlixC 
Office Holders 
(I) The International Secretariat of the IPR (the ISIPR)1 
1925 
Executive Secretarv , 
1926-1929 
General Secretary 
Associate General Secretary 
Research Secretary 
Research Assistant 
1930-1933 
Merle Davis (US, H)2 
Charles Loomb (US, H) 
M. Davis (1926-1930) 
C. Loomis (1926-1929) 
John CondEffe (NZ) (1927-1931) 
William Holland (NZ) (1929-1931) 
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Acting General Secretary 
Acting Research Secretary 
Editor, Pacific Affairs 
C. Loomis (1929-1933) 
William Holland (1931-1933) 
Elizabeth Green (US, H) (1927-1933)3 
1933-1946 
Secre~ary General 
Research Secretary 
Editor, Pacific Affairs 
Conference Secretary 
Assistant Treasurer 
1946-1961 
Secretary-General 
Publication Secretary 
Edward Carter (US, E)"l (19:;3-1946) 
W. Holland (1933-1943) 
Owen Lattimore(US, E) (1933-1941) 
C. Loomis (1933) 
Hilda Austern (US, E) 
W. !+"llli\nd (1946-1961) 
Mary Healy 
1 Lists here arc based on the information in the procccdin~c; of the canfcrcnccs and 
correspondences, and therefore the precise ·~s of changes of positions arc al times 
unidentifiable. 
2 The USA, Honolulu b<.scd. 
3 In lv'.iay 1928, News Bulletin [of the IPR] was renamed as Pacific Affairs. 
4 The USA, East Coast based. 
~~~------~-------~a .. I 
(II) The Pacific Councils 
1925-1927 
Chairman 
Treasurer 
Other members 
1927-1933 
Chairman 
Treasurer 
Other members 
1933-(1935]7 
Chairman 
Treasurer 
Members 
Ray Wilbur (US, W)6 
Frank Atherton (US, H) 
Inoue Junnosuke (Japan) 
David Yui (China) 
Mungo McCallum (Australia) 
Robert Borden (Canada) 
Jam es Allen (NZ) 
Jerome Greene (US, E) (until 1932) 
F. Atherton 
Nitobe Inazo (Japan) 
Newlon Rowell (Canada) 
Frederic Eggleston (Australia) 
Lionel Curtis (Britain) 
D. Yui 
J. Allen 
Newton Baker (US) (from 1932) 
F. Atherton 
F. Egglestm:' 
Nitobe I. (until 1933) 
J. Allen 
N. Rowell 
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Hu Shih (China) 
Archibold Rose (Britain) 
L.P. Le C. De Bussy (Netherlands-
Netherlands Indies) 
Manuel ·Camus (Philippines) 
F. N. Petroff (USSR) 
5 Lists here arc also based on the information in the proceedings of the conferences and 
correspondences, and therefore, this list should be taken as a guidance, rather than the 
fact. 
6 The USA, West Coast based. 
7 The exact year is unide;-.tifiabi•!. 
[1935)-1936 
Chairman 
Other members 
1936-1939 
Chairman 
Treasurer 
Honorary Vice-Chairman 
Other members 
1939-1942 
Chairman 
Other members 
1942-1945 
Chairman 
Other members 
N. Baker 
F. Eggleston 
J.W. Dafoe (Canada) 
H. Shih 
A. Sarraut (France) 
Takayanagi Kenzo Gapan) 
H. Belshaw (NZ) 
C. Benitez (Philippines) 
A.V. Alexander (Britain) 
V.E. Motylev (USSR) 
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G.A Dunlop (Netherlands-NI) 
R.B. Anderson (Advisory Committee in 
Honolulu) 
J.W. Dafoe (Canada) (1936-1938) 
N. Baker 
F. Atherton 
F. Eggleston 
N. Rowell (1939) 
H. Shih 
R.L. Wilbur 
Ishii Kikujiro Ga pan) 
Philip Jessup (US, E) 
Jack Shepherd (Australia) 
Edgar Tarr (Canada) 
W.W. Yen (China) 
J. Condliffe (NZ) 
C. Osias (Philippines) 
Frederick Field (US, E) 
E. Tarr 
unknown 
1945-1947 
Chairman 
Vice-Chairman 
Other members 
Percy Corbett (Canada) 
R.J.F. Boyer (Australia) 
Chiang Mon-lin (China) 
Paul Pelliot (France) 
Francis Visman (Netherlands-NI) 
I. Clunies Ross (Austtalia) 
R.G. Gavell (C;-,nada) 
Paul Emile Naggiar (France) 
Jaime Herhandez (Philippines) 
E. Zhukov (USSR) 
Andrew McFadyean (Britain) 
Robert Sproul (US) 
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